Showing posts with label Security Interviews. Show all posts

Security Interviews 2004/2005 - Part 2

January 26, 2006
Part 2 includes :
11. Eric (SnakeByte)http://www.snake-basket.de/ - 2005
12. Björn Andreassonhttp://www.warindustries.com/ - 2005
13. Bruce - http://www.dallascon.com/ - 2005
14. Nikolay Nedyalkov - http://www.iseca.org/ - 2005
15. Roman Polesek - http://www.hakin9.org/en/ - 2005
16. John Young - http://www.cryptome.org/ - 2005

Go through Part 1 and Part 3 as well!

Part of Asta's Security Newsletter---------------------------
Interview with SnakeByte (Eric), http://www.snake-basket.de/

Astalavista : Hi Eric, would you please introduce yourself to our readers and share your experience in the security scene?

Eric : I am 24 years old, currently studying computer science in Darmstadt, Germany for quite some time now. I am mostly a lazy guy, doing whatever I am currently interested in. My interest in computer security started with viruses ( no, I never spreaded one ), which were really interesting back then, but nowadays every worm looks the same;(

Astalavista : Things have changed much since the days of Webfringe, Progenic, BlackCode etc. What do you think are the main threats to security these days? Is it our dependece on technologies and the Internet the fact that it's insecure by design or you might have something else in mind?

Eric : I think security itself got a lot better since then but we have more dumb users who work hard to make it worse now. Most users nowadays get flooded with viruses and just click them,
also the recent rise in phishing attacks - it's not the box which gets attacked here, it's the user. Security also got a lot more commercial.

Astalavista : What is your opinion on today's malware and virii scene? Do you think that groups such as the infamous A29 have been gaining too much publicity? What do you think motivates virii writers and virii groups now in comparison to a couple of years ago?

Eric : It's 29a :) And they deserve the publicity they got. They did and are doing some really cool stuff. But they also were clever enough to be responsible with the stuff they created. About motivation for virii writers - it's different for each of them, have to ask them.

But I think there is a new motivation - money. Nowadays you can get paid for a couple of infected computers, so spammers can abuse them.

Astalavista : What do you think of Symantec ? Is too much purchasing power under one roof going to end up badly, or eventually the whole industry is going to benefit from their actions?

Eric : Sure monopolies are always bad but we get them everywhere nowadays. Maybe we need another revolution...

Astalavista : Is the practice of employing teen virii writers possessing what is thought to be a "know-how" a wise idea? Or it just promotes lack of law enforcement and creates ordes of source modifying or real malware coders?

Eric : I dont think it is a wise idea at all, but don't tell my boss ;-) Whether one has written virii or not should not influence your decision to you hire him/her.

Astalavista : Application security has gained much attention lately. Since you have significant programming experience, what do you think would be the trends in this field over the next couple of years, would software be indeed coded more securely?

Eric : Maybe,if universities started to teach coding in a secure way instead of teaching us more java bullcrap. But I think the open source development is indeed helpful there. If you want to
run something like a server, a quick glance at the code will tell you whether you really want to use this piece or search for another one.

Astalavista : Microsoft and its efforts to fight spyware has sparckled a huge debate over the Internet. Do you think it's somehow ironic that MS's IE is the number one reason for the existence of spyware. Would we see yet another industry build on MS's insecurities?

Eric : It's the only reasonable way for MS to react. Heh, they are just a company.

Astalavista : The Googlemania is still pretty hot. Are you somehow concerned about their one-page privacy policy, contradictive statements, and the lack of retention policies given the fact that they process the world's searches in the most advanced way and the U.S post 9/11 Internet wiretapping initiatives?

Eric : Yes I am, that's why their only product I use is the websearch function. As soon as I find another good website like google.

Astalavista: Thanks for your time Eric!
-----------------------------------------

Interview with Bjorn Andreasson, http://www.warindustries.com/

Astalavista : Hi Bjorn, would you please introducte yourself and share some more information about your background in the security world?

Bjorn : My name is Bjorn "phonic" Andreasson and I live in Sweden, I'm turning 22 this year. I've been a part of the so called "underground" since the age of 14 which gives a total of 8 years. I got my first computer at the age of 13 and I quickly got involved in Warez as my uncle showed me some basic stuff about the internet. After a while I realised Warez websites was "uncool" because of all the popups, porn ads, only trying to get as many clicks on your ads as possible to earn enough money to cover your phone bill. So, there I was viewing the Fringe of the web (www.webfringe.com) and I found all those wonderful h/p/v/c/a websites, which caught my eye. I knew I could do better than most of these guys as I had a lot of experience from the Warez scene -I knew how to attract visitors quickly. The first version of War Industries I belive was a total ripoff from Warforge.com as I didn't know better at the age of 15/16, I quickly understood this wasn't the way to do it so I made my first version of the War Industries and I might add it looked VERY ugly as I recall it:)

From there I have had several designers making new versions, trying to improve it and I belive we've acheived that goal now. It should be mentioned that during 2000 and 2003 War Industries was put on ice as I couldn't cover the expenses so it was only me and a friend keeping the name alive until 2003 when I relaunched the website and turned it into what it is today (Badass). I've also been a part of the Progenic.com crew as well. As Blackcode.com crew, it was practicly my work that made BC famous because I sent a shitload of hits to it back in '99 when WarIndustries received 4,000 unique hits on a daily basis. I also owned www.icqwar.com which held only ICQ war tools, some of my own creation, very basic but handy. The site had 3,000 unique hits on a daily basis after only one week online. After four weeks I got a letter from AOL to give me the domain name or being sued. What could I do? 16 years old, of course, I gave it away! Well that's pretty much my story.

Astalavista : WarIndustries.com has been around since 1998, nice to see that it's still alive.
What is the site's mission, is it hacking or security oriented? Shall we expect some quality stuff to be released in the future, too?

Bjorn : WarIndustries can't really be placed anywhere. It's either black, gray or white hat. I'd say we're a mix with a touch of them all. Our focus is to enlighten people in the means of programming, getting them to know google as their best friend. We've released a couple of video tutorials wich are very popular because they make things so easy. We're going to release a
couple of new ones soon, as soon as we get around to it as most of us got jobs and other stuff to attend to. Don't miss out on our brand new T-shirts coming up in a month! If you're something, you've got to have one of those!

Astalavista : What do you think has changed during all these years? Give a comparison between the scene back in 1998 as you knew it and today's global security industry, and is there a scene to talk about?

Bjorn : I'd say people are a way more enlightened today. Back in '98 you could pretty much do anything you liked without getting caught. Today you can't even download Warez without getting problems. I'd say there's a scene but very different from the oldschool I know. I am trying not to get involved and I have my own way. Maybe that's why WarIndustries is so popular.

Astalavista : Is Google evil, or let's put it this way, how can Google be evil? Why would Google want to be evil and what can we do about it if it starts getting too evil?

Bjorn : Google is not evil, Google is your best friend!

Astalavista : Give your comments on Microsoft's security ambitions given the fact that they've recently started competing in the anti-virus industry. They even introduced anti-spyware application - all this comming from MS?

Bjorn : If it wasn't for Microsoft, there wouldn't be viruses so I'm blaiming them for writing crap software. Why do they always leave a project unfinished and start another one? I mean Windows XP is working fine, why Longhorn? Why can't they make XP totally secure, like OpenBSD, there hasn't been a remote root exploit for many years as of what I've heard? That's security! If I didn't know better, I'd say MS is writing low-quality software so they can get
into the Anti-virus scene and make even more profits!

Astalavista : Recently, the EU has been actively debating software patents. Share your thoughts on this and the future of open-source software?

Bjorn : I can't make up my mind when it comes to Open/Closed source.There's benefits from both sides. Open source is fixed much quicker but also discovered way more often than closed. This is my opinion.

Astalavista : In conclusion, I would really appreciate if you share your comments about the Astalavista.com site and, particularly, about our security newsletter?

Bjorn : Actually, I haven't checked out Astalavista that much. I have known it for many years but I never got around. I promise I'll check it out!

Astalavista : Thanks for your time Bjorn!
--------------------------------------------

Interview with Bruce, http://www.dallascon.com/

Astalavista : Hi Bruce, would you please share with us some more information on your background in the security industry and what is DallasCon 2005 all about?

Bruce : Thanks for this opportunity. I have over 7 years of engineering experience working as a System's Engineer for companies such as Nortel Networks and Fujitsu. Realizing the importance of real information security training experince for everyday people, about 4 years ago a few colleagues and I decided to start truely academic Information Security Conference in Dallas and see what happens. We held the first DallasCon in 2002, just a few months after the tragic events of Septmber 11, 2001 in the U.S. The reponse was overwhelming with academic papers being presented from as far away as Russia and attending coming from countries such as Japan and China. Astalavista : There are so many active security cons and conferences out there that it is sometimes hard to decide which one is worth visiting. What, in your opinion, makes a con/conference qualified? Do you think that although there's nothing wrong with commercialization, some cons are becoming too commercial so they have lost sight of what their vision used to be in the very beginning of their history?

Bruce : Truly, I must admit the lure of money being thrown at many of similar conferneces such as ours is sometimes overwhelming. When a company such as Microsoft comes knocking on your door with a fist full of cash wanting to by into a Keynote speaker slot, it's hard to resist the temptation to give in. But we have tried to separate the academics from the commercial side. The training courses and the conference itself are designed to present the latest unbiased view of current trends in information security. We have a team of dedicated colleagues that read every paper carefully and look for flagrant promotions of certain technologies or companies. They also work very closely with the speakers who are chosen to present at DallasCon, to make
sure that they know what is expected from them. We do offer sponsorship opportunites to companies to help us carry the costs of such an event, but we try very hard to separate the business side from what people come to DallasCon for, which is the latest unbiased view of the trends and research in information security. I think many conferneces lose sight of what made
them big and forget their roots.

Astalavista : Like pretty much every organization, ChoicePoint or T-Mobile, keep a great deal of personal, often sensitive information about us, as citizens, students or employees. What actions do you think should be taken by the general public, the companies themselves and the government to ensure that the security within such databases or service providers is well beyond the acceptable level of security for most organizations?

Bruce : I think companies need to stop treating their customers like numbers and really put a face with the information that they are gathering. When someone gives you detailed information about themselves, they have put their trust in your company to protect them. When a breach is made, the cusomter feels betrayed and may never come back to you to do business. I laugh when I hear that huge muti-billion dollar companies are constantly having their cusotmer data stolen. I wonder how much they are really spending on security? How much are their cusotmers worth to them? These days it is hard to distinguish between legitiamte companies and fake ones online. It's funny, but people have trouble revealing their credit card information or social security number to a physical business down the street, but put the same business online and people throw that information at you without thinking twice. I think consumers need to stop taking security for granted and use some common sense. The first step of security is common sense...You can't put a price on that!

Astalavista : Two words - Symbian and malware - what are your assumptions for the future trends on the mobile malware front?

Bruce : I predict that it will be huge. The future of mobile OS is wide open and as the competition for market share grows, mobile companies want to offer anything they can in a smart-phone. I am always surprised as to what phones can do right now... in a few years, they might even serve us breakfast in bed! The downside is the huge vulnerability of the mobile-OS. First of all, more people own phones than computers around the world. It is the obvious next frontier for virus writers. Secondly, theoretically, it is much easier to infect an entire phone network than PC's. All you need is one infected phone syncking with a base station. Again, I go back to my previous answer, people need to use common sense... Do you really need to put your financial data or your sensitive e-mail on your phone?

Astalavista : What is your opinion about the mass introduction of biometrics on a world wide scale?

Bruce : Good - it will make security more individualized. We will all carry our security inside our DNA. Bad - it might increase the market for organ theft! (just kidding!)

Astalavista : In conclusion, I would appreciate if you share your comments about the Astalavista.com site, and particularly about this security publication?

Bruce : I have been visiting Astalavista.com for many years now, and I am very
impressed with the up to date cutting edge news, articles and really underground topics covered on your site. When we wanted to really reach out to the educated hacker community, Astalavista.com was the obvious choice. Thanks for putting us on your site and thanks for helping us promote our event.

Astalavista : You're welcome, wish you luck with the con!
-----------------------------

Interview with Nicolay Nedyalkov, http://www.iseca.org/

Astalavista : Hi Nicolay, would you, please, introduce yourself to our readers and share some info about your experience in the information security industry? Also what is ISECA all about?

Nicolay : My interest in information security dates back from 1996. At that time, respected Bulgarian experts from all over the country used to meet periodically at closed seminars where we exchanged our ideas and experience. At a later stage we developed the phreedom.org E-zine. I have also participated in numerous national and international mathematics and IT contests.

Currently I am a managing director for the R&D; department of one of Bulgaria’s most Prominent IT companies – Information Service. In 2002 I decided to initiate an InfoSec course at the University of Sofia. Once the course “Network Security? became part of the university’s curriculum, we immediately got the interest of over 500 students. During 2003, with the help of several experienced security colleagues of mine we developed another fresh and very useful course in “Secure programming?. Both of the courses fitted perfectly into the program curriculum and actually they attracted more students than we had expected. I am also teaching four other courses in Software technologies. As a whole, we contributed for the development of IT education in Bulgaria establishing the ISECA (Information Security Association), whose main purpose is to connect our members and inspire them to innovate, create, and enrich their personal knowledge, while being part of a unique community.

Astalavista : Correct me if I'm wrong but I believe not many Eastern European universities emphasize on the practicality of their computer and network security courses? What are your future plans for enriching the course selection further, and also integrating a more practical approach into your curriculum ?

Nicolay : During the last couple of years we have seen a definite slowdown in Europe regarding
information security courses and programmes. Until now we have already developed over eight courses, including the course Information Systems Security Audits, which is widely applicable. Furter, there is intensive work on the development of a new Network & Software Security Lab. We are also negotiating with ABA representatives for the introduction of a professional certification program – “Risk Management in the Financial and Banking Sector?

In fall 2005, University of Sofia will start a specialized master Information Security Program, coordinated by ISECA.

Astalavista : Who are the people behind ISECA, and what are the current local/global projects you're working on, or intend to develop in the upcoming future?

Nicolay : Our core members include certified security consultants and auditors, researchers, IS managers and class teaching professors. Among the key projects we’ve already developed or we are working on at the moment are:

- A National Laboratory for Network and Software Audits, being developed in close cooperation
with The University of Sofia. The lab will be used for audits and R&D; in the industry.
- An Information Security Portal – ISECA
- A National anti-spam system and its integration within international ones like SpamHouse
- Safeguarding the local business interests of information security and promoting its development on a government level
- Active participation in the development of the Bulgarian Law for E-trade and E-signature
- Subscription based “Vulnerability Notification? service
- Centralized log analysis and security monitoring

Astalavista : What is the current situation of the Bulgarian IT and Security market? What was it like 5 years ago, and is there an active security scene in the country?

Nicolay : We are currently witnessing a boom in the Bulgarian demand for information security services as a great number of businesses are realizing the importance of information security. On the other hand we are in a process of building strategical relationships with Bulgarian and multinational companies providing security related products and services. In the last couple of years official government bodies also have emphasized on sustaining secure communications. In response, our main goal in the upcoming future would be to build a collaborative working atmosphere with stable relationships between key partners and experts

Astalavista : Bulgaria and Eastern Europe have always been famous as a place where the
first computer viruses actually originated, to name the Dark Avenger as the most famous author. What do you think caused this - plain curiosity, outstanding programming skills, or you might have something else in mind?

