The exponential growth of mobile malware over the last couple of years, can be attributed to a variety of 'growth factors', the majority of which continue playing an inseparable role in the overall success and growth of the cybercrime ecosystem in general.
Tactics like standardization, efficiency-oriented monetization, systematic bypassing of industry accepted/massively adopted security measures like signatures-based antivirus scanning, affiliate networks helping cybercriminals secure revenue streams for their malicious/fraudulent tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), as well as pseudo legal distribution of deceptive software -- think scaware with long EULAs and ToS-es -- as well as mobile applications -- think subscription based premium rate SMS malware with long EULAs and ToS-es -- continue dominating the arsenal of tactics that any cybercriminal aspiring the occupy a market share in any market segment within the cybercrime ecosystem, can easily take advantage of in 2013.
What has changed over the last couple of years, in terms of concepts? A lot. For instance, back in 2007, approximately one year after I (publicly) anticipated the upcoming and inevitable monetization of mobile malware, the Red Browser started making its rounds, proving that I was sadly wrong, and once again, money and greed -- or plain simple profit maximization to others -- would play a crucial role in this emerging back then, cybercrime ecosystem market segment for mobile malware. Similar monetization attempts on behalf of cybercriminals, then followed, to further strengthen the ambitions of cybercriminals into this emerging market segment.
With "malicious economies of scale" just starting to materialize at the time, it didn't take long before the concept started getting embedded into virtually each and every cybercrime-friendly product/service advertised on the market. Thanks to Symbian OS dominating the mobile operating system at the time, opportunistic cybercriminals quickly adapted to steal a piece of the pie, by releasing multiple Symbian based malware variants. Sharing is caring, therefore, here are some MD5s from the Symbian malicious code that used to dominate the threat landscape, back then.
Symbian OS malware MD5s from that period of time, for historical OSINT purposes:
MD5: a4a70d9c3dbe955dd88ea6975dd909d8
MD5: 98f7cfd42df4a01e2c4f2ed6d38c1af1
MD5: 6fd6b68ed3a83b2850fe293c6db8d78d
MD5: 38837c60e2d87991c6c754f8a6fb5c2d
MD5: ace9c6c91847b29aefa0a50d3b54bac5
MD5: 3f1828f58d676d874a3473c1cd01a431
MD5: 2163ef88da9bd31f471087a55f49d1b1
MD5: 0a04f6fed68dec7507d7bf246aa265eb
MD5: ad4a9c68f631d257bd76490029227e41
MD5: 7a4639488b4698f131e42de56ceeb45d
MD5: fa3de591d3a7353080b724a294dca394
MD5: 5ba5fad8923531784cd06a1edc6e0001
MD5: 66abbd9a965b2213f895e297f40552e5
MD5: 92b069ef1fd9a5d9c78a2d3682c16b8f
MD5: a494da11f47a853308bfdb3c0705f4e1
MD5: 9f38eff6c58667880d1ff9feb9093dcb
MD5: a8a3ac5f7639d82b24e9eb4f9ec5981c
MD5: 0ebc8e9f5ec72a0ff73a73d81dc6807d
MD5: a3cd8f8302a69e786425e51467ad5f7c
MD5: 38837c60e2d87991c6c754f8a6fb5c2d
MD5: 522a8efdc382b38e336d4735a73e6b23
MD5: 052abb9b41f07192e8a02f0746e80280
MD5: 712a1184c5fc1811192cba5cc7feda51
MD5: bdae8a51d4f12762b823e42aa6c3fa0a
MD5: aec4b95aa8d80ee9a57d11cb16ce75ba
MD5: 6b854f2171cca50f49d1ace2d454065a
MD5: 945279ce239d2370e4a65b4f109b533b
MD5: cde433d371228fb7310849c03792479e
MD5: 957265e799246225e078a6d65bde5717
MD5: cde433d371228fb7310849c03792479e
MD5: 1f1074b709736fe4504302cbc06fd0f6
MD5: 1cd241a5ea55eb25baf50af25629af27
MD5: 60d9a75b5d3320635f9e33fe76b9b836
MD5: e23f69eea5fa000f259e417b64210d42
MD5: 36503b8a9e2c39508a50eb0bdbb66370
MD5: 1f1074b709736fe4504302cbc06fd0f6
MD5: da13e08a8778fa4ea1d60e8b126e27be
MD5: 642495185b4b22d97869007fcbc0e00f
MD5: 9af5d82f330bbc03f35436b3cc2fba3a
MD5: 6099516a39abb73f9d7f99167157d957
MD5: 6c75b3e9bf4625dc1b754073a2d0c4f1
MD5: e23f69eea5fa000f259e417b64210d42
MD5: ffb37b431ed1f0ac5764b57fa8d4cced
MD5: 1cd241a5ea55eb25baf50af25629af27
MD5: b3055e852b47979a774575c09978981a
MD5: 9f38eff6c58667880d1ff9feb9093dcb
MD5: 945279ce239d2370e4a65b4f109b533b
MD5: 66a0bbebbe14939706093aa5831b53a7
MD5: 30a2797f33ecb66524e01a63e49485dd
MD5: 785e921ea686c2fc8514fac94dd8a9cd
MD5: 69a68bdcbad227d5d8d1a27dd9c30ce7
MD5: f246b101bc66fe36448d0987a36c3e0a
MD5: 4fd086a236c2f3c70b7aa869fa73f762
MD5: 642495185b4b22d97869007fcbc0e00f
MD5: fd8b784df4bbb8082a7534841aa02f0e
MD5: 3ee70d31d0a3b6fab562c51d8ff70e6d
MD5: 3381d21f476d123dcf3b5cbc27b22ae1
MD5: 006b32148ce6747fddb6d89e5725573e
MD5: 7a4639488b4698f131e42de56ceeb45d
MD5: b9667e23bd400edcafde58b61ac05f96
MD5: 12527fd41dd6b172f8e28049011ebd05
MD5: c9baecb122bb6d58f765aaca800724d2
MD5: 799531e06e6aa19d569595d32d16f7cc
MD5: e301c2135724db49f4dd5210151e8ae9
MD5: 29d7c73bd737d5bb48f272468a98d673
In 2013, we can easily differentiate between the botnet building type of two-factor authentication bypassing mobile trojans, and the ubiquitous for the market segment, subscription based premium rate SMS malware, relying on deceptive advertising and successful 'visual social engineering' campaigns. The second, continue getting largely monetized through one of the primary growth factors of the mobile market segment, namely, affiliate networks for mobile malware.
In this post, I'll profile what can be best described as a sophisticated, customer-ized, customization and efficiency oriented, API-supporting, DIY mobile "lab" for generating, managing and operating multi-mobile-operating systems type of mobile malware campaigns. The service's unique value proposition (UVP) in comparison to that of competing "labs" for managing, operating and converting mobile traffic -- acquisition and selling of mobile traffic is a commoditized underground market item in 2013 -- orbits around the feature rich interface, offering 100% customization, monitoring and generally operating the campaigns, while efficiently earning fraudulently obtained revenue from unsuspecting mobile device users.
