Wednesday, November 18, 2026

What Does Sandboxing and Reverse Engineering 643 Salat Stealer Malicious Software Samples Lead To And Who Is Its Author Maxim Vladimirovich Nesterenko?

Dear blog readers,

This is Dancho.

I recently decided to take a deeper look inside the inner workings and network C&C communication network and infrastructure using 643 Salat Stealer samples which I on purposely sandboxed and reverse engineered in bulk with the idea to not just look for similarities which are evident in over 87% of the samples but also pin point and look for additional clues about how the Salat Stealer malicious software works and functions.

As you can see in the attached screenshot the embedded resolver certificate references Vladimir Putin's email Barack Obama and Kurwa bobr which is a Polish Internet meme and catchphrase which translated into Fucking beaver and there's also a "Я люблю сосать" message in the actual sample and also the following messages.

In this analysis I'll discuss in-depth how the Salat Stealer malicious software works and functions and elaborate in-depth on its network C&C command infrastructure and will also discuss several insecure coding practices that the malicious software authors seem to have neglected which is great news.

Some details on the C&C infrastructure include which are encoded in all the samples:

hxxp://salator.es - 195.208.61.205
hxxp://wruser.org - 195.208.61.205
hxxp://websalat.top - 185.53.179.136
hxxp://sa1atik.cn - 46.173.27.15 - Usmondzhon Zakirov - Email: istan4urka@gmail.com

hxxp://morkovka.cn
hxxp://webrat.su - sosincorp@gmail.com
hxxp://sa1atik.cn

MD5: 929e2b172bfda207f2b5491831da8dce
SHA256: 6135c3ae6a101a06638e209cd14999d786e724f21a65c52833e40b727f1d5de8

Also the following:

hxxp://salator.es/sa1at
hxxp://wruser.org/sa1at
hxxp://websalat.top/sa1at
hxxp://sa1atik.cn/sa1at
hxxp://wruser.org:992/sa1at - prioritized if winws.exe is running; appended otherwise

Configuration tables use a 129-word rotate/XOR transform, 4096-bit modular exponentiation with exponent65537, hex decoding, cumulative XOR, repeating XOR, another hex decode and AES-GCM. Seed `biba` derives key `93851482190d261c1302a29caa569522` through cumulative XOR of raw MD5(seed). Repeating-XOR secret is `d0af20d0bbd18ed0b1d0bbd18e20d181d0bed181d0b0d182d18c`. Decoder computation was checked against an AES-GCM known-answer vector and endpoint authentication tags.

## Transport and decentralized fallback
Transport selection/failover includes QUIC HTTP/3 and ordinary Go HTTP. `tryRQ` constructs **HTTP GET requests with bodies**, Content-Type `application/octet-stream`, to the selected URL directly. Body obfuscation is repeating XOR followed by cumulative XOR, not AES. Numeric JSON keys/opcodes are used. An IP-host branch sets HTTP Host to `google.com`; this does not make Google a malicious destination or prove successful domain fronting. An encrypted embedded blob was verified to decode to a 91-certificate CA trust bundle, not an executable second stage.

Gorilla WebSocket sessions provide interactive channels, with destinations supplied through commands. A single fixed built-in WSS destination was not established.

Exact TON discovery seeds:
- `hxxp://tonapi.io/v2/dns/webratpanel.ton/resolve`
- `hxxp://tonapi.io/v2/dns/remoteadministratortool.ton/resolve`
- `hxxp://shyetootval.ton`
- `hxxp://webratxaye1.ton`

Public RPC: `https://ton.access.orbs.network/route/1/mainnet/toncenter-api-v2/runGetMethod`

Embedded DNS root: `Ef_lZ1T4NCb2mwkme9h2rJfESCE0W34ma9lWp7-_uY3zXDvq`

TONAPI processing reads `wallet.address`. Raw account bytes, represented as 64 hex characters with optional `0:` prefix, decode into a NUL-trimmed comma-separated candidate list. Direct TON DNS calls `dnsresolve` with SHA256(wallet) category and follows contract records to terminal wallet bytes. Accepted candidates become `https://<candidate>/sa1at/` and populate primary/alternate buckets. Current replacement hosts remain unknown without external record data. **TONAPI, Orbs and the root contract are public infrastructure, not proof of attacker ownership; avoid unconditional provider-wide blocking.**

Startup creates mutex **`Global\WEBR_93FBTYWPXRVS`**. Installation follows successful initial communications and response gates: numeric key1 must be0 or1, key2 must parse, and a second response must be nonempty and begin `[` or `{`. A marker check can skip installation.

