Thursday, January 16, 2014
Facebook Spreading, Amazon AWS/Cloudflare/Google Docs Hosted Campaign, Serves P2P-Worm.Win32.Palevo
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Facebook Spreading, Amazon AWS/Cloudflare/Google Docs Hosted Campaign, Serves P2P-Worm.Win32.Palevo
I've recently spotted a malicious, cybercrime-friendly SWF iframe/redirector injecting service, that also exposes a long-run Win32.Nixofro serving malicious infrastructure, currently utilized for the purpose of operating a rogue social media service provider, that's targeting Turkish Facebook users through the ubiquitous social engineering vector, for such type of campaigns, namely, the fake Adobe Flash player.
Let's profile the service, discuss its relevance in the broader context of the threat landscape, provide actionable/historical threat intelligene on the malicious infrastructure, the rogue domains involved in it, the malicious MD5s served by the cybercriminals behind it, and directly link it to a previously profiled Facebook spreading P2P-Worm.Win32.Palevo serving campaign.
The managed SWF iframe/redirector service, is a great example of a cybercrime-as-a-service type of underground market proposition, empowering, both, sophisticated and novice cybercriminals with the necessary (malvertising) 'know-how', in an efficient manner, directly intersecting with the commercial availability of sophisticated mass Web site/Web server malicious script embedding platforms.
The managed SWF iframe/redirector injecting service is currently responding to 108.162.197.62 and 108.162.196.62 Known to have responded to the same IPs (108.162.197.62; 108.162.196.62) is also a key part of the malicious infrastructure that I'll expose in this post, namely hizliservis.pw - Email: furkan@cod.com.
Known to have phoned back to the same IP (108.162.197.62) are also the following malicious MD5s:
MD5: 432efe0fa88d2a9e191cb95fa88e7b36
MD5: 720ecb1cf4f28663f4ab25eedf620341
MD5: 02691863e9dfb9e69b68f5fca932e729
MD5: 69ed70a82cb35a454c60c501025415aa
MD5: cc586a176668ceef14891b15e1b412ab
MD5: 74291941bddcec131c8c6d531fcb1886
MD5: 7c27d9ff25fc40119480e4fe2c7ca987
MD5: 72c030db7163a7a7bf2871a449d4ea3c
MD5: 432efe0fa88d2a9e191cb95fa88e7b36
Known to have phoned to the same IP (108.162.196.62) are also the following malicious MD5s:
MD5: eda3f015204e9565c779e0725915864f
MD5: effcfe91beaf7a3ed2f4ac79525c5fc5
MD5: 14acd831691173ced830f4b51a93e1ca
MD5: 7f93b0c611f7020d28f7a545847b51e0
MD5: bcfce3a9bf2c87dab806623154d49f10
MD5: 4c90a89396d4109d8e4e2491c5da4846
MD5: 289c4f925fdec861c7f765a65b7270af
Sample redirection chain leading to the fake Adobe Flash Player:
hxxp://hizliservis.pw/unlu.htm -> hxxp://hizliservis.pw/indir.php -> hxxp://unluvideolari.info -> hxxp://videotr.in/player.swf -> hxxp://izleyelim.s3.amazonaws.com/movie.mp4&skin=newtubedark/NewTubeDark.xml&streamer=lighttpd&image=hqdefault.jpg
Domain name reconnaissance:
hizliservis.pw - Email: furkan@cod.com
videotr.in - Email: tiiknet@yandex.com; snack@log-z.com
izleyelim.s3.amazonaws.com - 176.32.97.249
Within hizliservis.pw, we can easily spot yet another part of the same malicious/fraudulent infrastructure, namely, the rogue social media distribution platform's login interface.
Sample redirection chain leading to a currently active fake Adobe Flash Player (Win32.Nixofro):
hxxp://socialmediasystem.net/down.php -> hxxps://profonixback31.googlecode.com/svn/FlashPlayer_Guncelle.exe
Detection rate for the fake Adobe Flash Player:
MD5: 28c3c503d398914bdd2c2b3fdc1f9ea4 - detected by 36 out of 50 antivirus scanners as Win32.Nixofro
Once executed, the sample phones back to profonixuser.net (141.101.117.218)
Known to have responded to the same IP (141.101.117.218) are also the following malicious MD5s:
MD5: 53360155012d8e5c648aca277cbde587
MD5: a66a1c42cc6fb775254cf32c8db7ad5b
MD5: a051fd83fc8577b00d8d925581af1a3b
MD5: f47784817a8a04284af4b602c7719cb7
MD5: 2e5c75318275844ce0ff7028908e8fb4
MD5: 90205a9740df5825ce80229ca105b9e8
Domain name reconnaissance for the rogue social media distibution platform:
socialmediasystem.Net (141.101.118.159; 141.101.118.158) - Email: furkan@cod.com
Sample redirection chain for the rogue social media distribution platform's core functions:
hxxp://profonixuser.net/new.php?nocache=1044379803 -> hxxp://sosyalmedyakusu.com/oauth.php (108.162.199.203; 108.162.198.203) Email: furkan@cod.com -> hxxp://hizliservis.pw/face.php -> hxxp://socialhaberler.com/manyak.php -> hxxp://profonixuser.net/new.php -> hxxp://profonixuser.net/amk.php (141.101.117.218) -> hxxp://me.cf/dhtcw (31.170.164.67) -> hxxps://video-players.herokuapp.com/?55517841177 (107.20.187.159) -> hxxp://kingprofonix.net/hxxp://kingprofonix.com (108.162.198.203) the same domain is also known to have responded to 108.162.197.62
Related MD5s known to have phoned back to the same IP (108.162.198.203) in the past:
MD5: 505f615f9e1c4fdc03964b36ec877d57
Sample internal redirectors structure:
hxxp://profonixuser.net/fb.php -> hxxp://profonixuser.net/manyak.php -> hxxp://molotofcu.com/google/hede.php (199.27.134.199) -> hxxp://profonixuser.net/pp.php -> hxxp://gdriv.es/awalbbmprtbpahpolcdt?jgxebgqjl -> hxxps://googledrive.com/host/0B08vFK4UtN5kdjV2NklHVTVjcTQ -> hxxp://sosyalmedyakusu.com/s3x.php?ref=google
hxxp://profonixuser.net/user.php -> hxxp://goo.gl/ber2EP -> hxxps://buexe-x.googlecode.com/svn/FlashPlayer%20Setup.exe -> MD5: 60137c1cb77bed9afcbbbc3ad910df3f -> phones back to wjetphp.com (46.105.56.61)
Secondary sample internal redirectors structure:
hxxp://profonixuser.net/yarak.txt -> hxxp://profonixuser.net/u.exe -> hxxp://profonixuser.net/yeni.txt -> hxxp://profonixuser.net/yeni.exe -> hxxp://profonixuser.net/recep.html -> hxxp://goo.gl/ber2EP -> hxxp://wjetphp.com/unlu/player.swf -> hxxp://profonixuser.net/kral.txt -> hxxp://likef.in/fate.exe - 108.162.194.123; 108.162.195.123; 108.162.199.107 - known to have phoned back to the same IP is also the following malicious MD5: effcfe91beaf7a3ed2f4ac79525c5fc5 - detected by 35 out of 50 antivirus scanners as Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Foreign.kcme
Once executed, the sample phones back to likef.biz (176.53.119.195). The same domain is also known to have responded to the following IPs 141.101.116.165; 141.101.117.165.
