Rogue Android Apps Hosting Web Site Exposes Malicious Infrastructure

With cybercriminals continuing to populate the cybercrime ecosystem with automatically generated and monetized mobile malware variants, we continue to observe a logical shift towards convergence of cybercrime-friendly revenue sharing affiliate networks, and malicious infrastructure providers, on their way to further achieve a posive ROI (return on investment) out of their risk-forwarding fraudulent activities.

I've recently spotted a legitimately looking, rogue Android apps hosting Web site, directly connected to a market leading DIY API-enabled mobile malware generating/monetizing platform, further exposing related fraudulent operations, performed, while utilizing the malicious infrastructure, which I'll expose in this post.

Let's assess the campaign, expose the malicious infrastructure behind it, list the cybercrime-friendly premium rate SMS numbers, involved in it, as well as related malicious MD5s, known to have participated in the campaign/have utilized the same malicious infrastructure.

Sample rogue Android apps hosting URL: hxxp://androidapps.mob.wf - 37.1.206.173

Responding to the same IP (37.1.206.173) are also the following fraudulent domains:
hxxp://22-minuty.ru
hxxp://nygolfpro.com
hxxp://bloomster.dp.ua
hxxp://stdstudio.com.ua
hxxp://autosolnce.ru

Detection rate for sample rogue Android apps:
MD5: 4bf349b601fd73c74eafc01ce8ea8be7
MD5: c4508c127029571e5b6f6b08e5c91415
MD5: bd296d35bf41b9ae73ed816cc7c4c38b

Sample redirection chain exposing the fraudulent infrastructure: hxxp://22-minuty.ru -> hxxp://playersharks2.com/player.php/?userid= - 94.242.214.133; 94.242.214.155

Known to have responded to the same IPs (94.242.214.133; 94.242.214.155) are also the following fraudulent domains, participating in a related revenue-sharing affiliate network based type of monetization scheme:
hxxp://4books.ru
hxxp://annoncer.media-bar.ru
hxxp://booksbutton1.com
hxxp://film-club.ru
hxxp://film-popcorn.ru
hxxp://filmbuttons.ru
hxxp://filmi-doma.com
hxxp://filmonika.ru
hxxp://films.909.su
hxxp://indiiskie.ru
hxxp://kinozond.ru
hxxp://media-bar.ru
hxxp://playersharks2.com
hxxp://playersharks4.com
hxxp://pplayer.ru
hxxp://sharksplayer2.com
hxxp://sharksplayer3.ru
hxxp://sharksreader.ru
hxxp://tema-info.ru
hxxp://toppfilms.ru
hxxp://video-movies.com
hxxp://video.909.su
hxxp://videodomm.ru
hxxp://videozzy.com
hxxp://videozzzz.ru
hxxp://websharks.ru
hxxp://yasmotrju.ru

Malicious MD5s known to have phoned back to the same IP (94.242.214.133):
MD5: 9ec8aef6dc0e3db8596ac54318847328
MD5: 895c38ec4fb1fbee47bfb3b6ee3a170b
MD5: c4d88b32b605500b7f86de5569a11e22
MD5: 49861fd4748dd57c192139e8bd5b71e3
MD5: 8b350f8a32ef4b28267995cf8f0ceae1

Premium rate SMS numbers involved in the fraudulent scheme:
7151; 9151; 2855; 3855; 3858; 2858; 8151; 7155; 7255; 3190; 3200; 3170; 3006; 3150; 6150; 4124; 4481; 7781; 5014; 1151; 4125; 1141; 1131; 1350; 3354; 7122; 3353; 7132; 3352; 8355; 8155; 8055; 7515; 1037; 1953; 3968; 5370; 1952; 3652; 5373; 9191; 1005; 7019; 7250; 1951; 7015; 7099; 7030

