MANPADS and Terrorism

Can terrorist entities easily obtain shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles and how are they achieving it? How is sensitive military technology leaking into the hands of those supposedly not in a position to take down modern aircraft? Did the overall shift of discussion aiming to shred more light into the guerilla type of asymmetric dominance terrorists have, excluded the real discussion of how MANPADS and night vision equipped fighters take lifes on a daily basis in the very sense of conventional warfare?

FAS analyst Matt Schroeder tries to answer these questions in a recently released publication entitled "Global efforts to control MANPADS" :

"Preventing the acquisition and use of man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) by terrorists and rebel groups has been a matter of concern since the early 1970s. However, despite the persistence of the threat MANPADS pose to aviation, it was the 2002 al-Qaeda attack on an Israeli civilian aircraft flying out of Mombassa, Kenya, that focused world attention on the issue. This introductory section continues by providing some basic information on the development and main types of MANPADS and their capabilities. Section II of this appendix gives an overview of the main threats posed by the weapon. Section III reviews efforts to control the weapon prior to the Mombassa attack, and section IV examines contemporary counter-MANPADS efforts. Section V presents some concluding observations and recommendations for further action."

Export controls, stockpile destruction, physical security and stockpile management practices, buy-back programmes, and active defence measures: airports and airliners are among the key topics discussed. Here's a related post on the topic "Video Shows Somali Insurgent with Sophisticated SA-18 Missile" as well.

Images courtesy of a MANPADS related article in the second issue of the Technical Mujahid E-zine.