Nicolay: It is a fact that Bulgaria is popular with its potential in the creation of viruses, trojans and malware at all. The thing is that there are a great number of highly skilled experts, who cannot apply their talent in the still growing local market; consequently they sometimes switch to the dark side. One of our main aims is namely to attract people with great potential and provide them with a professional and stable basis, on which they could develop themselves on the right track. The Bulgarian – Dark Avenger, well, he used to be an idol for the virus writers and the name still brings respect.

Astalavista : Is there an open-source scene in Bulgaria, how mature is it, and do you believe the country would be among the many other actively adopting open-source solutions in the future, for various government or nation's purposes?

Nicolay : Yes, there is a Free Software Society . Several municipalities have already
turned into E-municipalities with the help of open source software. There was a proposition for the introduction of a law for integrating open source software within the government’s administration, which was unfortunately rejected later on. Free Software Society is in close contact with various political movements, which reflects the overall support and understanding of open source from the society. The use of open source is also within the objectives of one of the main political parties in the country, a goal that resulted from the many initiatives undertaken by the Free Software Society. ISECA’s members are also active participants in the core direction of the FSS. We are currently developing a new opensource research team, part of Information Service – OSRT (Open-Source Research Team).

Astalavista : How skilled is the Bulgarian IT labor market and do you think there's a shortage of well - trained specialists in both IT and Information Security? How can this be tackled?

Nicolay : There are a great number of highly qualified software developers in Bulgaria, who created the Bulgarian Association for Software Developers. We have had numerous seminars and lectures between ISECA and the Association. One of our main objectives is namely to locate
and unite the highly qualified IT and Security experts within Bulgaria. Both organizations are constantly seeking to establish stable relations with international organizations with the idea to exchange experience and promote mutually beneficial partnerships.

Astalavista : India is among the well-known outsourcing countries for various IT
skills, while on the other hand the Bulgarian programmers are well- respected all over the world, winning international math and programming contests. Do you think an intangible asset like this should be taken more seriously by the Bulgarian Government, and what do you think would be the future trends?

Nicolay : Every year there is a leakage of highly qualitfied young professionals with great potential for growth, looking for further career development . The core reason for this “brainwave?, so painful for the Bulgharian econmy and society, is the lack of a relevant government policy, ensuring stable and beneficial career opportunities for the young generation. I honestly hope that further government policies, not only those related to the IT industry, would be successful in providing what a nation needs – a bright future for its brightest minds.

Astalavista : In conclusion, I wanted to ask you what is your opinion of the Astalavista.com's web site and, in particular, our security newsletter?

Nicolay : I have been visiting Astalavista.com since its early days and it is great to see that recently the portal has successfully established among the few serious and comprehensive sites. Furthermore, you can always find whatever you are looking for - software, as well as recommendations and shared experience in information security. I believe Bulgaria needs the same high quality portal, one of our main ideas behind ISECA.

Astalavista : Thanks for your time!
-------------------------------------

Interview with Roman Polesek, http://www.hakin9.org/

Astalavista : Hi Roman, would you please introduce yourself, share some info about your background in the security industry, and tell us what is Hakin9 all about?

Roman : My name is Roman Polesek, I am an editor-in-chief of the 'hakin9 - practical protection' magazine since Summer of 2004. I'm 27 years old if it does matter. This might be a bit surprising for folks who know our magazine well, but I'm more a journalist/editor (and that is my education) than a CS/security master. Of course, I worked as a sysadmin for some time,
use mainly Unices and code in several languages, but in the IT industry world I'm rather a self made man. I suppose I have no right to call myself "a hacker" in the proper meaning of the word. In short, 'hakin9' -- subtitled as "Hard Core IT Security Magazine" – aims to be a perfect source of strictly technical, IT security related quality information. We noticed that both the market and the community lack comprehensive, in-depth works on this topic. Decision was pretty simple: "Let's do it and let's do it good – we cannot fail". At the moment, with total circulation of nearly 50 thousand copies, we have 7 language versions. The magazine is available worldwide, by subscription or in distribution. However, it's important to remember that we are not encouraging anyone to commit any criminal acts. Beside disclaimers published in every issue of the mag, we emphasize on the legal matters wherever possible. We do not want to make a magazine for the so-called script-kiddies and assume that our readers are professionals and require some portion of knowledge to fully utilize magazine's content. On the other hand, as we all know, "The information wants to be free". 

There's no reason to avoid any particular subjects. Every article that precisely describes an attack technique includes a section that is to help defending from the threat we present. 'hakin9' is not only a magazine. The free cover CD is attached to every hardcopy. The disc includes a live Linux distribution called 'hakin9.live' along with plenty of useful documentation [RFCs, FYIs, HOWTOs] and a really huge amount of computer/network security applications. We also prepare our own tutorials that allow readers to exercise the techniques described in articles [only in their very own networks!]. Since the next issue of 'hakin9', the CD will also contain full versions of commercial applications for Windows. Athough we rarely use Microsoft Windows, we consider it useful and some of the readers requested such software. One of the articles from each issue is available for free, just to make sure anyone that buys 'hakin9' won't regret the purchase. See our website if you're interested in trying 'hakin9' articles.

Astalavista : What do you think are the critical success factors for a security oriented hard cover magazine?

Roman : I am convinced that the crucial matter is honesty. Our target readers are highly educated, extremely intelligent people and would easily recognize any marketing lies. We just do not say things that aren't true. Everyone can see what we publish and how we do it. The other important thing is diversity. It's obvious that creating a magazine that fits everybody is impossible. There will always be a guy that is not satisfied with, say, the cover story or the layout or anything else. This is nothing unusual, but should be expressed loud and
clear. That's why we cover different topics -- from e.g. attacks on Bluetooth stack, through data recovery in Linux or anti-cracking techniques for Windows programmers to methods of compromising EM emissions. Last but not least, the mother of all successes is making
people aware of magazines’ existence. Nobody would buy 'hakin9' unless they know we are available. But the main thing is that magazines like ours will never be mass publications, they have their niche that needs to be cultivated. The general rule -- for all press publishers, not only us -- is "Respect your readers and they will respect you". Selling many copies of one issue, using lies and misleading information, is not difficult. What's difficult is to make sure that users will consider you a professional who just makes a good magazine, not a travelling agent.

Astalavista : What is the current situation on Poland's IT and Security scene, and do you think it's developing in the right direction from your point of view, beside Poland's obvious anti-software patents policy?

Roman : Yes, "Thank you Poland" and all. It's always nice to know that someone in the world has positive connotations with your country. But I cannot give you any general overview of the Polish scene. It's just too diverse and I work with IT specialists from all over the world, so I do not concentrate on Poland particularly. After all, most of the important things happen in the USA. Really, the main problem in Poland is software piracy. I'm not talking about P2P networks specifically, I'm talking about the consciousness of Polish people. They are just not aware of the
fact that using cracked apps is a crime, a pure theft. I suppose this problem is present in all countries. And poverty does not justify such a procedure at all, we have plenty of free substitutes for even the most popular software. The Polish scene (I mean community by that, of course) is not very different from any other country. We do have a very strong group of open source ideologists (some might call them the followers of Richard Stallman :)), we do have some anti-patent people (I'd recommend http://7thguard.net for those who understand Polish). But we do not have any spectacular successes with any real inventions or discoveries (mind
that for now I'm talking about the community, not the corporations). I'd only mention two phenomena your readers might have heard of. One is the LSD, [Last Stage of Delirium] an independent research group known for pointing out bugs in Microsoft RPC some years ago. The other well known is Michal "lcamtuf" Zalewski, an author of a powerful passive network scanner called "p0f" and a set of very useful debugging/binary analysis called "fenris". The reason for this unimpressive situation is the fact that Poland was cut off from the capitalist world for nearly 50 years [and ENIAC was introduced in 1947], so we were isolated from real computing during that time. We just have to make these 50 years in the next few years. On the other hand, IT specialists from Poland -- say, programmers -- are considered very ingenious and good workers. For offshore corporations they are really attractive.

Astalavista : During 2004/2005 we've seen record breaking *reported* vulnerabilities. What do you think is the primary reason, increasing Internet population, programmers’ deepening their security knowledge, companies in a hurry to integrate more features with a trade-off in security or perhaps something else?

Roman : All of them. The increasing number of Internet users does not directly influence the number of vulns found, though. The new Internauts are mainly people who have never used computers and networks before. Of course the other thing is that Internet "aggregates" huge amounts of data, which was publicly unavailable before. There are more and more programmers and IT security specialists. Their population is constantly growing, be it because of the money they can earn or just the popularity of Computer Sciences. To be honest, most of them are at most average at their job, but for example people from India an China have great potential.
But you are right. Marketing and pressure for higher sales make companies work in a great hurry, they just don't care about average Joe Sixpack. And Joe Sixpack would hardly ever notice any security vulnerabilities, not mentioning they would probably never report such flaws. Finding bugs in software has also become some kind of a fashion these days. It's an intellectual challenge, similar to solving riddles. No wonder that along with the increasing number of people able to understand, say, the C code, the number of vulns reported increases. There is one more thing I'd like to mention. I suppose that the scale of reported vulns would appear far greater if proprietary software creators informed about all flaws found in their products. It's not in
their interest of course.

Astalavista : Thought or at least positioned to be secure, MAC's and Firefox browsers have started putting a lot of efforts to patch the numerous vulnerabilities that keep on getting reported. Is it the design of the software itself or the successful mass patching and early response procedures that matters most in these cases?

Roman : I have great respect for Apple products, though the only Mac I use is a very old Performa :), just for experiments with BSD distributions. I consider Macs secure in general. I also use Mozilla Firefox daily. I'd bet on the latter case, but like I said I'm no programming guru. The developers try to act fast and release patches as soon as possible, so at least average users can feel secure. The fact that there are plenty of developers makes it only better. Bugs in the code are not a nemesis themselves, you cannot avoid bugs in more complex applications. The only solution that makes sense for me is to conduct constant audits and release patches frequently. Look at the Microsoft Internet Explorer [I am aware this example is a
bit trivial]. I have a feeling that this company's ways of dealing with flaws is just childish, reminds me of covering your own eyes and hoping it will make yourself invisible to other kids on the playground. I'm not criticizing Microsoft at all -- it's just that the company with so many great specialists has problems with securing their code, and their software is the most popular solution in the world, no doubt. Apple is competing with Windows in general and Firefox tries to bite a part of the browser market. Looking at their financial and market share results makes me sure that the way the patches are done by these enterprises are the only right solution. Repeating that your product is secure and just better does not make it secure and better.

Astalavista : In may, a DNS glitch at Google forwarded its traffic to www.google.com.net (GoSearchGo.com) for 15 minutes. What are your comments about this event when it comes to security and mass DNS hijacking attempts on a large scale? Do you also picture a P3P enabled Google used on a large scale in the near future and do you fear that Google might be the next
data aggregator (they are to a certain extent) breached into?

Roman : The real point is -- DJB mentioned that in an interview for the next issue of 'hakin9' -- that some of the protocols we use, especially SMTP and DNS, are outdated. To be precise, they were outdated at the moment they were being created. It's nobody's fault. We have a saying in Poland that "Nobody is a prophet in his own country". Even Bill Gates didn't notice the potential of the Internet. I would say Google has really nothing to do with any DNS forgery. The protocol is flawful. What's worse, we can live without the problematic SMTP. Without DNS, which is a core of the Internet. For example, I just cannot imagine my mother using IP addresses to surf the WWW. I'm not afraid of threats to Google security. They have technology, they have money, they have ideas. I might say that it's Google, which will start and force security improvements in domain resolving mechanism. Daniel J. Bernstein claims that the first thing we should do is to implement some method of authentication in DNS protocol. Be it PKI, be it anything else -- we have to do it so that we would have some time to introduce a really secure DNS replacement. As for the hijacking itself, I consider it one of the most primitive kinds of abusing IT infrastructure. It's just like taking over somebody's house. It's as bad as deleting someone's data for sports or DDoS attacks used for fun and/or profit.

Astalavista : Anonymous P2P networks have been getting a lot of popularity recently namely because of RIAA's lawsuits on a mass scale. How thin do you think is the line between using P2P networks to circumvent censorship in Orwellian parts of the world, and the distribution of copyrighted materials?

Roman : 'hakin9' team likes P2P networks, the more anonymous, the better. We use them for distributing our free articles and our CD. It makes me laugh when **AAs send e-mails with legal threats based on the American legal system to Polish or Swedish citizens. Sometimes they're like an old blind man in the fog. Instead of adopting P2P for selling their video or music, they make the community angry. Digressions aside. I don't feel that P2P networks will help anyone make their transfers safe [security through obscurity, right?] and that they will help to fight censorship in countries like North Korea or even China. On the other side, I can imagine modifying XMPP [Jabber] protocol to transfer SSL-secured data -- it may be already done, I had no time to investigate it further. Unauthorized distribution of copyrighted content, however, will always be a problem. There's no way to prevent such behaviour. Recent events show us that writing a P2P client is a piece of cake, even a clever 9 years old boy can do this. I would rather make it easier for people to buy electronic copyrighted materials without the need to download it illegally. Regarding that according to some statistics even 30 per cent of total internet transfers are generated by P2P networks, I'm rather afraid that some stupid people downloading pr0n or Britney Spears MP3s could easily kill the Net some day. To sum up, each technology has its profits and costs. Obvious :). The profit of P2P is the ease of distributing any content. The cost is the people using it in an illegal manner. I can see no reason for prohibiting these network just because some people prefer bad quality motion pictures to going to the movies. Should we prohibit usage of knives only because of the fact that someone tabbed the kitchen knife in someone s stomach?

Astalavista : In conclusion, I wanted to ask you what is your opinion of the Astalavista.com's web site, in particular, our security newsletter?

Roman : I'm very impressed with the amount of data available for Astalavista's visitors. I'm not a member though, so I cannot really make a detailed review. To be honest, I had some problems with recognizing which of your websites are free and which ones are not. But I have managed to do it and use it almost daily :). As for the newsletter, it's one of the most informative and professional ones I have ever seen. Since having read Issue 16, I couldn't stop myself from reading the archives. I am a subscriber and strongly advise everybody to do the same. As a person professionally dealing with IT security, I mean it – this is not an advertisement for Astalavista. This is the truth.

Astalavista : Thanks for your time Roman!
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Interview with John Young, http://www.cryptome.org/

Astalavista : Hi John, would you, please, introduce yourself to our readers, share some info on your background, and tell us something more about what are Cryptome.org and the Eyeball-Series.org all about?

John : Cryptome was set up in June 1996, an outgrowth of the Cypherpunks mail list. Its original purpose was to publish hard to get documents on encryption and then gradually expanded to include documents on inforamtion security, intelligence, national security, privacy and freedom of expression. Its stated purpose now is: "Cryptome welcomes documents for publication that are prohibited by governments worldwide, in particular material on freedom of expression, privacy, cryptology, dual-use technologies, national security, intelligence, and secret governance -- open, secret and classified documents -- but not limited to those. Documents are removed from this site only by order served directly by a US court having jurisdiction. No court order has ever been served; any order served will be published here -- or elsewhere if gagged by order. Bluffs will be published if comical but otherwise ignored." The Eyeball Series was initiated in 2002 in response to the US government's removal of public documents and increased classification. Its intent is to show what can be obtained despite this clampdown.