Once executed MD5: 9ec8aef6dc0e3db8596ac54318847328 phones back to the following C&C servers, further exposing the malicious infrastructure:
67.215.246.10:6881
82.221.103.244:6881
114.252.58.66:6407
89.136.77.86:45060
212.25.54.183:32822
107.191.223.72:22127
87.89.149.106:24874
82.247.154.128:47988
108.181.68.73:47342
82.74.179.126:52352
121.222.168.146:64043
217.121.30.46:34421
115.143.245.78:51548
110.15.205.16:51477
37.114.69.97:19079
85.229.206.243:55955
95.109.112.178:60018
95.68.195.182:44025
239.192.152.143:6771
109.187.54.101:13100
117.194.5.97:55535
95.29.112.178:59039
109.162.133.97:19459
83.205.112.178:11420
95.68.3.182:53450
175.115.103.140:52696
197.2.133.97:27334
84.55.8.7:10060
27.5.132.243:19962
123.109.176.178:36527
175.157.176.178:22906
188.187.147.247:14745
178.212.133.205:52416
145.255.1.250:41973
213.21.32.190:51413
93.73.165.31:61889
176.97.214.119:46605
185.51.127.134:16447
109.239.42.123:16845
77.232.158.215:40266
178.173.37.2:47126
62.84.24.219:47594
37.144.87.15:13448
5.251.28.179:39620
94.19.66.51:42894
94.51.242.89:35691
93.179.102.216:24458
212.106.62.201:44821
95.52.69.39:12249
46.118.64.45:44172
217.175.33.130:45244
185.8.126.226:32972
93.92.200.202:56664
94.214.220.37:35196
46.182.132.67:32103
46.188.123.131:11510
83.139.188.142:34549
188.232.124.16:27582
91.213.23.226:19751
95.32.142.28:55555
95.83.188.157:15714
95.128.244.10:59239
176.31.240.170:6882
79.109.88.241:6881
91.215.90.109:34600
62.198.229.165:6881
91.148.118.250:21558
81.82.210.40:6881
97.121.23.163:31801
78.186.155.62:6881
78.1.158.105:47475
79.160.62.185:9005
213.87.123.81:17790
178.150.154.26:26816
83.174.247.71:59908
109.87.175.144:29374
86.57.186.171:45013
193.222.140.60:35691
176.115.158.138:24253
42.98.191.90:7085
178.127.152.72:10107
82.239.74.201:61137
185.19.22.192:46337
86.185.92.38:10819
78.214.194.145:24521
37.78.85.173:49001
82.70.112.150:32371
37.131.212.35:18525
79.136.156.151:59659
2.134.48.150:12530
95.29.164.86:6881
37.147.16.242:64954
79.45.36.86:22690
112.208.182.65:56374
62.99.29.74:44822
95.16.12.111:12765
124.169.69.69:41216
5.164.83.49:62348
79.22.73.216:61914
46.63.131.146:6881
89.150.119.203:55029
58.23.49.24:2717
83.41.5.241:45624
87.21.80.23:27949
178.150.176.150:57997
178.127.195.146:58278
5.141.236.13:15784
125.182.35.138:54094
99.228.23.82:29302
14.111.131.146:33433
122.177.90.137:25375
178.223.195.146:54596
182.54.112.150:1058
109.23.145.152:31514
213.241.204.31:27769
188.168.58.6:45823
2.94.4.215:50830
42.91.39.236:13923
116.33.113.4:19973
86.182.170.27:25712
177.82.206.231:39043
122.143.152.35:7890
217.13.219.147:39190
77.75.13.195:16279
87.239.5.144:58749
89.141.116.97:49001
176.106.11.49:44690
112.14.110.199:33243
122.26.6.52:20527
178.223.195.146:23034
98.118.85.85:51413
190.63.131.146:6881
46.151.242.82:16046
176.106.19.185:46114
85.113.157.12:62633
192.168.0.105:58749
211.89.227.34:56333
36.68.16.149:42839
31.15.80.10:42061
130.15.95.112:6881
87.119.245.51:6882
109.173.101.19:19700
193.93.187.234:1214
176.106.18.254:43469
176.183.137.53:19155
176.113.168.51:52672
93.123.60.130:52981
79.100.9.81:14053
91.124.125.16:29914
46.16.228.135:53473
95.61.55.234:22974
190.213.101.39:44376
58.173.158.99:50821
188.25.108.102:31047
95.153.175.173:15563
75.120.194.116:58001
61.6.218.126:63291
128.70.19.98:64296
5.167.193.5:25861
185.57.73.27:47892
109.205.249.105:58449
77.228.235.226:57715
2.62.49.161:49001
67.234.161.61:65228
91.243.100.237:40431
105.155.1.67:16084
73.34.178.71:41864
145.255.169.122:4612
92.241.241.4:61613
145.255.21.166:46596
83.253.71.148:34016
173.246.26.126:12988
79.181.115.213:43853
46.237.69.97:50772
86.159.67.146:48959
213.100.105.54:52147
178.45.129.126:45710
188.78.232.53:39336
70.82.20.41:11248
88.132.82.254:52722
85.198.154.126:35403
89.67.245.2:21705
95.76.128.209:36640
61.242.114.3:6383
79.112.156.169:10236
95.25.111.173:40781
108.36.82.254:57393
88.8.84.79:56740
118.36.49.220:59561
60.197.149.187:12996
86.26.224.104:39597
120.61.161.250:10023
151.249.239.173:6881
86.178.212.41:28489
95.180.244.144:48245
111.171.83.212:52952
122.164.99.166:1024
201.110.110.63:19314
79.100.52.144:54312
194.219.103.45:24008
178.89.171.19:10003
124.12.192.197:6881
92.96.186.112:31100
207.216.138.62:6881
194.8.234.230:51413
92.220.24.133:6881
2.134.203.233:6881
122.169.237.54:17407
36.232.153.137:16001
130.43.123.202:45689
86.73.45.54:56161
37.215.93.59:27997
78.154.164.176:42780
5.10.134.6:50452
98.176.222.50:61000
93.54.90.126:1189
220.81.46.201:51526
39.41.111.173:7702
41.111.41.122:19132
211.108.64.209:20728
178.66.212.41:14865
182.187.103.45:57751
118.41.230.79:52520
186.155.231.45:34294
109.174.113.128:15947
188.6.88.229:16785
99.247.58.79:23197
94.137.237.54:14617
197.203.129.67:10204
5.107.65.67:21618
117.194.114.71:64476
94.153.45.54:32715
2.176.158.50:17404
5.18.178.71:50971
78.130.212.41:63075
86.121.45.54:55858
109.187.1.67:15413
108.199.125.160:38558
83.181.18.121:15859
93.109.242.198:26736
95.86.220.68:27877
37.204.22.24:24146
198.203.28.43:17685