Copies use selected existing Program Files/Program Files(x86)/LocalAppData directories with AppData fallback, variable process-derived basenames and HIDDEN|SYSTEM attributes. Scheduled task name is `\` plus installed basename without extension, executing the copied path with logon/time triggers and a constructed three-minute repeat interval. Failed task setup falls back to **HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run**, value basename-without-extension, data installed executable path. There is no universal installed filename or task name. A GUID-shaped host-specific marker derives from MD5(HWID+hostname+`WF8wvauqSa11NbxrdPwN`).

The installation path launches an embedded PowerShell script attempting Defender directory exclusions for Program Files/AppData locations, `reagentc /disable`, and `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA=0`. Privileges, policy and tamper protection may prevent these changes. This establishes attempted defense impairment, not observed success. `winws.exe` affects connection method/priority, not a proved anti-analysis exit. No checked startup VM/debugger rejection gate was established.

{
  "sample": {
    "sha256": "6135c3ae6a101a06638e209cd14999d786e724f21a65c52833e40b727f1d5de8",
    "md5": "929e2b172bfda207f2b5491831da8dce",
    "size_bytes": 12570829,
    "format": "PE32 windows x86",
    "go_version": "go1.24.0",
    "module": "salat",
    "embedded_version": "0.28.2"
  },
  "scope": "Offline static analysis. No target execution, network contact, liveness or ownership checks.",
  "builtin_c2": [
    {"url": "hxxp://salator.es/sa1at/", "table_va": "0xc93f1c", "role": "primary", "authentication": "AES-GCM tag verified"},
    {"url": "hxxp://wruser.org/sa1at/", "table_va": "0xc94120", "role": "primary", "authentication": "AES-GCM tag verified"},
    {"url": "hxxp://websalat.top/sa1at/", "table_va": "0xc94324", "role": "primary", "authentication": "AES-GCM tag verified"},
    {"url": "hxxp://sa1atik.cn/sa1at/", "table_va": "0xc94528", "role": "alternate bucket", "authentication": "AES-GCM tag verified"},
    {"url": "hxxp://wruser.org:992/sa1at/", "table_va": "0xc9472c", "role": "prioritized in primary bucket when winws.exe found, otherwise appended", "authentication": "AES-GCM tag verified"}
  ],
  "ton_discovery": {
    "malware_selected_records": ["webratpanel.ton", "remoteadministratortool.ton", "shyetootval.ton", "webratxaye1.ton"],
    "tonapi_lookup_urls": ["hxxp://tonapi.io/v2/dns/webratpanel.ton/resolve", "hxxp://tonapi.io/v2/dns/remoteadministratortool.ton/resolve"],
    "public_rpc": "hxxp://ton.access.orbs.network/route/1/mainnet/toncenter-api-v2/runGetMethod",
    "root_contract": "Ef_lZ1T4NCb2mwkme9h2rJfESCE0W34ma9lWp7-_uY3zXDvq",
    "final_url_template": "hxxp://<account-decoded-candidate>/sa1at/",
    "dynamic_c2_hosts": null,
    "caution": "TONAPI, Orbs and TON root are public resolver context, not attacker-ownership indicators. Records were not fetched."
  },
  "obfuscation": {
    "build_seed": "biba",
    "aes128_key_hex": "93851482190d261c1302a29caa569522",
    "xor_secret_hex": "d0af20d0bbd18ed0b1d0bbd18e20d181d0bed181d0b0d182d18c",
    "rsa_modulus_table_va": "0xc93d18",
    "rsa_modulus_bits": 4096,
    "rsa_public_exponent": 65537,
    "endpoint_algorithm": "129-word rotate/XOR table transform; modular exponentiation; hex; cumulative XOR; repeating XOR; hex; AES-GCM nonce12/tag16",
    "ordinary_request_body": "JSON with repeating XOR then cumulative XOR, not AES"
  },
  "host_indicators": {
    "mutex": "Global\\WEBR_93FBTYWPXRVS",
    "build_marker": "WF8wvauqSa11NbxrdPwN",
    "run_key_fallback": "HKCU\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run",
    "installation_names": "variable"
  },
  "trust_store": {
    "pem_certificates": 91,
    "decrypted_length": 141880,
    "sha256": "6a7a6d5e9829634fe83688161eaffafb735782e3a26405a63b6aa24e2530db7d",
    "role": "Embedded CA bundle, not an executable payload or demonstrated unique certificate pin"
  },
  "anchors": {"main": "0x8d5410", "decoder": "0x8d3170", "word_decoder": "0x8dfac0", "http_helper": "0x8d4c00", "ton_fallback": "0x8de280", "ton_dns": "0x8dfee0", "steal": "0x8e5b30"}
}