Astalavista : What is your opinion about cyberterrorism in terms of platform for education, recrewting, propaganda and eventual real economic or life loses?

John : Cyberterrorism is a threat manufactured by government and business in a futile attempt to continue control of information and deny it to the public. Cyber media threatens authorities and authoritarians so it is demonized as if an enemy of the state, and, not least,
corporate profits.

Astalavista : A couple of words - privacy, data aggregation, data mining, terrorism fears and our constantly digitized lifes?

John : Privacy should be a right of citizens worldwide, in particular the right to keep government and business from gaining access to private information and personal data. The argument that government needs to violate privacy in order to assure security is a lie. The business of gathering private information by corporations and then selling that to government and other businesses is a great threat to civil liberties. Much of this technology was developed for intelligence and military uses but has since been expanded to include civil society.

Astalavista : Shouldn't the U.S be actively working on hydrogen power or alternative power sources instead of increasing its presence in the Middle East or to put the question in another way, what is the U.S doing in Iraq in your opinion? What do you think is the overall attitude of the average American towards these ambitions?

John : No question there should be energy sources as alternatives to the hegemonic fossil fuels. Dependence on fossil fuels is a rigged addiction of that worldwide cartel. Car ads are the most evil form of advertising, right up there with crippling disease of national security.

Astalavista : Is ECHELON still functioning in your opinion and what do you believe is the current state of global communications interception? Who's who and what are the actual capabilities?

John : Echelon continues to operate, and has gotten a giant boost since 9/11. The original 5 national beneficiaries -- US, UK, CA, AU and NZ -- have been supplemented by partial participation of other nations through global treaties to share information allegedly about terrorism. Terrorism is a bloated threat, manufactured to justify huge funding increases in
defense, law enforcement and intelligence budgest around the globe. Businesses which supply these agencies have thrived enormously, and some that were withering with the end of the Cold War have resurged in unprecedented profits, exceeding those of the Cold War.

Astalavista : Network-centric warfare and electronic warfare are already an active doctrine for the U.S government. How do you picture the upcoming future, both at land and space and might the Wargames scenario become reality some day?

John : Network wargames are as pointless and wasteful as Cold War wargames were. They churn activity and consume expensive resources. None are reality-based, that is, outside the reality of imaginary warfare.

Astalavista : Do you believe there's currently too much classified or declassified information, namely documents, maps, satellite imagery etc. available on the Net these days? In the post 9/11 world, this digital transparency is obviously very handy for both terrorists and governments, but who do you think is benefiting from it?

John : Far from being too much information available to the public, there is a diminishing amount, especially about exploitation of those who have access to classified and "privileged" information -- government and business -- and those who lack access. The concocted warning that open information aids terrorism is a canard of great legacy, one that is customarily spread during times of crisis, the very times when secret government expands and becomes less accountable. "National security" is the brand name of this cheat.

Astalavista : In conclusion, I wanted to ask you what is your opinion of the Astalavista.com's web site, in particular, our security newsletter?

John : Great site, very informative, give yourself a prize and a vacation at G8 with the world class bandits.

Astalavista : Thanks for your time John!

John : Thanks to you!
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Continue reading →

Security Interviews 2004/2005 - Part 3

January 26, 2006
Part 3 includes :

17. Eric Goldman - http://www.ericgoldman.org/ - 2005
18. Robert - http://www.cgisecurity.com/ - 2005
19. Johannes B. Ullrich - http://isc.sans.org/ - 2005
20. Daniel Brandt - http://google-watch.org/ - 2005
21. David Endler - http://www.tippingpoint.com/ - 2005
22. Vladimir, ZARAZAhttp://security.nnov.ru/ - 2005

Go through Part 1 and Part 2 as well!

Part of Asta's Security Newsletter
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Interview with Eric Goldman, http://www.ericgoldman.org/

Astalavista : Hi Eric, would you, please, introduce yourself to our readers and share some info about your profession and experience in the industry?

Eric : I am an Assistant Professor of Law at Marquette University Law School in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. I have been a full-time professor for 3 years. Before becoming an academic, I was an Internet lawyer for 8 years in the Silicon Valley. I worked first at a private law firm, where most
of my clients were Internet companies that allowed users to interact with other users (eBay was a leading example of that). Then, from 2000-2002, I worked at Epinions.com (soon to be part of eBay) as its general counsel. As an academic, I principally spend my time thinking and writing about Internet law topics. Some of my recent papers have addressed warez trading, spam, search engine liability and adware. I run two blogs: Technology & Marketing Law Blog, where we discuss many Internet law, IP law and marketing law topics, and Goldman’s Observations, a personal blog where I comment on other topics of interest.

Astalavista : Teaching tech and Internet-savvy students on CyberLaw and Copyrights infringement is definitely a challenge when it comes to influencing attitudes, while perhaps creative when it comes to discussions. What's the overall attitude of your students towards online music and movies sharing?

Eric : Students have a variety of perspectives about file sharing. Some students come from a content owner background; for example, they may have been a freelance author in the past. These students tend to strongly support the enforcement efforts of content owners, and they view unpermitted file sharing as stealing/theft, etc. Other students come from a technology background and subscribe to the “information wants to be free? philosophy. These students come into the classroom pretty hostile to content owners’ efforts and tend to be fatalistic about the long-term success of enforcement efforts. However, I think both of these groups are the minority. I think the significant majority of students do not really understand how copyright law applies to file sharing. They learned how to share files in school and do so regularly without fully understanding the legal ramifications. Usually, their thinking is: “if everyone is doing it, it must be OK.? These students tend to be surprised by the incongruity between their behavior and the law. Even when we discuss the rather restrictive nature of copyright law, these students are not always convinced to change their behavior. Deep down, they still want the files they want, and file sharing is how they get those files. As a result, I’ll be interested to see how attitudes evolve with the emergence of legal download sites like iTunes. I suspect these sites may be retraining students that there is a cost-affordable (but not free) way to get the files they want. We’ll see how this changes the classroom discussions!

Astalavista : Where do you think is the weakest link when it comes to copyright infringement of content online, the distribution process of the content or its development practices?

Eric : With respect to activities like warez trading, consistently the weakest link has been insiders at content companies. Not surprisingly (at least to security professionals), employees are the biggest security risk. I do think content owners are aware of these risks and have taken a number of steps to improve in-house security, but the content owners will never be able to eliminate this risk. I’d like to note a second-order issue here. Content owners have historically staggered the release of their content across different geographical markets. We’ve recently seen a trend towards content owners releasing their content on the same day worldwide (the most recent Harry Potter book is a good example of that). I think the content owners’ global release of content will reduce some of the damage from warez traders distributing content before it’s been released in other geographic markets. So as the content owners evolve their distribution practices, they will help limit the impact of other weak links in the distribution process.

Astalavista : Do you envision the commercialization of P2P networks given the amount of multimedia traded there, and the obvious fact that Internet users are willing to spend money on online content purchases (given Apple's Itune store success, even Shawn Fanning's Snocap for instance) given the potential of this technology?

Eric : Personally, I’m not optimistic about the commercialization of the P2P networks. The content owners continue to show little interest in embracing the current forms of technology. I think if the content owners wanted to go in this direction, they would have done so before spending years and lots of money litigating against Napster, Aimster, Grokster and Streamcast.

In my opinion, without the buy-in of the content owners, P2P networks have little chance of becoming the dominant form of commercialized content downloads. So I think, for now, we’ll see much more content owners’ efforts directed towards proprietary download sites than cooperation with the P2P networks.

Astalavista : Were spyware/adware as well as malware the main influence factors for users to start legally purchasing entertainment content online?

Eric : We have some evidence to suggest otherwise. A recent study conducted at UC Berkeley watched the behavior of users downloading file-sharing software. The users didn’t understand the EULAs they were presented with, so they were not very careful about downloading. But, more importantly, the users persisted in downloading file-sharing software even when they were told and clearly understood that the software was bundled with adware. If this result is believable, users will tolerate software bundles—even if those bundles are risky from a security standpoint—so long as the software will help them get where they want.

Instead, I would attribute the comparative success of the music download sites to their responsiveness to consumer needs. Consumers have made it clear what they want—they want music when they want it, they want to listen to it in the order of their choosing, they want to pay a low amount for just the music they want (not the music they don’t), they want the interface to be user-friendly and they want to deal with trustworthy sources. Also, consumers have surprisingly eclectic tastes, so any music download site must have a large database that’s
diverse enough to satisfy idiosyncratic tastes. The most recent generation of music download sites have finally provided an offering that satisfies most of these key attributes. They aren’t perfect yet, but the modern sites are so much better than prior offering where the pricing was off, the databases were incomplete, or the sites were still trying to tell consumers how they should enjoy the music (rather than letting the consumers decide for themselves).

P2P file-sharing networks still serve a consumer need, but the content owners have succeeded some in increasing the search costs that consumers have to receive (such as by using spoof files). As consumer search costs using file-sharing increase, legal downloading sites with efficient search/navigation interfaces become more attractive.

Astalavista : How would you explain the major investments of known companies
into spyware/adware? Is it legal but unethical from a moral point of view?

Eric : I’m a little contrarian on this topic, so I may be unintentionally controversial here. From my perspective, we should start with a basic proposition: adware and spyware are not inherently evil. Like many other technologies, adware and spyware are good technology capable of being misused. Indeed, I think adware and spyware are an essential part of our future technological toolkit—perhaps not in the existing form, but in some form. We should not dismiss the technology any more than we should dismiss P2P file sharing technology simply because many users choose to engage in illegal file sharing using it.

Once we realize that adware and spyware are not necessarily bad and could even be useful, then it makes sense that major brand-name companies are working with adware/spyware. Adware and spyware offer new—and potentially better—ways to solve consumers’ needs, so we should expect and want companies to continue innovating. Let me give an example. I use Microsoft XP and it constantly watches my activities. Indeed, in response to my actions/inactions, I get lots of pop-up alerts/notifications….“updates are available? “you are now connected online? “we have detected a virus? etc. I want my operating system to be monitoring my behavior and alerting me to problems that need my attention. In fact, I’d be happy if Microsoft fixed problems that don’t need my attention without even disturbing me. Microsoft is aware of this and is working on technological innovations to be smarter about when it delivers alerts.

So from my perspective, Microsoft is in the spyware business. They have huge investments in spyware. I’m glad they are making these investments and I hope they find even better ways to implement their software. I think adware and spyware have been maligned because a number of otherwise-legitimate marketers have engaged in (and may continue to engage in) some questionable practices. These practices can range from deceptive/ambiguous disclosures to exploiting security holes. I remain optimistic that legitimate businesses will evolve their practices. We’ve seen movement by companies like Claria (eliminating pop-up ads), WhenU (deliberately scaling back installations by taking more efforts to confirm that users want the software) and 180solutions (cleaning up its distribution channels). This is not to say that we’ve reached the right place yet, but I like to think that the major adware companies will continue to improve their practices over time.

However, there will also be people who will disseminate software that is intended to harm consumers, such as by destroying or stealing data. We have to remain constantly vigilant against these threats. But they are far from new; we’ve had to deal with malicious virus writers for a couple of decades. In thinking about the policy implications, we should not lump the purveyors of intentionally harmful software together with legitimate businesses that are evolving their business practices.

Astalavista : Do you think the distributed and globalized nature of the Internet is actually the double edged sword when it comes to fighting/tracing cyber criminals and limiting the impact of an already distributed/hosted copyrighted information?

Eric : There’s no question that the global nature of the Internet poses significant challenges to enforcement against infringement and criminals. While this is mostly a problem, the need for cross-border coordination creates an opportunity for governments to develop compatible laws and legal systems, and there could be real long-term benefits from that.

Astalavista : What's your opinion on the current state of DRM (Digital Rights Management) when it comes to usefulness and global acceptance?

Eric : I know DRM is pretty unpopular in a lot of circles, especially academic circles. Personally, I don’t have a problem with DRM. I look at DRM as a way of determining the attributes of the product I’m buying. Consider the analogy to physical space. When I buy a car, most manufacturers give me some options to purchase. For example, I can upgrade the seat covers to the leather package if I’m willing to pay for that. The manufacturer could make that choice for me (and sometimes they do), but when it’s my choice, I can pay for what I value. DRM is a way of creating different product attributes in digital bits. In theory, with DRM, I can buy 24 hour viewing rights, 1 year viewing rights or perpetual viewing rights. Depending on my needs, I may prefer to pay less and get less, or I may want the perpetual rights and will happily pay more for that. Without DRM, we’ve relied on physical nature of the content storage medium, plus post-hoc copyright infringement enforcement, to establish those different attributes. DRM does a much more effective job of defining the product. Therefore, DRM gives the content owners new ways to create products that respond to consumer needs. Of course, consumers need to understand what they are buying when it’s controlled by DRM, but that’s a consumer disclosure issue that we’ve encountered in lots of contexts before.

As far as I can tell, consumers have no problem with DRM. Indeed, the comparative success of download sites like iTunes indicates that consumers don’t really care about DRM so long as they can get what they want.

Astalavista : In conclusion, I would really appreciate if you share your comments
about the Astalavista.com site and, particularly, about our security newsletter?

Eric : My first introduction to your site was when one of my articles was linked on the site. My traffic immediately took off like a rocket ship. I was very impressed with the quantity and
sophistication of your readers. Thanks for giving me an opportunity to speak with them.
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Interview with Robert, http://www.cgisecurity.com/

Astalavista : Hi Robert, would you, please, introduce yourself to our readers and share some info about your profession and experience in the industry?

Robert : I first started to get interested in the hacker/security aspect of computers in the 90's in high school where I had my first brush with a non 'windows/mac system' called 'VMS' (a VAX/VMS system to be exact). A yearlater I *finally* got access to an internet connection and to my amazement discovered that it was possible to break into a website with nothing more than your browser which was something I found to be rather interesting. This *interest* grew into a website I originally hosted on xoom (some free hoster I forget which :) that later became CGISecurity.com in September of 2000 where I've published numerous articles and white papers pertaining to website security. In 2003 I 'sold out' (get paid to do what you'd do for free ) and was hired to perform R&D; and QA on a Web Application Security Product where I am to this day. In 2004 I Co Founded 'The Web Application Security Consortium' with Jeremiah Grossman to provide an outlet for some projects that multiple people we knew where interested in participating in. A year later I created 'The Web Security Mailing List' as a forum where people can freely discuss all aspects of Web Security where I am currently the lead list moderator.

Astalavista : Recently, there's been a growing trend towards the use of automated code auditing/exploitation tools in web applications security. Do you believe automation in this particular case gives a false sense of security, and provides managers with point'n'click efficiency, compared to a structured and an in-depth approach from a consultant?

Robert : Scanners provide a good baseline of the common types of issues that exist but are not magic bullets. It shouldn't come to a surprise to you but many of these consultants use these automated scanning tools (Both freeware and commercial) in conjunction with manual review and simply verify the results. The skill of the person using any specialized product greatly impacts the end result. Someone with a good security understanding can save immense amounts of time by using such an automated product. If your organization doesn't have a 'security guy'
then a consultant may be the best solution for you.

