The folks at Sucuri Security have posted an update on the reemergence of mass site compromises at Network Solutions, following last week's WordPress attack.
What has changed since last week's campaign? Several new domains were introduced, including new phone back locations, with the majority of new domains once again parked on the same IP as they were last week - 64.50.165.169 - AS15244, LUNARPAGES proxy aut-num for Lunarpages by MZIMA.
The exploitation chain of the currently embedded domain is as follows:
- corpadsinc.com/grep /?spl=3&br=MSIE&vers=7.0&s=
- corpadsinc.com /grep/soc.php
- corpadsinc.com /grep/load.php?spl=ActiveX_pack
- corpadsinc.com /grep/load.php?spl=pdf_2020
- corpadsinc.com /grep/load.php?spl=javal
- corpadsinc.com /grep/j2_079.jar
Detection rates for some of the obtained exploits:
- update.vbe - VBS:Encrypted-gen; Trojan-Downloader.VBS.Agent.yw - Result: 11/40 (27.5%)
- j2_079.jar - Exploit.Java.29; Exploit.Java.CVE-2009-3867.c; JAVA/Byteverify.O - Result: 5/40 (12.5%)
Responding to 64.50.165.169 - AS15244, LUNARPAGES proxy aut-num for Lunarpages by MZIMA are also:
binglbalts.com - Email: alex1978a@bigmir.net
corpadsinc.com - Email: alex1978a@bigmir.net
fourkingssports.com - Email: alex1978a@bigmir.net
networkads.net - Email: alex1978a@bigmir.net
mainnetsoll.com - Email: alex1978a@bigmir.net
lasvegastechreport.com
mauiexperts.com
mauisportsinsider.com
Upon successful exploitation from corpadsinc.com the campaigns drops load.exe - Trojan:Win32/Meredrop; Trojan.Win32.Sasfis.a (v) - Result: 7/40 (17.50%).
The sample load.exe also phones back to the following locations:
- nonstopacc.com/tmp /bb.php?v=200&id=130306319&b=7231522200&tm=8 - 188.124.16.95 - Email: alex1978a@bigmir.net
- nonstopacc.com/tmp /bb.php?v=200&id=130306319&tid=6&b=7231522200&r=1&tm=9
- 188.124.16.96 /blackout_dem.exe
Detection rate for blackout_dem.exe - Trojan-Dropper - Result: 7/40 (17.5%) which phones back to mazcostrol.com/inst.php ?aid=blackout - 188.124.16.103 - Email: alex1978a@bigmir.net.
Interestingly, the sample attempts to install a Firefox add-on in the following way:
- %ProgramFiles%\Mozilla Firefox\extensions\{8CE11043-9A15-4207-A565-0C94C42D590D}\chrome\content\timer.xul - MD5: 963136ADAA2B1C823F6C0E355800CE02 Detected by different vendors as IRC/Flood.gen.h or TROJ_BUZUS.ZYX;
It's also worth pointing out that the campaign's admin panel is pointing to a third-party -- cybercrime friendly IP that's currently offline -- corpadsinc.com/grep/stats.php -> HTTP/1.1 302 Found at 217.23.14.25, AS49981, WorldStream = Transit Imports = -CAIW.
The bottom line - although Network Solutions criticized the media last week, for blaming this on Network Solutions, or WordPress itself, the company should realize that for the sake of its reputation it should always use the following mentality - "protect the end user from himself" when offering any of its services.
Related WordPress security resources:
20 Wordpress Security Plug-ins And Tips To keep Hackers Away
11 Best Ways to Improve WordPress Security
20+ Powerful Wordpress Security Plugins and Some Tips and Tricks
This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter.
No comments:
Post a Comment