Also the following:

hxxp://webratpanel.ton
hxxp://remoteadministratortool.ton
hxxp://shyetootval.ton
hxxp://webratxaye1.ton

Also the following:

Global\WEBR_93FBTYWPXRVS
GBZAP-PACK-UNIQUE
git-root
Blockadeeuclip/discord-unban
wdvcache.exe

Also the following insecure coding practices:

Endpoint “validation” accepts URL syntax, not just hostnames
Resolver responses are read without an application size limit
Body-read errors and HTTP status are not properly checked

Also the following embedded certificates issuers and their SHA256 values:

|1|Entrust Root Certification Authority - EC1|`02ed0eb28c14da45165c566791700d6451d7fb56f0b2ab1d3b8eb070e56edff5`|

|2|SecureTrust CA|`f1c1b50ae5a20dd8030ec9f6bc24823dd367b5255759b4e71b61fce9f7375d73`|

|3|Starfield Root Certificate Authority - G2|`2ce1cb0bf9d2f9e102993fbe215152c3b2dd0cabde1c68e5319b839154dbb7f5`|

|4|IdenTrust Public Sector Root CA 1|`30d0895a9a448a262091635522d1f52010b5867acae12c78ef958fd4f4389f2f`|

|5|SECOM Trust.net / Security Communication RootCA1|`e75e72ed9f560eec6eb4800073a43fc3ad19195a392282017895974a99026b6c`|

|6|Entrust.net Certification Authority (2048)|`6dc47172e01cbcb0bf62580d895fe2b8ac9ad4f873801e0c10b9c837d21eb177`|

|7|DigiCert Global Root CA|`4348a0e9444c78cb265e058d5e8944b4d84f9662bd26db257f8934a443c70161`|

|8|Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions RootCA 2015|`a040929a02ce53b4acf4f2ffc6981ce4496f755e6d45fe0b2a692bcd52523f36`|

|9|QuoVadis Root CA 2 G3|`8fe4fb0af93a4d0d67db0bebb23e37c71bf325dcbcdd240ea04daf58b47e1840`|

|10|TeliaSonera Root CA v1|`dd6936fe21f8f077c123a1a521c12224f72255b73e03a7260693e8a24b0fa389`|

|11|DigiCert Trusted Root G4|`552f7bdcf1a7af9e6ce672017f4f12abf77240c78e761ac203d1d9d20ac89988`|

|12|thawte Primary Root CA|`8d722f81a9c113c0791df136a2966db26c950a971db46b4199f4ea54b78bfb9f`|

|13|Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority - G2|`45140b3247eb9cc8c5b4f0d7b53091f73292089e6e5a63e2749dd3aca9198eda`|

|14|GeoTrust Primary Certification Authority|`37d51006c512eaab626421f1ec8c92013fc5f82ae98ee533eb4619b8deb4d06c`|

|15|Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions ECC RootCA 2015|`44b545aa8a25e65a73ca15dc27fc36d24c1cb9953a066539b11582dc487b4833`|

|16|VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G4|`69ddd7ea90bb57c93e135dc85ea6fcd5480b603239bdc454fc758b2a26cf7f79`|

|17|Entrust Root Certification Authority|`73c176434f1bc6d5adf45b0e76e727287c8de57616c1e6e6141a2b2cbc7d8e4c`|