Astalavista : Phishers are indeed taking a large portion of today's e-commerce flow. Do you believe corporations are greatly contributing to the epidemic, by not taking web security seriously enough to ensure their web sites aren't vulnerable to attacks in favour of online scammers?

Robert : Phishing doesn't *require* that a website be vulnerable to anything it just simply requires a look alike site exploiting a users lack of security education and/or patches. I wouldn't say they are contributing towards it, but I do think that educating your user (as best as you can)
is a requirement that should be in place at any online organization.

Astalavista : What are you comments on the future use of web application worms, compared to today's botnets/scams oriented malware? What are the opportunities and how do you picture their potential/use in the upcoming future?

Robert : In 2005 we saw a rise in the use of search engines to 'data mine' Vulnerable and/or suspect hosts. Some of the larger search engines are starting to put measures in place such as daily request limitations, CAPTCHA's, and string filtering to help slow down the issue. While these efforts are noteworthy they are not going to be able to prevent *all* malicious uses
a search engine allows. I think the future 'web worms' will borrow methodologies from security scanners created to discover new vulnerabilities that will have no patches available. While the downside of this is to slow infection rates and lots of noise, the upside is infecting machines with no vendor supplied patch available because the 'vendor' may be a consultant or ex employee who is no longer available. Worms such as Nimda infected both the server and its visitors making it highly effective and I expect this user/server trend to increase in the future. I also suspect a switch towards 'data mining' worms, that is worms that are trying to steal useful data. Modern day versions of these worms steal cd keys to games and operating systems. The use
of worms to seek and steal data from a server environment, or user machine is only going to grow as credit card and identity theft continue to grow. While investigating a break-in into a friends ISP I discovered the use of a shopping cart 'kit' left behind by the attacker. This kit contained roughly 8 popular online shopping carts that where modified to grab copies of a customers order, a 'shopping cart rootkit' if you will. I suspect some type of automation of either auto backdooring of popular software or uploading modified copies to start creeping its way into future web worms. In 2002 I wrote an article titled 'Anatomy of the web application worm' describing some of these 'new' threats that web application worms maybring to us.

Astalavista : Is the multitude and availability of open-source or freeware web application exploitation tools benefiting the industry, resulting in constant abuse of web servers worldwide, or actually making the situation even worse for the still catching up corporations given the overall web applications abuse?

Robert : This entirely depends on the 'product'. There are tools that allow you to verify if a host is vulnerable without actually exploiting it which I consider to be a good thing while some of these 'point and root' tools are not helping out as many people as they are hurting. In the past
few years a shift has started involving 'full disclosure' where people are deciding not to release ./hack friendly exploits but are instead releasing 'just enough detail' for someone to verify it. This 'shift' is something that I fully support.

Astalavista : CGISecurity.com has been around for quite a few years. What are your plans for future projects regarding web security, and is it that you feel the industry is lacking right now - awareness, capabilities or incentives to deal with the problem?

Robert : Actually September 14th will be the 5th year anniversary of CGISecurity.com. Right now I'm heavily involved in 'The Web Application Security Consortium' where we have numerous projects underway to provide documentation, education, and guides for users. I plan on expanding CGISecurity into a one stop shop for all 'web security' related documentation where you can (hopefully) find just about anything you could ever need. To answer the second part of your question I'd say all three with awareness (education) being the biggest problem. 

One of the things that the industry hasn't 'gotten' yet (in my opinion) is security review throughout an application's lifecycle. Sure developers are starting to take 'secure development' more seriously but as many of your readers know deadlines hamper good intentions and often temporary solutions (if at all) are put in place to make something work in time for release. This is why we need security review during all phases of the cycle not just during development and post production. I think that a much overlooked aspect of the development cycle is Quality Assurance. QA's job is to ensure that a product works according to requirements, identify as many pre release (and post release) bugs as possible, and to think about ways to break the product. I think that more companies need to implement 'QA security testing' as a release requirement as well as train their testers to have a deeper understanding of these 'bugs' that they've been discovering. You've heard the term 'security in layers' so why can't this process be implemented throughout most development cycles? Developers get busy and may overlook something in the rush to meet the release date which is why (before release)
they need someone double checking their work (QA) before it goes production.

Astalavista : In conclusion, I would like to ask you what is your opinion of the Astalavista.com's web site and, in particular, our security newsletter?

Robert : I first discovered astalavista in my 'referrer' logs when it linked to one of my articles. Since then I've been visiting on and off for a few years and only recently discovered the newsletter which I think is a great resource for those unable to keep up with all the news sites, and mailing list postings.
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Interview with David Endler, http://www.tippingpoint.com/

Astalavista : Hi Dave, would you, please, introduce yourself to our readers and share with us some info about your experience in the industry?

Dave : Sure, I'm 6'1", a Leo, I like long walks on the beach, coffee ice cream,^H^H^H^H^H^H^H . . . oh, sorry, wrong window. I'm the Director of Security Research at 3Com's security division, TippingPoint. Some of the functions that fall under me include 3Com's internal product Security testing, 3Com Security Response, and the Digital Vaccine team Responsible for TippingPoint IPS vulnerability filters. Prior to 3Com, I was the director of iDefense Labs overseeing vulnerability and malware research. Before that, I had various security research roles with Xerox Corporation, the National Security Agency, and MIT.

Astalavista : What's the goal of your Zero Day Initiative, how successful is your approach so far, and what differentiates it from iDefense's one?

Dave : Over the past few years, no one can deny the obvious increase in the number of capable security researchers as well as the advancement of publicly available security researching tools. We wanted to tap into this network of global researchers in such a manner as to benefit the researchers, 3Com customers, and the general public. Our approach was the construction
of the Zero Day Initiative (ZDI), , launched on August 15, 2005. The main goals behind the program are:

a.) Extend 3Com's existing vulnerability research organization by leveraging
the methodologies, expertise, and time of others.
b.) Responsibly report 0day vulnerabilities to the affected vendors
c.) Protect our customers through the TippingPoint Intrusion
Prevention Systems (IPS) while the product vendor is working on a patch
d.) Protect all technology end users by eliminating 0day vulnerabilities
through collaboration with the security community, both vendors and
researchers.

The ZDI has had an incredibly positive result in only three months of activity, far exceeding our expectations. To date we have had over 200 researchers sign up through the portal, and received over 100 vulnerability submissions. We suspect that part of the early success of the program can be attributed to the wild launch party we threw at Blackhat/Defcon 2005.

The ZDI is different from iDefense's program in a number of ways. 3Com has invested considerable resources to ensure the success of the ZDI. As a result, ZDI contributors will receive a much higher valuation for their research. We provide 0day protection filters for our clients, without disclosing any details regarding the vulnerability, through our TippingPoint IPS, as opposed to simply selling vulnerability details in advance of public disclosure. Finally, we altruistically attempt to protect the public at large by sharing the acquired 0day data with other security vendors (yes, this includes competitors) in an effort to do the most good with the information we have acquired. We feel we can still maintain a competitive advantage with respect to our customers while facilitating the protection of a customer base larger than our own.

Astalavista : 0day vulnerabilities have always been a buzzword in the security community, while in recent years decision makers have started realizing their importance when evaluating possible solutions as well. What's the myth behind 0day vulnerabilities from your point of view,
and should it get the highest priority the way I'm seeing it recently?

Dave : Certainly not all vulnerabilities should be treated equally, including 0day. A typical vendor-announced vulnerability can be just as devastating as a 0day due to the trend of shrinking windows of time for exploit release. Obviously, for an organization or home user that doesn't stay up-to-date with security patches, a three-year old exploit for a patched vulnerability could be just as devastating as a 0day exploit. I think 0day vulnerability protection has begun to take more shape in security buying decisions simply due to the growing frustration and helplessness felt by users when vendors take a long time to patch these issues when exploits are widely circulating. In the last year alone, we saw several of the 0day browser exploits incorporated into spyware sites within one day of their disclosure.

Astalavista : Do you feel the ongoing monetization and actual development of security vulnerabilities market would act as an incentive for a ShadowCrew style underground market, whose "rewards" for 0day vulnerabilities will contribute to its instant monopoly?

Dave : I think there will always be an underground market, but I doubt it will ever have a monopoly for a few reasons. We know there is a thriving underground market today for 0days, especially browser vulnerabilities that can be used to inject Trojans and steal financial data. I think the main obstacle currently curbing the growth of the underground vulnerability-purchase
movement is a lack of trust. Since a security researcher doesn't really know the identity of an underground buyer, there's no guarantee he will get paid once he unveils his discovery. Also at the end of the day, many researchers want these vulnerabilities to be fixed and want to receive the appropriate recognition in the mainstream security community.

Astalavista : While you are currently acting as the intermediary between a vendor and researcher, do you picture the long-term scenario of actually bidding for someone else's research given the appearance of other competitors, the existence of the underground market I already mentioned, and the transparency of both? How do you think would the market evolve?

Dave : Good question. I hope the markets evolve in a way that encourages Vendors to put more skin in the game. It behooves these vendors to help protect their own customers more by rewarding outside researchers for security discoveries that escape internal QA testing. The only vendors I know of who currently do this are Netscape and Mozilla through their bug bounty
programs. I think a "0-bay" auction model could be viable if a neutral party launched it that was trustworthy as a vulnerability "escrow agent" and could guarantee anonymity and payment to researchers. There was some good discussion on the Daily Dave list of some of the issues raised by such an auction model.

Astalavista : Should a vendor's competencies be judged on how promptly it reacts to a vulnerability notification and actually provides a (working) fix? Moreover, should vendors be held somehow accountable for their practices in situations like these, thus eliminating or opening up windows of opportunity for pretty much anything malicious?

Dave : I've worn the hat of a security researcher, vulnerability disclosure intermediary, and most recently, a vendor. I now have a great amount of sympathy for all three groups. In general, vendors need to make a more concerted effort to reach out to security researchers in the vulnerability disclosure process. Many vendors don't seem to understand that most security researchers get no tangible benefit for reporting a security issue. More and more 0day disclosures it seems are also the result of a vendor-researcher relationship breaking down due to a misunderstanding over email or poor follow-up from the vendor. Ideally, vendors should also reward these researchers, if not with money, then other perks or recognition as a sign of appreciation. It's hard to judge all vendors the same on the amount of time it takes to patch a vulnerability. Some vulnerabilities legitimately take longer to fix and QA than others. Because there are no laws today that govern a vendor's security response, the market is going to have to be the ultimate judge in this arena. If enough potential customers are lost to a competitor because of poor security patch handling or a destructive worm, you can bet that more money will be budgeted into their security development lifecycle.

Astalavista : Having conducted security research for the NSA must have been quite an experience. Does the agency's approach on security research somehow differ from the industry's one, in terms of needs for sure, but in what way exactly?

Dave : No comment :-)

Astalavista : Can money buy creativity and innovation from an R&D's point of view?

Dave : Of course no amount of money can buy your way to really innovative research.Some of the most prolific research teams are built through visionary research directors creating a nurturing and non-restrictive environment, insulating the team from most corporate pressures and politics.

Astalavista : Thanks for your time!
-------------------------------------

Interview with Vladimir, aka 3APA3A http://www.security.nnov.ru/

Astalavista : Hi Vladimir, would you please introduce yourself to our readers, and share some info on your background and experience with information security?

Vladimir : OK. I'm 31, I’m married, and we have two daughters. For last 10 years I'm support service head for middle sized ISP in Nizhny Novgorod, Russia. As so, I'm not occupied in IT security industry and I'm not security professional. It's just a kind of useful hobby. And that's the reason why I use nickname though I have no relation to any illegal activity. Everyone who is interested can easily find my real name. In addition to my primary
job, I give few classes a week on computer science in Nizhny Novgorod State University.

I started on the Russian scene in the late 90s with the article on HTTP chats security. 'Cross site scripting' was quite new vulnerability class and the term itself arrived few years after. Later I began to publish some articles on the Bugtraq. Because my previous nickname taken from Pushkin's personage was not understandable abroad, I used gamer's nick '3APA3A', 'zaraza' in Cyrillic, it means infection. It also has a meaning of English 'swine' :). No, there is no relation with famous 3APA3A. ZARAZA virus, it was few years before.

I'm not 'bug digger', as one may think. Some bugs were discovered in the process of troubleshooting, while others were found in attempt to discover new vulnerability class or exploitation approach. And I’m proud to catch a few :)

Astalavista : What are some of your current and future projects?

Vladimir : Since 1999 http://www.security.nnov.ru
is the only project I'm constantly involved in. Sometimes, I patch old bugs and create new ones within 3proxy http://www.security.nnov.ru/soft/3proxy/.

Astalavista : How would you describe the current state of the Russian security scene? Also, what are you comments on the overall bad PR for, both, Russia, and Eastern Europe as a hackers' haven?

Vladimir : "hack" is an opposite to technology for me. The industry with technology is a conveyor, while the hack works only here and now. Hacking is the process of creating something to solve one particular problem without enough money, resources and, most important, without knowledge. In the best case it's something new for everyone and nobody to share knowledge and resources with you.

If you mean a lack of money, resources and knowledge - yes, Russia is hackers' heaven :)

We had interesting discussion on this topic with David Endler (from your Newsletter #23) Of cause you know how many viruses originated from Russia and you know some "famous" virus writing teams. Do you know any software written here? Well.. may be after some research you can find Outpost and Kaspersky Antivirus you have never used... That's all. You think. Lets look at the city I live. Many really interesting things from Quake II graphical drivers and Intel debugging and profiling tools to Motorola and Nortel firmware were written here. It's not largest city and Russia is large country. Same goes to Eastern Europe, India and China.

We have a lot of unknown programmers and few famous virus writers, that's the problem :)

The security scene in Russia is really hard question. Of course, there are few professionals, they are well-known buddies, who work for well-known companies. They publish their really useful books and write their really professional articles and receive their really good money. There are old-school hackers who do not speak Russian for few years. There are “underground" e-zines, none of them are living enough to spell correctly. There are "security teams" known by defacing each over and publishing up to 6 bugs in PHP scripts. Teenage #hax0r1ng IRC channels. And, of cause, guys who do their business with trojans and botnets and prefer to stay invisible.

That's all, folks. There is no scene. No place to meet each over. No Russian Defcon.

Astalavista : What are the most significant trends that happened with vulnerability researching as a whole since you've started your project?

Vladimir : Any new technology arrives as a hack, but grows into industry. It was with computers, software, network security and finally it happens with vulnerability research. This fact changes everything. No place left for real hacking. The guys on this scene became professionals. If you enter this without knowledge, all you can is to find some bugs in unknown PHP scripts.

Astalavista : Do you think a huge percentage of today's Internet threats are mainly posed by the great deal of window of vulnerabilities out there, and how should we respond to the concept of 0day by itself? Patching is definitely not worth it on certain occasions from my point of view!

Vladimir : Imagine a 100,000,000 of purely patched default configuration Fedora Core machines with users running their Mozilla's from root account. That's what we have in Windows world. Did you know that, 99% of Windows trojans/viruses/backdoors will not work if executed from unprivileged account? Life could be much more secure if only administrator with special license (like driver's one) might configure system and get penalties in case of virus incidents :)

Did you know that, most ISPs do not monitor suspicious activity from their customers and can not stop attack from their network within 24 hours? It's almost impossible to coordinate something between providers. There are non-formal organizations, like NSP-SEC, but it only
coordinates large providers from few countries. Coordination and short abuse response time
would be another step.