What's particularly interesting, about this campaign, is the fact, that, the Terms of Service (ToS) presented to gullible and socially engineered end users, refers to a well known Web site (jmobi.net), directly connected with the market leading DIY API-enabled mobile malware generating/monetization platform, extensively profiled in a previously published post.

As cybercriminals continue to achieve a cybercrime-ecosystem wide standardization, we'll continue to observe an increase in fraudulent activity, with the cybercriminals behind it, continuing to innovate, on their way to achieve efficient monetization schemes, and risk-forwarding centered fraudulent models, further contributing to the adaptive innovation to be applied to the current TTPs (tactics, techniques and procedures) utilized by them.

Win32.Nixofro Serving, Malicious Infrastructure, Exposes Fraudulent Facebook Social Media Service Provider

I've recently spotted a malicious, cybercrime-friendly SWF iframe/redirector injecting service, that also exposes a long-run Win32.Nixofro serving malicious infrastructure, currently utilized for the purpose of operating a rogue social media service provider, that's targeting Turkish Facebook users through the ubiquitous social engineering vector, for such type of campaigns, namely, the fake Adobe Flash player.

Let's profile the service, discuss its relevance in the broader context of the threat landscape, provide actionable/historical threat intelligene on the malicious infrastructure, the rogue domains involved in it, the malicious MD5s served by the cybercriminals behind it, and directly link it to a previously profiled Facebook spreading P2P-Worm.Win32.Palevo serving campaign.

The managed SWF iframe/redirector service, is a great example of a cybercrime-as-a-service type of underground market proposition, empowering, both, sophisticated and novice cybercriminals with the necessary (malvertising) 'know-how', in an efficient manner, directly intersecting with the commercial availability of sophisticated mass Web site/Web server malicious script embedding platforms.

The managed SWF iframe/redirector injecting service is currently responding to 108.162.197.62 and 108.162.196.62 Known to have responded to the same IPs (108.162.197.62; 108.162.196.62) is also a key part of the malicious infrastructure that I'll expose in this post, namely hizliservis.pw - Email: furkan@cod.com.

Known to have phoned back to the same IP (108.162.197.62) are also the following malicious MD5s:
MD5: 432efe0fa88d2a9e191cb95fa88e7b36
MD5: 720ecb1cf4f28663f4ab25eedf620341
MD5: 02691863e9dfb9e69b68f5fca932e729
MD5: 69ed70a82cb35a454c60c501025415aa
MD5: cc586a176668ceef14891b15e1b412ab
MD5: 74291941bddcec131c8c6d531fcb1886
MD5: 7c27d9ff25fc40119480e4fe2c7ca987
MD5: 72c030db7163a7a7bf2871a449d4ea3c
MD5: 432efe0fa88d2a9e191cb95fa88e7b36

Known to have phoned to the same IP (108.162.196.62) are also the following malicious MD5s:
MD5: eda3f015204e9565c779e0725915864f
MD5: effcfe91beaf7a3ed2f4ac79525c5fc5
MD5: 14acd831691173ced830f4b51a93e1ca
MD5: 7f93b0c611f7020d28f7a545847b51e0
MD5: bcfce3a9bf2c87dab806623154d49f10
MD5: 4c90a89396d4109d8e4e2491c5da4846
MD5: 289c4f925fdec861c7f765a65b7270af

Sample redirection chain leading to the fake Adobe Flash Player:
hxxp://hizliservis.pw/unlu.htm -> hxxp://hizliservis.pw/indir.php -> hxxp://unluvideolari.info -> hxxp://videotr.in/player.swf -> hxxp://izleyelim.s3.amazonaws.com/movie.mp4&skin=newtubedark/NewTubeDark.xml&streamer=lighttpd&image=hqdefault.jpg

Domain name reconnaissance:
hizliservis.pw - Email: furkan@cod.com
videotr.in - Email: tiiknet@yandex.com; snack@log-z.com
izleyelim.s3.amazonaws.com - 176.32.97.249

Within hizliservis.pw, we can easily spot yet another part of the same malicious/fraudulent infrastructure, namely, the rogue social media distribution platform's login interface.