Here's comes the interesting part. The fine folks at ExposedBotnets, have already intercepted a malicious Facebook spreading campaign, that's using the already profiled in this post videotr.in.
Having directly connected the cybercrime-friendly SWF iframe/redirector injecting service, with hizliservis.pw as well as the SocialMediaSystem as being part of the same malicious infrastructure, it's time to profile the fraudulent/malicious adversaries behind the campaigns. The cybercriminals behind these campaigns, appear to be operating a rogue social media service, targeting Facebook Inc.
Sample screenshots of the social media distribution platform's Web based interface:
Sample advertisement of the rogue social media distribution platform:
Skype ID of the rogue company: ProFonixcod
Secondary company name: ProfMedya - hxxp://profmedya.com - 178.33.42.254; 188.138.9.39; 89.19.20.242 - Email: kayahoca@gmail.com. The same domain, profmedya.com used to respond to 188.138.9.39.
Domains known to have responded to the same IP (188.138.9.39) are also the following malicious domains:
hxxp://facebooook.biz
hxxp://worldmedya.net
fhxxp://astotoliked.net
hxxp://adsmedya.com
hxxp://facebookmedya.biz
hxxp://fastotolike.com
hxxp://fbmedyahizmetleri.com
hxxp://fiberbayim.com
hxxp://profonixcoder.com
hxxp://sansurmedya.biz
hxxp://sosyalpaket.com
hxxp://takipciniarttir.net
hxxp://videomedya.net
hxxp://videopackage.biz
hxxp://worldmedya.net
hxxp://www--facebook.net
hxxp://www.facebook-java.com
hxxp://www.facemlike.com
hxxp://www.fastcekim.com
hxxp://www.fastotolike.com
hxxp://www.fbmedyahizmetleri.com
hxxp://www.profmedya.com
hxxp://www.sansurmedya.com
Rogue social media distribution platform operator's name: Fatih Konar
Associated emails: fiberbayimdestek@hotmail.com.tr; nerdenezaman@hotmail.com.tr
Google+ Account: hxxps://plus.google.com/103847743683129439807/about
Twitter account: hxxps://twitter.com/ProfonixCodtr
Domain name reconnaissance:
profonixcod.com (profonix-cod.com) - 216.119.143.194 - Email: abazafamily_@hotmail.com (related domains known to have been registered with the same email - warningyoutube.com; likebayi.com)
profonixcod.net
Updated will be posted as soon as new developments take place.
Let's profile the service, discuss its relevance in the broader context of the threat landscape, provide actionable/historical threat intelligene on the malicious infrastructure, the rogue domains involved in it, the malicious MD5s served by the cybercriminals behind it, and directly link it to a previously profiled Facebook spreading P2P-Worm.Win32.Palevo serving campaign.
The managed SWF iframe/redirector service, is a great example of a cybercrime-as-a-service type of underground market proposition, empowering, both, sophisticated and novice cybercriminals with the necessary (malvertising) 'know-how', in an efficient manner, directly intersecting with the commercial availability of sophisticated mass Web site/Web server malicious script embedding platforms.
Known to have phoned back to the same IP (108.162.197.62) are also the following malicious MD5s:
MD5: 432efe0fa88d2a9e191cb95fa88e7b36
MD5: 720ecb1cf4f28663f4ab25eedf620341
MD5: 02691863e9dfb9e69b68f5fca932e729
MD5: 69ed70a82cb35a454c60c501025415aa
MD5: cc586a176668ceef14891b15e1b412ab
MD5: 74291941bddcec131c8c6d531fcb1886
MD5: 7c27d9ff25fc40119480e4fe2c7ca987
MD5: 72c030db7163a7a7bf2871a449d4ea3c
MD5: 432efe0fa88d2a9e191cb95fa88e7b36
Known to have phoned to the same IP (108.162.196.62) are also the following malicious MD5s:
MD5: eda3f015204e9565c779e0725915864f
MD5: effcfe91beaf7a3ed2f4ac79525c5fc5
MD5: 14acd831691173ced830f4b51a93e1ca
MD5: 7f93b0c611f7020d28f7a545847b51e0
MD5: bcfce3a9bf2c87dab806623154d49f10
MD5: 4c90a89396d4109d8e4e2491c5da4846
MD5: 289c4f925fdec861c7f765a65b7270af
Sample redirection chain leading to the fake Adobe Flash Player:
hxxp://hizliservis.pw/unlu.htm -> hxxp://hizliservis.pw/indir.php -> hxxp://unluvideolari.info -> hxxp://videotr.in/player.swf -> hxxp://izleyelim.s3.amazonaws.com/movie.mp4&skin=newtubedark/NewTubeDark.xml&streamer=lighttpd&image=hqdefault.jpg
Domain name reconnaissance:
hizliservis.pw - Email: furkan@cod.com
videotr.in - Email: tiiknet@yandex.com; snack@log-z.com
izleyelim.s3.amazonaws.com - 176.32.97.249
Within hizliservis.pw, we can easily spot yet another part of the same malicious/fraudulent infrastructure, namely, the rogue social media distribution platform's login interface.
Sample redirection chain leading to a currently active fake Adobe Flash Player (Win32.Nixofro):
hxxp://socialmediasystem.net/down.php -> hxxps://profonixback31.googlecode.com/svn/FlashPlayer_Guncelle.exe
Detection rate for the fake Adobe Flash Player:
MD5: 28c3c503d398914bdd2c2b3fdc1f9ea4 - detected by 36 out of 50 antivirus scanners as Win32.Nixofro
Once executed, the sample phones back to profonixuser.net (141.101.117.218)
Known to have responded to the same IP (141.101.117.218) are also the following malicious MD5s:
MD5: 53360155012d8e5c648aca277cbde587
MD5: a66a1c42cc6fb775254cf32c8db7ad5b
MD5: a051fd83fc8577b00d8d925581af1a3b
MD5: f47784817a8a04284af4b602c7719cb7
MD5: 2e5c75318275844ce0ff7028908e8fb4
MD5: 90205a9740df5825ce80229ca105b9e8
Domain name reconnaissance for the rogue social media distibution platform:
socialmediasystem.Net (141.101.118.159; 141.101.118.158) - Email: furkan@cod.com
Sample redirection chain for the rogue social media distribution platform's core functions:
hxxp://profonixuser.net/new.php?nocache=1044379803 -> hxxp://sosyalmedyakusu.com/oauth.php (108.162.199.203; 108.162.198.203) Email: furkan@cod.com -> hxxp://hizliservis.pw/face.php -> hxxp://socialhaberler.com/manyak.php -> hxxp://profonixuser.net/new.php -> hxxp://profonixuser.net/amk.php (141.101.117.218) -> hxxp://me.cf/dhtcw (31.170.164.67) -> hxxps://video-players.herokuapp.com/?55517841177 (107.20.187.159) -> hxxp://kingprofonix.net/hxxp://kingprofonix.com (108.162.198.203) the same domain is also known to have responded to 108.162.197.62
Related MD5s known to have phoned back to the same IP (108.162.198.203) in the past:
MD5: 505f615f9e1c4fdc03964b36ec877d57
Sample internal redirectors structure:
hxxp://profonixuser.net/fb.php -> hxxp://profonixuser.net/manyak.php -> hxxp://molotofcu.com/google/hede.php (199.27.134.199) -> hxxp://profonixuser.net/pp.php -> hxxp://gdriv.es/awalbbmprtbpahpolcdt?jgxebgqjl -> hxxps://googledrive.com/host/0B08vFK4UtN5kdjV2NklHVTVjcTQ -> hxxp://sosyalmedyakusu.com/s3x.php?ref=google
hxxp://profonixuser.net/user.php -> hxxp://goo.gl/ber2EP -> hxxps://buexe-x.googlecode.com/svn/FlashPlayer%20Setup.exe -> MD5: 60137c1cb77bed9afcbbbc3ad910df3f -> phones back to wjetphp.com (46.105.56.61)
Secondary sample internal redirectors structure:
hxxp://profonixuser.net/yarak.txt -> hxxp://profonixuser.net/u.exe -> hxxp://profonixuser.net/yeni.txt -> hxxp://profonixuser.net/yeni.exe -> hxxp://profonixuser.net/recep.html -> hxxp://goo.gl/ber2EP -> hxxp://wjetphp.com/unlu/player.swf -> hxxp://profonixuser.net/kral.txt -> hxxp://likef.in/fate.exe - 108.162.194.123; 108.162.195.123; 108.162.199.107 - known to have phoned back to the same IP is also the following malicious MD5: effcfe91beaf7a3ed2f4ac79525c5fc5 - detected by 35 out of 50 antivirus scanners as Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Foreign.kcme
Once executed, the sample phones back to likef.biz (176.53.119.195). The same domain is also known to have responded to the following IPs 141.101.116.165; 141.101.117.165.