Astalavista : What is your attitude towards an 0bay market for software vulnerabilities? And who wins and who loses from your point of view?

Vladimir : On the real market both sides win. No doubt, the fact there is now a legal market for 0days is a good news for researches and end users, because it rises vulnerability price and establishes some standards. This "white" market is in it's beginning. There are only few players.

Who can value 0day Internet Explorer bug? First of all, Microsoft. But for some reason it does not. The second, IDS/IPS vendors and security consulting companies to make signatures and PR. Bugtraq posting is really good PR. If vulnerability is then exploited in-the-wild, it raises the article in Washington Post. It's even better PR.

Astalavista : Do you also, somehow picture a centralized underground ecosystem, the way we are currently seeing/intercepting exchange of 0day vulnerabilities on IRC channels, web forums. But one with better transparency of its content, sellers and buyers?

Vladimir : And, of cause, underground market is always ready to pay. Exploits are required to install a trojan. Trojan is required to create a botnet. Botnet is required for spamming, DDoS and blackmailing, phishing, illegal content hosting. It's definitely a kind of ecosystem with different roles and specializations and it's money cycle as a basement.

With some dirty games with 0day Internet Explorer vulnerability you can make a new car on the botnet market or (and?) just few thousands dollars with PR. Underground market is not
centralized and lies on private contacts. Forums and IRC channels you can find are the top of the iceberg. It makes it less vulnerable. I bet last WMF exploit was sold without any IRC channels and forums.

Astalavista : Can there ever be a responsible disclosure, and ow do you picture it?

Vladimir : According to Russian legislation, a vendor may not sell roduct without informing customer about any known defect or imitation on it. I bet different countries have similar legislations. I don't understand why it doesn't work with computer software. Vendor should either timely inform customers on defect in software or should stop to sell it.

Of cause, disclosing information without informing vendor is just stupid and non-profitable for everyone. From other side, a vendor has not eliminated vulnerability after few months and has
not informed customers there is nothing non-responsible in publishing this information. I never saw vendor who blames esearchers in non-responsible disclosure to stop selling defective product.

There were few attempts to standardize disclosure policy, FPolicy is the first one.

Astalavista : Can a vulnerability researcher gets evil if not reated properly, and what could follow? :)

Vladimir : Sure. Imagine a situation you want to get money rom vendor for vulnerability information you discovered. There is nothing bad in getting money for your work and
vendor should be interested in buying this information on the irst place. But it can be just a blackmail if not "treated properly".

Astalavista : In conclusion, I wanted to ask on some of your uture predictions for 2006 concerning vulnerability research, nd the industry as a whole?

Vladimir : One year is small period. Maybe we will see endors to buy vulnerabilities. "Vulnerability researcher" ay be scripted on somebody's business card and become profession by this way. "Vulnerability researching" as University course... No, let's wait for another 2-3 years :)

Astalavista : Thank you for your time! 
Continue reading →

Security Interviews 2004/2005 - Part 1

January 26, 2006
I’ve decided to compile a list of all the interviews I have been taking for the Asta's Security Newsletter (feel free to opt-in), with the idea to provide you with the opinions of 22 folks(two anonymous ones are excluded as perhaps they shouldn't have been taken at the first place, and a Xmas issue without an interview) that I have had the chance to talk to. I hope you will enjoy the diversity of the their background and the topics covered.

Enjoy!

Go though Part 2 and Part 3 as well!

1. Proge - http://www.progenic.com/ - 2003
2. Jason Scott - http://www.textfiles.com/ - 2003
3. Kevin Townsend - http://www.Itsecurity.com/ - 2003
4. Richard Menta - http://www.bankinfosecurity.com 2004
5. MrYowler - http://www.cyberarmy.net/ - 2004
6. Prozachttp://www.astalavista.com/ - 2004
7. Candid Wuest - http://www.trojan.ch/ - 2004
8. Anthony Aykut - http://www.frame4.com/ - 2004
9. Dave Wreski - http://www.linuxsecurity.com/ - 2004
10. Mitchell Rowtow - http://www.securitydocs.com/ - 2004
11. Eric (SnakeByte)http://www.snake-basket.de/ - 2005
12. Björn Andreassonhttp://www.warindustries.com/ - 2005
13. Bruce - http://www.dallascon.com/ - 2005
14. Nikolay Nedyalkov - http://www.iseca.org/ - 2005
15. Roman Polesek - http://www.hakin9.org/en/ - 2005
16. John Young - http://www.cryptome.org/ - 2005
17. Eric Goldman - http://www.ericgoldman.org/ - 2005
18. Robert - http://www.cgisecurity.com/ - 2005
19. Johannes B. Ullrich - http://isc.sans.org/ - 2005
20. Daniel Brandt - http://google-watch.org/ - 2005
21. David Endler - http://www.tippingpoint.com/ - 2005
22. Vladimir, 3APA3Ahttp://security.nnov.ru/ - 2005

------------------------
Interview with Proge, Founder of Progenic http://www.progenic.com/

Astalavista : To those who still don't know of Progenic.com, give us a brief introduction of the whole idea and its history?

Proge : Basically it all started in back in 98, we just made software for the fun of it and stuck it up on a webpage, mostly pretty simple stuff.It was a fun time but as the scene grew, things got a little out of hand, and when FakeSurf (the first automated surfing tool) was released we had legal threats from Alladvantage, lost our sponsorship that was paying for the bandwidth and were flooded with people wanting nothing more than a quick buck.I think that's when everyone decided enough was enough, and we took the site behind closed doors, I left the toplist up on Progenic.com because it's a scene I came from and I don't want to see it die.At the moment I'm
working on more constructive things like DownSeek.com, it's more satisfying to create something that helps people.

Astalavista : As being on the Scene for such a long time, what is your opinion on today's Security threats home and corporate users face every day?

Proge : There are usually two reasons why you become a target, automated software scanning your system for known exploits that you should have patched, or you've made yourself a target.If someone wants to break into your system then unless you have a dedication to security, that window between an exploit and a patch is going to get you.Even if you stay on top
of things, it can still be a battle. According to Microsoft 'the only truly secure computer is the one buried in concrete, with the power turned off and the network cable cut' and you probably run their operating system.

Astalavista : Is Security through Education the perfect model for any organization?

Proge : Definitely!I'm still amazed that there are programmers and sys-amins out there, who think functionality first, security second or not at all.You need to understand hacking to understand Security, you know the reasons why you lock your door at night, why you set an alarm, but do you know why you have a firewall or an intrusion detection system, or did it just sound like a good idea when you got a glossy leaflet warning you about 'hackers' and asking your money? You can't just install a product and forget about Security, but that's what the industry tries to sell.Security is a constant threat and it isn't game over until you lose.

Astalavista : How real you think is the threat of CyberTerrorism?

Proge : With people like we have in power it gets more real.Like I said, if you make yourself a target, you've got a problem.

Astalavista : Is BigBrother really watching us, and what's the actual meaning of the word 'privacy' nowadays ?

Proge : A good question, they're definitely watching us but to what degree, who knows.It doesn't hurt to have a healthy paranoia. There're two sides to the privacy argument really.Either you're worried that government/business is overstepping the mark and intruding on your personal life for their own benefit, or you've got something to hide. Unfortunately privacy is being marketed at those with something to hide, you've seen the ads, cheating on your wife? Grooming underage kids? Erase your history, don't get caught etc.It's ironic that there are more ethics in a scene that is largely banded a threat to Security than there are in government and business.

Astalavista : Thanks for your time, Proge.

Proge : You're welcome!
-------------------------
Interview with Jason Scott, Founder of TextFiles.com http://www.TextFiles.com/

Astalavista : How was the idea of TextFiles.com born?

Jason : TEXTFILES.COM was born because one day in 1998 I wondered what had ever happened to an old BBS I used to call (it was called Sherwood Forest II). Since the WWW had been around for a good 5 years, I figured out there would be a page up with information about it, and I could even download a few of the old textfiles I used to read back in those days (the BBS was up from about 1983 to 1985). To my shock, there was nothing about Sherwood Forest II anywhere, and nothing about ANY of the BBSes of my youth. So then I went off and registered the most easy-to-remember name I could find, textfiles.com, and started putting up my old collection from Floppies. This gave me about 3,000 files, which I used to attract other peoples' collections and find more on my own, until the curren number, which is well past 60,000.

Astalavista : There's a huge amount of illegal and destructive information(bomb howto guides, drugs howtos) spreading around the Internet these days.Some of these files can be found at TextFiles.com as well, don't you think that accessing such information is rather dangerous and could endanger someone?

Jason : Well, the question makes it sound like this is a recent event, the availability of information that, if implemented, could cause damage or other sorts of trouble. This has always been the case; if you want, we can go back to the days of the TAP newsletter (and the later 2600 magazine) where all sorts of "dangerous" information was being printed. We can go back many years before that.

This may sound like a copout, but I don't really buy into the concept of "dangerous information". At a fundamental level, it is someone saying "I am looking at this, and I have decided you should not see it. So don't look. I've made my decision." And I find that loathesome in that it gives
someone enormous arbitrary power. This argument applies for the concepts of Obscenity and Governmentally-Classified information, as well.

Sometimes people bring up the concept of children into the argument and my immediate reaction is not very pleasant. Parents protect; be a parent.

If somebody wants to hurt somebody else, then information files are not the big limiting factor to them doing it; they'll just pick up a match and set your house on fire, or buy a gun and shoot you or someone you really like. Censorship, as you might imagine, is not big on my list of things
that improve the quality of life.

Astalavista : Nowadays Information could be considered the most expensive "good", what's your attitude towards the opinion that the access to certain Information would have to be a paid one?

Information is a very funny thing. It can be quantified to some extent, and some amount of control can be issued on its transfer and storage. But the fact is that we, as a race, have been spending a lot of time making information easier and easier to spread. Printing press, book, flyer, radio, records, tapes, CDs, DVDs, internet, Peer to Peer... faster and faster. It is possible to know on the other side of the world what a child looked like at the moment it was born, a mere few seconds later. When Americans elected the president in the 1800s, they might not know who had won for weeks. Many people might have never seen a photograph of the man who ran
their country. They would almost certainly never hear him speak.

Charging for information is everyone's right. More power to them if they can make a buck. But that's not what I'm talking about. I've seen kids with a hundred textfiles trying to sell access to them for $5. If they're able to lure in suckers to pay that, then they have a talent. When you're in the cinema, the same soda that cost something like fifty cents or a quarter, at the local store it will cost you two or three dollars. Are you paying for the soda or for the ability to have a soda in that location? Similarly, I don't think you're paying for the information on a site that charges, you're paying a fee because you didn't know any other way to get this information.

There will always be a market for people with the ability to take a large amount of information and distill it for others (we called them "gatekeepers" when I took Mass Communications in college). The only difference is that now anyone can be a gatekeeper, and people can choose to forget them and get the information themselves. So now it's an option, which is a great situation indeed.

I've always been insistent about not charging for access to textfiles.com and not putting advertisements up on the site. I'm going to continue to do that as long as I can, which I expect will be for the rest of my life.

Astalavista : Share your thoughts about the Dmitry Skylarov case.

Jason : While this is not the first time that something like the Skylarov fiasco has occurred, I am glad that in this particular instance, a lot of press and a lot of attention was landed on what was being done here. Adobe realized within a short time that they'd made a serious mistake, and I hope they will continue to be reminded of how rotten and self-serving they were in the whole event. I certainly hope the company name 'Adobe' will stays in the minds of everyone with it for a long time to come.

That said, I'm glad everything worked out OK for him. Nobody deserves to be held up in a country away from their family because some software publisher has decided they're evil.

America has occasionally taken poor shortcuts through very evil laws trying to fix problems and make them worse. The "Separate but Equal" rulings in regard to Segregation and the indictment of anti-war protesters during World War I for something akin to Treason now have a modern cousin the DMCA and its equivalent laws, the Mini-DMCAs being passed by states. I think we will look back at this time with embarassment and whitewashing what went on.

Astalavista : How do you see the future of Internet, having in mind the Government's
invasion in the user's privacy, and on the other hand, the commercialization of the Net?

Jason : Mankind has been driven from probably day one to make things better, cheaper, and quicker because that's what will bring them success and fortune. People talk about television being this vast wasteland of uselessness, yet using something like my TiVO I can now bounce among my thousands of daily television programs and listen to events and people that just 10 or 20 years ago, there would be no room on television for. For all the Internet's abutments with the law, the fact is that it's still being adopted as fast as it can, the technology driving it is cheaper and cheaper (I have a connection to my house that costs me $200 that would have cost upwards of $10,000 in 1993) and nobody is really able to say "This Internet Thing Needs to Go" and not get laughed at.

It took me years and years to collect the textfiles on textfiles.com. If people go to torrent.textfiles.com, they can download the entire collection in as little as a few hours. People are now trading half-gigabyte to multi-gigabyte files like they used to trade multi-megabyte MP3 files just a few years ago.

I really don't have any fear about it being crushed. Too many people know the secret of how wonderful this all is. It's a great time to be alive.
Astalavista : Thanks for the chat!
------------------------------------
Interview with Kevin Townsend, Founder and Editor of http://ITSecurity.com

Originally taken for HiComm Magazine

Astalavista : How did you get interested in the Information Security field?

Kevin : More by accident than design. I had been a freelance IT journalist for many years - then we had a child that couldn't sleep. We went through many, many months of averaging just a couple of hours sleep each night - it played havoc with my freelancing; couldn't concentrate, couldn't write, couldn't meet deadlines... In the end I gave up and got a proper job. It was actually the first thing that came along, and was marketing manager with a software company that just happened to develop security software. But from then on I was hooked. Infosec is one of the most fascinating areas there is: good versus bad, light versus dark - the perpetual battlefield at an intellectual level without any blood.

Astalavista : Share your viewpoint on the constantly increasing malware problem issue, are we going to see another ILOVEYOU disaster in the near future?

Kevin : I'm sure there will be more malware all the time - and sooner or later, one of them will be dramatic and disastrous. My biggest fear for the Internet, however, is government intervention. Governments need control, and they fear lack of control. The weaker they are, the more they need to control - and the world has some mighty weak people in high office ATM. The Internet is a threat to their control. They need to control the Internet in order to control people. Consider this: we call a category of malware 'viruses'. We do so because they behave like biological viruses. If we continue that analogy, then the 'system' they attack (the Internet) equates to the human body.

Now, if a virus attacks a human, we react in several different ways. The 'traditional' method
(it isn't traditional at all; it's very recent) is to attack the virus with ever-stronger antibiotics, or even the surgeon's knife. But more and more of us are coming to the conclusion that this sort of 'quick fix' is no fix at all - all it does is weaken the immune system and encourage the virus to grow into ever stronger variants. The real solution is to strengthen the immune system so that the viruses are tackled and destroyed without causing any damage.

This analogy should be passed back to computer viruses. If governments over-react with increasing penalties and draconian actions (the surgeon's knife), we will weaken the Internet until it is just a pale shadow of the vibrant organism it should be - and we still won't ever get rid of the viruses. The real solution is to strengthen the Internet, not to emasculate it.

Astalavista : As far as ITSecurity is concerned, what are the major
threats companies and home users face on a daily basis and how can they be prevented?

