Just consider this scheme for a second. A well known money mule recruitment site Cash Transfers is maintaining a fast-flux infrastructure on behalf of the Asprox botnet, that is also providing hosting services for several hundred domains used on the last wave of SQL injection attacks. Ironically, the money mule recruitment site is sharing IPs with many of them. Who are these money launderers (cashtransfers.tk; cashtransfers.eu; type53.eu; sid57.tk; catdbw.mobi; cdrpoex.com etc. ) anyway?
"Cash-Transfers Inc. is an online-to-offline international money transfer service. We offer a secure, fast, and inexpensive means of sending money from the UK to offline recipients worldwide. Recipients do not require a bank account or Internet connection to receive funds. We have teamed with select local disbursement partners to provide a convenient, secure, and cost-effective means of sending money to family, friends and business partners abroad. The basic requirements to send money/transfer money are:
1) Senders must have Internet access and a bank account or credit/debit card to transfer money. However, recipients do not require either a bank account or Internet connection.
2) Money sent through Cash-Transfers Inc. is available for pick up at the distribution partner instantly, or, in most countries, money can be delivered to the recipient in a matter of hours.
3) Our local agents will call your recipient (during local business hours) to provide additional details, including: forms of identification required, hours of operation, and other locations. The sender will also receive an email confirmation with transaction details and tracking information."
The fast-flux infrastructure they're currently using is also providing services to domains that are currently used, or have been used in previous SQL injection attacks. Some info on the current DNS servers used in the fast-flux :
ns10.cashtransfers.tk
ns11.cashtransfers.tk
ns1.cashtransfers.tk
ns12.cashtransfers.tk
ns2.cashtransfers.tk
ns13.cashtransfers.tk
ns3.cashtransfers.tk
ns14.cashtransfers.tk
ns4.cashtransfers.tk
ns15.cashtransfers.tk
ns5.cashtransfers.tk
ns16.cashtransfers.tk
ns6.cashtransfers.tk
ns17.cashtransfers.tk
ns7.cashtransfers.tk
ns8.cashtransfers.tk
With the distributed and dynamic hosting infrastructure courtesy of the malware infected user, scammers, spammers, phishers and malware authors are only starting to experiment with the potential abuses of such an underground ecosystem build on the foundations of compromises hosts.
Related posts:
Storm Worm's Fast Flux Networks
Managed Fast Flux Provider
Fast Flux Spam and Scams Increasing
Fast Fluxing Yet Another Pharmacy Spam
Obfuscating Fast Fluxed SQL Injected Domains
Storm Worm Hosting Pharmaceutical Scams
Fast-Fluxing SQL injection attacks executed from the Asprox botnet
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Friday, July 18, 2008
Money Mule Recruiters use ASProx's Fast Fluxing Services
Tags:
ASProx,
Botnet,
Cash Transfers,
Fast-Flux,
Hacking,
Information Security,
Money Mule,
Money Mule Recruitment,
Security
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