Here's comes the interesting part. The fine folks at ExposedBotnets, have already intercepted a malicious Facebook spreading campaign, that's using the already profiled in this post videotr.in.
Having directly connected the cybercrime-friendly SWF iframe/redirector injecting service, with hizliservis.pw as well as the SocialMediaSystem as being part of the same malicious infrastructure, it's time to profile the fraudulent/malicious adversaries behind the campaigns. The cybercriminals behind these campaigns, appear to be operating a rogue social media service, targeting Facebook Inc.
Sample screenshots of the social media distribution platform's Web based interface:
Sample advertisement of the rogue social media distribution platform:
Skype ID of the rogue company: ProFonixcod
Secondary company name: ProfMedya - hxxp://profmedya.com - 178.33.42.254; 188.138.9.39; 89.19.20.242 - Email: kayahoca@gmail.com. The same domain, profmedya.com used to respond to 188.138.9.39.
Domains known to have responded to the same IP (188.138.9.39) are also the following malicious domains:
hxxp://facebooook.biz
hxxp://worldmedya.net
fhxxp://astotoliked.net
hxxp://adsmedya.com
hxxp://facebookmedya.biz
hxxp://fastotolike.com
hxxp://fbmedyahizmetleri.com
hxxp://fiberbayim.com
hxxp://profonixcoder.com
hxxp://sansurmedya.biz
hxxp://sosyalpaket.com
hxxp://takipciniarttir.net
hxxp://videomedya.net
hxxp://videopackage.biz
hxxp://worldmedya.net
hxxp://www--facebook.net
hxxp://www.facebook-java.com
hxxp://www.facemlike.com
hxxp://www.fastcekim.com
hxxp://www.fastotolike.com
hxxp://www.fbmedyahizmetleri.com
hxxp://www.profmedya.com
hxxp://www.sansurmedya.com
Rogue social media distribution platform operator's name: Fatih Konar
Associated emails: fiberbayimdestek@hotmail.com.tr; nerdenezaman@hotmail.com.tr
Google+ Account: hxxps://plus.google.com/103847743683129439807/about
Twitter account: hxxps://twitter.com/ProfonixCodtr
Domain name reconnaissance:
profonixcod.com (profonix-cod.com) - 216.119.143.194 - Email: abazafamily_@hotmail.com (related domains known to have been registered with the same email - warningyoutube.com; likebayi.com)
profonixcod.net
Updated will be posted as soon as new developments take place.
Thursday, January 09, 2014
Dissecting the Ongoing Febipos/Carfekab Rogue Chrome/Firefox Extensions Dropping, Facebook Circulating Malicious Campaign
This summary is not available. Please
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Dissecting the Ongoing Febipos/Carfekab Rogue Chrome/Firefox Extensions Dropping, Facebook Circulating Malicious Campaign
This summary is not available. Please
click here to view the post.
Tuesday, January 07, 2014
Fake Adobe Flash Player Serving Campaign Utilizes Google Hosting/Redirection Infrastructure, Spreads Across Facebook
What "better" time to spread malicious "joy", then during the Holidays? Cybercriminals are still busy maintaining a fake Adobe Flash Player serving, Facebook spreading campaign, which I originally intercepted during the Holidays, utilizing Google redirectors/hosting services. Despite the modest -- naturally conservative estimate -- click-through rate (45,000 clicks) compared to that of the most recently profiled similar Febipos spreading campaign, which resulted in over 1 million clicks, the campaign remains active, and continues tricking users into installing the rogue Adobe Flash Player, resulting in the continued spread of the campaign, on the Facebook Walls of socially engineered users.
Let's dissect the campaign, expose its infrastructure/command and control servers, and provide MD5s of the served malware.
Spamvertised Facebook URL+redirection chain: hxxp://goo.gl/QeshtO; hxxp://goo.gl/vVbrHp; hxxp://goo.gl/0oSJ7z; hxxp://goo.gl/38qIq8; hxxp://goo.gl/QNQhc5 -> hxxps://9dvme0lk2r0osqg3qb3rlk95z.storage.googleapis.com/q1fwum32gld35iab9d2u4o35bjsvhjhu309.html?ref=12 -> hxxp://goo.gl/wKXme1 -> hxxp://www.i-justice.org/g-o-27312-gooenn.html
(94.23.166.27) -> hxxp://f3c47a0d01f3ec343f57-2ba5bba9317af81ae21c42000295a455.r9.cf4.rackcdn.com/24471bmbqv07595?ref=27312&aff_sub=27312&sub_id=27312 -> hxxp://www.eklentidunyasi.com/dl.php (176.31.2.155) or hxxp://www.agentofex.com/dl.php (176.227.218.99; www.puee.in) ->
hxxp://docs.google.com/uc?export=download&id=0B6DFdqpSFDAlSmpsTkZkT2hvN28 or hxxps://doc-0g-4o-docs.googleusercontent.com/docs/securesc/ha0ro937gcuc7l7deffksulhg5h7mbp1/7fbm9gn67t8t18r8etd00juf0rvmrrmh/1387836000000/16300082901287672546/*/0BzU3dARQGry0TlMxN3F2STN0Z3M
GA Account ID: UA-36486228-1
Detection rate for the served malware: MD5: 30118bec581f80de46445aef79e6cf10 - detected by 33 out of 48 antivirus scanners as Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Blocker.dbud.
Once executed, the sample phones back to:
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/control8.txt
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/NewFile0008.exe
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/version.txt
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/list.txt
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/list.txt
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/buflash.xpi
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/bune10.zip
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/private/sandbox_status.php
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/extFiles/yok.txt
The files were offline in time of processing of the sample.