Sample screenshots featuring the administration panel of an affiliate network participant:
Sample "system" domains used for hosting/rotating the generated mobile malware samples courtesy of the service:
jmobi.net - 91.202.63.75
omoby.net - 91.202.63.75
rrmobi.net - 91.202.63.75
moby-aa.ru - 91.202.63.75
mobyc.net - 91.202.63.75
mobi-files.com - 91.202.63.75
mobyw.net - 91.202.63.75
mobyy.net - 91.202.63.75
mobyc.net - 91.202.63.75
mobyz.net - 91.202.63.75
Known to have responsed to the same IP are also the following malicious domains:
doklameno1.ru
doklameno2.ru
downloadakpinstall.ru
mobiy.net
moby-aa.ru
moby-ae.ru
mobyc.net
mobyw.com
mobyw.net
mobyy.net
mobyz.net
omoby.net
rrmobi.net
system-update.ru
telefontown.pp.ua
Sample Web sites serving multi-mobile-operating-system premium rate mobile malware, relying on the service:
Samples generated and currently distributed in the wild using the service:
MD5: ac69514f9632539f9e8ad7b944556ed8 - detected by 15 out of 48 antivirus scanners as HEUR:Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Stealer.a
MD5: e62f97a095ca15747bb529ee9f1b5057 - detected by 2 out of 45 antivirus scanners as Java.SMSSend.780; J2ME/TrojanSMS.Agent.DX
MD5: 0688dac2754cce01183655bbbe50a0b1 - detected by 2 out of 46 antivirus scanners as Java.SMSSend.780; J2ME/TrojanSMS.Agent.DX
MD5: 4062a77bda6adf6094f4ab209c71b801 - detected by 2 out of 44 antivirus scanners as Java.SMSSend.780; J2ME/TrojanSMS.Agent.DX
MD5: 42a6cf362dbff4fd1b5aa9e82c5b7b56 - detected by 2 out of 45 antivirus scanners as Java.SMSSend.780; J2ME/TrojanSMS.Agent.DX
MD5: 3bcbe78a2fa8c050ee52675d9ec931ad - detected by 2 out of 46 antivirus scanners as Java.SMSSend.780; J2ME/TrojanSMS.Agent.DX
MD5: 53d3d35cf896938e897de002db6ffc68 - detected by 2 out of 47 antivirus scanners as Java.SMSSend.780; J2ME/TrojanSMS.Agent.DX
MD5: 2f66735b37738017385cc2fb56c21357 - detected by 2 out of 46 antivirus scanners as Java.SMSSend.780; J2ME/TrojanSMS.Agent.DX
MD5: 0ec11bba4a6a86eb5171ecad89d78d05 - detected by 2 out of 47 antivirus scanners as Java.SMSSend.780; J2ME/TrojanSMS.Agent.DX
MD5: 9f059c973637f105271d345a95787a5f - detected by 2 out of 45 antivirus scanners as Java.SMSSend.780; J2ME/TrojanSMS.Agent.DX
MD5: f179a067580014b1e16900b90d90a872 - detected by 2 out of 47 antivirus scanners as Java.SMSSend.780; J2ME/TrojanSMS.Agent.DX
MD5: aef4f659943cbc530e4e1b601e75b19e - detected by 2 out of 46 antivirus scanners as Java.SMSSend.780; J2ME/TrojanSMS.Agent.DX
MD5: 8a00786ed6939a8ece2765d503c97ff8 - detected by 2 out of 45 antivirus scanners as Java.SMSSend.780; J2ME/TrojanSMS.Agent.DX
MD5: 868fcf05827c092fa1939930c2f50016 - detected by 2 out of 45 antivirus scanners as Java.SMSSend.780; J2ME/TrojanSMS.Agent.DX
MD5: a6ef49789845ed1a66f94fd7cc089e1b - detected by 2 out of 47 antivirus scanners as Java.SMSSend.780; J2ME/TrojanSMS.Agent.DX
MD5: 22aa473772b2dfb0f019dac3b8749bb6 - detected by 2 out of 45 antivirus scanners as Java.SMSSend.780; J2ME/TrojanSMS.Agent.DX
MD5: 52b74046d0c123772566d591524b3bf7 - detected by 2 out of 46 antivirus scanners as Java.SMSSend.780; J2ME/TrojanSMS.Agent.DX
MD5: bbff61a2e3555a6675bc77621be19a73 - detected by 2 out of 46 antivirus scanners as Java.SMSSend.780; J2ME/TrojanSMS.Agent.DX
Cybercrime-friendly affiliate networks continue, and will continue to represent a major driving factor behind the growth of any market segment within the cybercrime system, as they result in a win-win-lose scenario for their operations, participants and the potential victims of the fraudulent/malicious propositions/releases courtesy of these networks. With mobile traffic acquisition available on demand based on any given preference a potential could have, cybercriminals would continue converting it into victims, cashing in on their overall lack of awareness of the TTPs of today's modern cybercriminals.
This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter.
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