|18|SECOM Trust Systems / Security Communication RootCA2|`513b2cecb810d4cde5dd85391adfc6c2dd60d87bb736d2b521484aa47a0ebef6`|

|19|DigiCert Assured ID Root G2|`7d05ebb682339f8c9451ee094eebfefa7953a114edb2f44949452fab7d2fc185`|

|20|Chunghwa Telecom / ePKI Root Certification Authority|`c0a6f4dc63a24bfdcf54ef2a6a082a0a72de35803e2ff5ff527ae5d87206dfd5`|

|21|AffirmTrust Commercial|`0376ab1d54c5f9803ce4b2e201a0ee7eef7b57b636e8a93c9b8d4860c96f5fa7`|

|22|SSL.com Root Certification Authority RSA|`85666a562ee0be5ce925c1d8890a6f76a87ec16d4d7d5f29ea7419cf20123b69`|

|23|GlobalSign Root CA - R6|`2cabeafe37d06ca22aba7391c0033d25982952c453647349763a3ab5ad6ccf69`|

|24|Amazon Root CA 4|`e35d28419ed02025cfa69038cd623962458da5c695fbdea3c22b0bfb25897092`|

|25|Certum Trusted Network CA|`5c58468d55f58e497e743982d2b50010b6d165374acf83a7d4a32db768c4408e`|

|26|Certum CA|`d8e0febc1db2e38d00940f37d27d41344d993e734b99d5656d9778d4d8143624`|

|27|XRamp Global Certification Authority|`cecddc905099d8dadfc5b1d209b737cbe2c18cfb2c10c0ff0bcf0d3286fc1aa2`|

|28|AddTrust Qualified CA Root|`8095210805db4bbc355e4428d8fd6ec2cde3ab5fb97a9942988eb8f4dcd06016`|

|29|Buypass Class 2 Root CA|`9a114025197c5bb95d94e63d55cd43790847b646b23cdf11ada4a00eff15fb48`|

|30|D-TRUST Root Class 3 CA 2 EV 2009|`eec5496b988ce98625b934092eec2908bed0b0f316c2d4730c84eaf1f3d34881`|

|31|DigiCert Assured ID Root G3|`7e37cb8b4c47090cab36551ba6f45db840680fba166a952db100717f43053fc2`|

|32|Entrust Root Certification Authority - G4|`db3517d1f6732a2d5ab97c533ec70779ee3270a62fb4ac4238372460e6f01e88`|

|33|GeoTrust Primary Certification Authority - G2|`5edb7ac43b82a06a8761e8d7be4979ebf2611f7dd79bf91c1c6b566a219ed766`|

|34|SwissSign Gold CA - G2|`62dd0be9b9f50a163ea0f8e75c053b1eca57ea55c8688f647c6881f2c8357b95`|

|35|USERTrust ECC Certification Authority|`4ff460d54b9c86dabfbcfc5712e0400d2bed3fbc4d4fbdaa86e06adcd2a9ad7a`|

|36|IdenTrust Commercial Root CA 1|`5d56499be4d2e08bcfcad08a3e38723d50503bde706948e42f55603019e528ae`|

|37|QuoVadis Root CA 2|`85a0dd7dd720adb7ff05f83d542b209dc7ff4528f7d677b18389fea5e5c49e86`|

|38|D-TRUST Root Class 3 CA 2 2009|`49e7a442acf0ea6287050054b52564b650e4f49e42e348d6aa38e039e957b1c1`|

|39|QuoVadis Root CA 1 G3|`8a866fd1b276b57e578e921c65828a2bed58e9f2f288054134b7f1f4bfc9cc74`|

|40|COMODO ECC Certification Authority|`1793927a0614549789adce2f8f34f7f0b66d0f3ae3a3b84d21ec15dbba4fadc7`|

|41|USERTrust RSA Certification Authority|`e793c9b02fd8aa13e21c31228accb08119643b749c898964b1746d46c3d4cbd2`|

|42|ISRG Root X1|`96bcec06264976f37460779acf28c5a7cfe8a3c0aae11a8ffcee05c0bddf08c6`|

|43|DigiCert High Assurance EV Root CA|`7431e5f4c3c1ce4690774f0b61e05440883ba9a01ed00ba6abd7806ed3b118cf`|