Kevin : Well, by now you won't be surprised to know that I consider over-regulation to be the major threat for both business and home users. We are all rapidly transferring our personas to the cyber world, whether that is our business persona or individual persona. Once that is complete, whoever controls the cyber world will control all of us. Smart card ID cards will be able to track everything that everybody does - in fact; we won't be able to do anything without the cards. And if a domain name is withdrawn, individuals or entire companies will effectively disappear overnight. This is a far greater threat than another Lovebug.

Astalavista : In today's world of terror, how real do you think the danger of
Cyberterrorism is, like stock exchanges going down, corporate networks completely devastated by terrorist groups?

Kevin : I think that the danger exists, but is over-hyped. Attack analyses show that a large percentage of attacks against western (that is, American) utilities and banks come from a very small number of countries well known to be largely anti-American. I cannot believe that this is all done without their government knowledge - so the danger is very real. But just as there are some very clever people attacking systems, so there are some very, very clever people defending them.

Astalavista : What's your personal opinion on the US government's effort to monitor
its citizens' Internet activities, in order to protect them from potential terrorist attacks?

Kevin : It isn't, of course, just the US Government. I actually believe that the UK is already further down the line on this. Governments need to strike a balance between defending their people and enslaving their people. A recent poll of American CSOs by CSO magazine shows
that 31% of US business leaders believe that the USA is on the way to becoming a police state.
I think that most governments have failed to find the right balance - and I think the UK government has already put everything in place for a police state in the UK. I forget the precise words, but the comment that 'those who would give up freedom for security actually deserve
neither' is so very true.
------------------------

Interview with Richard Menta http://BankInfoSecurity.com/

Astalavista : Hi Richard, I would appreciate if you introduce yourself and the web site you represent, namely BankInfoSecurity.com

Rich : My name is Richard Menta. I work for an information security consulting firm in NJ called Icons, Inc where I serve as a consultant and as the editor of BankInfoSecurity.com.

About 90% of the Icons's clients are banks and credit unions. These institutions are heavily regulated regarding information security, yet despite this fact we found many of our clients needed much more education on the concepts of information security and the added threats and risks presented by technology. BankInfoSecurity.com was developed to help fill this need by aggregating the latest news and information, covering both the technical and regulatory aspects of InfoSec.

Astalavista : What's the major difference between the security threats the financial sector is dealing with, compared with the general security ones?

Rich : Privacy is the biggest issues with regards to financial institutions. They are mandated by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) to protect what is called the non-public personal information (NPPI) of their customers. The biggest security threat comes from intruders looking to garner NPPI to facilitate identity theft. As the relationship of financial institutions with their customers is highly based on trust and mass identity theft undermines that trust, it is a critical issue to control the theft of customer information.

Astalavista : E-business wouldn't be profitable without E-commerce, what do you think are the major security problems E-shops face nowadays, how aware of the information security issue are the managers behind them, and what do you think can make a significant change in their mode of thinking?

Rich : The biggest security issue is the lack of awareness as a whole. A good information security strategy takes significant effort and financial commitment, but many senior managers are unaware of the full breadth of what information security covers. There is a lot to grasp too as information security is an every evolving discipline that has to rapidly change with the
changes in the threat environment.

Awareness is still an issue in the banking industry where there is a federal examiner coming in once a year to tell management what they need to do. The reason is because examiners have only been focused on information security since 2001 (when the agencies started to enforce GLBA) and they are still learning the ins and outs. It's improving, though, as examiners are visibly becoming savvier with time and communicating more to the banks.

Dramatic change in other industries is a bit more elusive as they have no such oversight as the banking industry does. Still, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act looks to drive better information security because a deficient security plan violates the due care requirements of the Act. As the act imposes criminal penalties for faulty compliance, there will be a lot more pressure once its tenets go into effect this fall.

Astalavista : Malicious software has always been trying to get hold of sensitive financial information, how significant do you think is the threat from worms like the Bizex one in future?

Rich : It is a significant problem as it goes back to the trust issue. All banks are adopting online banking, yet you have malicious code trying to take snapshots of your information as well as anyone else's who are in your address book.

The FDIC recently posted a mandate that banks must have a written patch management program consisting of several steps. The reason the agency did this is because they realized that poorly patched systems posed a severe threat and most financial institutions were doing an insufficient job with regards to patch activities. Right now, the great majority of banks are
highly susceptible to these worms, as are their average customers who rarely patch their home systems. Of course, even a great patch management program only goes so far, especially with zero day exploits.

Astalavista : Despite the latest technology improvements and the security measures put in place by companies, a major part of the Internet users are still afraid to use their credit card online, who should be blamed and most importantly, what do you think should be done to increase the number of online customers who want to purchase a good or services but feel secure while doing it?

Rich : Consumers are afraid for good reasons. How many prime trafficked sites have been broken? It is embarrassing, especially when it makes the national media. The latest technology improvements and security measures are good, but all merchants as a whole need to impose better security on their end. Those who don't improve measures will continue to undermine the efforts of those who do by perpetuating the insecurity that many patrons feel with regards to online shopping.

Again, it's a trust issue and there are a significant amount of consumers who don't trust typing their credit card number into their browser. The good news is that as security improves throughout online commerce consumer trust will rise.

Astalavista : What's your opinion on companies citing California's security breach disclosure law and notifying customers of a recent security breach?

Rich : Most companies can absorb any financial losses arising from a breach. It is the damage to their reputation that poses the greatest risk. What is more embarrassing than notifying your customers their information was compromised? Not only does the customer lose trust in the company, but such a disclosure inevitably becomes public and that can hinder the ability to draw new customers.

So why do I think this law is good? Because there is a general apathy among many organizations regarding their activities to properly protect their systems. Regulation has been the greatest motivator to improve security. In this case, forced disclosure is far more motivating than any fine.
----------------------

Interview with Mr.Yowler, http://www.cyberarmy.net/

Astalavista : Mr.Yowler, Cyberarmy.com has been online since 1998, and is a well known community around the net. But there're still people unaware about it, can you please tell us something more about the main idea behind starting the site, and what inspired you the most?

MrYowler : Well, I didn't actually start the site; that was Pengo's doing. I actually joined when CyberArmy had about 37,000 members, and I worked my way up the ranks, first by completing the puzzles, and later by participating in the community as one of its leading members. I was first put in charge, back in 2002, and I bought the domain from Pengo, and completely took over, in late 2003.

CyberArmy is a community of 'hackers' of various skill levels and ethical colors. We focus primarily upon creating a peer environment in which 'hackers' can share information and ideas, and we accomplish that through our Zebulun puzzle and ranked forums, which serve to stratify discussion groups be comparative technical ability. We tend to focus on 'n00bs', largely because they are the group that has the most difficulty finding peer groups to become involved in, because they are the group that most often needs the technical and ethical guidance that CyberArmy provides, and because they are the group that is most receptive to this guidance.

I suppose that what I find most inspiring about the CyberArmy is its tendency to regulate itself. People who are interested in 'hacking hotmail' tend to gravitate together, and not pester people who are not interested in it, and when they don't, the community rapidly takes corrective action on its own. This is a model that I would like to see extend to the rest of the Internet; spammers and kiddie-porn dealers should be possible to identify and remove from the networks without the necessity to monitor *everyone's* email, through some regulatory or enforcement organization that is largely unrepresentative of the users that it is chartered to protect.

I like that CyberArmy gives its members a reason to *think* about social ethics, and to decide upon what they should be, rather than to simply accept what is established, without reasoning. I find that to be a fundamental failing of modern society - that we frequently simply accept law, as the determinant of social ethics, instead of requiring law to be guided by them. When people use *judgement*, rather than rely solely upon law, then people are much more likely to treat one another with fairness. Externally imposed rules are for people who lack the judgement skills to figure out how best to behave, without them. And most rules, today, are externally imposed. I believe that when people *think* about social ethics, it usually results in a moral fiber that is founded in an honest *belief* in the moral behavior that they come up with - and that this makes for infinitely better Internet citizens, than rules or laws that are supported only by a deterrent fear of reprisals. I think that such people usually come up with better behavior than the minimum standards that rules and law do, as well.

Astalavista : Cyberarmy runs a challenge - Zebulun, which happens to be a very popular one. How many people have already passed the challenge, and what are you trying to achieve with it besides motivating their brain cells?

MrYowler : About 200,000 people have participated in the Zebulun challenge, over the years, to one extent or another. Because the challenges are changed, over time (to discourage 'cheating', and to keep them challenging, during changing times), the definition of "passed the challenge" is somewhat variable. Approximately 300-400 people have completed all of the challenges that were available to them, to obtain the highest possible rank that one can reach, by solving the puzzles. That has traditionally been "Kernel" (the misspelling is an intentional pun) or "General", and it is presently "Kernel". At the moment, the Kernel puzzle seems to be too advanced, and will probably have to be changed. There are seven puzzles, and our intended target is that there should always be about a 2:1 ratio of players, from one rank to the next. This guarantees that the puzzles will be challenging to most players, without being discouraging.

Of course, we like encouraging people to learn. More importantly, I'm trying to get people to *think*. Anyone can become educated about technical systems; this only requires time and dedication to the task. And while that is an important think to do, it is already heavily stressed in schools, and throughout most societies and cultures. Smart people know a lot of things.

But this is not entirely true. Most smart people have come to realize that "knowledge is power" - but it is not the knowledge that makes them smart. As with static electricity, which is expressed only as voltage potential - until it strikes the ground as lightning - knowledge is not expressed as power, until someone *thinks*, and applies that knowledge to some useful purpose. Socrates was effectively an illiterate shoe-salesman (a cobbler), but he is considered a great philospher, because he took the little bit that he knew about the world, and *thought* about it. Not only that, but he convinced other to think about it, as well. Einstein was a mediocre mathematician and generally viewed as a quack, until his thinking was expressed in the form of nuclear energy. *Thought* is what separates the well-educated from the brilliant - and most successful 'hackers' rely much more upon *thought*, than upon an exhaustive understanding of the systems that they target. Not that having such knowledge isn't helpful... :)

I am trying to get people to *think* - not only about intrusion tactics, but also about defensive measures, motivations, risks, ethics, and about life in general. Too much of the world around us is taken for granted, and not questioned. Not thought about. I am trying to make the art of questioning and *thinking*, into a larger part of people's lifestyles.

Astalavista : How did the infosec industry evolved based on your observations since 1998? Is it getting worse? What are the main reasons behind it? Crappy software or the end users' lack of awareness?

MrYowler : In its early years, the infosec industry was largely dominated by the mavericks - as is true with most developing industries. A few people dominated the profession, with their independence - it gave them the freedom to tell the business world how things should be, and to walk away, if the business world was unwilling to comply. Today, we see less of that, and
while the industry is still largely dominated by such people, the majority of people whose job is to implement system security, are much more constrained by resource limitations.

Essentially, there are two groups of people in the defensive side of this industry; the policy-makers and the implementors. Policy-makers are usually corporate executives, CISOs, legislators, consultants, or otherwise figures of comparative authority, whose job it is to find out what is wrong with system security, and to come up with ideas about how to fix it. Implementors are usually the ones who are tasked with implementing these ideas, and they are usually system or network administrators, programmers, security guards, or otherwise people whose influence on things such as budget and staff allocation, is insignificant. As a rule, the policy-makers make a great deal of money, establishing policies that they have very little part in implementing, and often these policies have a significant impact upon the work loads and environments of implementors.

It is all well and good, for example, to decide that there will be no more use of instant messenger software in the workplace. Stopping it from occurring, however... while remotely possible, by employing purely technical measures, it is certainly not desireable or inexpensive. Even monitoring for it can require staff resources which are rarely allocated for the task, and the effect of draconian security measures - or penalties for non-compliance - is usually much more damaging to workplace productivity than the instant messengers ever were. For some reason, policy-makers have abandoned the basic principle of system design; "involve the user" - and
have limited themselves to requiring the support of executive management. Security policy is surprisingly cheaper, faster, and easier to achieve compliance with, when is also has the support of the rank-and-file members of an organization - and not the kind of support that is achieved putting a professional gun to their heads, by requiring people to sign compliance agreements. Rather, the support that is achieved by giving the employees a sense of personal investment in the security of the system. User awareness is fairly easy to achieve, although users will tend to disclaim it, when caught in a violation or compromise. Creating accountability documents, such as security policy compliance agreements, may combat these disclaimers; but the most truly effective approach is not to just tell the users and demand compliance - but to give the users a voice in it, and the desire to strive for it. In many cases, the users have excellent ideas about areas where system security falls down - and similarly excellent ideas about how to fix it.

Policy-makers have to bridge the gap between themselves and implementors, or security will always be 'that pain-in-the-ass policy' which people are trying to find ways to work around. And instead of the draconian Hand of God, which appears only so that it can smite you down; security needs to become the supportive freind that you can always pick up the phone and talk
to, when you have a question or a problem.

That having been said, there is another problem with modern security practices, that is worth giving some attention to...

Because security has traditionally been sold to organizations, as a way to prevent losses that result from security compromises, these organizations have begun to assign values to these compromises, and these values determine the extent to which these organizations will go, to prevent them. While perfectly reasonable and sensible from a business perspective, these values are determined largely by educated guessing, and the value of a compromise can be highly subjective, depending upon who is making the assessment.

Remember - if your credit information gets into the hands of someone who uses it to print checks with your name on them, you could spend years trying to straighten out your credit with the merchants who accept these checks. It can impact your mortgage interest rates, or prevent you from getting a mortgage, at all - and it can force you to carry cash, in amounts that may
place you in considerable personal danger. The organization which pulls a credit report on you, to obtain this information, however, stands very little to lose from its compromise, since you are unlikely to ever determine, much less be able to prove, that they were the source of the
compromise. So, what motivates them to guarantee that all credit report information is properly protected, destroyed and disposed of? What's to stop them from simply throwing it in the garbage? And what happens to it, if they go out of business, or are bought out by some other company? To what extent do they verify that their employees are trustworthy?

*This* is typically where security falls down. Remember; security is the art of protecting *yourself* from harm - not necessarily your customers, your marketing prospects, or anyone else. As a result, most of the effort to secure systems, goes into protecting the interests of the people who *operate* those systems - and not necessarily the users of them, or the data
points that they contain information about. In many cases, legal disclaimers and transfers of liability replace actual protective countermeasures, when it comes to protecting things that *you* care about - and in still other cases, a lack accountability suffices to make an
organization willing to take a chance with your security, out of a commercial interest in doing so. Marketing entities often openly sell your information, or sell the use of your information to market things to you, and make no bones about doing so - after all, it's not their loss, if your
information gets misused - it's yours.

This is a fundamental problem in information security, and for many of us it costs our personal freedom. The government needs access to all of our emails, without the requirement to notify us or get a warrant to access the information, because we might be drug dealers or child molestors. And I worry that some child molestor will gain access to the information, through
the channels that are made available to government. Amazon.com stores our credit information, in order to make is easier for us to buy books through them, in the future - and I worry that all someone needs is the password to my Amazon.com account, to start ordering books on my credit card. Every time that I fill out an application for employment, I am giving some filing
clerk access to all the information required, to assume my identity. That information is worth a great deal, to me - how much is it worth, to them? Enough to pay for a locking cabinet, to put it into? Enough to put it into a locked office? Enough to alarm the door? Enough the get a guard to protect the facility in which it is stored? Enough to arm the guard? Enough to adequately shred and destroy the information, when they dispose of it? Enough to conduct criminal background investigations on anyone that has access to the information? Or do they just get some general corporate liability insurance, and figure that it's an unlikely-enough circumstance,
that even if it happens, and I'm able to trace it back to them, and make it stick, in court, that it's worth the risk of a nuisance libility lawsuit?