Related MD5s for the same served fake Adobe Flash Player:
MD5: 61f5af5d0067ea8d10f0764ff3c82066
MD5: 80b9ef43183abdd5b22482bc1cea7b36
MD5: 2da7cb838234eebbca3115fcafd6f513
MD5: 40ae8d901102ee3951c241b394eb94e9
MD5: 30118bec581f80de46445aef79e6cf10
MD5: 2de9865032e997d59c03bfd8435f1ada
MD5: fce013bec7b3651c100b6887c0a12eee
Once executed, MD5: fce013bec7b3651c100b6887c0a12eee phones back to:
hxxp://176.227.218.99/extFiles/control17.txt
hxxp://176.227.218.99/extFiles/NewFile00017.exe
hxxp://46.163.100.240/NewFile00017.exe
hxxp://176.227.218.99/NewFile00017.exe
hxxp://176.227.218.99/extFiles/extFiles/version.txt
hxxp://176.227.218.99/extFiles/extFiles/list.txt
hxxp://176.227.218.99/extFiles/extFiles/buflash.xpi
hxxp://176.227.218.99/extFiles/extFiles/bune10.zip
Files remain offline in the time of processing of the sample.
This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter.
Let's dissect the campaign, expose its infrastructure/command and control servers, and provide MD5s of the served malware.
Spamvertised Facebook URL+redirection chain: hxxp://goo.gl/QeshtO; hxxp://goo.gl/vVbrHp; hxxp://goo.gl/0oSJ7z; hxxp://goo.gl/38qIq8; hxxp://goo.gl/QNQhc5 -> hxxps://9dvme0lk2r0osqg3qb3rlk95z.storage.googleapis.com/q1fwum32gld35iab9d2u4o35bjsvhjhu309.html?ref=12 -> hxxp://goo.gl/wKXme1 -> hxxp://www.i-justice.org/g-o-27312-gooenn.html
(94.23.166.27) -> hxxp://f3c47a0d01f3ec343f57-2ba5bba9317af81ae21c42000295a455.r9.cf4.rackcdn.com/24471bmbqv07595?ref=27312&aff_sub=27312&sub_id=27312 -> hxxp://www.eklentidunyasi.com/dl.php (176.31.2.155) or hxxp://www.agentofex.com/dl.php (176.227.218.99; www.puee.in) ->
hxxp://docs.google.com/uc?export=download&id=0B6DFdqpSFDAlSmpsTkZkT2hvN28 or hxxps://doc-0g-4o-docs.googleusercontent.com/docs/securesc/ha0ro937gcuc7l7deffksulhg5h7mbp1/7fbm9gn67t8t18r8etd00juf0rvmrrmh/1387836000000/16300082901287672546/*/0BzU3dARQGry0TlMxN3F2STN0Z3M
GA Account ID: UA-36486228-1
Detection rate for the served malware: MD5: 30118bec581f80de46445aef79e6cf10 - detected by 33 out of 48 antivirus scanners as Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Blocker.dbud.
Once executed, the sample phones back to:
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/control8.txt
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/NewFile0008.exe
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/version.txt
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/list.txt
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/list.txt
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/buflash.xpi
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/bune10.zip
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/private/sandbox_status.php
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/extFiles/yok.txt
The files were offline in time of processing of the sample.
Related MD5s for the same served fake Adobe Flash Player:
MD5: 61f5af5d0067ea8d10f0764ff3c82066
MD5: 80b9ef43183abdd5b22482bc1cea7b36
MD5: 2da7cb838234eebbca3115fcafd6f513
MD5: 40ae8d901102ee3951c241b394eb94e9
MD5: 30118bec581f80de46445aef79e6cf10
MD5: 2de9865032e997d59c03bfd8435f1ada
MD5: fce013bec7b3651c100b6887c0a12eee
Once executed, MD5: fce013bec7b3651c100b6887c0a12eee phones back to:
hxxp://176.227.218.99/extFiles/control17.txt
hxxp://176.227.218.99/extFiles/NewFile00017.exe
hxxp://46.163.100.240/NewFile00017.exe
hxxp://176.227.218.99/NewFile00017.exe
hxxp://176.227.218.99/extFiles/extFiles/version.txt
hxxp://176.227.218.99/extFiles/extFiles/list.txt
hxxp://176.227.218.99/extFiles/extFiles/buflash.xpi
hxxp://176.227.218.99/extFiles/extFiles/bune10.zip
Files remain offline in the time of processing of the sample.
This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter.
Fake Adobe Flash Player Serving Campaign Utilizes Google Hosting/Redirection Infrastructure, Spreads Across Facebook
What "better" time to spread malicious "joy", then during the Holidays? Cybercriminals are still busy maintaining a fake Adobe Flash Player serving, Facebook spreading campaign, which I originally intercepted during the Holidays, utilizing Google redirectors/hosting services. Despite the modest -- naturally conservative estimate -- click-through rate (45,000 clicks) compared to that of the most recently profiled similar Febipos spreading campaign, which resulted in over 1 million clicks, the campaign remains active, and continues tricking users into installing the rogue Adobe Flash Player, resulting in the continued spread of the campaign, on the Facebook Walls of socially engineered users.
Let's dissect the campaign, expose its infrastructure/command and control servers, and provide MD5s of the served malware.
Spamvertised Facebook URL+redirection chain: hxxp://goo.gl/QeshtO; hxxp://goo.gl/vVbrHp; hxxp://goo.gl/0oSJ7z; hxxp://goo.gl/38qIq8; hxxp://goo.gl/QNQhc5 -> hxxps://9dvme0lk2r0osqg3qb3rlk95z.storage.googleapis.com/q1fwum32gld35iab9d2u4o35bjsvhjhu309.html?ref=12 -> hxxp://goo.gl/wKXme1 -> hxxp://www.i-justice.org/g-o-27312-gooenn.html
(94.23.166.27) -> hxxp://f3c47a0d01f3ec343f57-2ba5bba9317af81ae21c42000295a455.r9.cf4.rackcdn.com/24471bmbqv07595?ref=27312&aff_sub=27312&sub_id=27312 -> hxxp://www.eklentidunyasi.com/dl.php (176.31.2.155) or hxxp://www.agentofex.com/dl.php (176.227.218.99; www.puee.in) ->
hxxp://docs.google.com/uc?export=download&id=0B6DFdqpSFDAlSmpsTkZkT2hvN28 or hxxps://doc-0g-4o-docs.googleusercontent.com/docs/securesc/ha0ro937gcuc7l7deffksulhg5h7mbp1/7fbm9gn67t8t18r8etd00juf0rvmrrmh/1387836000000/16300082901287672546/*/0BzU3dARQGry0TlMxN3F2STN0Z3M
GA Account ID: UA-36486228-1
Detection rate for the served malware: MD5: 30118bec581f80de46445aef79e6cf10 - detected by 33 out of 48 antivirus scanners as Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Blocker.dbud.
Once executed, the sample phones back to:
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/control8.txt
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/NewFile0008.exe
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/version.txt
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/list.txt
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/list.txt
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/buflash.xpi
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/bune10.zip
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/private/sandbox_status.php
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/extFiles/yok.txt
The files were offline in time of processing of the sample.
Related MD5s for the same served fake Adobe Flash Player:
MD5: 61f5af5d0067ea8d10f0764ff3c82066
MD5: 80b9ef43183abdd5b22482bc1cea7b36
MD5: 2da7cb838234eebbca3115fcafd6f513
MD5: 40ae8d901102ee3951c241b394eb94e9
MD5: 30118bec581f80de46445aef79e6cf10
MD5: 2de9865032e997d59c03bfd8435f1ada
MD5: fce013bec7b3651c100b6887c0a12eee
Once executed, MD5: fce013bec7b3651c100b6887c0a12eee phones back to:
hxxp://176.227.218.99/extFiles/control17.txt
hxxp://176.227.218.99/extFiles/NewFile00017.exe
hxxp://46.163.100.240/NewFile00017.exe
hxxp://176.227.218.99/NewFile00017.exe
hxxp://176.227.218.99/extFiles/extFiles/version.txt
hxxp://176.227.218.99/extFiles/extFiles/list.txt
hxxp://176.227.218.99/extFiles/extFiles/buflash.xpi
hxxp://176.227.218.99/extFiles/extFiles/bune10.zip
Files remain offline in the time of processing of the sample.