|44|GlobalSign Root CA - R2|`ca42dd41745fd0b81eb902362cf9d8bf719da1bd1b1efc946f5b4c99f42c1b9e`|

|45|VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G5|`9acfab7e43c8d880d06b262a94deeee4b4659989c3d0caf19baf6405e41ab7df`|

|46|QuoVadis Root CA 3|`18f1fc7f205df8adddeb7fe007dd57e3af375a9c4d8d73546bf4f1fed1e18d35`|

|47|GeoTrust Universal CA|`a0459b9f63b22559f5fa5d4c6db3f9f72ff19342033578f073bf1d1b46cbb912`|

|48|GlobalSign Root CA - R3|`cbb522d7b7f127ad6a0113865bdf1cd4102e7d0759af635a7cf4720dc963c53b`|

|49|Starfield Services Root Certificate Authority - G2|`568d6905a2c88708a4b3025190edcfedb1974a606a13c6e5290fcb2ae63edab5`|

|50|Baltimore CyberTrust Root|`16af57a9f676b0ab126095aa5ebadef22ab31119d644ac95cd4b93dbf3f26aeb`|

|51|Amazon Root CA 3|`18ce6cfe7bf14e60b2e347b8dfe868cb31d02ebb3ada271569f50343b46db3a4`|

|52|AAA Certificate Services|`d7a7a0fb5d7e2731d771e9484ebcdef71d5f0c3e0a2948782bc83ee0ea699ef4`|

|53|Starfield Class 2 Certification Authority|`1465fa205397b876faa6f0a9958e5590e40fcc7faa4fb7c2c8677521fb5fb658`|

|54|Chambers of Commerce Root|`0c258a12a5674aef25f28ba7dcfaeceea348e541e6f5cc4ee63b71b361606ac3`|

|55|QuoVadis Root CA 3 G3|`88ef81de202eb018452e43f864725cea5fbd1fc2d9d205730709c5d8b8690f46`|

|56|VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G3|`eb04cf5eb1f39afa762f2bb120f296cba520c1b97db1589565b81cb9a17b7244`|

|57|GlobalSign Root CA|`ebd41040e4bb3ec742c9e381d31ef2a41a48b6685c96e7cef3c1df6cd4331c99`|

|58|Actalis Authentication Root CA|`55926084ec963a64b96e2abe01ce0ba86a64fbfebcc7aab5afc155b37fd76066`|

|59|UTN-USERFirst-Object|`6fff78e400a70c11011cd85977c459fb5af96a3df0540820d0f4b8607875e58f`|

|60|AffirmTrust Networking|`0a81ec5a929777f145904af38d5d509f66b5e2c58fcdb531058b0e17f3f0b41b`|

|61|AffirmTrust Premium|`70a73f7f376b60074248904534b11482d5bf0e698ecc498df52577ebf2e93b9a`|

|62|LuxTrust Global Root|`a1b2dbeb64e706c6169e3c4118b23baa09018a8427666d8bf0e28891ec051950`|

|63|QuoVadis Root Certification Authority|`a45ede3bbbf09c8ae15c72efc07268d693a21c996fd51e67ca079460fd6d8873`|

|64|Buypass Class 3 Root CA|`edf7ebbca27a2a384d387b7d4010c666e2edb4843e4c29b4ae1d5b9332e6b24d`|

|65|GeoTrust Primary Certification Authority - G3|`b478b812250df878635c2aa7ec7d155eaa625ee82916e2cd294361886cd1fbd4`|

|66|thawte Primary Root CA - G2|`a4310d50af18a6447190372a86afaf8b951ffb431d837f1e5688b45971ed1557`|

|67|LuxTrust Global Root 2|`54455f7129c20b1447c418f997168f24c58fc5023bf5da5be2eb6e1dd8902ed5`|

|68|VeriSign Universal Root Certification Authority|`2399561127a57125de8cefea610ddf2fa078b5c8067f4e828290bfb860e84b3c`|

|69|Chambers of Commerce Root - 2008|`063e4afac491dfd332f3089b8542e94617d893d7fe944e10a7937ee29d9693c0`|