At its core, information security is failing, for at least these two reasons: 1) for all the talk that goes on, very little on the way of actual resources are devoted to information security; and, 2) people and organizations usually show comparatively little interest in anyone's security but their own.

Astalavista : Mr.Yowler, lately we've seen an enormous flood of worms in the wild,
what do you think is the reason?

MrYowler : Firstly, these worms exploit errors in upper-layer protocols of networks and
network applications. Because network applications are proliferating at an ever-increasing rate, the possible ways to exploit them are also increasing at this geometric rate - and people who are interested in exploiting them, therefore have more things to work with.

Secondly, there is a glut of information technology talent in the United States, perhaps thanks, in part to the collapse of the Internet economy - and also, in part, thanks to the rush to outsource technology jobs to overseas entities. Additionally, third-world countries have been developing
technical talent for some years, now, in an effort to become competitive in this rapidly-growing outsourcing market. This has created an evironment where technical talent is plentiful and cheap - and often disenfranchised.

In some cases, these worms are written by kids, with nothing better to do - and that has always been a problem, which has grown in a linear way, as more and more advanced technical education has begun to become available to younger and younger students.

In other cases, this is the technical equivalent of "going postal", in which a disenfranchised technology worker creates a malicious product, either as a form of vengance, of in the hope of creating a need for his own technical talents, as a researcher of considerable talent, with regard to the worm in question. Surprisingly many people who might otherwise never find work in
the technical or security industries, are able to do so, by making a name for themselves through criminal activity or other malicious behavior. While demonstrating questionable ethics, it also demonstrates technical talent, and the noteriety is sometimes more valuable to a company, than the damage that they risk by hiring someone whose ethics are questionable. Many people
are employed or sponsored in the lecture circuit, for this reason; they did something that bought them noteriety - good or bad - and their employer/s figure that they can benefit from the noteriety, without risking a lot of possible damage, by putting these people on the lecture circuit.

In an increasing number of cases, these disenfranchised technology workers are actually employed for the specific purpose of creating malware, by spyware, adware, and spam organizations, as I will cover in the next question. When one is forced to choose between one's ethics and feeding one's children, ethics are generally viewed as a luxury that one can no
longer afford. I, myself, am currently under contract to a spammer, since I am now approximately two weeks from homelessness, and better offers have not been forthcoming. I'm writing an application which will disguise a process which sends out spam, as something benign, in the process listing, on what are presumably compromised *nix hosts. The work will buy me approximately one more week of living indoors, which is really not enough to justify the
evil of it, but I am in no position to refuse work, regardless of the employer. And indeed, if I did not accept the contract, and cheaply, then it is quite likely that someone from a third-world country would have done so - and probably much more cheaply than I did.

Astalavista : Recently, spammers and spyware creators started using 0-day browser
bugs, in order to disseminate themselves in ways we didn't consider serious several months ago. Did they get smarter and finally realize the advantages or a 0-day exploit, compared to those of an outdated and poisoned e-mail databse?

MrYowler : As indicated in the previous question, spam, spyware and adware organizations are beginning to leverage the fact that there is now a glut of technical talent available on the world market, and some of it can be had, very cheaply. These organizations have been taking advantage of technical staff that could not find better work for a long time. As more people who
possess these talents, find themselves unable to sustain a living in the professional world; they are increasingly likely to turn to the growing professional underground.

Employment in the security industry is no longer premised on talent, ability, education, skill, or professional credentials, and there are essentially three markets that are increasingly reachable, for the malware professional world. 1) Third-world nations with strong technical educational programs are simply screaming for more of this sort of comparatively lucrative work to do. 2) Young people who lack the age or credentials to get picked up professionally, by the more respectable organizations, often crave the opportunity to put 'hacking' skills, developed in earlier years, to professional use. 3) Older technology workers, finding it difficult to find work in a market dominated by under-30-year-old people, often have large mortgages to pay, and children to put through college, and are willing to take whatever work they can find - if not to solve their financial problems, then perhaps to tide them over until a better solution presents itself.

It's not so much that spam, spyware, and adware marketers have become smarter, as it is that greater technical talent has become available to them. The same people who used to develop and use blacklists, and filter spam based upon header information for ISPs that have since gone bankrupt or been bought out, are now writing worms that mine email client databases, to
extract names and addresses, and then use this, combined with email client configuration information, to send spam out from the user's host that the addresses were mined from. They are using the user's own name and email address, to spoof the sender - even using the SMTP server provided to the victim, by their ISP, to deliver the mail. This effectively permits them to
relay through servers that are not open relays, and distributing the traffic widely enough to stay under the spam-filtering radar of the sending ISPs, and to evade the blacklisting employed by the recieving ISPs. It also permits them to leverage the victim's relationship to the recipients of the spam, in order to get them to open and read it - and sometimes, to get them to open attachments, or otherwise infect themselves with the worm that was used to reach them. The spammers have not previously been able to hire talent of this grade, very often - now, this talent is often not only available, but often desperate for cash, and therefore willing to work cheap.

It's a bit like an arms race. In the rush to develop enough technical talent to defend against this sort of thing, we have developed an over-abundance of talent in the area - and that talent is now being hired to work against us. This will presumably force people to work even harder at developing coutnermeasures, and repeat the cycle. Assuming, of course, that the threat is taken seriously enough by the public, to keep the arms race going. After all - once everybody has enough nuclear weapons to destroy all the life on Earth, then there isn't much point in striving to build more. You just have to learn to deal with the constant threat of extinction, and try
not to take it too seriously - since there isn't really anything to be done about it, any more. We seem to be rapidly approaching this mentality, with regard to malware.

Astalavista : What is your opinion on ISPs that upgrade their customers' Internet connections for free, while not providing them with enhanced security measures in place? To put it in another way, what do you think is going to happen when there're more and more novice ADSL users around the globe, who don't have a clue about what is actually going on?

MrYowler : This comes back around to the second point, with regard to the problems of
information security, today. People have little interest in anyone's security but their own.

The ISPs *could* block all outgoing traffic on port 25, unless it is destined for the ISPs SMTP servers - and then rate-limit delivery of email from each user, based upon login (or in the case of unauthenticated broadband, by IP address). This is a measure that would have effectively
prevented both the desktop server and open relay tactics that I described in my paper, "Bulk Email Transmission Tactics", about four years ago, and it would severely constrain the flow of spam from zombie hosts in these user networks. The problem is that they don't care. They only care when the spam is *incoming*, and then they can point fingers about how uncaring someone else is. The same holds true for individual users.

It is neither difficult nor expensive to implement a simple broadband router, to block most incoming traffic which would be likely to infect user hardware with malware. It is also not difficult or expensive to implement auto-updating virus protection, spyware/adware detection/removal, and software patching. It could be done even more cheaply, if ISPs were to
aggregate the costs, for all of their users, and buy service contracts for this kind of protection, in bulk, for their users, and pass the cost along as part of the 'upgraded' service. Unfortunately, the nominal cost of doing so, would have to be borne by users who do not take the threat seriously, and who only care about the threat, when it has a noticeable impact on them. Since many of the malware packages are designed *not* to have a noticeable impact on the user - using them essentially as a reflection, relay, or low-rate DDoS platform, or quietly extracting data from their systems which will be abused in ways not directly traceable to their computer - these users to not perceive the threat to be real, and are therefore unwilling to invest - even nominally - in protecting themselves from it. ISPs are not willing to absorb these costs, and they are not willing to risk becoming uncompetitive, by passing costs on to their subscribers; so they pay lip service to questions of security and antispam service, and perform only the most minimal tasks, to support their marketing claims.

As with most organizations, the security of the organization itself, lies at the focus of their security policies. The security of subscribers, other network providers, or other Internet users in general, is something that they go to some trouble to create the perception that they care about, but when the time comes to put their money where their mouths are, it's just not happening.

Astalavista : Thanks for your time.

MrYowler : Any time... :-P
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Interview with a core founder of Astalavista.com http://www.astalavista.com/

Dancho : Hi Prozac, Astalavista.com - the underground has been one of the most popular and well known hacking/security/cracks related web site in the world since 1997. How did it all start? What was the idea behind it?

Prozac : Basically, it was me and a college friend that started Astalavista.com during our student years. The name of the site came from the movie Terminator 2 from Schwarzenegger's line " Hasta la vista Baby"! Back in those days there weren't many qualified security related web sites, and we spotted a good opportunity to develop something unique, which quickly turned into one of the most popular hacking/security sites around the globe. In the beginning, it was just our Underground Search List, the most comprehensive and up-to-date search list of underground and security related web sites, based on what we define as a quality site. Then we started providing direct search opportunities and started developing the rest of the site. Many people think we did some serious brainstorming before starting Astalavista, well, we did, but we hadn't expected it to become such a popular and well known site, which is the perfect moment to say thanks to all of you who made us as popular as we're today.

Dancho : Astalavista.com always provides up to date, sometimes "underground" documents/programs. The Security Directory is growing daily as well, and it has been like this for the past several years. How do you manage to keep such an archive always online, and up to date?

Prozac : Astalavista's team members are aware of what's "hot" and what's interesting for our visitors, just because we pay an enormous attention to their requests for security knowledge, and try to maintain a certain standard, only quality files. While we add files every day, a large number of those are submitted by our visitors themselves, who find their programs and papers highly valued at our site, as we give them the opportunity to see how many people have downloaded their stuff.

Dancho : Astalavista occupies people's minds as the underground search engine. But what is Astalavista.com all about?

Prozac : The majority of people still think Astalavista.com is a Crack web site, which is NOT true at all. Astalavista.com is about spreading secutity knowledge, about providing professionals with what they're looking for, about educating the average Internet user on various security issues; basically we try to create a very well segmented portal where everyone will be able to find his/her place. We realize the fact that we're visited by novice, advanced and highly advanced users, even government bodies; that's why we try to satisfy everyone with the files and resources we have and help everyone find precious information at astalavista.com. Although we sometimes list public files, the exposure they get through our site is always impressing for the author, while on the other hand, some of the files that are listed at Astalavista.com sometimes appear for the first time at our site. We try not to emphasize on the number of files, but on their quality and uniqueness.

Dancho : Everyone knows Astalavista, and sooner or later everyone visits the site. How did the image of Asta become so well-known around the world?

Prozac : Indeed, we are getting more and more visitors every month, even from countries we didn't expect. What we think is important is the quality of the site, the lack of porn, the pure knowledge provided in the most professional and useful way, the free nature of the site, created "for the people", instead of getting it as commercial as possible. Yes, we work with a large number of advertisers, however, we believe to have come to a model where everyone's happy, advertisers for getting what they're paying for, and users for not being attacked by adware or spyware or a large number of banners.

Dancho : A question everyone's asking all the time - is Astalavista.com illegal?

Prozac : No! And this is an endless debate which can be compared to the Full Disclosure one. We live in the 21st century, a single file can be made public in a matter of seconds, then it's up to the whole world to decide what to do with the information inside. We're often blamed because we're too popular and the files get too much exposure. We're often blamed for serving these files to script-kiddies etc. Following these thoughts, I think we might also ask, is Google illegal, or is Google's cache illegal?! Yes, we might publish certain files, but we'll never publish "The Complete Novice Users on HOWTO ShutDown the Internet using 20 lines VB code". And no, we don't host any cracks or warez files, and will never do.

Dancho : Such a popular secutity site should establish a level of social responsibility - given the fact how popular it is among the world, are you aware of this fact, or basically it's just your mission that guides you?

Prozac : We're aware of this fact, and we keep it in mind when appoving or adding new content to the site. We also realize that we still get a large number of "first time visitors", some of them highly unaware of what the security world is all about; and we try to educate them as well. And no, we're not tempted by "advertising agencies" eager to place adware/spyware at the site, or
users submitting backdoored files, and we have a strict policy on how to deal with those - "you're not welcome at the site"!

Dancho : We saw a completely new and "too professional to be true" Astalavista.com since the beginning of 2004 - what made you renovate the whole site, and its mission to a certain extend?

Prozac : It was time to change our mission in order to keep ourselves alive, and most importantly, increase the number and quality of our visitors, and we did so by finding several more people joining the Astalavista.com team, closely working together to improve and popularize the site. We no longer want to be defined as script kiddies paradise, but as a respected security portal with its own viewpoint in the security world.

Dancho : What should we expect from Astalavista.com in the near future?

Prozac : To put it in two words - changes and improvements. We seek quality and innovation, and have in mind that these developed by us, have an impact on a large number of people - you, our visitors. Namely because of you we're devoted to continue to develop the site, and increase the number of services offered for free, while on the other hand provide those having some
sort of purchasing power and trusting us with more quality services and products.

Dancho : Thanks for the chat!

Prozac : You're more than welcome :)

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Interview with Candid Wuest, http://www.trojan.ch/

Astalavista : Candid, would you, please, introduce yourself to our readers and tell us more about your background in the security industry?

Candid : Well, my name is Candid and I have been working in the computer security field for several years now, performing different duties for different companies. For example, IBM Security Research and Symantec to name the most known ones. I got a master degree in computer science but, in my opinion, in this business curiosity is the main thing that matters.

Astalavista : What do you think has had a major impact on the popularity of malware in recent years? Is it the easiness of coding a worm/trojan or the fact that the authors don't get caught?

Candid : Why do people code worms? Because they can?

The first point I would like to mention here is the growth of the Internet as a whole in the last years. More people getting a system and more people getting broadband access means more people are exposed to the risks. You may say the fish tank has grown over the years; therefore it is clear that there is now also more space for sharks in it.

I think the few people which where caught have scared some and stopped them from doing the same, but the media hype they have caused has for sure attracted new ones to get started with the whole idea. So this might balance out even and these were mostly smaller fishes, which didn’t take enough precautions.

Another point to mention is that it is really easy to download a source code and create your own malware and it is getting easier every day. There are many bulletin boards out there with fast growing communities helping each other in developing new methods for malware or simply sharing their newest creations.

When recalling the last hundreds of worms we saw in the wild for the last time, most of them were similar and much alike. Nearly no direct destructive payload and not much innovation in regards to the used methods. Just a mass mailer here or an IRC bot there.

That’s why I think the motivation is a mixture of the easiness of doing so and the mental kick suggested from the media, which pushes the bad underground hacker image. (Even though the media uses the term hacker seldom correctly in its original meaning.) This seems to motivate many to code malware: just because they can.

In the future money might become a new motivation for malware writers, when industrial parties get involved in it.

Astalavista : Where's the gap between worms in the wild and the large number of infected computers? Who has more responsiblity, the system administrators capable of stopping the threat at the server level, or the large number of people who don't know how to protect themsvels properly?

Candid : As we all should know 100% security will never be reached, regardless of what the sysadmin and the end user do. A good example for this is the recent issue with the JPEG and TIFF malware, which sneaked through many filters.