Sample redirection chain leading to a currently active fake Adobe Flash Player (Win32.Nixofro):
hxxp://socialmediasystem.net/down.php ->  hxxps://profonixback31.googlecode.com/svn/FlashPlayer_Guncelle.exe

Detection rate for the fake Adobe Flash Player:
MD5: 28c3c503d398914bdd2c2b3fdc1f9ea4 - detected by 36 out of 50 antivirus scanners as Win32.Nixofro

Once executed, the sample phones back to profonixuser.net (141.101.117.218)

Known to have responded to the same IP (141.101.117.218) are also the following malicious MD5s:
MD5: 53360155012d8e5c648aca277cbde587
MD5: a66a1c42cc6fb775254cf32c8db7ad5b
MD5: a051fd83fc8577b00d8d925581af1a3b
MD5: f47784817a8a04284af4b602c7719cb7
MD5: 2e5c75318275844ce0ff7028908e8fb4
MD5: 90205a9740df5825ce80229ca105b9e8

Domain name reconnaissance for the rogue social media distibution platform:
socialmediasystem.Net (141.101.118.159; 141.101.118.158) - Email: furkan@cod.com

Sample redirection chain for the rogue social media distribution platform's core functions:
hxxp://profonixuser.net/new.php?nocache=1044379803 -> hxxp://sosyalmedyakusu.com/oauth.php (108.162.199.203; 108.162.198.203) Email: furkan@cod.com -> hxxp://hizliservis.pw/face.php -> hxxp://socialhaberler.com/manyak.php -> hxxp://profonixuser.net/new.php -> hxxp://profonixuser.net/amk.php (141.101.117.218) -> hxxp://me.cf/dhtcw (31.170.164.67) -> hxxps://video-players.herokuapp.com/?55517841177 (107.20.187.159) -> hxxp://kingprofonix.net/hxxp://kingprofonix.com (108.162.198.203) the same domain is also known to have responded to 108.162.197.62

Related MD5s known to have phoned back to the same IP (108.162.198.203) in the past:
MD5: 505f615f9e1c4fdc03964b36ec877d57

Sample internal redirectors structure:
hxxp://profonixuser.net/fb.php -> hxxp://profonixuser.net/manyak.php -> hxxp://molotofcu.com/google/hede.php (199.27.134.199) -> hxxp://profonixuser.net/pp.php -> hxxp://gdriv.es/awalbbmprtbpahpolcdt?jgxebgqjl -> hxxps://googledrive.com/host/0B08vFK4UtN5kdjV2NklHVTVjcTQ -> hxxp://sosyalmedyakusu.com/s3x.php?ref=google
hxxp://profonixuser.net/user.php -> hxxp://goo.gl/ber2EP -> hxxps://buexe-x.googlecode.com/svn/FlashPlayer%20Setup.exe -> MD5: 60137c1cb77bed9afcbbbc3ad910df3f -> phones back to wjetphp.com (46.105.56.61)

Secondary sample internal redirectors structure:
hxxp://profonixuser.net/yarak.txt -> hxxp://profonixuser.net/u.exe -> hxxp://profonixuser.net/yeni.txt -> hxxp://profonixuser.net/yeni.exe -> hxxp://profonixuser.net/recep.html -> hxxp://goo.gl/ber2EP -> hxxp://wjetphp.com/unlu/player.swf -> hxxp://profonixuser.net/kral.txt -> hxxp://likef.in/fate.exe - 108.162.194.123; 108.162.195.123; 108.162.199.107 - known to have phoned back to the same IP is also the following malicious MD5: effcfe91beaf7a3ed2f4ac79525c5fc5 - detected by 35 out of 50 antivirus scanners as Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Foreign.kcme

Once executed, the sample phones back to likef.biz (176.53.119.195). The same domain is also known to have responded to the following IPs 141.101.116.165; 141.101.117.165.

Here's comes the interesting part. The fine folks at ExposedBotnets, have already intercepted a malicious Facebook spreading campaign, that's using the already profiled in this post videotr.in.

