I wrote this post in 2007.
It all started with the basic speculation that a superpower should aim to physically bomb the source of the cyber attack.
Here are some thoughts:
- physically bomb the source of the attack is not a metaphor, its an indication of the wrongly understood situational awareness
- install a hxxp://makelovenotspam.com type of screensaver on each and every U.S government PC, have it periodically obtain the last list of hosts to be attacked, obtained from a central Target List repository
- if the U.S is to attack those attacking the U.S, a third party interested in taking advantage of the U.S's bandwidth and know-how would easily make it look like someone else is attacking the U.S and have the U.S attack the third party enemies
- the myth of lining up your army, and waiting for the other army to appear at a particular battlefield doesn't exist in a cyber guerilla information warfare, where you're the visible target, and your enemy is everywhere.
- each and every of the comments regarding the stereotyped type of adversary talk like the adversary has a home address, physical headquarters
- there's no physical location to be bombed, there's no IP to be DDoS-ed since it's not theirs, there's no home PC of the commander to take control of.
The bottom line, some of the most insightful and visionary for decades to come cyber warfare research papers I've ever read, were written by U.S army researchers. However, as if pretty much everything else in life, those who don't know are usually the one holding up the positions where they're supposed to know more than everyone, and exactly the opposite.
Stay tuned!
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