|70|SSL.com EV Root Certification Authority RSA R2|`2e7bf16cc22485a7bbe2aa8696750761b0ae39be3b2fe9d0cc6d4ef73491425c`|

|71|SwissSign Silver CA - G2|`be6c4da2bbb9ba59b6f3939768374246c3c005993fa98f020d1dedbed48a81d5`|

|72|SSL.com Root Certification Authority ECC|`3417bb06cc6007da1b961c920b8ab4ce3fad820e4aa30b9acbc4a74ebdcebc65`|

|73|Entrust Root Certification Authority - G2|`43df5774b03e7fef5fe40d931a7bedf1bb2e6b42738c4e6d3841103d3aa7f339`|

|74|Amazon Root CA 1|`8ecde6884f3d87b1125ba31ac3fcb13d7016de7f57cc904fe1cb97c6ae98196e`|

|75|Amazon Root CA 2|`1ba5b2aa8c65401a82960118f80bec4f62304d83cec4713a19c39c011ea46db4`|

|76|DigiCert Assured ID Root CA|`3e9099b5015e8f486c00bcea9d111ee721faba355a89bcf1df69561e3dc6325c`|

|77|Go Daddy Class 2 Certification Authority|`c3846bf24b9e93ca64274c0ec67c1ecc5e024ffcacd2d74019350e81fe546ae4`|

|78|GlobalSign ECC Root CA - R4|`bec94911c2955676db6c0a550986d76e3ba005667c442c9762b4fbb773de228c`|

|79|AddTrust External CA Root|`687fa451382278fff0c8b11f8d43d576671c6eb2bceab413fb83d965d06d2ff2`|

|80|T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 3|`fd73dad31c644ff1b43bef0ccdda96710b9cd9875eca7e31707af3e96d522bbd`|

|81|Global Chambersign Root - 2008|`136335439334a7698016a0d324de72284e079d7b5220bb8fbd747816eebebaca`|

|82|thawte Primary Root CA - G3|`4b03f45807ad70f21bfc2cae71c9fde4604c064cf5ffb686bae5dbaad7fdd34c`|

|83|COMODO RSA Certification Authority|`52f0e1c4e58ec629291b60317f074671b85d7ea80d5b07273463534b32b40234`|

|84|DigiCert Global Root G3|`31ad6648f8104138c738f39ea4320133393e3a18cc02296ef97c2ac9ef6731d0`|

|85|AffirmTrust Premium ECC|`bd71fdf6da97e4cf62d1647add2581b07d79adf8397eb4ecba9c5e8488821423`|

|86|GeoTrust Global CA|`ff856a2d251dcd88d36656f450126798cfabaade40799c722de4d2b5db36a73a`|

|87|T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2|`91e2f5788d5810eba7ba58737de1548a8ecacd014598bc0b143e041b17052552`|

|88|SwissSign Platinum CA - G2|`3b222e566711e992300dc0b15ab9473dafdef8c84d0cef7d3317b4c1821d1436`|

|89|DigiCert Global Root G2|`cb3ccbb76031e5e0138f8dd39a23f9de47ffc35e43c1144cea27d46a5ab1cb5f`|

|90|GlobalSign ECC Root CA - R5|`179fbc148a3dd00fd24ea13458cc43bfa7f59c8182d783a513f6ebec100c8924`|

|91|Resolver|`4f13cddd9fd6f996fd981bdb5d735daf54c83427557607b950a625f0804b2df8`|


Whos is Salat's Stealer author Maxim Vladimirovich Nesterenko?

Based on my research and analysis for the istan4urka user and the fact that there's only one publicly known user that's using the exact istan4urka username we can easily conclude that based on this research and analysis the author of Salat Stealer is Maxim Vladimirovich Nesterenko who's also into programming once came up with his own antivirus scanner program and not surprisingly one of the domains that he disputed with his domain registrar Reg.ru which is hxxp://nyashkoon.ru is also known to be heavily involved with the NyashTeam malware-as-a-service (Maas) cybercrime ecosystem underground market proposition and also WebRat which is a common alias for Salat Stealer which is where I originally picked up his real name for this analysis.


