Malicious Client-Side Exploits Serving Campaign Intercepted, Thousands of Users Affected

April 26, 2016
We've recently intercepted, a currently, circulating, malicious campaign, utilizing, a variety, of compromised, Web sites, for, the purpose, of serving, malicious software, to socially engineered, users.

In this post, we'll profile, the campaign, the infrastructure, behind, it, provide, actionable, intelligence, MD5s, and, discuss, in depth, the tactics, techniques, and procedures, of, the cybercrimnals, behind it.

Sample malicious URL:
hxxp://directbalancejs.com/module.so - 37.48.116.208; 31.31.204.161

hxxp://2-eco.ru
hxxp://2401.ru
hxxp://24xxx.site
hxxp://3502050.ru
hxxp://6553009.xyz
hxxp://7032949.ru
hxxp://academing.ru
hxxp://academyfinance.ru
hxxp://activelifelab.com
hxxp://advokat-mikheev.ru
hxxp://advokatstav.ru
hxxp://akvahim98.ru
hxxp://al-minbar.ru
hxxp://allesmarket.com
hxxp://alltrump.ru
hxxp://altropasso.ru
hxxp://ambertao.info
hxxp://ambertao.org
hxxp://ancra.ru
hxxp://andr-6-update.ru
hxxp://android-new.ru
hxxp://androidid-6-new.ru
hxxp://angrymultik.ru
hxxp://animaciyafoto.ru
hxxp://animaciyaonline.ru
hxxp://animaciyastiker.ru
hxxp://animationline.ru
hxxp://animehvost.ru
hxxp://anyen.ru
hxxp://anywifi.online
hxxp://apple-pro.moscow
hxxp://appliancerepairmonster.com
hxxp://aptechka.farm
hxxp://arbosfera.ru
hxxp://archsalut.ru
hxxp://arstd.ru
hxxp://aslanumarov.ru
hxxp://atlanted.ru
hxxp://aurispc.ru
hxxp://avangardmaster.ru
hxxp://aviacorp24.ru
hxxp://awpashko.com

Known to have phoned back to the same malicious C&C server (31.31.204.161) are also the following malicious MDSs:
MD5: c3754018dab05b3b8aac5fe8100076ce

Once executed the sample phones back to the following C&C server:
hxxp://info-get.ru - 31.31.204.161

Known to have phoned back to the same malicious C&C server (31.31.204.161) are also the following malicious MD5s:
MD5: 4ff9bd7a045b0fe42a8f633428a59732
MD5: 46b1eaae5b53668a7ac958aecf4e57c3
MD5: d643025c5d0a2a2940502f4b15ca1801
MD5: 75dce2d84540153107024576bfce08fc
MD5: a23235ed940a75f997c127f59b09011d

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog.

Malware Campaign Using Google Docs Intercepted, Thousands of Users Affected

April 26, 2016
We've recently intercepted, a malicious campaign, utilizing, Google Docs, for, the purpose, of spreading, malicious software, potentially, exposing, the confidentiality, integrity, and availability, of the, targeted hosts.

In this, post, we'll profile, the malicious campaign, expose, the malicious, infrastructure, behind, it, provide, MD5s, and, discuss, in depth, the, tactics, techniques, and procedures, of, the, cybercriminals, behind it.

Sample malicious URL:
hxxp://younglean.cba.pl/lean/ - 95.211.80.4

Sample malicious URL hosting locations:
hxxp://ecku.cba.pl/js/bin.exe
hxxp://mondeodoslubu.cba.pl/js/bin.exe
hxxp://piotrkochanski.cba.pl/js/bin.exe
hxxp://szczuczynsp.cba.pl/122/091.exe

Known to have responded to the same malicious (95.211.80.4) are also the following malicious domains:
hxxp://barbedosgroup.cba.pl
hxxp://brutalforce.pl
hxxp://christophar-hacker.pl
hxxp://moto-przestrzen.pl
hxxp://eturva.y0.pl
hxxp://lingirlie.com
hxxp://ogladajmecz.com.pl
hxxp://oriflamekonkurs2l16.c0.pl
hxxp://umeblowani.cba.pl
hxxp://webadminvalidation.cba.pl
hxxp://adamr.pl
hxxp://alea.cba.pl
hxxp://artbymachonis.cba.pl
hxxp://beqwqgdu.cba.pl
hxxp://bleachonline.pl
hxxp://facebook-profile-natalia9320.j.pl
hxxp://fllrev1978.cba.pl
hxxp://gotowesms.pl
hxxp://kbvdfuh.cba.pl
hxxp://maplka1977.c0.pl
hxxp://nagrobkiartek.pl
hxxp://nyzusbojpxnl.cba.pl
hxxp://okilh1973.cba.pl
hxxp://pucusej.cba.pl
hxxp://sajtom.pl
hxxp://tarnowiec.net.pl
hxxp://techtell.pl
hxxp://testujemypl.cba.pl
hxxp://lawendowawyspa.cba.pl
hxxp://younglean.cba.pl
hxxp://delegaturaszczecin.cba.pl
hxxp://metzmoerex.cba.pl
hxxp://kmpk.c0.pl
hxxp://500plus.c0.pl
hxxp://erxhxrrb1981.cba.pl
hxxp://exztwsl.cba.pl
hxxp://fafrvfa.cba.pl
hxxp://fastandfurios.cba.pl
hxxp://filmonline.cba.pl
hxxp://fragcraft.pl
hxxp://fryzjer.cba.pl
hxxp://hgedkom1973.cba.pl
hxxp://luyfiv1972.cba.pl
hxxp://oliviasekulska.com
hxxp://opziwr-zamosc.pl
hxxp://ostro.ga
hxxp://rodzina500plus.c0.pl
hxxp://roknasilowni.tk
hxxp://vfqqgr1971.cba.pl

