Largely ignoring its real life applicability, a vendor of "email marketing" tools continues the development of a DIY spamming tools, whose features greatly evolved throughout the last couple of years. Originally released in 2004, the vendor appears to have been actively improving the real-time metrics of the campaigns, next to building interactivity into the spamming process through the WYSIWYG editor.
For better or worse, despite that these applications are empowering spammers and lowering down the entry barriers into spamming, the tools have gotten largely replaced by the increasing number of managed spamming services, whose quality assurance features of bypassing spam filters act as a main differentiation factor. Here are some of this tool's features :
"- High speed distribution - 200,000 letters per hour.
- Contains an embedded SMTP server that allows you to send letters directly to the recipient's mailbox without using your provider's SMTP server.
- If you are accessing the Internet via modem, and distribution using the SMTP server, you do not fit - also allowed to send mail through any number of remote SMTP servers (relay), or via SMTP server provider.
- Support for SMTP authentication.
- Supports up to 500 concurrent streams to send to each mailing.
- Automatic caching DNS requests to speed up distribution and reducing the load on the DNS server.
- Ability to run multiple independent shots at the same time.
- Ability to suspend delivery and continue later with a point.
- All modes distribution - TO, CC, BCC and PersonalCopy. In the latter case, the program generates a personal letter to each recipient.
- Ability to specify the size of BCC package regimes TO, CC, and BCC.
- Ability to specify the TO: field for mailing regimes and CS BCC.
- Full emulation signature letters Outlook Express to increase cross-your-mails through spam filters.
- Support for distribution via a proxy server.
- Automatically detect the bad (non-existent) and not by E-Mail addresses directly in the process of distribution based on a flexible, user SMTP rules. Thanks SMTP rules achieved a very precise definition of bad addresses virtually no false positives.
- Ability to create lists of addresses, depending on the specific responses of remote servers for SMTP commands.
- Organize automatically subscribe / unsubscribe to the mailing addresses.
- Perform any processing of existing lists.
- Develop a letter to the powerful WYSIWYG Html editor.
- Automatically apply to each recipient by name, as well as paste in a letter to a specific, personalized information through powerful Mail Merge templates.
- Set the calendar to automatically launch shots at the right time.
- Quickly send out mail."
With managed spam services' on-demand, risk forwarding and completely outsourced processes, they're not only going to replace such DIY tools, but also, position them as a dynamically evolving cybercrime platforms.
Independent Contractor. Bitcoin: 15Zvie1j8CjSR52doVSZSjctCDSx3pDjKZ Email: dancho.danchev@hush.com OMEMO: ddanchev@conversations.im | OTR: danchodanchev@xmpp.jp | TOX ID: 2E6FCA35A18AA76B2CCE33B55404A796F077CADA56F38922A1988AA381AE617A15D3D3E3E6F1
Wednesday, October 29, 2008
Pseudo Email Marketing Tools Empowering Spammers
Independent Security Consultancy, Threat Intelligence Analysis (OSINT/Cyber Counter Intelligence) and Competitive Intelligence research on demand. Insightful, unbiased, and client-tailored assessments, neatly communicated in the form of interactive reports - because anticipating the emerging threatscape is what shapes the big picture at the end of the day. Approach me at dancho.danchev@hush.com
Tuesday, October 28, 2008
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Eleven
The following portfolio of fake security software appear to have been integrated within traffic redirection doorways during the weekend, consequently redirecting hundreds of thousands of users acquired from blackhat hat SEO, malvertising, email spam and SQL injections, to non-existent security vendors and their non-existent security products. Here's an excerpt from one of the templates that they're using :
"Since its first establishement in 2001, Antivirus V.I.P consistently maintained its position as one of the world's leading companies in antivirus research and product development. Antivirus V.I.P is known mostly for Antivirus V.I.P, its powerful mix of Anti-Malware, Anti-Virus, Anti-Trojan, Anti-Backdoor, Anti-Worm and Anti-PornoDial in one program. Antivirus V.I.P scans and removes trojans and other malware, which can be placed on a computer without the owner's knowledge.
Antivirus V.I.P is a powerful and easy-to-use Trojan horses, Viruses and all types of Malware removal software, which detects and eliminates more than 100'000 Trojan Horses and Spywares. It also detects viruses, trojans, worms, spyware, malicious ActiveX controls and Java applets. The latest version of Antivirus V.I.P features outstanding detection abilities, together with high performance. Antivirus V.I.P creates best anti-virus, anti-trojan and anti-spyware security solutions that protect computer users from ever-increasing cyber threats and all the dangers of the new century."
And the domains and their associated IPs :
antivirus-freescan .com (208.72.169.100)
defendyourpc .com
mycupupdate .com
secureupdatecenter .com
secureupdateserver .com
webscannertools .com
secureyourpayments .com
protection-overview .com
save-my-pc-now .com (84.243.196.136; 89.149.227.196; 89.149.227.232)
antivirus-pcscan .com
hiqualityscan .com
active-scanner .com
perfectscanner .com
livesecurityinfo .com (216.240.134.208)
protection-freescan .com
antvirushelp .com
prosecurity-audit .com
scan-my-pc .com (89.149.251.56)
securedclickhere .com
premiumlivescan .com (78.159.118.217; 89.149.253.215; 216.240.134.211)
quick-live-scan .com
ekerberos .com (77.244.220.134; 119.47.81.140; 218.106.90.227)
virtualpcguard .com (67.55.81.200)
antivirus-vip .com (216.32.76.87)
As I've already pointed out numerous times in the past, on the majority of occasions the "campaigners" aren't fully taking advantage of the evasive features that their traffic management kits empower them with.
Related posts:
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Ten
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Nine
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Eight
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Seven
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Six
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Five
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Four
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Three
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Two
Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software
"Since its first establishement in 2001, Antivirus V.I.P consistently maintained its position as one of the world's leading companies in antivirus research and product development. Antivirus V.I.P is known mostly for Antivirus V.I.P, its powerful mix of Anti-Malware, Anti-Virus, Anti-Trojan, Anti-Backdoor, Anti-Worm and Anti-PornoDial in one program. Antivirus V.I.P scans and removes trojans and other malware, which can be placed on a computer without the owner's knowledge.
Antivirus V.I.P is a powerful and easy-to-use Trojan horses, Viruses and all types of Malware removal software, which detects and eliminates more than 100'000 Trojan Horses and Spywares. It also detects viruses, trojans, worms, spyware, malicious ActiveX controls and Java applets. The latest version of Antivirus V.I.P features outstanding detection abilities, together with high performance. Antivirus V.I.P creates best anti-virus, anti-trojan and anti-spyware security solutions that protect computer users from ever-increasing cyber threats and all the dangers of the new century."
And the domains and their associated IPs :
antivirus-freescan .com (208.72.169.100)
defendyourpc .com
mycupupdate .com
secureupdatecenter .com
secureupdateserver .com
webscannertools .com
secureyourpayments .com
protection-overview .com
save-my-pc-now .com (84.243.196.136; 89.149.227.196; 89.149.227.232)
antivirus-pcscan .com
hiqualityscan .com
active-scanner .com
perfectscanner .com
livesecurityinfo .com (216.240.134.208)
protection-freescan .com
antvirushelp .com
prosecurity-audit .com
scan-my-pc .com (89.149.251.56)
securedclickhere .com
premiumlivescan .com (78.159.118.217; 89.149.253.215; 216.240.134.211)
quick-live-scan .com
ekerberos .com (77.244.220.134; 119.47.81.140; 218.106.90.227)
virtualpcguard .com (67.55.81.200)
antivirus-vip .com (216.32.76.87)
As I've already pointed out numerous times in the past, on the majority of occasions the "campaigners" aren't fully taking advantage of the evasive features that their traffic management kits empower them with.
Related posts:
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Ten
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Nine
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Eight
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Seven
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Six
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Five
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Four
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Three
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Two
Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software
Independent Security Consultancy, Threat Intelligence Analysis (OSINT/Cyber Counter Intelligence) and Competitive Intelligence research on demand. Insightful, unbiased, and client-tailored assessments, neatly communicated in the form of interactive reports - because anticipating the emerging threatscape is what shapes the big picture at the end of the day. Approach me at dancho.danchev@hush.com
Money Mules Syndicate Actively Recruiting Since 2002
Money mules have already been an inseparable part of the underground ecosystem. And while others try to hide their activities by outsourcing their hosting needs to botnet masters partitioning their botnets, the experienced ones apply a decent level of OPSEC (operational security) by establishing a trust based model based on recommendations in order to even consider letting you register for their services. Their geographical location not only reflects the average time it would take to take action against their activities and expose yet another extensive network of fraudulent operations, but also, has the potential to increase or decrease the commissions that the mules take based on the risk factor of getting caught.
There are several different types of money mules, those serving themselves, and those offering their services to others, in this particular case, we have a money mules syndicate that's been operating since 2002, and is only serving the high profile customers. What happens when such a money mule syndicate (naturally) starts vertically integrating by offering value-added services like credit card balance checking and date of birth lookups? Profits apparently increase, since the syndicate is actively recruiting and is currently looking for 20 to 30 mules -- their current staff is said to be approximately 100 people -- to cash out anything from bank account logins, Paypal accounts, to stolen credit card data. Here's a translated description of the service :
"Who we are?
- First place at (cyber crime community) top list of trusted service providers for 2008
- We serve the big guys only since 2002
- We never scam, in business since 2002 without a single scam complaint
- We look for you, you don't look for us
- We offer outstanding working conditions and high commissions
Who you should be?
- Dedicated person with experience in the field
- Have been in the business for at least 6 months
- Have been recommended by at least 1 person from (cybercrime community) and from (cybercrime community)
- You take 45% commission of the processed check, minimal amount is $3000
- You pay a membership fee
In the next two months we draw the command of 20-30 people who will most satisfy our requirements. For the selected team will be Paradise conditions:
- Instant payment (a few hours after delivered)
- Large numbers to drop service in the USA and the UK (30)
- Individual drop in the number of large islands
- 3-5 fresh weekly drop
- Round-the-clock support"
In case some of their customers get scammed -- appreciate the irony here as scammers compensate the scammers getting scammed by the scammer's outsourced personnel -- by some of their money mules, the service is offering compensation for the stolen goods/amount of money, clearly speaking for the revenues it is to prone to be generating. OPSEC (Operational Security) has been taking place across high-profile cybercrime communities during the last quarter, mostly in response to their increasing awareness that in the very same way they keep track of the major anti-fraud features implemented across their services of (ab)use, those implementing them could be monitoring them as well.
There are several different types of money mules, those serving themselves, and those offering their services to others, in this particular case, we have a money mules syndicate that's been operating since 2002, and is only serving the high profile customers. What happens when such a money mule syndicate (naturally) starts vertically integrating by offering value-added services like credit card balance checking and date of birth lookups? Profits apparently increase, since the syndicate is actively recruiting and is currently looking for 20 to 30 mules -- their current staff is said to be approximately 100 people -- to cash out anything from bank account logins, Paypal accounts, to stolen credit card data. Here's a translated description of the service :
"Who we are?
- First place at (cyber crime community) top list of trusted service providers for 2008
- We serve the big guys only since 2002
- We never scam, in business since 2002 without a single scam complaint
- We look for you, you don't look for us
- We offer outstanding working conditions and high commissions
Who you should be?
- Dedicated person with experience in the field
- Have been in the business for at least 6 months
- Have been recommended by at least 1 person from (cybercrime community) and from (cybercrime community)
- You take 45% commission of the processed check, minimal amount is $3000
- You pay a membership fee
In the next two months we draw the command of 20-30 people who will most satisfy our requirements. For the selected team will be Paradise conditions:
- Instant payment (a few hours after delivered)
- Large numbers to drop service in the USA and the UK (30)
- Individual drop in the number of large islands
- 3-5 fresh weekly drop
- Round-the-clock support"
In case some of their customers get scammed -- appreciate the irony here as scammers compensate the scammers getting scammed by the scammer's outsourced personnel -- by some of their money mules, the service is offering compensation for the stolen goods/amount of money, clearly speaking for the revenues it is to prone to be generating. OPSEC (Operational Security) has been taking place across high-profile cybercrime communities during the last quarter, mostly in response to their increasing awareness that in the very same way they keep track of the major anti-fraud features implemented across their services of (ab)use, those implementing them could be monitoring them as well.
Independent Security Consultancy, Threat Intelligence Analysis (OSINT/Cyber Counter Intelligence) and Competitive Intelligence research on demand. Insightful, unbiased, and client-tailored assessments, neatly communicated in the form of interactive reports - because anticipating the emerging threatscape is what shapes the big picture at the end of the day. Approach me at dancho.danchev@hush.com
Friday, October 24, 2008
Compromised Portfolios of Legitimate Domains for Sale
Is the demand for access to compromised legitimate portfolios of domains -- where the price is based on the pagerank and is shaped by the number of domains in question -- the main growth factor for the increasing supply of such stolen accounting data, or is it the result of cybercriminals data mining their botnets for accounting data that would provide them with access to such portfolios of high trafficked domains with clean reputation? Moreover, would such a data mining approach made easily possible due to the availability of botnet parsing services and stolen accounting data dumps streaming directly from a botnet, would in fact be the more efficient approach in injecting their malicious presence on as many hosts as possible, next to the plain simple massive SQL injection approach?
As always, it's a matter of who you're dealing with, and their understanding of the exclusiveness of a particular underground item at a given period of time. This exclusiveness is inevitably going to increase due to the fact that they're several "vendors" that are already purchasing access to such portfolios, as well as compromised Cpanel accounts as a core business, the access to which they would later on either resell at a higher price enjoying the underground market's lack of transparency, or directly monetize and break-even immediatelly. As for this particular proposition for an account with 404 domains in it, it's interesting to monitor how the seller is soliciting bids from multiple sources by leaving the price an open topic, clearly indicating his low profile into the underground ecosystem. How come? An experienced seller or buyer would be offering or requesting page rank verification respectively.
With nearly each and every aspect of cybercrime already available as a service, or literally outsourced as a process to those supposidely excelling into a particular practice, building capabilities for data mining botnets is no longer a requirement, with the people behind the botnets monetizing all the data coming from it by soliciting deals of accounting data dumps based on a particular country only.
As always, it's a matter of who you're dealing with, and their understanding of the exclusiveness of a particular underground item at a given period of time. This exclusiveness is inevitably going to increase due to the fact that they're several "vendors" that are already purchasing access to such portfolios, as well as compromised Cpanel accounts as a core business, the access to which they would later on either resell at a higher price enjoying the underground market's lack of transparency, or directly monetize and break-even immediatelly. As for this particular proposition for an account with 404 domains in it, it's interesting to monitor how the seller is soliciting bids from multiple sources by leaving the price an open topic, clearly indicating his low profile into the underground ecosystem. How come? An experienced seller or buyer would be offering or requesting page rank verification respectively.
With nearly each and every aspect of cybercrime already available as a service, or literally outsourced as a process to those supposidely excelling into a particular practice, building capabilities for data mining botnets is no longer a requirement, with the people behind the botnets monetizing all the data coming from it by soliciting deals of accounting data dumps based on a particular country only.
Independent Security Consultancy, Threat Intelligence Analysis (OSINT/Cyber Counter Intelligence) and Competitive Intelligence research on demand. Insightful, unbiased, and client-tailored assessments, neatly communicated in the form of interactive reports - because anticipating the emerging threatscape is what shapes the big picture at the end of the day. Approach me at dancho.danchev@hush.com
Wednesday, October 22, 2008
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Ten
Popping up like mushrooms, these are the very latest rogue security software domains for your case building, cross-checking, or blackholing pleasure. Interestingly, next to decentralizing the hosting locations, they're also using legitimate hosting providers, whose reputation they've also been abusing for spamming in the past :
go-scan-pro .com (78.157.143.184)
internet-antivirus-2008 .com
ia-stat-ia .com
ia-scanner-pc .com
ia-scanner-pro .com
goscanpc .com
go-iascan .com
ia-install-pro .com
ia-scan-pro .com
ia-scanner-pro .com
ia-scanpro .com
ia-scannerpro .com
ia-free-scanner .com
ia-scan-now .com
online-antivirus .net (91.203.70.57)
virus-scan-online .com
online-virus-scanning .com
scanner-protection .com
online-scan .net
s-avirus2009 .com (92.241.177.70)
sa-vir2009-buy .com
s-avir2009-buy .com
xpas-2009 .com (96.9.135.85; 206.161.120.26)
xp-as-2009 .com
antimalwaresuite2009 .com (58.65.234.193)
cleaner2009pro .com
pcdefender2008 .com (89.149.241.228)
database-virus .com (75.125.215.35)
Moreover, a new template which you can see in the attached screenshots that mimicking a local AV scanning, has been circulating for a while. Naturally, it's localized and based on the browser's default language is serving a local version of the message. Follow the customer and expose the vendor still works, however, in between the average time it takes to track them down, a great number of people have already purchased the rogue software. The rogue security software business model is very similar to the spamming business model in the sense that they don't care whether 5, 10 or 15 people get tricked and install it, since even if 4 people out of the 100,000 unique daily visits fall victim - they break even.
Related posts:
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Eight
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Seven
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Six
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Five
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Four
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Three
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Two
Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Seven
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Six
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Five
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Four
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Three
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Two
Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software
Independent Security Consultancy, Threat Intelligence Analysis (OSINT/Cyber Counter Intelligence) and Competitive Intelligence research on demand. Insightful, unbiased, and client-tailored assessments, neatly communicated in the form of interactive reports - because anticipating the emerging threatscape is what shapes the big picture at the end of the day. Approach me at dancho.danchev@hush.com
Tuesday, October 21, 2008
Massive SQL Injection Attacks - the Chinese Way
From copycats and "localizers" of Russian web malware exploitation kits, to suppliers of original hacking tools, the Chinese IT underground has been closely following the emerging threats and the obvious insecurities on a large scale, and so is either filling the niches left open by other international communities, or coming up with tools setting new benchmarks for massive SQL injection attacks, like the case with this one :
"A professional web site vulnerability scanning, use of tools, SQL injection is a new generation of tools to help Web developers and site of the station quickly find vulnerabilities in order to be able to effectively prepare Security work. At the same time, the tool to Web developers to demonstrate the ways in which hackers are using these vulnerabilities, hackers, as well as through the loopholes to do things, can effectively raise the safety awareness of relevant personnel."
Nothing's wrong with the marketing pitch at the first place, but going through the features, the "massive SQL injections through search engine reconnaissance" and automatic page rank verification which you can see in the attached screenshots, ruin the "security auditing" marketing pitch. The tool not only allows easy integration of potentially vulnerable sites obtained through search engines reconnaissance, but also, is prioritizing the results based on the probability for successful injection, next to the page rank of the domains in question. A simple demonstration offered by the company is also, directly enticing its users to "localize" the search engine reconnaissance, by filtering the search results for a particupar country, in this case they used French sites for one of the demos. Here are some excerpts from its CHANGE log speaking for themselves :
"2008.7.15 release version 1.3
- New powerful "automatic machine cycle" feature
- Automatic machine cycle is to provide assistance to the advanced user manual into the use of a very
- powerful and flexible module, the main sites used for some special filtering into the hand, is almost a
- universal tool, you can achieve the following:
1. In support of GET / POST / COOKIES in a variety of ways, such as the injection.
2. Scan the key to the page (background, upload, WebShell, databases, backup files, etc.).
3. According to the dictionary to violence landing back-guess solution WebShell password and password (required to verify that the code can not guess solution).
4. Page language does not limit the types and databases (to provide specific statements into the database).
5. At the same time, support for the circulation of the two variables and two dictionaries, fast running and violent content of the database solution to guess a password."
It gets even more interesting in terms of the massive SQL injection attacks mentality which is pretty evident on all fronts :
"- The use of the three search engine sites scans to invade the side to complete
- in scanning probe into the Web site ranking points
- added, "VBS upload to download", "upload directory Web site viewer," "FTP upload to download configuration file" function to make it more convenient for the sa rights to use the site.
- New "sequence document scanners"
- What is the sequence document scanners role? Upload to find loopholes, some of the procedures to upload the file after the upload will be renamed, rename the way the system is usually based on time or incremental increase in the number prefix code for the upload process, if not to return after the file name, Upload files to know the url is usually very difficult to sequence the use of paper scanner can be scanned out
- The best reverse domain name query engine, and quasi-wide
- in scanning the database of basic information, an increase of the database of information related to the process, the link has information on the database server user login (sa need permission)
- control of the interface had a big adjustment, the interface process easier to understand and operate.
- based on a significant site of the wrong mode of access to a comprehensive code optimization and more accurate access to the content, accuracy and access to show progress.
- added, "VBS upload to download", "upload directory Web site viewer," "FTP upload to download configuration file" function to make it more convenient for the sa rights to use the site.
- point into the types of improved detection order to improve the efficiency of detection.
- improved automatic keyword detection, automatic keyword detection more accurate.
- probe into the points the way to improve and increase the use of automatic detection of the keyword detection.
- type of database to improve the detection, the use of the contents of the length of the failure to detect the type of database automatically switch to the probe through the keyword.
- automatically save and load solution has been to guess the tree structure of the database, guess Solutions has been the content and structure of the database will automatically save and open the next time the injection point will be automatically made available, the solutions do not have to guess again, the continuity of work Greatly increased.
- solved from the database to read large amounts of data (on hundreds of thousands or millions of records), the half-way card program will die.
- increased significantly on the wrong model of ASP.NET and SQL Server2005 significant mode of dealing with mistakes, error messages can be extracted from a Web directory!
- significant amendments to the wrong mode, some of the injected one by one point in the field or access to the contents of the issue can not be successful (error code in hand); for increased access to specific points table and into the field.
- amendments to the text of a significant error patterns to detect and correct use of loopholes in the system can be used more to expand. (Text significantly in the wrong mode in version 1.1 already supported, but in the version 1.2 upgrade in the process of scanning to improve the performance of the Gaodiao careless. -_-#)
- on a variety of encoded text can be significantly wrong in the right-compatible, able to correctly handle the ASP.NET page of the text marked wrong. Through custom error keyword, truly compatible with any language, any coding error message.
- crack anti-improvement and enhancement.
- An increase of auto-detection feature keywords.
- Mssql database specifically for significant points into the wrong mode of detection and the use of up and down the hard work, and many other software can not detect the point of injection can also be used.
- Automatic save and load access to the database, to allow manual known to add tables and fields for solutions to guess.
- Can be used to amend the degree of accuracy; optimize the code to reduce memory footprint; enhance the stability of multi-threading.
- Significant amendments to the wrong mode solution guess the contents of the database must be checked first field defects."
The public version of the tool has been in the while for over an year, with a VIP version available to customers only.
"A professional web site vulnerability scanning, use of tools, SQL injection is a new generation of tools to help Web developers and site of the station quickly find vulnerabilities in order to be able to effectively prepare Security work. At the same time, the tool to Web developers to demonstrate the ways in which hackers are using these vulnerabilities, hackers, as well as through the loopholes to do things, can effectively raise the safety awareness of relevant personnel."
Nothing's wrong with the marketing pitch at the first place, but going through the features, the "massive SQL injections through search engine reconnaissance" and automatic page rank verification which you can see in the attached screenshots, ruin the "security auditing" marketing pitch. The tool not only allows easy integration of potentially vulnerable sites obtained through search engines reconnaissance, but also, is prioritizing the results based on the probability for successful injection, next to the page rank of the domains in question. A simple demonstration offered by the company is also, directly enticing its users to "localize" the search engine reconnaissance, by filtering the search results for a particupar country, in this case they used French sites for one of the demos. Here are some excerpts from its CHANGE log speaking for themselves :
"2008.7.15 release version 1.3
- New powerful "automatic machine cycle" feature
- Automatic machine cycle is to provide assistance to the advanced user manual into the use of a very
- powerful and flexible module, the main sites used for some special filtering into the hand, is almost a
- universal tool, you can achieve the following:
1. In support of GET / POST / COOKIES in a variety of ways, such as the injection.
2. Scan the key to the page (background, upload, WebShell, databases, backup files, etc.).
3. According to the dictionary to violence landing back-guess solution WebShell password and password (required to verify that the code can not guess solution).
4. Page language does not limit the types and databases (to provide specific statements into the database).
5. At the same time, support for the circulation of the two variables and two dictionaries, fast running and violent content of the database solution to guess a password."
It gets even more interesting in terms of the massive SQL injection attacks mentality which is pretty evident on all fronts :
"- The use of the three search engine sites scans to invade the side to complete
- in scanning probe into the Web site ranking points
- added, "VBS upload to download", "upload directory Web site viewer," "FTP upload to download configuration file" function to make it more convenient for the sa rights to use the site.
- New "sequence document scanners"
- What is the sequence document scanners role? Upload to find loopholes, some of the procedures to upload the file after the upload will be renamed, rename the way the system is usually based on time or incremental increase in the number prefix code for the upload process, if not to return after the file name, Upload files to know the url is usually very difficult to sequence the use of paper scanner can be scanned out
- The best reverse domain name query engine, and quasi-wide
- in scanning the database of basic information, an increase of the database of information related to the process, the link has information on the database server user login (sa need permission)
- control of the interface had a big adjustment, the interface process easier to understand and operate.
- based on a significant site of the wrong mode of access to a comprehensive code optimization and more accurate access to the content, accuracy and access to show progress.
- added, "VBS upload to download", "upload directory Web site viewer," "FTP upload to download configuration file" function to make it more convenient for the sa rights to use the site.
- point into the types of improved detection order to improve the efficiency of detection.
- improved automatic keyword detection, automatic keyword detection more accurate.
- probe into the points the way to improve and increase the use of automatic detection of the keyword detection.
- type of database to improve the detection, the use of the contents of the length of the failure to detect the type of database automatically switch to the probe through the keyword.
- automatically save and load solution has been to guess the tree structure of the database, guess Solutions has been the content and structure of the database will automatically save and open the next time the injection point will be automatically made available, the solutions do not have to guess again, the continuity of work Greatly increased.
- solved from the database to read large amounts of data (on hundreds of thousands or millions of records), the half-way card program will die.
- increased significantly on the wrong model of ASP.NET and SQL Server2005 significant mode of dealing with mistakes, error messages can be extracted from a Web directory!
- significant amendments to the wrong mode, some of the injected one by one point in the field or access to the contents of the issue can not be successful (error code in hand); for increased access to specific points table and into the field.
- amendments to the text of a significant error patterns to detect and correct use of loopholes in the system can be used more to expand. (Text significantly in the wrong mode in version 1.1 already supported, but in the version 1.2 upgrade in the process of scanning to improve the performance of the Gaodiao careless. -_-#)
- on a variety of encoded text can be significantly wrong in the right-compatible, able to correctly handle the ASP.NET page of the text marked wrong. Through custom error keyword, truly compatible with any language, any coding error message.
- crack anti-improvement and enhancement.
- An increase of auto-detection feature keywords.
- Mssql database specifically for significant points into the wrong mode of detection and the use of up and down the hard work, and many other software can not detect the point of injection can also be used.
- Automatic save and load access to the database, to allow manual known to add tables and fields for solutions to guess.
- Can be used to amend the degree of accuracy; optimize the code to reduce memory footprint; enhance the stability of multi-threading.
- Significant amendments to the wrong mode solution guess the contents of the database must be checked first field defects."
The public version of the tool has been in the while for over an year, with a VIP version available to customers only.
Independent Security Consultancy, Threat Intelligence Analysis (OSINT/Cyber Counter Intelligence) and Competitive Intelligence research on demand. Insightful, unbiased, and client-tailored assessments, neatly communicated in the form of interactive reports - because anticipating the emerging threatscape is what shapes the big picture at the end of the day. Approach me at dancho.danchev@hush.com
Monday, October 20, 2008
Real-Time OSINT vs Historical OSINT in Russia/Georgia Cyberattacks
The original real-time OSINT analysis of the Russian cyberattacks against Georgia conducted on the 11th of August, not only closed the Russia vs Georgia cyberwar case for me personally, but also, once again proved that real-time OSINT is invaluable compared to historical OSINT using a commercial social network visualization/data mining tool which cannot and will never be able to access the Dark Web, accessible only through real-time CYBERINT practices.
The value of real-time OSINT in such people's information warfare cyberattacks -- with Chinese hacktivists perfectly aware of the meaning of the phrase -- relies on the relatively lower operational security (OPSEC) the initiators of a particular campaign apply at the beginning, so that it would scale faster and attract more participants. What the Russian government was doing is fueling the (cyber) fire - literally, since all it takes for a collectivist socienty's cyber militia to organize, is a "call for action" which was taking place at the majority of forums, with the posters of these messages apparently using a spamming application to achieve better efficiency.
The results from 56 days of Project Grey Goose in action got published last week, a project I discussed back in August, point out to the bottom of the food chain in the entire campaign - stopgeorgia.ru :
"Furthermore, coming up with Social Network analysis of the cyberattacks would produce nothing more but a few fancy graphs of over enthusiastic Russian netizen's distributing the static list of the targets. The real conversations, as always, are happening in the "Dark Web" limiting the possibilities for open source intelligence using a data mining software. Things changed, OPSEC is slowly emerging as a concept among malicious parties, whenever some of the "calls for action" in the DDoS attacks were posted at mainstream forums, they were immediately removed so that they don't show up in such academic initiatives"
So what's the bottom line? Nothing that I haven't already pointed out back in August : "Report: Russian Hacker Forums Fueled Georgia Cyber Attacks" :
"But experts say evidence suggests that Russian officials did little to discourage the online assault, which was coordinated through a Russian online forum that appeared to have been prepped with target lists and details about Georgian Web site vulnerabilities well before the two countries engaged in a brief but deadly ground, sea and air war."
Some more comments :
"Just because there was no smoking gun doesn't mean there's no connection," said Jeff Carr, the principal investigator of Project Grey Goose, a group of around 15 computer security, technology and intelligence experts that investigated the August attacks against Georgia. "I can't imagine that this came together sporadically," he said. "I don't think that a disorganized group can coalesce in 24 hours with its own processes in place. That just doesn't make sense."
It wouldn't make sense if this was the first time Russian hacktivists are maintaining the same rhythm as real-life events - which of course isn't.
Moreover, exactly what would have constituted a "smoking gun" proving that the Russian government was involved in the campaign, remains unknown -- I'm still sticking to my comment regarding the web site defacement creative. If they truly wanted to compromise themselves, they would have cut Georgia off the Internet, at least from the perspective offered by this graph courtesy of the Packet Clearing House speaking for their dependability on Russian ISPs.
As for the script kiddies at stopgeorgia.ru, they were informed enough to feature my research into their "negative public comments section". To sum up - the "DoS battle stations operational in the name of the "Please, input your cause" mentality is always going to be there.
The value of real-time OSINT in such people's information warfare cyberattacks -- with Chinese hacktivists perfectly aware of the meaning of the phrase -- relies on the relatively lower operational security (OPSEC) the initiators of a particular campaign apply at the beginning, so that it would scale faster and attract more participants. What the Russian government was doing is fueling the (cyber) fire - literally, since all it takes for a collectivist socienty's cyber militia to organize, is a "call for action" which was taking place at the majority of forums, with the posters of these messages apparently using a spamming application to achieve better efficiency.
The results from 56 days of Project Grey Goose in action got published last week, a project I discussed back in August, point out to the bottom of the food chain in the entire campaign - stopgeorgia.ru :
"Furthermore, coming up with Social Network analysis of the cyberattacks would produce nothing more but a few fancy graphs of over enthusiastic Russian netizen's distributing the static list of the targets. The real conversations, as always, are happening in the "Dark Web" limiting the possibilities for open source intelligence using a data mining software. Things changed, OPSEC is slowly emerging as a concept among malicious parties, whenever some of the "calls for action" in the DDoS attacks were posted at mainstream forums, they were immediately removed so that they don't show up in such academic initiatives"
So what's the bottom line? Nothing that I haven't already pointed out back in August : "Report: Russian Hacker Forums Fueled Georgia Cyber Attacks" :
"But experts say evidence suggests that Russian officials did little to discourage the online assault, which was coordinated through a Russian online forum that appeared to have been prepped with target lists and details about Georgian Web site vulnerabilities well before the two countries engaged in a brief but deadly ground, sea and air war."
Some more comments :
"Just because there was no smoking gun doesn't mean there's no connection," said Jeff Carr, the principal investigator of Project Grey Goose, a group of around 15 computer security, technology and intelligence experts that investigated the August attacks against Georgia. "I can't imagine that this came together sporadically," he said. "I don't think that a disorganized group can coalesce in 24 hours with its own processes in place. That just doesn't make sense."
It wouldn't make sense if this was the first time Russian hacktivists are maintaining the same rhythm as real-life events - which of course isn't.
Moreover, exactly what would have constituted a "smoking gun" proving that the Russian government was involved in the campaign, remains unknown -- I'm still sticking to my comment regarding the web site defacement creative. If they truly wanted to compromise themselves, they would have cut Georgia off the Internet, at least from the perspective offered by this graph courtesy of the Packet Clearing House speaking for their dependability on Russian ISPs.
As for the script kiddies at stopgeorgia.ru, they were informed enough to feature my research into their "negative public comments section". To sum up - the "DoS battle stations operational in the name of the "Please, input your cause" mentality is always going to be there.
Independent Security Consultancy, Threat Intelligence Analysis (OSINT/Cyber Counter Intelligence) and Competitive Intelligence research on demand. Insightful, unbiased, and client-tailored assessments, neatly communicated in the form of interactive reports - because anticipating the emerging threatscape is what shapes the big picture at the end of the day. Approach me at dancho.danchev@hush.com
Thursday, October 16, 2008
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Nine
Among the most recently spotted rogue security software applications and fake system maintenance tools are :
pcvirusremover2008 .com (78.157.142.47; 92.62.101.67)
registrydoctorpro2008 .com
powerfulvirusremover2008 .com
registrydoctor2008 .com
topregistrydoctor2008 .com
securefileshredder2009 .com
securefilesshred .com
registrydoctor2008-scan .com
registrydoctor2008-pro .com
prosecureexpertcleanerpro .com
supersecurefileshredder .com
hypersecurefileshredder .com
securefilesshredder .com
secureexpertcleaner .com
winsecureexpertcleaner .com
prosecureexpertcleaner .com
yoursecureexpertcleaner .com
bestsecureexpertcleaner .com
mysecureexpertcleaner .com
energysavecenter .com
virusremover2008plus .com
malwarecrashpro .com (195.5.117.248)
antimalwareguard .com
malwarecrash .com
antimalwareguardpro .com
antimalwaremasterpro .com
xp-antispyware-2009 .com (206.161.120.21)
xp-antispyware2009 .com (206.161.120.20)
xp-as-2009 .com (206.161.120.24)
xpantispyware-2009 .com (206.161.120.22)
xpas2009 .com (206.161.120.23)
killwinpc .com (200.63.45.20)
registryupdate .org (216.122.218.11)
antivirus-2009-pro .net (217.20.175.44)
a-a-v-2008 .com (92.241.163.27)
aav2008 .com
adv-a-v .com
ietoolsupdate .com (208.72.168.84)
iexplorerfile .com
Registrants of notice for cross-checking purposes :
Sagent Group (adminsagent@gmail.com)
Billy A. Schmitt (admiragroup@yahoo.com)
Shestakov Yuriy (alexvasiliev1987@cocainmail.com)
Andrej Kazanski (akazanski@europe.com)
Related posts:
Violating OPSEC for Increasing the Probability of Malware Infection
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Eight
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Seven
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Six
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Five
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Four
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Three
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Two
Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software
pcvirusremover2008 .com (78.157.142.47; 92.62.101.67)
registrydoctorpro2008 .com
powerfulvirusremover2008 .com
registrydoctor2008 .com
topregistrydoctor2008 .com
securefileshredder2009 .com
securefilesshred .com
registrydoctor2008-scan .com
registrydoctor2008-pro .com
prosecureexpertcleanerpro .com
supersecurefileshredder .com
hypersecurefileshredder .com
securefilesshredder .com
secureexpertcleaner .com
winsecureexpertcleaner .com
prosecureexpertcleaner .com
yoursecureexpertcleaner .com
bestsecureexpertcleaner .com
mysecureexpertcleaner .com
energysavecenter .com
virusremover2008plus .com
malwarecrashpro .com (195.5.117.248)
antimalwareguard .com
malwarecrash .com
antimalwareguardpro .com
antimalwaremasterpro .com
xp-antispyware-2009 .com (206.161.120.21)
xp-antispyware2009 .com (206.161.120.20)
xp-as-2009 .com (206.161.120.24)
xpantispyware-2009 .com (206.161.120.22)
xpas2009 .com (206.161.120.23)
killwinpc .com (200.63.45.20)
registryupdate .org (216.122.218.11)
antivirus-2009-pro .net (217.20.175.44)
a-a-v-2008 .com (92.241.163.27)
aav2008 .com
adv-a-v .com
ietoolsupdate .com (208.72.168.84)
iexplorerfile .com
Registrants of notice for cross-checking purposes :
Sagent Group (adminsagent@gmail.com)
Billy A. Schmitt (admiragroup@yahoo.com)
Shestakov Yuriy (alexvasiliev1987@cocainmail.com)
Andrej Kazanski (akazanski@europe.com)
Related posts:
Violating OPSEC for Increasing the Probability of Malware Infection
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Eight
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Seven
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Six
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Five
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Four
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Three
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Two
Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software
Independent Security Consultancy, Threat Intelligence Analysis (OSINT/Cyber Counter Intelligence) and Competitive Intelligence research on demand. Insightful, unbiased, and client-tailored assessments, neatly communicated in the form of interactive reports - because anticipating the emerging threatscape is what shapes the big picture at the end of the day. Approach me at dancho.danchev@hush.com
TorrentReactor Compromised, 1.2M Users Database In the Wild
It appears that TorrentReactor.net, a highly popular torrent tracker, got compromised in September, with it's users database concisting of 1.2M users and TorrentReactor's source code stolen.