Let's dissect the campaign, expose its infrastructure/command and control servers, and provide MD5s of the served malware.
Spamvertised Facebook URL+redirection chain: hxxp://goo.gl/QeshtO; hxxp://goo.gl/vVbrHp; hxxp://goo.gl/0oSJ7z; hxxp://goo.gl/38qIq8; hxxp://goo.gl/QNQhc5 -> hxxps://9dvme0lk2r0osqg3qb3rlk95z.storage.googleapis.com/q1fwum32gld35iab9d2u4o35bjsvhjhu309.html?ref=12 -> hxxp://goo.gl/wKXme1 -> hxxp://www.i-justice.org/g-o-27312-gooenn.html
(94.23.166.27) -> hxxp://f3c47a0d01f3ec343f57-2ba5bba9317af81ae21c42000295a455.r9.cf4.rackcdn.com/24471bmbqv07595?ref=27312&aff_sub=27312&sub_id=27312 -> hxxp://www.eklentidunyasi.com/dl.php (176.31.2.155) or hxxp://www.agentofex.com/dl.php (176.227.218.99; www.puee.in) ->
hxxp://docs.google.com/uc?export=download&id=0B6DFdqpSFDAlSmpsTkZkT2hvN28 or hxxps://doc-0g-4o-docs.googleusercontent.com/docs/securesc/ha0ro937gcuc7l7deffksulhg5h7mbp1/7fbm9gn67t8t18r8etd00juf0rvmrrmh/1387836000000/16300082901287672546/*/0BzU3dARQGry0TlMxN3F2STN0Z3M
GA Account ID: UA-36486228-1
Detection rate for the served malware: MD5: 30118bec581f80de46445aef79e6cf10 - detected by 33 out of 48 antivirus scanners as Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Blocker.dbud.
Once executed, the sample phones back to:
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/control8.txt
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/NewFile0008.exe
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/version.txt
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/list.txt
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/list.txt
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/buflash.xpi
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/bune10.zip
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/private/sandbox_status.php
hxxp://176.31.2.155/extFiles/extFiles/yok.txt
The files were offline in time of processing of the sample.
Related MD5s for the same served fake Adobe Flash Player:
MD5: 61f5af5d0067ea8d10f0764ff3c82066
MD5: 80b9ef43183abdd5b22482bc1cea7b36
MD5: 2da7cb838234eebbca3115fcafd6f513
MD5: 40ae8d901102ee3951c241b394eb94e9
MD5: 30118bec581f80de46445aef79e6cf10
MD5: 2de9865032e997d59c03bfd8435f1ada
MD5: fce013bec7b3651c100b6887c0a12eee
Once executed, MD5: fce013bec7b3651c100b6887c0a12eee phones back to:
hxxp://176.227.218.99/extFiles/control17.txt
hxxp://176.227.218.99/extFiles/NewFile00017.exe
hxxp://46.163.100.240/NewFile00017.exe
hxxp://176.227.218.99/NewFile00017.exe
hxxp://176.227.218.99/extFiles/extFiles/version.txt
hxxp://176.227.218.99/extFiles/extFiles/list.txt
hxxp://176.227.218.99/extFiles/extFiles/buflash.xpi
hxxp://176.227.218.99/extFiles/extFiles/bune10.zip
Files remain offline in the time of processing of the sample.
Monday, January 06, 2014
Summarizing Webroot's Threat Blog Posts for December
The following is a brief summary of all of my posts at Webroot's Threat Blog for December, 2013. You can subscribe to Webroot's Threat Blog RSS Feed, or follow me on Twitter:
01. Cybercrime-friendly VPN service provider pitches itself as being ‘recommended by Edward Snowden’
02. Commercial Windows-based compromised Web shells management application spotted in the wild
03. Compromised legitimate Web sites expose users to malicious Java/Symbian/Android “Browser Updates”
04. Malicious multi-hop iframe campaign affects thousands of Web sites, leads to a cocktail of client-side exploits – part two
05. How cybercriminals efficiently violate YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, SoundCloud and Google+’s ToS
06. Tumblr under fire from DIY CAPTCHA-solving, proxies-supporting automatic account registration tools
07. Newly launched ‘HTTP-based botnet setup as a service’ empowers novice cybercriminals with bulletproof hosting capabilities – part three
08. Cybercriminals offer fellow cybercriminals training in Operational Security (OPSEC)
09. Fake ‘WhatsApp Missed Voicemail’ themed emails lead to pharmaceutical scams
10. A peek inside the booming underground market for stealth Bitcoin/Litecoin mining tools
11. Cybercrime Trends 2013 – Year in Review
This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter.
Wednesday, December 11, 2013
Continuing Facebook "Who's Viewed Your Profile" Campaign Affects Another 190k+ Users, Exposes Malicious Cybercrime Ecosystem
Last week, immediately after I published the initial analysis detailing a massive privacy-violating "Who's Viewed Your Profile" campaign, that was circulating across Facebook, the cybercriminals behind it, supposedly took it offline, with one of the main redirectors now pointing to 127.0.0.1.
Not surprisingly, the primary campaign has multiple sub-campaigns still in circulation, which based on the latest statistics -- embedded within the campaign on the same day they supposedly shut it down -- has already exposed another 190,000+ of the social network's users -- the original campaign appears to have been launched in 2011 having already exposed 800,000+ users -- to more rogue, privacy violating apps -- JS.Febipos, Mindspark Interactive Network's MyImageConverter and Trojan-Ransomer.CLE, in this particular case.
Let's dissect the still circulating campaign, expose the entire infrastructure supporting it, establish direct connections with it to related malicious campaigns, indicating that someone's either multi-tasking, or that their malicious/fraudulent activities share the same infrastructure, provide MD5s for the currently served privacy-violating apps, as well as list the actual -- currently live -- hosting locations.