In my opinion the sysadmins have the easier task, as they can enforce their restriction; often it’s just a question of having the time to do it properly. Don’t get me wrong here. I know the whole patching issue may be quite a pain sometimes. Of course, they have all the users and the
management complaining if the restrictions are (too) tight but that’s how it works, right :- )

Therefore I think often it is the end user who has not enough protection or simply does not care enough about it. Many users still think that no one will aim at them, as they are not an interesting target, but DDoS attacks for example do exactly target such a user. Of course, many end users don’t have the possibilities of a sysadmin. In general, it comes down to an AntiVirus and a personal firewall application, which still leaves enough space for intruders to slip through.

So, as always, it should be a combination of an ISP, a sysadmin and an end user working together to protect themselves.

Astalavista : We've recently seen a DDoS mafia, something that is happening even now. What is the most appropriate solution to fight these? Do you think this concept is going to evolve in time?

Candid : DDoS attacks are quite hard to counter if they are performed in a clever way. I have seen concepts for which I haven’t seen a working solution yet. Some can be countered by load balancing and traffic shaping or by simply changing the IP address if it was hard coded. More promising would be if you could prevent the DDoS nets from being created, but this goes back to question number three.

Astalavista : Have you seen malware used for e-spionage, and do you think it's the next trend in the field?

Candid : This is nothing new; malware has been used for industrial e-spionage for years. Usually, it just isn't that well known as those attacks might never get noticed or admitted in public. I have seen plenty of such attacks over the last years. This for sure will increase in time as more business relevant data gets stored in vulnerable environments. In some sort you could even call phishing an art of espionage. But I think the next big increase will be in the adware & spyware filed where malware authors will start getting hired to write those applications as
it already happens today. Or are you sure that your favourite application is not sending an encoded DNS request back somewhere?
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Interview with Anthony Aykut,Frame4 Security Systems http://www.frame4.com/

Astalavista : Anthony, would you please tell us something more about your experience in the InfoSec industry, and what is Frame4 Security Systems all about?

Anthony : Sure. I guess I am what you would primarily call a "security enthusiast", with what I came to see as "a keen sense of security business enthusiasm". Actively following the Trojan/Virus community since my teens in the late-1980's, I have been working in the IT industry since the early 90's, though up until 2002 I have never felt the need to follow the IT security path. Let's just say that a certain chain of events made me "fall" into it :-)) ... and that is when I decided to start Frame4 Security Systems.

Frame4 Security Systems is a small IT-Security company based in the Netherlands. We offer the usual "out-of-the-box" professional security services (security audits, pen-testing, etc.), but we especially pride ourselves on our outstanding security awareness programs (seminars and
courses), exceptional service, and our upcoming "ProjectX Security Knowledgebase". I really feel that we are on an unique playing-field with Frame4; whereas big (and often expensive) consultancies are primarily focused on big companies/contracts, bottom line figures and dead-lines - often the Security Awareness on a personal (employee) level gets often overlooked. This creates a well-known security gap that gets exploited more and more often, rendering the million-dollar security solution back in the server-room absolutely useless. I have personally seen good examples of this within big companies -- and it is therefore we let the big boys do what they are good at by providing solid, proven solutions, whereas we have the unique opportunity of "fighting the disease from inside-out".

Astalavista : "Internet privacy", do these words still exist in your opinion?

Anthony : To a large extent (and unfortunately), no. But I guess this was to be expected with millions of people pumping their personal data into online databases and keeping information on their PCs. It is an open field, with little or no control or control structure. Let's face it, (personal) information and data is big business, and people will do absolutely anything from hacking databases to infecting people with spyware/trojans to extract that information. And in some cases, custodians of personal information have just made it way too easy for other (unauthorised) people to gain access to private data. I guess that's when the finger-pointing started :-)

But on a more serious note, I have friends who are so paranoid that they only surf the net behind a wall of proxies and anonymizers, under false/assumed names and identities. Me, I am just careful; I think when people have a basic online awareness level, and know what to look out for, it is no more a threat to your information than, say, putting your garbage outside and someone going through it (a.k.a. dumpster diving).

Astalavista : We have recently seen a large number of DDoS extortion schemes, whereas certain companies comply behind the curtains, should we consider every E-business site that goes down a victim of extortion schemes? What do you think a company should do in a situation like this?

Anthony : I personally think that "head-in-the-sand" ostrich attitude is completely wrong; pay once to one extortionist, and a dozen others will line up to grab that easy cash. I don't think you should comply and give in to any of these demands (I prefer to call them threats) but come out with it in the open and track down the perpetrators if possible. Openness, like some companies have chosen, may possibly dent your corporate identity on a temporary basis, but also takes away the power of the extortionist. We have seen that this approach is the lesser of two evils in general, especially true if your business does not depend on a internet presence per se.

Astalavista : In today's world of "yet another worm in the wild", what do you think are the main consequences for this cycle, and what do you think should be done in order to prevent it?

Anthony : Well, I am pretty clear on that. As long as publicly/privately available source-code floats around the web, not much can be done - unless the AV vendors come up with better technologies. It really is up to them to come up with better and improved techniques to protect our systems - more and more the current AV technology is showing that it is getting out-dated by being circumvented in many ways. I am more than aware that it is difficult to "protect against the unknown", but I just know there should be more. Maybe AV vendors should float a bit more within the "community" to gain awareness
:-)

To be honest, with the advent of other malware, such as Trojans, Sniffers, Keyloggers and Spyware to name a few and many interesting technologies such as Firewall-Bypassing, etc. it is getting more and more obvious that we need an "All Comprehensive Malware Solution" than just a pattern based AV system. It just ain't cutting it anymore. Until then, keep up your defences and update those virus patterns on a daily basis!

Astalavista : The threat and actual infections with spyware opened up an entire market for anti-spyware related services and products, whereas millions of people out there are still infected, and some are even unaware of it. What is your opinion on the recent government regulations targeting spyware vendors, but allowing "spy agencies" to use spyware? What do you think is going to happen on the spyware scene in the next couple of years?

Anthony : Well, as I pointed out in your previous question, I tend to see Spyware almost in the same category as Trojans, Viruses and other malware. Subsequently I think things are going to get (much) worse before they (I hope, eventually) get better, and it is going to take some considerable changes in AV technology for one (along with our ways of thinking) to ensure people will not take advantage of these technologies to the disadvantage of others.

Currently things are not looking too good: governments have proven that we cannot trust their ineffective and inevitably slow schemes and until better/additional technologies are invented to bolster our AV defences, we are pretty much sitting duck targets. This has been proven yet again with the recent "hijacking" of 1000's of zombie/drone PCs to perform DDoS attacks, etc. So it is really up to the individuals to get at least some basic security measures up and running, and there are plenty of reputable web-sites out there to provide all the information one needs to secure themselves well.

Astalavista : Thanks for your time.

Anthony : No problem!
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Interview with Dave Wreski, http://www.linuxsecurity.com/

Astalavista : Dave, tell us something more about your background in the InfoSec industry and what is LinuxSecurity.com all about?

Dave : I have been a long-time Linux enthusiast, using it before version v1.0 on my 386DX40 home PC, which prompted me to dump Windows shortly thereafter and I've never looked back.
In early 1993 I began to realize the tremendous value that Linux could bring to the security issues I was facing. I found the decisions I was making, with regard to managing computer systems, were more and more based on the impact security had on the data residing on those systems. It's certainly more challenging to keep the bad guys out than it is the other way round - the bad guys have to only be right once, while the good guys have to always make the right decisions. So I created a company to help ensure the good guys had the tools necessary to make the most effective options to keep their networks secure.

The void in comprehensive information on security in the Linux space was the primary reason I started LinuxSecurity.com in 1996. Since then, we have seen millions of visitors make it their primary information resource. In fact, we're completely revamping the site with new features, greater functionality and a whole new look -launching December 1st.

Astalavista : What was the most important trend in the open-source security scene during the last couple of years,in your opinion?

Dave : Actually, there have been so many that it's difficult to focus on any one in particular. Certainly, the adoption of open standards by many vendors and organizations makes it much easier to communicate between disparate systems securely. The maturity of the OpenSSH/OpenSSL projects, IPsec, and even packet filtering has enabled companies, including Guardian Digital, to create solutions to Internet security issues equal to, or better than, their proprietary counterparts.

Astalavista : The monopolism of Microsoft in terms of owning more than 95% of the desktops in the world has resulted in a lot of debates on how insecure the whole Internet is because of their insecure software. Whereas my personal opinion is that if Red Had had 95% of the desktop market, the effect would be the same. Do you think their software is indeed insecure, or it happens to be the one most targeted by hackers?

Dave : I think the mass-market Linux vendors try to develop a product that's going to provide the largest numbers of features, while sacraficing security in the process. They have to appeal to the lowest common denominator, and if that means delivering a particular service that is requested by their customers, then much of the responsibility of security falls on the consumer, who may or may not be aware of the implications of not maintaining a secure system, and in all likelihood, do not possess the ability to manage the security of their system.

Astalavista : The appearance of Gmail and Google Desktop had a great impact on the privacy concerns of everyone, however these expanditures by Google happened to be very successful. Do you think there's really a privacy concern about Google, their services and privacy policy, and, most importantly, the future of the company?

Dave : No, not really. I actually think that most of us gave up our privacy years ago, and any privacy that remains is only in perception. There's far more damage that could be done
through things like the United States Patriot Act than there is through Google reading your general communications. Anyone who has half a brain and wants to make sure their communications are not intercepted is using cryptography for electronic issues.

Astalavista : We've recently seen an enormous increase of phishing attacks, some of which are very successful. What caused this in your opinion? What is the way to limit these from your point of view?

Dave : Reduce the human factor involvement somehow. Phishing is just the new "cyber" term for social engineering, which has existed forever. Through the efforts of Guardian Digital, and other companies concerned about the privacy and security of their customers' data, we are making great strides towards user education, and providing tools for administrators to filter commnications.

Astalavista : Spyware is another major problem that created an industry of companies fighing it, and while the government is slowly progressing on the issue, the majority of PCs online are infected by spyware. Would you, please, share your comments on the topic?

Dave : This issue is different from issues such as phishing because the end-user is not aware is it occurring. The responsibility here falls directly on the operating system vendor to produce an
environment where security is maintained. In other words, by creating software that enables the end-user to better define what constitutes authorized access, users can develop a situation where this type of attack does not succeed. In the meantime, application-level security filters and strict corporate information policies thwart many of these types of attacks.

Astalavista : What do you think will happen in the near future with Linux vs. Microsoft? Shall we witness more Linux desktops, or entire countries will be renovating their infrastructure with
Unix-based operating systems?

Dave : We are already seeing a growing trend on an international level in the migration from Windows operating systems to Linux. Guardian Digital has implemented several Linux-based solutions for multi-national and international corporations who recognize the costs and security risks associated with a Windows system, and if our business is any indication of the growth potential, I'd say Microsoft is going to have a real fight on their hands.

Although I'm not too involved in the desktop space itself, I am completely comfortable with my cobbled-together Linux desktop, much more than just a few years ago. I think that as more
and more computing tasks become distributed - moved from the desktop to being powered by a central server - it will become easier to rely on Linux on the desktop and the growth will continue.
--------------------------------

Interview with Mitchell Rowton, http://www.securitydocs.com/

Astalavista : Hello Mitchell, would you please tell us something more about your background in the information security industry, and what is SecurityDocs.com all about?

Mitchell : I joined the US Marine Corps after high school. There I worked a helpdesk for a year or so before moving on to being a server administrator. After a while I became more and more interested in the networking side of things (switches and routers.) Firewalls weren't used that often back then, and one day I was asked to put up an access-control list (ACL) on our borderrouter. After that I started getting more and more security responsibility. When I left the Marine Corps I used my security clearance to get a job as a DoD contractor, then a contractor in the health care industry.

By this time in my life I had a wife and kids. So I took a job that was more stable and didn't have as much travel closer to home. When I think back, this is probably when the idea behind SecurityDocs.com was born. While I was leaving one job and going to another I was told to do a very in depth turnover about starting an incident response team at the company. So how do you explain how to start an incident response team at a fortune 500 company in a turnover document? After a while I gave up and put several dozen links to white papers that discuss starting an incident response team.

Basically that's what SecurityDocs.com is - a collection of security white papers that are organized into categories so that it's easy for someone to learn any particular area.

Astalavista : The media and a large number of privacy concious experts keep targeting Google and how unseriously the company is taking the privacy concerns of its users. What is your opinion on that? Do you think a public company such as Google should keep to its one-page privacy policy and contradictive statements given the fact that it's the world's most popular
search engine?

Mitchell : I should start off by saying that my company makes money through Google's Adsense program. That being said, it seems like most of the media hoopla surrounding Google privacy has centered around gmail and desktop search. I just don't see a problem with either of these issues. I signed up for gmail knowing that I would see targeted text ads based on the content of e-mail that I was viewing.

And I know that Google is going to learn some general stuff about everyones desktop searching habits. They will know that pdf's are searched for more often than spreadsheets and other non-specific information. None of which is personally identifiable.

Astalavista : Phishing attacks are on the rise, each and every month we see an increasing number of new emails targeting new companies. What do you think of the recent exploit of the SunTrust bank web site? Are users really falling victims to these attacks or even worse, they're getting even more scared to shop online?

Mitchell : The blame in this specific case falls mostly with the bank, but also on the users. I can't remember the last time my bank asked me for my atm or credit card number on a non-secure page. That being said, I know that my grand mother would probably fall for this. Sure users should check for SSL Certificates and use common sense. But more importantly financial institutions should not allow cross site scripting or malicious scripting injections.

If this type of phishing continues to rise then I imagine it will make the average user a little more worried about giving information online. This is bad for companies, but as a security guy, I think that most users should be more worried about who they give their information to. There are a lot of phishing attacks that have nothing to do with the institutions. In cases like this, users must use some basic security common sense or risk getting scammed.

Astalavista : What used to be a worm in wild launched by a 15 years old kid or hactivist, has recently turned into "DDoS services on demand", what do you think made this possible? Is it the unemployed authors themselves, the real criminals realizing the potential of the Internet, or the unethical competition?

Mitchell : I'm sure it's a combination of all three. But it's also getting more popular because it hurts more today than it used to. Five years ago an organizations web site was usually little more than an online brochure that wasn't too important in the scheme of things. Today their website is probably tightly integrated into their business model, and will cause a large financial and reputation loss if it is compromised or unusable.

The first step in doing a security assessment is to determine what's really important. Most companies should realize that having the same security mechanisms in place that they had three years ago is putting them more and more at risk because these security mechanisms are protecting information that gets more important every day.

Astalavista : Recently, the FBI has been questioning Fyodor, the author of NMAP over accessing server logs from insecure.org. Do you think these actions, legal or not, can have any future implications on the users's privacy at other web sites? I mean, next it could be any site believed to be visited by a criminal, and besides all how useful this information might be in an investigation?

Mitchell : I had a mixed reaction when I first read about this. But I must say that Fyodor handled this superbly. He sent an e-mail out telling people what was happening and explaining that he was only complying with properly served subpoenas. He also puts things into perspective. If someone hacks into a server and downloads nmap at a specific time, then perhaps law enforcement should be able to view the nmap server logs for that specific time. On the other hand what if I were also downloading NMap at that time? I personally wouldn't care if anyone knows that I download nmap, but I can also understand why other people would be bothered by this. Overall I agree with very narrow subpoenas directed at specific time periods and source IP's.

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