Having directly connected the cybercrime-friendly SWF iframe/redirector injecting service, with hizliservis.pw as well as the SocialMediaSystem as being part of the same malicious infrastructure, it's time to profile the fraudulent/malicious adversaries behind the campaigns. The cybercriminals behind these campaigns, appear to be operating a rogue social media service, targeting Facebook Inc.

Sample screenshots of the social media distribution platform's Web based interface:

Sample advertisement of the rogue social media distribution platform:

Skype ID of the rogue company: ProFonixcod
Secondary company name: ProfMedya - hxxp://profmedya.com - 178.33.42.254; 188.138.9.39; 89.19.20.242 - Email: kayahoca@gmail.com. The same domain, profmedya.com used to respond to 188.138.9.39.

Domains known to have responded to the same IP (188.138.9.39) are also the following malicious domains:
hxxp://facebooook.biz
hxxp://worldmedya.net
fhxxp://astotoliked.net
hxxp://adsmedya.com
hxxp://facebookmedya.biz
hxxp://fastotolike.com
hxxp://fbmedyahizmetleri.com
hxxp://fiberbayim.com
hxxp://profonixcoder.com
hxxp://sansurmedya.biz
hxxp://sosyalpaket.com
hxxp://takipciniarttir.net
hxxp://videomedya.net
hxxp://videopackage.biz
hxxp://worldmedya.net
hxxp://www--facebook.net
hxxp://www.facebook-java.com
hxxp://www.facemlike.com
hxxp://www.fastcekim.com
hxxp://www.fastotolike.com
hxxp://www.fbmedyahizmetleri.com
hxxp://www.profmedya.com
hxxp://www.sansurmedya.com

Rogue social media distribution platform operator's name: Fatih Konar
Associated emails: fiberbayimdestek@hotmail.com.tr; nerdenezaman@hotmail.com.tr
Google+ Account: hxxps://plus.google.com/103847743683129439807/about
Twitter account: hxxps://twitter.com/ProfonixCodtr

Domain name reconnaissance:
profonixcod.com (profonix-cod.com) - 216.119.143.194 - Email: abazafamily_@hotmail.com (related domains known to have been registered with the same email - warningyoutube.com; likebayi.com)
profonixcod.net

Updated will be posted as soon as new developments take place.

Summarizing Webroot's Threat Blog Posts for February

The following is a brief summary of all of my posts at Webroot's Threat Blog for February, 2014. You can subscribe to Webroot's Threat Blog RSS Feed, or follow me on Twitter:

01. Cybercriminals release Socks4/Socks5 based Alexa PageRank boosting application
02. Market leading ‘standardized cybercrime-friendly E-shop’ service brings 2500+ boutique E-shops online
03. Managed TeamViewer based anti-forensics capable virtual machines offered as a service
04. Malicious campaign relies on rogue WordPress sites, leads to client-side exploits through the Magnitude exploit kit
05. ‘Hacking for hire’ teams occupy multiple underground market segments, monetize their malicious ‘know how’
06. DoubleClick malvertising campaign exposes long-run beneath the radar malvertising infrastructure
07. Spamvertised ‘Image has been sent’ Evernote themed campaign serves client-side exploits
08. Spamvertised ‘You received a new message from Skype voicemail service’ themed emails lead to Angler exploit kit

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter.

Summarizing Webroot's Threat Blog Posts for January

The following is a brief summary of all of my posts at Webroot's Threat Blog for January, 2014. You can subscribe to Webroot's Threat Blog RSS Feed, or follow me on Twitter:

01. ‘Adobe License Service Center Order NR’ and ‘Notice to appear in court’ themed malicious spam campaigns intercepted in the wild
02. New “Windows 8 Home Screen’ themed passwords/game keys stealer spotted in the wild
03. Vendor of TDoS products resets market life cycle of well known 3G USB modem/GSM/SIM card-based TDoS tool
04. New TDoS market segment entrant introduces 96 SIM cards compatible custom GSM module, positions itself as market disruptor
05. DIY Python-based mass insecure WordPress scanning/exploting tool with hundreds of pre-defined exploits spotted in the wild
06. Google’s reCAPTCHA under automatic fire from a newly launched reCAPTCHA-solving/breaking service
07. Fully automated, API-supporting service, undermines Facebook and Google’s ‘SMS/Mobile number activation’ account registration process
08. Newly launched managed ‘compromised/hacked accounts E-shop hosting as service’ standardizes the monetization process
09. Newly released Web based DDoS/Passwords stealing-capable DIY botnet generating tool spotted in the wild
10. Cybercriminals release new Web based keylogging system, rely on penetration pricing to gain market share
  
This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter.

Facebook Spreading, Amazon AWS/Cloudflare/Google Docs Hosted Campaign, Serves P2P-Worm.Win32.Palevo

This summary is not available. Please click here to view the post.