Sample redirection chain:
hxxp://NXJXBMQ.tk/?12358289 - 93.170.52.21; 93.170.52.33 -> hxxp://p2r0f3rviewer9890.co.nf/?sdk222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222ajsklfjasl
fkjasfklja -> hxxp://prostats.vf1.us - 192.157.201.42 -> hxxp://whoviewsfb.uni.me/ch/profile.html - 82.208.40.11
Redirection chain domain name reconnaissance:
NXJXBMQ.tk - 93.170.52.21; 93.170.52.33
p2r0f3rviewer9890.co.nf - 83.125.22.192
whoviewsfb.uni.me - 82.208.40.11
prostats.vf1.us - 192.157.201.42
wh0stalks.uni.me - 192.157.201.42
cracks4free.info - 192.157.201.42
Known to have responded to 93.170.52.21 are also the following fraudulent domains:
0.facebook.com.fpama.tk
001200133184123129811.tk
00wwebhost.tk
01203313441.tk
01prof86841.tk
029m821t9fs.4ieiii.tk
031601.tk
0333.tk
0571baidu.tk
05pr0f1le21200.tk
05pr0file214741.tk
060uty80w.tk
06emu.tk
0886.tk
0akleycityn.tk
0ao0grecu.tk
0fcf7.chantaljltaste.tk
0lod1lmt1.tk
0love.tk
The following malicious MD5s are also known to have phoned back to 93.170.52.21 in the past:
MD5: ee78fe57ad8dbac96b31f41f77eb5877
MD5: bed006372fc76ec261dc9b223b178438
MD5: 58f9cbec80d1dc3a5afbb7339d200e66
MD5: fd0c6b284f7700d59199c55fdcd5bd8a
MD5: 4bfeb3c882d816d37c3e6cbb749e44af
MD5: 97ec866ac26e961976e050591f49fec3
MD5: aba1720b1a6747de5d5345b5893ba2f5
MD5: de5e1f6f137ecb903a018976fc04e110
MD5: a9669b65cabd6b25a32352ccf6c6c09a
MD5: 003f4d9dafba9ee6e358b97b8026e354
MD5: bab313e031b0c54d50fd82d221f7defc
MD5: e6b766f627b91fd420bd93fab4bc323f
MD5: d63656d9b051bf762203b0c4ac728231
MD5: 935440d970ee5a6640418574f4569dab
MD5: 2524e3b4ed3663f5650563c1e431b05c
MD5: f726646a41f95b12ec26cf01f1c89cf9
MD5: a5af6c04d28fcea476827437caf4c681
MD5: c7346327f86298fa5dad160366a0cf26
MD5: 912ed9ef063ae5b6b860fd34f3e8b83a
MD5: b33aaa98ad706ced23d7c64aed0fcad6
Known to have responded to 93.170.52.33 are also the following fraudulent domains:
0lwwa.tk
0msms.tk
122.72.0.7sierra-web-www.szjlc-pcb.tk
1z8dz.tk
4f1wz8.ga
777898.ga
888234.ml
8eld7.tk
abmomre.tk
accountupdateinformation.tk
ahram-org-eg.tk
alex-fotos.tk
allycam.tk
amerdz.ml
angelsmov.tk
apis-drives-google.tk
apis-googledrive.tk
apple-idss.tk
appleid.apple.com.cgi-bin.myappleid.woa.apple-idss.tk
avtoshina.tk
The following malicious MD5s are also known to have phoned back to 93.170.52.33 in the past:
MD5: 2d951e649a8bbcbfa468f7916e188f9f
MD5: dbe2c0788e74916eba251194ef783452
MD5: 4bfeb3c882d816d37c3e6cbb749e44af
MD5: dc01c1db51e26b585678701a64c94437
MD5: 61cc3de4e9a9865e0d239759ed3c7d5a
MD5: 64505b7ca1ce3c1c0c4892abe8d86321
MD5: 0b98356395b2463ea0f339572b9c95ef
MD5: 9e87c189d3cbf2fc2414934bef6e661b
MD5: 48964a66bdc81b48f2fe7a31088c041b
MD5: f81c85bea0e2251655b7112b352f302e
The following MD5s are also known to have phoned back to 83.125.22.192 in the past:
MD5: 3935b6efa7e5ee995f410f4ef1e613ab
MD5: 64c1496e1ba2b7cb5c54a33c20be3e95
MD5: 08f76a1ed5996d7dfdcf8226fe3f66b9
MD5: f508d8034223c4ce233f1bdbed265a3a
Known to have responded to 82.208.40.11 are the following fraudulent domains:
000e0062fb44cd5b277591349e070277.cz.cc
003bc1b16c548efbc4f30790e0bc17be.cz.cc
0057ab88a8febe310f94107137731424.cz.cc
008447a58c242b52cb69fe7dceea9a0b.cz.cc
00a47e5e57323f23c66f2c2d5bc1debc.cz.cc
00a9a591d1e7aaf65639781bc73199d4.cz.cc
00ad3353e0ba865a521da380ba4e0cc4.cz.cc
00d55beb792962f7a04c66b85f2c6082.cz.cc
00e3b9ece447187da3f43f98ab619a28.cz.cc
00eb52dbc4331a64e4fd96fdca890d9c.cz.cc
00f59cfa33cd097e943a38a8f2e343ee.cz.cc
00fbdb49398f0e5fd9d5572044d8934e.cz.cc
010ab81241856dfca44dd9ade4489fbc.cz.cc
011622fb7752328ebb60bd2c075f1fe6.cz.cc
011fbf88cff1c18e05c2afb53d6e5ffd.cz.cc
0133147433aeef23bbe60df0cbc4eac9.cz.cc
013f98b7157ae3754d463e9d2346a549.cz.cc
013fa3e9db6e476282b8e9f1bac6d68e.cz.cc
017c2bd33744c2d423a2a7598a0c0a4e.cz.cc
019368b1f3b364c0d3ec412680638f04.cz.cc
The following malicious MD5s are also known to have phoned back to 82.208.40.11 in the past:
MD5: 2c89dfc1706b31ba7de1c14e229279e5
MD5: 6719d3e8606d91734cde25b8dfc4156f
MD5: 61dcea6fbf15b68be831bff8c5eb0c1d
MD5: 3875fa91f060d02bddd43ff8e0046588
MD5: 929b72813bae47f78125ec30c58f3165
MD5: 96fa2ea6db2e4e9f00605032723e1777
MD5: c46968386138739c81e219da6fb3ead5
MD5: 3d627e0dbc5ac51761fa7cc7b202ec49
MD5: d9714a0f7f881d3643125aa0461a30be
MD5: 81171015a95073748994e463142ddcc7
Known to have responded to 192.157.201.42 are also the following fraudulent domains:
cracks4free.info
pr0lotra.p9.org
prostats.vf1.us
wh0prof.uni.me
cracks4free.info
Time to provide the actual, currently live, hosting locations for the served privacy-violating content.