Maxim Vladimirovich Nesterenko IoCs:


Personal email: maxnest@mail.ru; maxnest@mail.primorye.ru; web@ginner.ru

Domains: hxxp://nester.fesaem.ru; hxxp://nester.psue.ru

Personal Address: Chkalova st. 12, apt. 56, 690068 Vladivostok, Primorsky krai, Russia


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Sunday, November 08, 2026

My Private Telegram Channel

Hi, everyone,

160 subscribers for my private Telegram cybercrime research channel.

Thank you so much.

Here's the invitation link.

https://t.me/+Zn-3H2WyftRkNmI0

Thank you once again and stay tuned.

Thanks,

Dancho

Thursday, November 05, 2026

Who is RAMP's Administrator Stallman? - Part Two

Dear blog readers,

This is Dancho.

This is the second part of the article which a reader recently shared with me in terms of using not just publicly accessible but publicly obtainable information to cross-check and cross-reference RAMP's administrator Stallman.

Here's the analysis:

Stallman ---> admin ---> axe1@thesecure.biz | the operator's jabber persona (Jan 2022) | "My contackts … Jabber axe1@thesecure.biz" (2022-01-19); re-issued by a member in April 2022: "contackts still valid" | ---> Axe1@list.ru

/OnlineTrade_BF/data/onlinetrade-clients.sql a russian online marketplace like ebay
(1702572, 1547186758, 0, 1596084470, 0, 0, 'Никита', '', '', 0, 0, 'Axe1@list.ru', '+79129809766', '9129809766', 1547186758, '', '', '', '', 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 221, 2, 0, 380909, 0, 1, '', 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, '', 0, '', 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, '', 0, '', 0, '', 0, '', 0, '', '', 0, 0, 0, 0, '46.146.221.120 109.194.185.131', '', 0, 0, '', 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, '', '', 0, 0),

CDEK_BF/data/base.txt
920691430 \N \N Кириллов Епифан Кириллов Епифан  614535757 PRM32 Axe1@list.ru
858287747 \N \N Радаев Никита Радаев Никита  572925927 PRM14 Axe1@list.ru

Радаев Никита Радаев Никита -- IT Guy works at merdian credit union https://vk.ru/radaev89
Meridian Bank is a financial institution in Pennsylvania
Admin has one single IP leak
2023-03-30, 12:14:51 UTC. admin. A cookie_login a returning browser, a remembered session from 166.148.215.206 this is from a phone in Pennsylvania

Дорогие друзья! Я не проверяю ВК. Пожалуйста пишите в инсту на lipton_catman, в ФБ или на емейл radaev89@gmail.com
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4 Aug 2021

He says he will be inactive and that you should email him if you need anything

| 2021-04-05 | Master wallet 1Bc4Nkmo… first on-chain activity pre-RAMP financial trail begins |
| 2021-07 | Matveev (Orange) builds RAMP on Babuk's old Tor infrastructure; Orange admin, MRT/999/KAJIT moderators (McAfee ATR/Intel 471, 2021-09-09) |
| 2021-10-18 | Kajit named RAMP admin (Velasco/Group-IB via The Register, 2021-12-02); admin account registered 14:45:28 UTC same day |
| 2021-11-01 | RAMP opens to the public; Stallman account registered 23:33:54 UTC, email stallman2@thesecure.biz |
At the same time as stallman starts operating

Nikita Radaev
Сегодня я понял, что означает пословица hear no evil, see no evil, speak no evil.
0 people reacted
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6 Nov 2018

Nikita Radaev
updated his profile photo to the 
11 people reacted
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20 Oct 2018
Mikhail Serov
Mikhail Serov
мафиозник?)
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21 Oct 2018
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Stas Stezz
Stas Stezz replied to Mikhail
Mikhail, ты спрашиваешь без уважения
1
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21 Oct 2018
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Nikita Radaev
Mikhail Serov
Mikhail Serov
уважение только к истинным мафиози)
png496 KB
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21 Oct 2018
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Nikita Radaev

other accounts belonging to himhttps://huggingface.co/meacue
https://ca.linkedin.com/in/nikitaradaev
https://github.com/Meacue into infosec and cybersecuritycodewars.com/users/Meacue
https://career.habr.com/meacue
https://leetcode.com/u/meacue/
https://hub.docker.com/u/meacue
radaev.72@yandex.ru

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