Showing posts with label Affiliate Network. Show all posts

Exposing a Portfolio of Pay Per Install Rogue and Fraudulent and Malicious Affiliate Network Domains - An OSINT Analysis

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January 24, 2022

 
Dear blog readers,

I've decided to share with everyone an in-depth historical OSINT analysis on some of the primary pay per install rogue fraudulent and malicious affiliate network based rogue and fraudulent revenue sharing scheme operating malicious software gangs that are known to have been active back in 2008 with the idea to assist everyone in their cyber campaign attribution efforts.

Sample portfolio of pay per install rogue fraudulent and malicious affiliate network domains known to have been in operation in 2008 include:

vipsoftcash[.]com
iframevip[.]com
avicash[.]com
softmonsters[.]biz
cashboom[.]biz
loader[.]cc
luxecash[.]com
iframepartners[.]com
installsforyou[.]biz
topsale2[.]ru
cashcodec[.]com
go-go-cash[.]com
oxocash[.]com
3xl-cash2[.]com
3xlpartnership[.]com
installs4sale[.]com
profitclick[.]org
megatraffer[.]com
oemcash[.]com
goldencashworld[.]biz
topsale[.]us
installsmarket[.]com
profit-cash[.]biz
ADWSearch[.]com
ovocash[.]com
loadsprofit[.]com
exerevenue[.]com
adwaredollars[.]com
yabucks[.]com
installing[.]cc
installconverter[.]com
topsale[.]us
bakasoftware[.]com
goldencashworld[.]net
niftystats[.]com
niftystats[.]com
royal-cash[.]com
dogmasoftware[.]com
3xlsoftware[.]com
rashacash[.]com
3xltop[.]com
vipinstall[.]cn
installercash[.]com
spicycodec[.]com
softwareprofit[.]com
codecmoney[.]biz
trafcash[.]com
smilecash[.]biz
bucksloads[.]com
traffic-converter[.]biz
eupays[.]com
seocash[.]us
vipppc[.]ru
cashwrestler[.]com
VipSoftCash[.]com
vscstatistics[.]com
vipsoftcashstats[.]com
Spy-Partners[.]com
vippirog[.]com
cashbotnet[.]com
installsforyou[.]biz
profit-cash[.]biz
bestcash[.]biz
VisitPay[.]com
partnerka[.]com
spy-partners[.]com
download4money[.]com
luxecash[.]net
iframe911[.]com
LOADBUCKS[.]BIZ
Cashpanic[.]com
longbucks[.]com
drugrevenue[.]com
evapharmacy[.]ru
bucksloads[.]com
spydevastator[.]com
softcash[.]org
3xlsoftware[.]com
rashacash[.]com
3xlcash[.]com
spicycodec[.]com
buckster[.]ru
trafficconverter2[.]biz
bucksware[.]com
bucksware-admin[.]com
mac-codec[.]com
traffic-converter[.]biz
klikadult[.]com
goldencash[.]com
payperinstall[.]org
pay-per-install[.]com
pay-per-install[.]org
zangocash[.]com
iframebiz[.]com
webmaster-money[.]org
cash4toolbar[.]com
toolbar4cash[.]com
bluechillies[.]com
adwaredollars[.]com
iframestat[.]org
snapinstalls[.]com
installercash[.]com
installcash[.]org
earnperinstall[.]com
dollarsengine[.]com
installercash[.]com
vombacash[.]com
softahead[.]com
iframestat[.]org
antispy[.]ws
sexprofit[.]com
evapharmacy-login[.]biz
vipsoftcash[.]com
glavmed[.]com

Sample name servers known to have been used by the same rogue fraudulent and malicious pay per install affiliate network domains include:

ns1[.]cgymwmlcaa[.]com A 85[.]17[.]136[.]135
ns1[.]cdpvaqnlod[.]com A 85[.]17[.]136[.]135
ns1[.]ccytvpbsdg[.]com A 85[.]17[.]136[.]135
ns1[.]cbfkzhtyik[.]com A 85[.]17[.]136[.]135
ns1[.]cezqtessjo[.]com A 85[.]17[.]136[.]135
ns1[.]cfsiqejclo[.]com A 85[.]17[.]136[.]135
ns1[.]catjepzcft[.]com A 85[.]17[.]136[.]135
ns1[.]dhxkycjmrg[.]net A 85[.]17[.]136[.]135
ns1[.]dglcxlcfmk[.]net A 85[.]17[.]136[.]135
ns1[.]damqrgldev[.]net A 85[.]17[.]136[.]135
ns1[.]dfhatnjfjw[.]net A 85[.]17[.]136[.]135
ns1[.]ddzmuatncz[.]net A 85[.]17[.]136[.]135

ns1[.]cgymwmlcaa[.]com A 72[.]232[.]184[.]10
ns1[.]cdpvaqnlod[.]com A 72[.]232[.]184[.]10
ns1[.]ccytvpbsdg[.]com A 72[.]232[.]184[.]10
ns1[.]cbfkzhtyik[.]com A 72[.]232[.]184[.]10
ns1[.]cezqtessjo[.]com A 72[.]232[.]184[.]10
ns1[.]cfsiqejclo[.]com A 72[.]232[.]184[.]10
ns1[.]chyaicpvxo[.]com A 72[.]232[.]184[.]10
ns1[.]catjepzcft[.]com A 72[.]232[.]184[.]10
ns1[.]dhxkycjmrg[.]net A 72[.]232[.]184[.]10
ns1[.]dcorbtfyni[.]net A 72[.]232[.]184[.]10
ns1[.]dglcxlcfmk[.]net A 72[.]232[.]184[.]10
ns1[.]detjstniup[.]net A 72[.]232[.]184[.]10
ns1[.]damqrgldev[.]net A 72[.]232[.]184[.]10
ns1[.]dfhatnjfjw[.]net A 72[.]232[.]184[.]10
ns1[.]dbsjxuvijx[.]net A 72[.]232[.]184[.]10
ns1[.]ddzmuatncz[.]net A 72[.]232[.]184[.]10

cgymwmlcaa[.]com  A  195[.]2[.]253[.]247 
cezqtessjo[.]com  A  195[.]2[.]253[.]247 
cfsiqejclo[.]com  A  195[.]2[.]253[.]247 
chyaicpvxo[.]com  A  195[.]2[.]253[.]247 
cdpvaqnlod[.]com  A  195[.]2[.]253[.]246 
ccytvpbsdg[.]com  A  195[.]2[.]253[.]246 
cbfkzhtyik[.]com  A  195[.]2[.]253[.]246 
catjepzcft[.]com  A  195[.]2[.]253[.]246 

http://catjepzcft[.]com
http://catjepzcft[.]com
http://damqrgldev[.]net
http://catjepzcft[.]com 
http://damqrgldev[.]net

catjepzcft[.]com

damqrgldev[.]net  195[.]2[.]253[.]248  
dcorbtfyni[.]net A 195[.]2[.]253[.]248
damqrgldev[.]net A 195[.]2[.]253[.]248
dbsjxuvijx[.]net A 195[.]2[.]253[.]248
ddzmuatncz[.]net A 195[.]2[.]253[.]248

dhxkycjmrg[.]net A 195[.]2[.]253[.]249
dglcxlcfmk[.]net A 195[.]2[.]253[.]249
detjstniup[.]net A 195[.]2[.]253[.]249
dfhatnjfjw[.]net A 195[.]2[.]253[.]249

dhxkycjmrg[.]net NS ns1[.]dhxkycjmrg[.]net
ns1[.]dhxkycjmrg[.]net A 72[.]232[.]184[.]10
ns1[.]dhxkycjmrg[.]net A 85[.]17[.]136[.]135
dcorbtfyni[.]net NS ns1[.]dhxkycjmrg[.]net
dglcxlcfmk[.]net NS ns1[.]dhxkycjmrg[.]net
detjstniup[.]net NS ns1[.]dhxkycjmrg[.]net
damqrgldev[.]net NS ns1[.]dhxkycjmrg[.]net
dfhatnjfjw[.]net NS ns1[.]dhxkycjmrg[.]net
dbsjxuvijx[.]net NS ns1[.]dhxkycjmrg[.]net
ddzmuatncz[.]net NS ns1[.]dhxkycjmrg[.]net

Related pay per install rogue fraudulent and malicious domains known to have been used back in 2008 for various rogue fraudulent and malicious purposes include:

drawn-cash[.]com
vippay[.]com
bucksware-admin[.]com
www[.]system-protector[.]net
sys-scan-1[.]biz
sys-scan-wiz[.]biz
topsale2[.]ru
earning4u[.]com
flashdollars[.]com
installing[.]cc
siteload[.]cn A 94[.]247[.]2[.]54
hostnsload[.]cn
siteinstall[.]cn
hostnsinstall[.]cn
jjupsport[.]ru
installz[.]cn
adware-help[.]com
fliporn[.]com
dailybucks[.]org
installloader[.]com
installaga[.]cn
georgenatas[.]in
naemnitibo[.]in
tirosanare[.]in
mialo-goodle[.]info
nailcash[.]com
ultraantivirus2009[.]com
nailcash[.]com  A  64[.]86[.]17[.]9 
virusalarmpro[.]com  A  64[.]86[.]17[.]9 
vmfastscanner[.]com  A  64[.]86[.]17[.]9 
mysuperviser[.]com  A  64[.]86[.]17[.]9 
virusmelt[.]com  A  64[.]86[.]17[.]9 
payvirusmelt[.]com  A  64[.]86[.]17[.]9 
updvmfnow[.]cn  A  64[.]86[.]17[.]9 
mysupervisor[.]net  A  64[.]86[.]17[.]9

Related personal email accounts known to have been used for various related pay per install rogue fraudulent and malicious affiliate network domain registrations include:

pvc6168@sina[.]com
windinv@yahoo[.]com
new@loveplus[.]in
johnson8402@post[.]com
lmunozv1@live[.]com
ididid828@gmail[.]com
onlineprivacy@aol[.]com
alex@bnetworks[.]us
milen[.]radumilo@gmail[.]com
ztao72945@gmail[.]com
redsunray@hotmail[.]com
WINDINV@YAHOO[.]COM
tvmt2000@yahoo[.]com
325214476@qq[.]com
adxluxe@gmail[.]com
SexPicker@gmail[.]com
domainaccount@protonmail[.]com
ancientholdings@fastmail[.]fm
newseowork12@gmail[.]com
oem[.]myrian@gmail[.]com
229848501@qq[.]com
bdmailhere@gmail[.]com
danny9@gmail[.]com
phone49012@yahoo[.]com
miok2001@mail[.]ru
zuev@cmedia-online[.]ru
daniel[.]bastien@gmail[.]com
domainadmin1900@gmail[.]com
larsonown@gmail[.]com
ppcseo2@gmail[.]com
sima[.]jogminaite@inbox[.]lt
topsaleus@gmail[.]com

Stay tuned!
Continue reading →

Exposing the Pay Per Install Underground Business Model – Historical OSINT - An Analysis - 2008

January 06, 2021
What are some of the primary scareware and adware distributors circa 2008? Which were the most profitable pay-pay-install and drive-by-download affiliate-network based revenue-sharing scheme malicious and fraudulent scareware and adware pushing providers circa 2008? Who was providing them with the necessary infrastructure to help them stay online and earn fraudulent profit in the processes of pushing fake security software also known as scareware including adware to hundreds of thousands of unsuspecting users online? Keep reading.

In this exclusive analysis I'll provide actionable intelligence on some of the major rogue and fraudulent pay-per-install and drive-by-download scareware and adware pushing affiliate-network based type of rogue providers circa 2008 and discuss in-depth the tactics techniques and procedures of the cybercriminals behind these affiliate-networks including actionable intelligence on the infrastructure behind these campaigns.

Sample Key Pay-Per-Install and Drive-by-Download Affiliate-Networks that I'll expose in this analysis circa 2008 include:
  • LuxeCash
  • LoudMo
  • Adware Dollars
  • GoldenCashWorld
  • CodecMoney
  • Earnings4you
  • EXE Revenue
  • Go-Go-Cash
  • InstallConverter
  • InstallerCash
  • Junior VIP
  • Oxocash
  • Snap Installs
  • Spicy Codec
  • The Installs
  • Traf Cash
  • Vomba Cash
  • Wave Revenue
  • Ya Bucks
  • Yazzle
  • Zango Cash
  • 3XL Parnership
  • Cash Boom
  • Cash Codec
  • Cash Wrestler
  • Buckware
  • Bakasoftware
  • Cash Panic
  • Dogma Software
  • K2Cash
  • Traffic Converter
  • VipSoft Cash
  • Dailybucks
  • EU Pays
  • Golden Cash
  • Profit Cash
  • Ruler Cash
  • Sex Profit
  • VIP Convert
  • Stimul Cash
Sample Screenshots of some of the key pay per install affiliate programs circa 2008:






Sample Screenshot of Adware Dollars:






Sample Screenshot of Bakasoftware:


Sample Screenshot of Bakasoftware's Admin Interface:






Sample rogue and fraudulent domains known to have been involved in Bakasoftware-related campaigns:
hxxp://av-xp-08.com
hxxp://av-xp-2008.com
hxxp://antivirusxp08.net
hxxp://antivirusxp2008.net
hxxp://antivirusxp-2008.net
hxxp://antivirusxp-08.net
hxxp://antivirus-xp-08.net
hxxp://antivirus-xp-08.com
hxxp://antivirusxp-08.com
hxxp://antivirusxp-2008.com
hxxp://antivirxp08.com
hxxp://avxp08.net
hxxp://avxp-08.com
hxxp://avxp-2008.com
hxxp://avxp08.com
hxxp://avxp2008.com
hxxp://avxp-2008.net
hxxp://antivirusxp08.com
hxxp://antivirusxp2008.com
hxxp://antivirusxp-2009.com






















































































































































































































Including the following photos obtained from a private safari where the top performing participants in the rogue affiliate-network based programs participated:



















































Stay tuned!
Continue reading →