Facebook Spreading, Amazon AWS/Cloudflare/Google Docs Hosted Campaign, Serves P2P-Worm.Win32.Palevo

I've recently spotted a malicious, cybercrime-friendly SWF iframe/redirector injecting service, that also exposes a long-run Win32.Nixofro serving malicious infrastructure, currently utilized for the purpose of operating a rogue social media service provider, that's targeting Turkish Facebook users through the ubiquitous social engineering vector, for such type of campaigns, namely, the fake Adobe Flash player.

Let's profile the service, discuss its relevance in the broader context of the threat landscape, provide actionable/historical threat intelligene on the malicious infrastructure, the rogue domains involved in it, the malicious MD5s served by the cybercriminals behind it, and directly link it to a previously profiled Facebook spreading P2P-Worm.Win32.Palevo serving campaign.

The managed SWF iframe/redirector service, is a great example of a cybercrime-as-a-service type of underground market proposition, empowering, both, sophisticated and novice cybercriminals with the necessary (malvertising) 'know-how', in an efficient manner, directly intersecting with the commercial availability of sophisticated mass Web site/Web server malicious script embedding platforms.

The managed SWF iframe/redirector injecting service is currently responding to 108.162.197.62 and 108.162.196.62 Known to have responded to the same IPs (108.162.197.62; 108.162.196.62) is also a key part of the malicious infrastructure that I'll expose in this post, namely hizliservis.pw - Email: furkan@cod.com.

Known to have phoned back to the same IP (108.162.197.62) are also the following malicious MD5s:
MD5: 432efe0fa88d2a9e191cb95fa88e7b36
MD5: 720ecb1cf4f28663f4ab25eedf620341
MD5: 02691863e9dfb9e69b68f5fca932e729
MD5: 69ed70a82cb35a454c60c501025415aa
MD5: cc586a176668ceef14891b15e1b412ab
MD5: 74291941bddcec131c8c6d531fcb1886
MD5: 7c27d9ff25fc40119480e4fe2c7ca987
MD5: 72c030db7163a7a7bf2871a449d4ea3c
MD5: 432efe0fa88d2a9e191cb95fa88e7b36

Known to have phoned to the same IP (108.162.196.62) are also the following malicious MD5s:
MD5: eda3f015204e9565c779e0725915864f
MD5: effcfe91beaf7a3ed2f4ac79525c5fc5
MD5: 14acd831691173ced830f4b51a93e1ca
MD5: 7f93b0c611f7020d28f7a545847b51e0
MD5: bcfce3a9bf2c87dab806623154d49f10
MD5: 4c90a89396d4109d8e4e2491c5da4846
MD5: 289c4f925fdec861c7f765a65b7270af

Sample redirection chain leading to the fake Adobe Flash Player:
hxxp://hizliservis.pw/unlu.htm -> hxxp://hizliservis.pw/indir.php -> hxxp://unluvideolari.info -> hxxp://videotr.in/player.swf -> hxxp://izleyelim.s3.amazonaws.com/movie.mp4&skin=newtubedark/NewTubeDark.xml&streamer=lighttpd&image=hqdefault.jpg

Domain name reconnaissance:
hizliservis.pw - Email: furkan@cod.com
videotr.in - Email: tiiknet@yandex.com; snack@log-z.com
izleyelim.s3.amazonaws.com - 176.32.97.249

Within hizliservis.pw, we can easily spot yet another part of the same malicious/fraudulent infrastructure, namely, the rogue social media distribution platform's login interface.

Sample redirection chain leading to a currently active fake Adobe Flash Player (Win32.Nixofro):
hxxp://socialmediasystem.net/down.php ->  hxxps://profonixback31.googlecode.com/svn/FlashPlayer_Guncelle.exe

Detection rate for the fake Adobe Flash Player:
MD5: 28c3c503d398914bdd2c2b3fdc1f9ea4 - detected by 36 out of 50 antivirus scanners as Win32.Nixofro

Once executed, the sample phones back to profonixuser.net (141.101.117.218)

Known to have responded to the same IP (141.101.117.218) are also the following malicious MD5s:
MD5: 53360155012d8e5c648aca277cbde587
MD5: a66a1c42cc6fb775254cf32c8db7ad5b
MD5: a051fd83fc8577b00d8d925581af1a3b
MD5: f47784817a8a04284af4b602c7719cb7
MD5: 2e5c75318275844ce0ff7028908e8fb4
MD5: 90205a9740df5825ce80229ca105b9e8

Domain name reconnaissance for the rogue social media distibution platform:
socialmediasystem.Net (141.101.118.159; 141.101.118.158) - Email: furkan@cod.com

