Fake Adobe Flash Player Serving Campaign Utilizes Google Hosting/Redirection Infrastructure, Spreads Across Facebook

What "better" time to spread malicious "joy", then during the Holidays? Cybercriminals are still busy maintaining a fake Adobe Flash Player serving, Facebook spreading campaign, which I originally intercepted during the Holidays, utilizing Google redirectors/hosting services. Despite the modest -- naturally conservative estimate -- click-through rate (45,000 clicks) compared to that of the most recently profiled similar Febipos spreading campaign, which resulted in over 1 million clicks, the campaign remains active, and continues tricking users into installing the rogue Adobe Flash Player, resulting in the continued spread of the campaign, on the Facebook Walls of socially engineered users.

Let's dissect the campaign, expose its infrastructure/command and control servers, and provide MD5s of the served malware.

Spamvertised Facebook URL+redirection chain: hxxp://goo.gl/QeshtO; hxxp://goo.gl/vVbrHp; hxxp://goo.gl/0oSJ7z; hxxp://goo.gl/38qIq8; hxxp://goo.gl/QNQhc5 -> hxxps://9dvme0lk2r0osqg3qb3rlk95z.storage.googleapis.com/q1fwum32gld35iab9d2u4o35bjsvhjhu309.html?ref=12 -> hxxp://goo.gl/wKXme1 -> hxxp://www.i-justice.org/g-o-27312-gooenn.html
(94.23.166.27) -> hxxp://f3c47a0d01f3ec343f57-2ba5bba9317af81ae21c42000295a455.r9.cf4.rackcdn.com/24471bmbqv07595?ref=27312&aff_sub=27312&sub_id=27312 -> hxxp://www.eklentidunyasi.com/dl.php (176.31.2.155) or hxxp://www.agentofex.com/dl.php (176.227.218.99; www.puee.in) ->
hxxp://docs.google.com/uc?export=download&id=0B6DFdqpSFDAlSmpsTkZkT2hvN28 or hxxps://doc-0g-4o-docs.googleusercontent.com/docs/securesc/ha0ro937gcuc7l7deffksulhg5h7mbp1/7fbm9gn67t8t18r8etd00juf0rvmrrmh/1387836000000/16300082901287672546/*/0BzU3dARQGry0TlMxN3F2STN0Z3M

GA Account ID: UA-36486228-1

Detection rate for the served malware: MD5: 30118bec581f80de46445aef79e6cf10 - detected by 33 out of 48 antivirus scanners as Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Blocker.dbud.

Once executed, the sample phones back to:
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/control8.txt
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/NewFile0008.exe
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/version.txt
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/list.txt
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/list.txt
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/buflash.xpi
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/bune10.zip
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/private/sandbox_status.php
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/extFiles/yok.txt

The files were offline in time of processing of the sample.

Related MD5s for the same served fake Adobe Flash Player:
MD5: 61f5af5d0067ea8d10f0764ff3c82066
MD5: 80b9ef43183abdd5b22482bc1cea7b36
MD5: 2da7cb838234eebbca3115fcafd6f513
MD5: 40ae8d901102ee3951c241b394eb94e9
MD5: 30118bec581f80de46445aef79e6cf10
MD5: 2de9865032e997d59c03bfd8435f1ada
MD5: fce013bec7b3651c100b6887c0a12eee

Once executed, MD5: fce013bec7b3651c100b6887c0a12eee phones back to:
hxxp://176.227.218.99/extFiles/control17.txt
hxxp://176.227.218.99/extFiles/NewFile00017.exe
hxxp://46.163.100.240/NewFile00017.exe
hxxp://176.227.218.99/NewFile00017.exe
hxxp://176.227.218.99/extFiles/extFiles/version.txt
hxxp://176.227.218.99/extFiles/extFiles/list.txt
hxxp://176.227.218.99/extFiles/extFiles/buflash.xpi
hxxp://176.227.218.99/extFiles/extFiles/bune10.zip

Files remain offline in the time of processing of the sample.

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter.