Independent Contractor. Bitcoin: 15Zvie1j8CjSR52doVSZSjctCDSx3pDjKZ Email: dancho.danchev@hush.com OMEMO: ddanchev@conversations.im | OTR: danchodanchev@xmpp.jp | TOX ID: 2E6FCA35A18AA76B2CCE33B55404A796F077CADA56F38922A1988AA381AE617A15D3D3E3E6F1
Saturday, July 31, 2021
Personally Identifiable Information Regarding Various Internationally Recognized Cyber Threat Actors - A 2021 Compilation - Free Download!
Inquiry About My Disappearance Circa 2010 in Republic of Bulgaria and Possible Local Police Offers Kidnapping Attempt Report - An Analysis
Thursday, July 29, 2021
Dancho Danchev's "Personally Identifiable Information Regarding Various Internationally Recognized Cyber Threat Actors - A 2021 Compilation" Report Available! Request a Free Copy Today!
This is Dancho. Are you a security researcher OSINT analyst threat intelligence analyst or LE officer or member of a security organization or a vendor that wants to catch up with some of the latest developments in the world of cyber threat actor attribution?
UPDATE: Here's the actual link.
I've just finished working on my 2021 compilation entitled "Personally Identifiable Information Regarding Various Internationally Recognized Cyber Threat Actors" which is available on request for free to blog readers who drop me a line at dancho.danchev@hush.com seeking access to the report. Grab a copy today!
Stay tuned!
Tuesday, July 27, 2021
Two Persons on the U.S Secret Service Most Wanted Cybercriminals List Run a Managed Android Malware Enterprise Including a Black Energy DDoS Botnet - An OSINT Analysis
Thursday, July 22, 2021
Recommended Song of the Day!
I've decided to share a high-profile and recently track with everyone to keep the spirit of the scene and the industry and to basically empower you to do your work more efficiency. Keep up the good work!
Stay tuned!
Exposing a Currently Active WannaCry Ransomware Domains Portfolio - An OSINT Analysis for WhoisXML API
Exposing a Currently Active Cyber Jihad Domains Portfolio - An OSINT Analysis for WhoisXML API
Exposing a Currently Active Domain Portfolio Managed and Operated by Members of the Ashiyane Digital Security Team - An OSINT Analysis for WhoisXML API
Who's Behind the Conficker Botnet? - An OSINT Analysis for WhoisXML API
Using Maltego and WhoisXML API's Real-Time and Historical WHOIS Database to Profile A Currently Active CoolWebSearch Domains Portfolio - An OSINT Analysis for WhoisXML API
Exposing a Currently Active NSO Spyware Group's Domain Portfolio - An OSINT Analysis for WhoisXML API
Exposing a Currently Active Domain Portfolio of Currently Active High-Profile Cybercriminals Internationally - An OSINT Analysis for WhoisXML API
Monday, July 12, 2021
Profiling "Nedasites" - A DDoS Attack Tool Campaign Aiming to Target Iran Prior to the 2009 Election - An OSINT Analysis
In this post I'll provide actionable intelligence and discuss in-depth the campaign including the actual tool and provide the actual list of targeted URLs including the actual MD5 for the malicious DDoS tool and discuss in-depth the actual crowd-sourcing DDoS campaign which was originally lauched during the 2009 election in Iran.
It appears that back in 2009 a tiny group of folks including companies actually organized an online spree to help and support Iran's activists and protestors with technologies and access to free service which basically violates the law and should be considered a dangerous precendent in the context of assisting Iran-based activists and protestors. Therefore I've decided to take a deeper look inside the trend that took place internationally back in the 2009 Iran-based election and offer practical and relevant technical and actionable intelligence information on the actual infrastructure behind the campaign including its participants.
Related domains and URLs known to have been involved in the campaign:
https://lxkghnyg2owy6scd.onion
http://iran.whyweprotest.net/
http://haystack.austinheap.com/
http://www.haystacknetwork.com/
http://iproxyiran.tk/
http://iranpetitie.wordpress.com/
https://davepack.net/retweetforiran.html
https://iranfree.cryptocloud.net/
http://servers-info.com/
MD5: 25bc5507934756a836e574e9b43f8b3a - Detection rate
Sample official download location of the actual DDoS application:
https://sites.google.com/site/nedasites
Sample targeted URLs and domains list:
http://keyhannews.ir
http://www.iran-newspaper.com
http://www.irna.com
http://www.irna.ir
http://www2.irna.com
http://www5.irna.com
http://www.irna.net
http://www.tabnak.com
http://www.farsnews.com
http://english.farsnews.com
http://shahabnews.com
http://www.rajanews.com
http://www.khamenei.ir
http://www.ahmadinejad.ir
http://www.gerdab.ir
http://www.bornanews.com
http://www.bornanews.ir
http://www.leader.ir/langs/en
http://www.president.ir/fa/
http://www.mod.ir
http://www.isna.ir
http://www.justice.ir
http://www.presstv.ir
http://www.police.ir
http://mfa.gov.ir
http://sahandnews.com
http://www.farsnews.net
HAMSEDA.IR -- theplanet.com
HAMSHAHRIONLINE.IR -- cogentco.com
AYANDENEWS.COM -- theplanet.com
ASRIRAN.COM -- theplanet.com
SHIA-NEWS.COM -- theplanet.com
SHAFAF.IR -- theplanet.com
SIBNA.IR -- theplanet.com
SAYENEWS.COM -- theplanet.com
KAYHANNEWS.IR -- theplanet.com
RESALAT-NEWS.COM -- iweb.com
DEILAMNEWS.COM -- iweb.com
KHORASANNEWS.COM -- abac.com
JAHANNEWS.COM -- theplanet.com
JARASNEWS.COM -- theplanet.com
POOLNEWS.IR -- theplanet.com
PARSINE.COM -- theplanet.com
BUSHEHRNEWS.COM -- theplanet.com
TEBNA.COM -- theplanet.com
IWNA.IR -- theplanet.com
ALBORZNEWS.NET -- theplanet.com
ERAMNEWS.IR -- theplanet.com
AYANDENEWS.COM -- theplanet.com
JOMHOURIESLAMI.COM -- iweb.com
Something else that's also worth emphasizing on in terms of the Iran 2009 election is that the U.K's GCHQ has also been busy attempting to track down protestors including activists and has been busy working on an election specific and GCHQ owned URL shortening service which I managed to profile and expose here including the following still active Twitter accounts and URLs known to have been involved in the GCHQ campaign to monitor and track down Iran 2009 election protesters and activists:
https://twitter.com/2009iranfree
https://twitter.com/MagdyBasha123
https://twitter.com/TheLorelie
https://twitter.com/Jim_Harper
https://twitter.com/angelocerantola
https://twitter.com/recognizedesign
https://twitter.com/akhormani
https://twitter.com/FNZZ
https://twitter.com/GlenBuchholz
https://twitter.com/enricolabriola
https://twitter.com/katriord
https://twitter.com/ShahkAm147
https://twitter.com/Pezhman09
https://twitter.com/jimsharr
https://twitter.com/blackhatcode
Stay tuned!
Sunday, July 11, 2021
Upcoming Personal Memoir - Pre-Orders Accepted!
Free Chapter - Upcoming Personal Memoir!
Friday, July 09, 2021
Historical OSINT - An Analysis of the South Korean/U.S DDoS Attacks Circa 2009
During the last couple of days, I was getting harder to resist not publishing some of literally moronic commentary on the DDos attacks, thankfully not made
by people I know in person or virtually. From the "we know they did it but we don't have data to prove it", to the very latest and most disturbing commment
by a U.S intelligence
Why disturbing? Because that's exactly what the person -- controversial to the common wisdom you don't need a team to launch this old school amateur-ish http
request flooder --
Key summary points:
- if such a small botnet with such a noisy and amateur-ish request flooder can shutdown the U.S FCC for days, I wonder what would have happened to the rest
of the sites in the target list if the size of the botnet and sophistication of DDoS techniques improved
Let me continue in this line of thought - or they secretly brainwash the Teletubies and infiltirate he hearts and minds of children across the globe, a future
generation of pro-North Korean youngerts. Or they could secretly become a Russian Business Network franchise, now try sending an abuse notice to the non-existent
North Korean ISPs. They could,
The Web is abuzz with news reports regarding the ongoing DDoS (distributed denial of service attack)
The attacks which originally took off in the 4th of July weekend, target 26 Sourth Korean and American government sites and financial institutions.
The W32.Dozer comes in the form of an email attachment
Upon execution the trojan attempts to download the list of targets from three apparently compromised servers based in Germany, the U.S and Austria.
213.23.243.210 - Mannesmann Arcor Telecommunications AG & Co
216.199.83.203 - FDN.com
213.33.116.41 - Telekom Austria Aktiengesellschaft
75.151.32.182
92.63.2.118
75.151.32.182
202.14.70.116
201.116.58.131
200.6.218.194
163.19.209.22
122.155.5.196
newrozfm.com
text string “get/China/DNS
The word china within the malware code, the
http://www.virustotal.com/analisis/7dee2bd4e317d12c9a2923d0531526822cfd37eabfd7aecc74258bb4f2d3a643-1247001891
http://www.virustotal.com/analisis/1d1814e2096d0ec88bde0c0c5122f1d07d10ca743ec5d1a3c94a227d288f05a7-1246990042
http://www.virustotal.com/analisis/7c6c89b7a7c31bcb492a581dfb6c52d09dffca9107b8fd25991c708a0069625f-1246990249
http://www.virustotal.com/analisis/f9feee6ebbc3dc0d35eea8bf00fc96cf075d59588621b0132b423a4bbf4427d4-1247006555
Tuesday, July 06, 2021
Thanks, But no Thanks!
Following a series of successful data mining and OSINT enrichment successes in the face of OSINT and Law Enforcement operation called "Uncle George" including my recent attempt to take down approximately 3,000 ransomware emails which was quite a success including the recent and ongoing publication of various compilations of currently active high-profile cybercriminal email addresses and XMPP/Jabber accounts I had the privilege to get several of my blog posts censored and basically taken offline courtesy of Google which is actually good news in the face of the basic news that I'm currently sitting have been and will continue to be sitting on a treasure trove of threat intelligence and cyber attack attribution information on current and emerging cyber threats including to get actual legal threats from various individuals who appear to have been busy closing down their Twitter and Facebook accounts including LinkedIn accounts meaning quite a success for the actual data mining and technical collection process where the ultimate goal here would be to assist U.S Law Enforcement and the U.S Intelligence Community on its way to track down and prosecute the cybercriminals.
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It's been a privilege and an honor to serve everyone's needs for approximately 12 years as an independent contractor running this blog where I've actually had the chance to meet and actually get to know some of the security industry's leading companies and actual folks working within the security industry and it will continue to be a privilege and an honor to know and work with them in the future.
What's next? Always feel free to approach me at my dancho.danchev@hush.com where you can direct your "keep up the good work" "keep it cool" and "keep up the good spirit" including to actually inquire about my expertise and how I can jump on board on your cybercrime research and threat intelligence including OSINT research and analysis project in terms of fighting cybercrime.