Sample redirection chain for the rogue social media distribution platform's core functions:
hxxp://profonixuser.net/new.php?nocache=1044379803 -> hxxp://sosyalmedyakusu.com/oauth.php (108.162.199.203; 108.162.198.203) Email: furkan@cod.com -> hxxp://hizliservis.pw/face.php -> hxxp://socialhaberler.com/manyak.php -> hxxp://profonixuser.net/new.php -> hxxp://profonixuser.net/amk.php (141.101.117.218) -> hxxp://me.cf/dhtcw (31.170.164.67) -> hxxps://video-players.herokuapp.com/?55517841177 (107.20.187.159) -> hxxp://kingprofonix.net/hxxp://kingprofonix.com (108.162.198.203) the same domain is also known to have responded to 108.162.197.62

Related MD5s known to have phoned back to the same IP (108.162.198.203) in the past:
MD5: 505f615f9e1c4fdc03964b36ec877d57

Sample internal redirectors structure:
hxxp://profonixuser.net/fb.php -> hxxp://profonixuser.net/manyak.php -> hxxp://molotofcu.com/google/hede.php (199.27.134.199) -> hxxp://profonixuser.net/pp.php -> hxxp://gdriv.es/awalbbmprtbpahpolcdt?jgxebgqjl -> hxxps://googledrive.com/host/0B08vFK4UtN5kdjV2NklHVTVjcTQ -> hxxp://sosyalmedyakusu.com/s3x.php?ref=google
hxxp://profonixuser.net/user.php -> hxxp://goo.gl/ber2EP -> hxxps://buexe-x.googlecode.com/svn/FlashPlayer%20Setup.exe -> MD5: 60137c1cb77bed9afcbbbc3ad910df3f -> phones back to wjetphp.com (46.105.56.61)

Secondary sample internal redirectors structure:
hxxp://profonixuser.net/yarak.txt -> hxxp://profonixuser.net/u.exe -> hxxp://profonixuser.net/yeni.txt -> hxxp://profonixuser.net/yeni.exe -> hxxp://profonixuser.net/recep.html -> hxxp://goo.gl/ber2EP -> hxxp://wjetphp.com/unlu/player.swf -> hxxp://profonixuser.net/kral.txt -> hxxp://likef.in/fate.exe - 108.162.194.123; 108.162.195.123; 108.162.199.107 - known to have phoned back to the same IP is also the following malicious MD5: effcfe91beaf7a3ed2f4ac79525c5fc5 - detected by 35 out of 50 antivirus scanners as Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Foreign.kcme

Once executed, the sample phones back to likef.biz (176.53.119.195). The same domain is also known to have responded to the following IPs 141.101.116.165; 141.101.117.165.

Here's comes the interesting part. The fine folks at ExposedBotnets, have already intercepted a malicious Facebook spreading campaign, that's using the already profiled in this post videotr.in.

Having directly connected the cybercrime-friendly SWF iframe/redirector injecting service, with hizliservis.pw as well as the SocialMediaSystem as being part of the same malicious infrastructure, it's time to profile the fraudulent/malicious adversaries behind the campaigns. The cybercriminals behind these campaigns, appear to be operating a rogue social media service, targeting Facebook Inc.

Sample screenshots of the social media distribution platform's Web based interface:

Sample advertisement of the rogue social media distribution platform:

Skype ID of the rogue company: ProFonixcod
Secondary company name: ProfMedya - hxxp://profmedya.com - 178.33.42.254; 188.138.9.39; 89.19.20.242 - Email: kayahoca@gmail.com. The same domain, profmedya.com used to respond to 188.138.9.39.

Domains known to have responded to the same IP (188.138.9.39) are also the following malicious domains:
hxxp://facebooook.biz
hxxp://worldmedya.net
fhxxp://astotoliked.net
hxxp://adsmedya.com
hxxp://facebookmedya.biz
hxxp://fastotolike.com
hxxp://fbmedyahizmetleri.com
hxxp://fiberbayim.com
hxxp://profonixcoder.com
hxxp://sansurmedya.biz
hxxp://sosyalpaket.com
hxxp://takipciniarttir.net
hxxp://videomedya.net
hxxp://videopackage.biz
hxxp://worldmedya.net
hxxp://www--facebook.net
hxxp://www.facebook-java.com
hxxp://www.facemlike.com
hxxp://www.fastcekim.com
hxxp://www.fastotolike.com
hxxp://www.fbmedyahizmetleri.com
hxxp://www.profmedya.com
hxxp://www.sansurmedya.com

Rogue social media distribution platform operator's name: Fatih Konar
Associated emails: fiberbayimdestek@hotmail.com.tr; nerdenezaman@hotmail.com.tr
Google+ Account: hxxps://plus.google.com/103847743683129439807/about
Twitter account: hxxps://twitter.com/ProfonixCodtr

Domain name reconnaissance:
profonixcod.com (profonix-cod.com) - 216.119.143.194 - Email: abazafamily_@hotmail.com (related domains known to have been registered with the same email - warningyoutube.com; likebayi.com)
profonixcod.net

Updated will be posted as soon as new developments take place.