Mindspark Interactive Network's MyImageConverter served URL:
hxxp://download.myimageconverter.com/index.jhtml?partner=^AZ0^xdm081
Google Store served URLs:
hxxps://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/miapmjacmjonmofofflhnbafpbmfapac - currently active
hxxps://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/dllaajjfgpigkeblmlbamflggfjkgbej
Dropbox Accounts serving the Android app (offline due to heavy usage), and the Firefox extension:
hxxps://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/s/rueyn3owrrpsbw4/whoviews5.xpi - currently online
hxxps://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/s/so3vm50w298qkto/WhoViewsYourProfile.apk
hxxp://apps.facebook.com/dislike___button/
Google Docs served privacy-violating apps:
hxxps://docs.google.com/uc?authuser=0&id=0BziH-mKCuQwqVFljUDBnTjFHdVE&export=download
hxxps://docs.google.com/uc?authuser=0&id=0BziH-mKCuQwqRXBMLWZ4cVZJV2s&export=download
hxxps://docs.google.com/uc?authuser=0&id=0BziH-mKCuQwqOXlyNko0VFBOdnM&export=download
hxxps://docs.google.com/uc?authuser=0&id=0BziH-mKCuQwqZm5yeUFudFhqclU&export=download
hxxps://docs.google.com/uc?authuser=0&id=0BziH-mKCuQwqbWpfNW5FalJmRGM&export=download
hxxps://docs.google.com/uc?authuser=0&id=0BziH-mKCuQwqS3V1ZkZBQjJGbjQ&export=download
hxxps://docs.google.com/uc?authuser=0&id=0BziH-mKCuQwqX2xXbEJLbEY0Q3M&export=download
hxxps://docs.google.com/uc?authuser=0&id=0BziH-mKCuQwqMU5RVkJSWURxME0&export=download
hxxps://docs.google.com/uc?authuser=0&id=0BziH-mKCuQwqVFljUDBnTjFHdVE&export=download
GA Account IDs: UA-23441223-3; UA-12798017-1
MyImageConverter Affiliate Network ID: ^AZ0^xdm081
Detection rate for the served apps/extensions:
MD5: 30cf98d7dc97cae57f8d72487966d20b - detected by 19 out of 49 antivirus scanners as Trojan-Ransomer.CLE; Troj/Mdrop-FNZ
MD5: 88dd376527c18639d3f8bf23f77b480e - detected by 8 out of 49 antivirus scanners as JS:Febipos-N [Trj]; JS/Febipos
Once executed, MD5: 30cf98d7dc97cae57f8d72487966d20b also drops MD5: 106320fc1282421f8f6cf5eb0206abee and MD5: 43b20dc1b437e0e3af5ae7b9965e0392 on the affected hosts. It then phones back to 195.167.11.4:
Two more MD5s from different malware campaigns, are known to have phoned back to 195.167.11.4:
MD5: 8192c574b8e96605438753c49510cd97
MD5: d55de5e9ec25a80ddfecfb34d417b098
The Privacy Policy (hxxp://prostats.vf1.us/firefox/pp.html) and the EULA (hxxp://prostats.vf1.us/firefox/eula.html) point to hxxp://dislikeIt.com - 176.74.176.179. Not surprisingly, multiple malicious MD5s are also known to have previously interacted with the same IP:
MD5: d366088e4823829798bd59a4d456a3df
MD5: 3c73db8202d084f33ab32069f40f58c8
MD5: d7fce1ec777c917f72530f79363fc6d3
MD5: 83568d744ab226a0642233b93bfc7de6
MD5: c84b1bd7c2063f34900bbc9712d66e0f
MD5: 58baa919900656dacaf39927bb614cf1
MD5: a86e97246a98206869be78fd451029a0
MD5: 70a0894397ac6f65c64693f1606f1231
MD5: f9166237199133b24cd866b61d0f6cca
MD5: 0f24ad046790ee863fd03d19dbba7ea5
Based on the latest performance metrics for the campaign, over 190,000 users have already interacted with this sub-campaign, since 4th of December, when I initially analyzed the primary campaign.
Monitoring of the campaign is naturally in progress. Updates will be posted as soon as new developments take place.
This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter.
Continuing Facebook "Who's Viewed Your Profile" Campaign Affects Another 190k+ Users, Exposes Malicious Cybercrime Ecosystem
Last week, immediately after I published the initial analysis detailing a massive privacy-violating "Who's Viewed Your Profile" campaign, that was circulating across Facebook, the cybercriminals behind it, supposedly took it offline, with one of the main redirectors now pointing to 127.0.0.1.
Not surprisingly, the primary campaign has multiple sub-campaigns still in circulation, which based on the latest statistics -- embedded within the campaign on the same day they supposedly shut it down -- has already exposed another 190,000+ of the social network's users -- the original campaign appears to have been launched in 2011 having already exposed 800,000+ users -- to more rogue, privacy violating apps -- JS.Febipos, Mindspark Interactive Network's MyImageConverter and Trojan-Ransomer.CLE, in this particular case.
Let's dissect the still circulating campaign, expose the entire infrastructure supporting it, establish direct connections with it to related malicious campaigns, indicating that someone's either multi-tasking, or that their malicious/fraudulent activities share the same infrastructure, provide MD5s for the currently served privacy-violating apps, as well as list the actual -- currently live -- hosting locations.
hxxp://NXJXBMQ.tk/?12358289 - 93.170.52.21; 93.170.52.33 -> hxxp://p2r0f3rviewer9890.co.nf/?sdk222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
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222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222ajsklfjasl
fkjasfklja -> hxxp://prostats.vf1.us - 192.157.201.42 -> hxxp://whoviewsfb.uni.me/ch/profile.html - 82.208.40.11
Redirection chain domain name reconnaissance:
NXJXBMQ.tk - 93.170.52.21; 93.170.52.33
p2r0f3rviewer9890.co.nf - 83.125.22.192
whoviewsfb.uni.me - 82.208.40.11
prostats.vf1.us - 192.157.201.42
wh0stalks.uni.me - 192.157.201.42
cracks4free.info - 192.157.201.42
Known to have responded to 93.170.52.21 are also the following fraudulent domains:
0.facebook.com.fpama.tk
001200133184123129811.tk
00wwebhost.tk
01203313441.tk
01prof86841.tk
029m821t9fs.4ieiii.tk
031601.tk
0333.tk
0571baidu.tk
05pr0f1le21200.tk
05pr0file214741.tk
060uty80w.tk
06emu.tk
0886.tk
0akleycityn.tk
0ao0grecu.tk
0fcf7.chantaljltaste.tk
0lod1lmt1.tk
0love.tk
The following malicious MD5s are also known to have phoned back to 93.170.52.21 in the past:
MD5: ee78fe57ad8dbac96b31f41f77eb5877
MD5: bed006372fc76ec261dc9b223b178438
MD5: 58f9cbec80d1dc3a5afbb7339d200e66
MD5: fd0c6b284f7700d59199c55fdcd5bd8a
MD5: 4bfeb3c882d816d37c3e6cbb749e44af
MD5: 97ec866ac26e961976e050591f49fec3
MD5: aba1720b1a6747de5d5345b5893ba2f5
MD5: de5e1f6f137ecb903a018976fc04e110
MD5: a9669b65cabd6b25a32352ccf6c6c09a
MD5: 003f4d9dafba9ee6e358b97b8026e354
MD5: bab313e031b0c54d50fd82d221f7defc
MD5: e6b766f627b91fd420bd93fab4bc323f
MD5: d63656d9b051bf762203b0c4ac728231
MD5: 935440d970ee5a6640418574f4569dab
MD5: 2524e3b4ed3663f5650563c1e431b05c
MD5: f726646a41f95b12ec26cf01f1c89cf9
MD5: a5af6c04d28fcea476827437caf4c681
MD5: c7346327f86298fa5dad160366a0cf26
MD5: 912ed9ef063ae5b6b860fd34f3e8b83a
MD5: b33aaa98ad706ced23d7c64aed0fcad6
Known to have responded to 93.170.52.33 are also the following fraudulent domains:
0lwwa.tk
0msms.tk
122.72.0.7sierra-web-www.szjlc-pcb.tk
1z8dz.tk
4f1wz8.ga
777898.ga
888234.ml
8eld7.tk
abmomre.tk
accountupdateinformation.tk
ahram-org-eg.tk
alex-fotos.tk
allycam.tk
amerdz.ml
angelsmov.tk
apis-drives-google.tk
apis-googledrive.tk
apple-idss.tk
appleid.apple.com.cgi-bin.myappleid.woa.apple-idss.tk
avtoshina.tk
The following malicious MD5s are also known to have phoned back to 93.170.52.33 in the past:
MD5: 2d951e649a8bbcbfa468f7916e188f9f
MD5: dbe2c0788e74916eba251194ef783452
MD5: 4bfeb3c882d816d37c3e6cbb749e44af
MD5: dc01c1db51e26b585678701a64c94437
MD5: 61cc3de4e9a9865e0d239759ed3c7d5a
MD5: 64505b7ca1ce3c1c0c4892abe8d86321
MD5: 0b98356395b2463ea0f339572b9c95ef
MD5: 9e87c189d3cbf2fc2414934bef6e661b
MD5: 48964a66bdc81b48f2fe7a31088c041b
MD5: f81c85bea0e2251655b7112b352f302e
The following MD5s are also known to have phoned back to 83.125.22.192 in the past:
MD5: 3935b6efa7e5ee995f410f4ef1e613ab
MD5: 64c1496e1ba2b7cb5c54a33c20be3e95
MD5: 08f76a1ed5996d7dfdcf8226fe3f66b9
MD5: f508d8034223c4ce233f1bdbed265a3a
Known to have responded to 82.208.40.11 are the following fraudulent domains:
000e0062fb44cd5b277591349e070277.cz.cc
003bc1b16c548efbc4f30790e0bc17be.cz.cc
0057ab88a8febe310f94107137731424.cz.cc
008447a58c242b52cb69fe7dceea9a0b.cz.cc
00a47e5e57323f23c66f2c2d5bc1debc.cz.cc
00a9a591d1e7aaf65639781bc73199d4.cz.cc
00ad3353e0ba865a521da380ba4e0cc4.cz.cc
00d55beb792962f7a04c66b85f2c6082.cz.cc
00e3b9ece447187da3f43f98ab619a28.cz.cc
00eb52dbc4331a64e4fd96fdca890d9c.cz.cc
00f59cfa33cd097e943a38a8f2e343ee.cz.cc
00fbdb49398f0e5fd9d5572044d8934e.cz.cc
010ab81241856dfca44dd9ade4489fbc.cz.cc
011622fb7752328ebb60bd2c075f1fe6.cz.cc
011fbf88cff1c18e05c2afb53d6e5ffd.cz.cc
0133147433aeef23bbe60df0cbc4eac9.cz.cc
013f98b7157ae3754d463e9d2346a549.cz.cc
013fa3e9db6e476282b8e9f1bac6d68e.cz.cc
017c2bd33744c2d423a2a7598a0c0a4e.cz.cc
019368b1f3b364c0d3ec412680638f04.cz.cc
The following malicious MD5s are also known to have phoned back to 82.208.40.11 in the past:
MD5: 2c89dfc1706b31ba7de1c14e229279e5
MD5: 6719d3e8606d91734cde25b8dfc4156f
MD5: 61dcea6fbf15b68be831bff8c5eb0c1d
MD5: 3875fa91f060d02bddd43ff8e0046588
MD5: 929b72813bae47f78125ec30c58f3165
MD5: 96fa2ea6db2e4e9f00605032723e1777
MD5: c46968386138739c81e219da6fb3ead5
MD5: 3d627e0dbc5ac51761fa7cc7b202ec49
MD5: d9714a0f7f881d3643125aa0461a30be
MD5: 81171015a95073748994e463142ddcc7
Known to have responded to 192.157.201.42 are also the following fraudulent domains:
cracks4free.info
pr0lotra.p9.org
prostats.vf1.us
wh0prof.uni.me
cracks4free.info
Time to provide the actual, currently live, hosting locations for the served privacy-violating content.
Mindspark Interactive Network's MyImageConverter served URL:
hxxp://download.myimageconverter.com/index.jhtml?partner=^AZ0^xdm081
Google Store served URLs:
hxxps://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/miapmjacmjonmofofflhnbafpbmfapac - currently active
hxxps://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/dllaajjfgpigkeblmlbamflggfjkgbej
Dropbox Accounts serving the Android app (offline due to heavy usage), and the Firefox extension:
hxxps://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/s/rueyn3owrrpsbw4/whoviews5.xpi - currently online
hxxps://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/s/so3vm50w298qkto/WhoViewsYourProfile.apk
hxxp://apps.facebook.com/dislike___button/
Google Docs served privacy-violating apps:
hxxps://docs.google.com/uc?authuser=0&id=0BziH-mKCuQwqVFljUDBnTjFHdVE&export=download
hxxps://docs.google.com/uc?authuser=0&id=0BziH-mKCuQwqRXBMLWZ4cVZJV2s&export=download
hxxps://docs.google.com/uc?authuser=0&id=0BziH-mKCuQwqOXlyNko0VFBOdnM&export=download
hxxps://docs.google.com/uc?authuser=0&id=0BziH-mKCuQwqZm5yeUFudFhqclU&export=download
hxxps://docs.google.com/uc?authuser=0&id=0BziH-mKCuQwqbWpfNW5FalJmRGM&export=download
hxxps://docs.google.com/uc?authuser=0&id=0BziH-mKCuQwqS3V1ZkZBQjJGbjQ&export=download
hxxps://docs.google.com/uc?authuser=0&id=0BziH-mKCuQwqX2xXbEJLbEY0Q3M&export=download
hxxps://docs.google.com/uc?authuser=0&id=0BziH-mKCuQwqMU5RVkJSWURxME0&export=download
hxxps://docs.google.com/uc?authuser=0&id=0BziH-mKCuQwqVFljUDBnTjFHdVE&export=download
GA Account IDs: UA-23441223-3; UA-12798017-1
MyImageConverter Affiliate Network ID: ^AZ0^xdm081
Detection rate for the served apps/extensions:
MD5: 30cf98d7dc97cae57f8d72487966d20b - detected by 19 out of 49 antivirus scanners as Trojan-Ransomer.CLE; Troj/Mdrop-FNZ
MD5: 88dd376527c18639d3f8bf23f77b480e - detected by 8 out of 49 antivirus scanners as JS:Febipos-N [Trj]; JS/Febipos
Once executed, MD5: 30cf98d7dc97cae57f8d72487966d20b also drops MD5: 106320fc1282421f8f6cf5eb0206abee and MD5: 43b20dc1b437e0e3af5ae7b9965e0392 on the affected hosts. It then phones back to 195.167.11.4:
Two more MD5s from different malware campaigns, are known to have phoned back to 195.167.11.4:
MD5: 8192c574b8e96605438753c49510cd97
MD5: d55de5e9ec25a80ddfecfb34d417b098
The Privacy Policy (hxxp://prostats.vf1.us/firefox/pp.html) and the EULA (hxxp://prostats.vf1.us/firefox/eula.html) point to hxxp://dislikeIt.com - 176.74.176.179. Not surprisingly, multiple malicious MD5s are also known to have previously interacted with the same IP:
MD5: d366088e4823829798bd59a4d456a3df
MD5: 3c73db8202d084f33ab32069f40f58c8
MD5: d7fce1ec777c917f72530f79363fc6d3
MD5: 83568d744ab226a0642233b93bfc7de6
MD5: c84b1bd7c2063f34900bbc9712d66e0f
MD5: 58baa919900656dacaf39927bb614cf1
MD5: a86e97246a98206869be78fd451029a0
MD5: 70a0894397ac6f65c64693f1606f1231
MD5: f9166237199133b24cd866b61d0f6cca
MD5: 0f24ad046790ee863fd03d19dbba7ea5
Based on the latest performance metrics for the campaign, over 190,000 users have already interacted with this sub-campaign, since 4th of December, when I initially analyzed the primary campaign.
Monitoring of the campaign is naturally in progress. Updates will be posted as soon as new developments take place.
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About Me
- Dancho Danchev
- Independent Security Consultancy, Threat Intelligence Analysis (OSINT/Cyber Counter Intelligence) and Competitive Intelligence research on demand. Insightful, unbiased, and client-tailored assessments, neatly communicated in the form of interactive reports - because anticipating the emerging threatscape is what shapes the big picture at the end of the day. Approach me at dancho.danchev@hush.com
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