Despite that the attacker claiming responsibility is citing reputation enhancement as the reason for the attack, sooner or later the personal details will be sold and resold to spammers, with the possibilitity for spear phishing attacks left wide open.
Despite that the attacker claiming responsibility is citing reputation enhancement as the reason for the attack, sooner or later the personal details will be sold and resold to spammers, with the possibilitity for spear phishing attacks left wide open.
Independent Security Consultancy, Threat Intelligence Analysis (OSINT/Cyber Counter Intelligence) and Competitive Intelligence research on demand. Insightful, unbiased, and client-tailored assessments, neatly communicated in the form of interactive reports - because anticipating the emerging threatscape is what shapes the big picture at the end of the day. Approach me at dancho.danchev@hush.com
Wednesday, October 15, 2008
DDoS Attack Graphs from Russia vs Georgia's Cyberattacks
Part of Georgia's information warfare campaign aiming to minimize the bandwidth impact on its de-facto media platforms such as the web site of their Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I've just received a report part of Georgia's "Russian Invasion of Georgia" series entitled "Russian Cyberwar on Georgia", which is quoting me on page 4 in regard to the "too good to be courtesy of Russia's cyber militia" creative that appeared on the defaced Georgian President's web site. The report also includes DDoS attack graphs and related details worth going through :
"The last large cyberattack took place on 27 August. After that, there have been no serious attacks on Georgian cyberspace. By that is meant that minor attacks are still continuing but these are indistinguishable from regular traffic and can certainly be attributed to regular civilians. On 27 August, at approximately 16:18 (GMT +3) a DDoS attack against the Georgian websites was launched. The main target was the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The attacks peaked at approx 0,5 million network packets per second, and up to 200–250 Mbits per second in bandwidth (see attached graphs). The graphs represent a 5-minute average: actual peaks were higher.
The attacks mainly consisted of HTTP queries to the http://mfa.gov.ge website. These were requests for the main page script with randomly generated parameters. These requests were generated to overload the web server in a way where every single request would need significant CPU time. The initial wave of the attack disrupted services for some Georgian websites. The services became slow and unresponsive. This was due to the load on the servers by these requests. As you see from the graphs above the attacks started to wind down after most of the attackers were successfully blocked. The latest attack may have been initiated as a response to the media coverage on the Russian cyber attacks."
In case you're interested in more factual evidence about what was happening at the particular moment in time, go through the following assessment - "Coordinated Russia vs Georgia cyber attack in progress", as well as through the following posts - "The Russia vs Georgia Cyber Attack"; "Who's Behind the Georgia Cyber Attacks?"; "Georgia President’s web site under DDoS attack from Russian hackers".
"The last large cyberattack took place on 27 August. After that, there have been no serious attacks on Georgian cyberspace. By that is meant that minor attacks are still continuing but these are indistinguishable from regular traffic and can certainly be attributed to regular civilians. On 27 August, at approximately 16:18 (GMT +3) a DDoS attack against the Georgian websites was launched. The main target was the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The attacks peaked at approx 0,5 million network packets per second, and up to 200–250 Mbits per second in bandwidth (see attached graphs). The graphs represent a 5-minute average: actual peaks were higher.
The attacks mainly consisted of HTTP queries to the http://mfa.gov.ge website. These were requests for the main page script with randomly generated parameters. These requests were generated to overload the web server in a way where every single request would need significant CPU time. The initial wave of the attack disrupted services for some Georgian websites. The services became slow and unresponsive. This was due to the load on the servers by these requests. As you see from the graphs above the attacks started to wind down after most of the attackers were successfully blocked. The latest attack may have been initiated as a response to the media coverage on the Russian cyber attacks."
In case you're interested in more factual evidence about what was happening at the particular moment in time, go through the following assessment - "Coordinated Russia vs Georgia cyber attack in progress", as well as through the following posts - "The Russia vs Georgia Cyber Attack"; "Who's Behind the Georgia Cyber Attacks?"; "Georgia President’s web site under DDoS attack from Russian hackers".
Independent Security Consultancy, Threat Intelligence Analysis (OSINT/Cyber Counter Intelligence) and Competitive Intelligence research on demand. Insightful, unbiased, and client-tailored assessments, neatly communicated in the form of interactive reports - because anticipating the emerging threatscape is what shapes the big picture at the end of the day. Approach me at dancho.danchev@hush.com
Tuesday, October 14, 2008
The Cost of Anonymizing a Cybercriminal's Internet Activities
What would the perfect traffic anonymity service provider targeting cybercriminals consist of? A service operating in Russia that is on purposely not logging any of its user's activities, next to allowing direct spamming from the socks servers, automatic rotation of the VPN servers which they operate in a RBN style hosting provider, or a service using actual malware infected hosts as VPN tunnels not only securing the cybercrime traffic, but also, forwarding the responsibility for the malicious activities to the end user?
Long gone are the days of socks chaining, the practice of automatically connecting to multiple malware infected hosts in order to use them as stepping stones, in between the rest of the malicious activities going on their behalf.
The possibilities for building point-to-point or server-to-multiclient encrypted tunnels between malware infected hosts by using already available Socks5 functions has always been there. As of August, the coders behind a relatively popular web based malware originally started as a DDoS kit, but later on started introducing new features on a "module basis", they have started offering a BETA module for building a VPN network of malware infected hosts, including an admin panel for reselling access to these hosts in order to better monetize their botnet.
This VPN-owning of malware infected hosts is not only resulting in improved anonymity for botnet masters and anyone else having access to the network, but is also contributing to the growth of VPN services designed specifically to be accessed by cybercriminals created on the foundatiosn of such admin panels offering easier reselling of access to the network.
So, what's the cost of anonymizing a cybercriminal's Internet activities? Starting from $40 and going to $300 for a quarter of access, with the price increasing based on the level of anonymity added.
Long gone are the days of socks chaining, the practice of automatically connecting to multiple malware infected hosts in order to use them as stepping stones, in between the rest of the malicious activities going on their behalf.
The possibilities for building point-to-point or server-to-multiclient encrypted tunnels between malware infected hosts by using already available Socks5 functions has always been there. As of August, the coders behind a relatively popular web based malware originally started as a DDoS kit, but later on started introducing new features on a "module basis", they have started offering a BETA module for building a VPN network of malware infected hosts, including an admin panel for reselling access to these hosts in order to better monetize their botnet.
This VPN-owning of malware infected hosts is not only resulting in improved anonymity for botnet masters and anyone else having access to the network, but is also contributing to the growth of VPN services designed specifically to be accessed by cybercriminals created on the foundatiosn of such admin panels offering easier reselling of access to the network.
So, what's the cost of anonymizing a cybercriminal's Internet activities? Starting from $40 and going to $300 for a quarter of access, with the price increasing based on the level of anonymity added.
Independent Security Consultancy, Threat Intelligence Analysis (OSINT/Cyber Counter Intelligence) and Competitive Intelligence research on demand. Insightful, unbiased, and client-tailored assessments, neatly communicated in the form of interactive reports - because anticipating the emerging threatscape is what shapes the big picture at the end of the day. Approach me at dancho.danchev@hush.com
Quality Assurance in Malware Attacks - Part Two
Surprisingly, while opportunistic cybercriminals have long embraced the malware as a service model, and are offering managed lower detection rate services for a customer's malware, or DIY ones where the customer can take advantage of popular tools ported to the Web, others are still trying to innovate at a faddish market niche - multiple offline AV scanners tools aiming to ensure that their malware doesn't end up in the hands of vendors/researchers.
Multiple offline AV scanning tools like this very latest release, naturally using pirated copies of popular antivirus software, are faddish, due to the fact that during the last two years, the underground has been busy working on several paid web based services, that not only make sure vendors and researchers never get the chance to obtain the samples, but also, are already offering scheduled scanning of malware and automatic ICQ/Jabber notifications for QA of the campaign, next to the rest of unique features disintermediating legitimate multiple AV scanning services.
Certain features within such services clearly speak for the intentions of the people behind the service. For instance, among one of these features is the ability to fetch a binary from a set of given dropper URLs like malwaredomain.com/binary.exe, the result of the scan can then alert the malware campaigner about the current state of detection.
What's on these proprietary multiple AV scanning service's to-do list? Let's say anything that a legitimate multiple AV scanning service would never offer, like the following according to one of the services in question :
- DIY heuristic scanning level settings for each of the software in place
- upcoming sets of anti spyware and personal firewalls with detailed statistics of the sandboxing
- behavior-based detection results
The possibilities for integrating such proprietary multi AV scanning services within the QA process of a malware campaign are countless, and both, the customers and the sellers seem to have realized the potential of this ecosystem.
Multiple offline AV scanning tools like this very latest release, naturally using pirated copies of popular antivirus software, are faddish, due to the fact that during the last two years, the underground has been busy working on several paid web based services, that not only make sure vendors and researchers never get the chance to obtain the samples, but also, are already offering scheduled scanning of malware and automatic ICQ/Jabber notifications for QA of the campaign, next to the rest of unique features disintermediating legitimate multiple AV scanning services.
Certain features within such services clearly speak for the intentions of the people behind the service. For instance, among one of these features is the ability to fetch a binary from a set of given dropper URLs like malwaredomain.com/binary.exe, the result of the scan can then alert the malware campaigner about the current state of detection.
What's on these proprietary multiple AV scanning service's to-do list? Let's say anything that a legitimate multiple AV scanning service would never offer, like the following according to one of the services in question :
- DIY heuristic scanning level settings for each of the software in place
- upcoming sets of anti spyware and personal firewalls with detailed statistics of the sandboxing
- behavior-based detection results
The possibilities for integrating such proprietary multi AV scanning services within the QA process of a malware campaign are countless, and both, the customers and the sellers seem to have realized the potential of this ecosystem.
Independent Security Consultancy, Threat Intelligence Analysis (OSINT/Cyber Counter Intelligence) and Competitive Intelligence research on demand. Insightful, unbiased, and client-tailored assessments, neatly communicated in the form of interactive reports - because anticipating the emerging threatscape is what shapes the big picture at the end of the day. Approach me at dancho.danchev@hush.com
Thursday, October 09, 2008
Cybercriminals Abusing Lycos Spain To Serve Malware
Spanish cybercriminals have recently started taking advantage of the bogus accounts at Lycos Spain, which they seem to be registering on their own, by releasing a do-it-yourself malicious link generator redirecting to fake YouTube and Adobe Flash video pages. Whereas the concept of abusing legitimate web services for infection and propagation isn't new, what's new is the fact that the FTP access is efficiently abused.
Here's a description of the link generator :
"Download the program and run it asks for an ID (identifier), then copy it and paste it there, then press' Create Installer 'and the program will create the Installer! (this program to run a simulation that is installing the Adobe Flash and indicates to our page that "has been installed Adobe Flash," in order to show the video when YouVideo refresh the page, this you must file tie it in with your server! and what flames or Installer Setup (simulating being an installer)! Now you need to upload that file you've joined an FTP, click Next and put the path of that file in the next step!"
Whereas the tool is exclusively relying on Lycos Spain to host the binaries and the campaign itself, the recent blackhat SEO campaign relying on pre-registered Windows Live Spaces and AOL Journals syndicating hot Google Trends keywords, further indicates the malicious attacker's capabilities of efficiently abusing legitimate services. And with the process of bogus accounts registration performed automatically, or outsourced entirely, malicious services aiming to automate the abuse process are only going to get more efficient.
Here's a description of the link generator :
"Download the program and run it asks for an ID (identifier), then copy it and paste it there, then press' Create Installer 'and the program will create the Installer! (this program to run a simulation that is installing the Adobe Flash and indicates to our page that "has been installed Adobe Flash," in order to show the video when YouVideo refresh the page, this you must file tie it in with your server! and what flames or Installer Setup (simulating being an installer)! Now you need to upload that file you've joined an FTP, click Next and put the path of that file in the next step!"
Whereas the tool is exclusively relying on Lycos Spain to host the binaries and the campaign itself, the recent blackhat SEO campaign relying on pre-registered Windows Live Spaces and AOL Journals syndicating hot Google Trends keywords, further indicates the malicious attacker's capabilities of efficiently abusing legitimate services. And with the process of bogus accounts registration performed automatically, or outsourced entirely, malicious services aiming to automate the abuse process are only going to get more efficient.
Independent Security Consultancy, Threat Intelligence Analysis (OSINT/Cyber Counter Intelligence) and Competitive Intelligence research on demand. Insightful, unbiased, and client-tailored assessments, neatly communicated in the form of interactive reports - because anticipating the emerging threatscape is what shapes the big picture at the end of the day. Approach me at dancho.danchev@hush.com
Commoditization of Anti Debugging Features in RATs - Part Two
Yet another piece of malware promoted as a RAT (remote access tool) includes what's turning into the defacto set of anti-debugging features within RATs.
As the authors point out, the Anti Virtual PC, VMware, Virtualbox, Sandboxie, ThreatExpert, Anubis, CWSandbox, Joebox, Norman Sandbox features inevitably increase the server size. Next to the product, there's always the managed service of ensuring a lower detection rate for binaries submitted to the authors.
As the authors point out, the Anti Virtual PC, VMware, Virtualbox, Sandboxie, ThreatExpert, Anubis, CWSandbox, Joebox, Norman Sandbox features inevitably increase the server size. Next to the product, there's always the managed service of ensuring a lower detection rate for binaries submitted to the authors.