Dissecting the Ongoing Febipos/Carfekab Rogue Chrome/Firefox Extensions Dropping, Facebook Circulating Malicious Campaign

This summary is not available. Please click here to view the post.

Dissecting the Ongoing Febipos/Carfekab Rogue Chrome/Firefox Extensions Dropping, Facebook Circulating Malicious Campaign

This summary is not available. Please click here to view the post.

Fake Adobe Flash Player Serving Campaign Utilizes Google Hosting/Redirection Infrastructure, Spreads Across Facebook

What "better" time to spread malicious "joy", then during the Holidays? Cybercriminals are still busy maintaining a fake Adobe Flash Player serving, Facebook spreading campaign, which I originally intercepted during the Holidays, utilizing Google redirectors/hosting services. Despite the modest -- naturally conservative estimate -- click-through rate (45,000 clicks) compared to that of the most recently profiled similar Febipos spreading campaign, which resulted in over 1 million clicks, the campaign remains active, and continues tricking users into installing the rogue Adobe Flash Player, resulting in the continued spread of the campaign, on the Facebook Walls of socially engineered users.

Let's dissect the campaign, expose its infrastructure/command and control servers, and provide MD5s of the served malware.

Spamvertised Facebook URL+redirection chain: hxxp://goo.gl/QeshtO; hxxp://goo.gl/vVbrHp; hxxp://goo.gl/0oSJ7z; hxxp://goo.gl/38qIq8; hxxp://goo.gl/QNQhc5 -> hxxps://9dvme0lk2r0osqg3qb3rlk95z.storage.googleapis.com/q1fwum32gld35iab9d2u4o35bjsvhjhu309.html?ref=12 -> hxxp://goo.gl/wKXme1 -> hxxp://www.i-justice.org/g-o-27312-gooenn.html
(94.23.166.27) -> hxxp://f3c47a0d01f3ec343f57-2ba5bba9317af81ae21c42000295a455.r9.cf4.rackcdn.com/24471bmbqv07595?ref=27312&aff_sub=27312&sub_id=27312 -> hxxp://www.eklentidunyasi.com/dl.php (176.31.2.155) or hxxp://www.agentofex.com/dl.php (176.227.218.99; www.puee.in) ->
hxxp://docs.google.com/uc?export=download&id=0B6DFdqpSFDAlSmpsTkZkT2hvN28 or hxxps://doc-0g-4o-docs.googleusercontent.com/docs/securesc/ha0ro937gcuc7l7deffksulhg5h7mbp1/7fbm9gn67t8t18r8etd00juf0rvmrrmh/1387836000000/16300082901287672546/*/0BzU3dARQGry0TlMxN3F2STN0Z3M

GA Account ID: UA-36486228-1

Detection rate for the served malware: MD5: 30118bec581f80de46445aef79e6cf10 - detected by 33 out of 48 antivirus scanners as Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Blocker.dbud.

Once executed, the sample phones back to:
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/control8.txt
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/NewFile0008.exe
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/version.txt
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/list.txt
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/list.txt
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/buflash.xpi
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/bune10.zip
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/private/sandbox_status.php
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/extFiles/yok.txt

The files were offline in time of processing of the sample.

Related MD5s for the same served fake Adobe Flash Player:
MD5: 61f5af5d0067ea8d10f0764ff3c82066
MD5: 80b9ef43183abdd5b22482bc1cea7b36
MD5: 2da7cb838234eebbca3115fcafd6f513
MD5: 40ae8d901102ee3951c241b394eb94e9
MD5: 30118bec581f80de46445aef79e6cf10
MD5: 2de9865032e997d59c03bfd8435f1ada
MD5: fce013bec7b3651c100b6887c0a12eee

Once executed, MD5: fce013bec7b3651c100b6887c0a12eee phones back to:
hxxp://176.227.218.99/extFiles/control17.txt
hxxp://176.227.218.99/extFiles/NewFile00017.exe
hxxp://46.163.100.240/NewFile00017.exe
hxxp://176.227.218.99/NewFile00017.exe
hxxp://176.227.218.99/extFiles/extFiles/version.txt
hxxp://176.227.218.99/extFiles/extFiles/list.txt
hxxp://176.227.218.99/extFiles/extFiles/buflash.xpi
hxxp://176.227.218.99/extFiles/extFiles/bune10.zip

Files remain offline in the time of processing of the sample.

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter.