Showing posts with label Antivirus Signatures. Show all posts

No Anti Virus Software, No E-banking For You

May 30, 2006
Malware and Phishing are the true enemies of E-commerce, its future penetration, and E-banking altogether. Still, there are often banks envisioning the very basic risks, and hedging them one way or another, as "Barclays gives anti-virus software to customers"

"Barclays Bank is issuing UK internet banking customers with anti-virus software, as part of attempts to reduce online identity theft. The bank has signed a deal with Finnish anti-virus firm F-Secure, which will provide software to the bank’s 1.6m UK internet banking customers. While other banks offer discounted anti-virus software deals to customers, Barclays is the first in the UK to give it away for free. ’Nearly two-thirds of home PCs don’t have active virus protection, and one in five is actually infected by a virus, placing people at risk from data theft, as well as damage to their computers,’ said Barnaby Davis, director of electronic banking at Barclays."

I find the idea a very good mostly because compared to other banks that try to reestablish the email communication with their customers, but starting from the basics, you can't do E-banking without generally acceptable security measure in place. And while an AV solution doesn't necessarily mean the customer wouldn't get attacked by other means, or that it would be actually active in the moment of the attack, this is a very smart to do. To take advantage of even more benefits, Barclays must actively communicate their contribution and unique differentiating point to their customers, in comparison with the other banks -- it's getting harder for companies to retain customers due to improved access to information, thus more informed decisions.

You can't just deal with the technological part of the problem, but avoid the human side in it, as education and awareness will result in less gullible, but more satisfied and longer retained customers. Phishing is today's efficient social engineering, and a bank's site shouldn't be assumed "secure" as on many occasions site-specific vulnerabilities improve the truthfulness of the scam itself. Forwarding the responsibility for secured access to the E-banking feature to final customers should be simultaneous with the bank auditing its web services. In the upcoming years, with the rise of mobile banking, I think we will inevitably start seeing more mobile phishing attempts.

Ebay's PayPal is still a major player in online payments, on its way to dominate mobile payments too. The trend and potential of cross-platform malware is what both AV vendors and payment providers should keep in mind. Continue reading →

The anti virus industry's panacea - a virus recovery button

April 20, 2006
Just when I thought I've seen everything when it comes to malware, I was wrong as a PC vendor is trying to desperately position itself as one offering a feeling of security with the idea to strip its product and lower the customer price. The other day I came across to a fancy ad featuring Lenovo's ThinkVantage Virus Recovery Button, and promoting its usefulness even when there's no AV solution in place :





"Rescue and Recovery is a one button recovery and restore solution that includes a set of self recovery tools to help users diagnose, get help and recover from a virus or other system crashes quickly, even if the primary operating system will not boot and you are remote from your support team."





The video ad is indeed fascinating, and while their Embedded Security Subsystem 2.0 "locks your sensitive data behind hardware-based encryption", you'd better take advantage of their utilities options and try to avoid such a weak positioning in respect to malware. The Virus Recovery Button seems to be directly targeting the masses and totaly removing the complexity issue by introducing a button-based solution to malware -- dangerous as backups and their idea could have proven useful during the first generations of malware.





Anti virus signatures, response time, and various other proactive malware prevention approaches such as, IPS, buffer overflow protection are among today's most widely discussed approaches when dealing with malware, and of course, the principle of least privilege to user accounts. But why the anti virus button when it can be an anti-hacker one? I feel they'd better stick to their OEM agreements and find other ways to achieve competive advantage in pricing than providing a false sense of security.





In my recent "Malware - future trends" research I mentioned on the fully realistic scenario of having your security solution turn into a security problem itself. While this is nothing new, in this case we have a misjudged security proposition, as recovering to a pre-infection state doesn't necessariry mean confidentiality of sensitive personal/financial information wouldn't be breached by the time the user is aware of the infection, if it ever happens of course.





Moreover, Lenovo was recently under scrutiny as "The U.S.-China Economic Security Review Commission (USCC) argues that a foreign intelligence like that of the Communist Party of China (CPC) can use its power to get Lenovo to equip its machines with espionage devices. Lenovo has strongly declined that it is involved in any such activities", and while they eventually reached a consensus on using the machines on unclassified systems only, it doesn't mean they aren't exposed to a wide variety of threats going beyond China backdooring them, such as Zotob over border-screening systems at airports.





As a matter of fact, the rival PC/notebook propositions might still be owned by U.S companies, but are mostly assembled in China these days -- too much hype for nothing.



UPDATE - Sites that picked up the post

LinuxSecurity.com
MalwareHelp.org





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Why relying on virus signatures simply doesn't work anymore?

January 19, 2006
As a fan of VirusTotal and Norman's Sandbox being always handy when making analyses or conclusions, and me looking for metrics and data to base my judgments on, besides experience, I feel their "Failures in Detection" of VT deserve more attention then they it's actually getting. 

With over 14, 000 files submitted on a weekly basis, where most of them are supposedly 0day malicious software, it's a great resource to consider. Using these scanners for the basis of its service (saw yours?!), it is still able to conclude the plain truth - signature based anti virus protection is having deep troubles as a concept these days. 

Moreover, vendors covering or enjoying monopolistic competition in specific geographical regions, without having the necessary AV expertise is something that is actually happening. So what made me an impression?

Failures in Detection (Last 7 days)

- 14, 016 failures that is, infected files not detected by at least one antivirus engine
- 372 samples detected by all vendors

What's important to note here is that, response time towards a new piece of malware in the wild is crucial as always. But that's great when it's actually achieved. The independent folks at Av-test.org, have featured a very nice Excel sheet on the "Reaction Times of the latest MS05-039-based Worm Attacks"(2005-08-22) so you can take a look for yourself. 

And as I've once mentioned my opinion on the growing possibility of 0day malware on demand, proactive measures would hopefully get the attention of vendors. Some folks are going as high as stating that AV scanners and AV defense as a concept will eventually end up as product line extension of a security appliance? Though, I feel you will never be able to license a core competency of a vendor that's been there before the concept of DDoS started getting public! And obviously, the number of signatures detected by them doesn't play a major role like it used years ago. Today's competitive factors have to do with, but not only of course :

Heuristic
Policy-Based Security
IPS (Intrusion Prevention Systems)
Behaviour Blockers
Protection against Buffer Overruns


I also advise you to go though a well written research on the topic of Proactive Antivirus protection, as it highlights the issues to keep in mind in respect to each of these. Is client side sandboxing an alternative as well, could and would a customer agree to act as a sandbox compared to the current(if any!) contribution of forwarding a suspicious sample? Would v2.0 constitute of a collective automated web petrol in a PC's "spare time"? How sound is this and the other concepts in terms of usability and deployment on a large scale?

Signatures are always a necessary evil as I like to say, ensure that at least your anti virus software vendor is not a newly born company with a modest honeyfarm and starting to perceive itself as a vendor, vendor of what? Solutions or signatures?!

Don't get me wrong, my intention behind this post was to make you think, as a customer or decion-maker on the approaches your current vendor uses, and how to make better decisions. At the bottom line, it's still a vendor's sensor network or client side submissions, even exchange of data between them, that provides the fastest response to *known* malware!

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