Independent Security Consultancy, Threat Intelligence Analysis (OSINT/Cyber Counter Intelligence) and Competitive Intelligence research on demand. Insightful, unbiased, and client-tailored assessments, neatly communicated in the form of interactive reports - because anticipating the emerging threatscape is what shapes the big picture at the end of the day. Approach me at dancho.danchev@hush.com
Tuesday, October 07, 2008
Summarizing Zero Day's Posts for September
As usual, here's September's summary of all of my posts at Zero Day. You may also want to catch up and go through August's and July's summaries, next to adding my personal RSS feed or Zero Day's main feed to your RSS reader.
Notable article for September - Spamming vendor launches managed spamming service.
01. DoS vulnerability hits Google's Chrome, crashes with all tabs
02. Malware and spam attacks exploiting Picasa and ImageShack
03. Spamming vendor launches managed spamming service
04. Facebook introducing new security warning feature
05. Google downplays Chrome's carpet-bombing flaw
06. Targeted malware attack against U.S schools intercepted
07. The most "dangerous" celebrities to search for in 2008
08. Norwegian BitTorrent tracker under DDoS attack
09. Attacker: Hacking Sarah Palin's email was easy
10. Bill O'Reilly's web site hacked, attackers release personal details of users
11. India's government: At last, we've cracked Blackberry's encryption
12. Memory exhaustion DoS vulnerability hits Google's Chrome
13. 44% of second hand mobile devices still contain sensitive data
14. Spammers attacking Microsoft's CAPTCHA -- again
Notable article for September - Spamming vendor launches managed spamming service.
01. DoS vulnerability hits Google's Chrome, crashes with all tabs
02. Malware and spam attacks exploiting Picasa and ImageShack
03. Spamming vendor launches managed spamming service
04. Facebook introducing new security warning feature
05. Google downplays Chrome's carpet-bombing flaw
06. Targeted malware attack against U.S schools intercepted
07. The most "dangerous" celebrities to search for in 2008
08. Norwegian BitTorrent tracker under DDoS attack
09. Attacker: Hacking Sarah Palin's email was easy
10. Bill O'Reilly's web site hacked, attackers release personal details of users
11. India's government: At last, we've cracked Blackberry's encryption
12. Memory exhaustion DoS vulnerability hits Google's Chrome
13. 44% of second hand mobile devices still contain sensitive data
14. Spammers attacking Microsoft's CAPTCHA -- again
Independent Security Consultancy, Threat Intelligence Analysis (OSINT/Cyber Counter Intelligence) and Competitive Intelligence research on demand. Insightful, unbiased, and client-tailored assessments, neatly communicated in the form of interactive reports - because anticipating the emerging threatscape is what shapes the big picture at the end of the day. Approach me at dancho.danchev@hush.com
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Eight
In the spirit of "taking a bite out of cybercrime", here are the latest fake security software domains, typosquatted and already acquiring traffic through a dozen of malware campaigns redirecting to most of them :
antivirus-scanner-online.com (67.205.75.14)
archivepacker.com (78.157.142.111)
winpacker.com
xh-codec.net
securedownloadcenter.com (89.18.189.44)
winupdates-server.com
browserssecuritypage.com
megatradetds0.com
quickscanpc.com (78.159.118.144)
clickchecker6.com
gensoftdownload.com (91.203.93.25)
online-av-scan2008.com (66.232.105.232)
anothersoftportal09.com
bigfreesoftarchive.com
celebs-on-video-08.com
celebs-on-video-2008.com
cleansoftportal2009.com
hot-p0rntube.com
hot-porn-tube-2008.com
hot-porn-tube2008.com
hot-porn-tube2009.com
justdomain08.com
new-porntube-2008.com
online-av-scan2008.com
s0ftvvarep0rtal.com
s0ftvvareportal.com
s0ftvvareportal08.com
s0ftwarep0rtal08.com
softportalforfun.com
softportalforfun08.com
softportalforfun2008.com
softvvareportal.com
softvvareportal08.com
softvvareportal2008.com
trustedsoftportal06.com
trustedsoftportal2008.com
antivirus-online-08.com (89.187.48.155; 218.106.90.227)
anti-virus-xp.com
anti-virus-xp.net
anti-virusxp2008.net
antimalware09.com
antivirxp.net
av-xp08.net
av-xp2008.com
av-xp2008.net
avx08.net
axp2008.com
e-antiviruspro.com
eantivirus-payment.com
ekerberos.com
online-security-systems.com
xpprotector.com
youpornzztube.com
sp-preventer.com (92.241.163.32)
spypreventers.com
u-a-v-2008.com (92.241.163.31)
uav2008.com
power-avcc.com (92.62.101.57)
power-avc.com
pvrantivirus.com
m-s-a-v-c.com (92.62.101.55)
ms-avcc.com
ms-avc.com
wav2008.com (92.241.163.30)
wiav2009.com
win-av.com
windows-av.com
windowsav.com
You know the drill.
Related posts:
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Seven
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Six
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Five
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Four
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Three
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Two
Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software
antivirus-scanner-online.com (67.205.75.14)
archivepacker.com (78.157.142.111)
winpacker.com
xh-codec.net
securedownloadcenter.com (89.18.189.44)
winupdates-server.com
browserssecuritypage.com
megatradetds0.com
quickscanpc.com (78.159.118.144)
clickchecker6.com
gensoftdownload.com (91.203.93.25)
online-av-scan2008.com (66.232.105.232)
anothersoftportal09.com
bigfreesoftarchive.com
celebs-on-video-08.com
celebs-on-video-2008.com
cleansoftportal2009.com
hot-p0rntube.com
hot-porn-tube-2008.com
hot-porn-tube2008.com
hot-porn-tube2009.com
justdomain08.com
new-porntube-2008.com
online-av-scan2008.com
s0ftvvarep0rtal.com
s0ftvvareportal.com
s0ftvvareportal08.com
s0ftwarep0rtal08.com
softportalforfun.com
softportalforfun08.com
softportalforfun2008.com
softvvareportal.com
softvvareportal08.com
softvvareportal2008.com
trustedsoftportal06.com
trustedsoftportal2008.com
antivirus-online-08.com (89.187.48.155; 218.106.90.227)
anti-virus-xp.com
anti-virus-xp.net
anti-virusxp2008.net
antimalware09.com
antivirxp.net
av-xp08.net
av-xp2008.com
av-xp2008.net
avx08.net
axp2008.com
e-antiviruspro.com
eantivirus-payment.com
ekerberos.com
online-security-systems.com
xpprotector.com
youpornzztube.com
sp-preventer.com (92.241.163.32)
spypreventers.com
u-a-v-2008.com (92.241.163.31)
uav2008.com
power-avcc.com (92.62.101.57)
power-avc.com
pvrantivirus.com
m-s-a-v-c.com (92.62.101.55)
ms-avcc.com
ms-avc.com
wav2008.com (92.241.163.30)
wiav2009.com
win-av.com
windows-av.com
windowsav.com
You know the drill.
Related posts:
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Seven
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Six
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Five
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Four
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Three
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Two
Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software
Independent Security Consultancy, Threat Intelligence Analysis (OSINT/Cyber Counter Intelligence) and Competitive Intelligence research on demand. Insightful, unbiased, and client-tailored assessments, neatly communicated in the form of interactive reports - because anticipating the emerging threatscape is what shapes the big picture at the end of the day. Approach me at dancho.danchev@hush.com
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)