Sample malicious MD5s known to have phoned back to the same malicious IP (95.211.80.4):
MD5: 495f05d7ebca1022da2cdd1700aeac39
MD5: 68abd8a3a8c18c59f638e50ab0c386a4
MD5: 65b4bdba2d3b3e92b8b96d7d9ba7f88e
MD5: 64b5c6b20e2d758a008812df99a5958e
MD5: a0869b751e4a0bf27685f2f8677f9c62

Once executed the sample phones back to the following C&C servers:
hxxp://smartoptionsinc.com - 216.70.228.110
hxxp://ppc.cba.pl - 95.211.80.4
hxxp://apps.identrust.com - 192.35.177.64
hxxp://cargol.cat - 217.149.7.213
hxxp://bikeceuta.com - 91.142.215.77

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog.

Analyzing the Bill Gates Botnet - An Analysis

April 24, 2016
We've, recently, intercepted, a high-profile, Linux-based, botnet-driven, type of, malicious, software, that's capable, of launching, a multitude of malicious attacks, on, compromised servers, potentially, exposing, the, integrity, confidentiality, and, availability, of, the compromised servers. Malicious attackers, often rely, on the use of compromised servers, for, the purpose, of, utilizing the access for malicious purposes, including, the capability, to launch malicious DDoS (Denial of Service Attack) attacks, and the ability, to spread additional malicious software, to potential users, including the capability to monetize access to the service, by, launching, DDoS for hire type of malicious and fraudulent services, including, the capability to launch high performance DDoS attacks.

In this post, we'll, profile, and analyze, the Bill Gates botnet, provide, actionable intelligence, on, the infrastructure, behind it, and, discuss, in depth, the tactics, techniques, and procedures, of the cybercriminals, behind it.

Malicious MD5s known to be part of the Bill Gates botnet:
MD5: 5d10bcb15bedb4b94092c4c2e4d245b6
MD5: 0d79802eeae43459ef0f6f809ef74ecc
MD5: 9a77f1ad125cf34858be5e438b3f0247
MD5: 9a77f1ad125cf34858be5e438b3f0247
MD5: a89c089b8d020034392536d66851b939
MD5: a5b9270a317c9ef0beda992183717b33

Known Bill Gates botnet C&C server:
hxxp://dgnfd564sdf.com - 122.224.34.42; 122.224.50.37

Malicious C&C servers known to be part of the Bill Gates botnet:
202.103.178.76
121.12.110.96
112.90.252.76
112.90.22.197
112.90.252.79

Known to have responded to the same malicious IP (122.224.50.37) are also the following malicious domains:
hxxp://lfs99.com
hxxp://chchong.com
hxxp://uc43.net
hxxp://59wgw.com
hxxp://frade8c.com
hxxp://96hb.com
hxxp://cq670.com
hxxp://776ka.com

Malicious MD5s known to have phoned back to the same C&C server IP (122.224.50.37):
MD5: 6739ca4a835c7976089e2f00150f252b
MD5: eb234cee4ff769f2b38129bc164809d2
MD5: dc893d16316489dffa4e8d86040189b2
MD5: 0c1cac2a019aa1cc2dcc0d3b17fc4477
MD5: b7765076af036583fc81a50bd0b2a663

Known to have responded to the same malicious IP (122.224.34.42) are also the following malicious domains:
hxxp://76.wawa11.com
hxxp://903.wawa11.com
hxxp://904.wawa11.com
hxxp://905.wawa11.com
hxxp://906.wawa11.com
hxxp://907.wawa11.com
hxxp://91ww.0574yu.com
hxxp://9911sf.com
hxxp://901.t772277.com
hxxp://aisf.jux114.com
hxxp://520.wawa11.com
hxxp://awooolsf.com
hxxp://2288game.com
hxxp://588bc.com
hxxp://488game.com
hxxp://588bc.com

Malicious MD5s known to have been downloaded from the same malicious C&C server IP (122.224.34.42):
MD5: 5d10bcb15bedb4b94092c4c2e4d245b6
MD5: 9a77f1ad125cf34858be5e438b3f0247

Malicious MD5s known to have been phoned back to the same malicious C&C server IP(122.224.34.42):
MD5: 815e453b6e268addf6a6763bfe013928

Once executed the sample phones back to the following malicious C&C server IPs:
hxxp://awooolsf.com/222.txt - 122.224.34.42
hxxp://xxx.com/download/xx.exe - 67.23.112.226

Known to have responded to the same malicious IP (67.23.112.226) are also the following malicious domains:
hxxp://falconglobalimpex.com
hxxp://deschatz-army.net
hxxp://m.xxx.com
hxxp://xxx.com
hxxp://xxxsites.com
hxxp://t.xxx.com
hxxp://m.xxx.org
hxxp://m.xxxsites.com
hxxp://xxx.org

Known to have been downloaded from the same malicious IP (67.23.112.226) are also the following malicious MD5s:
MD5: b4b483eb0d25fa3a9ec589eb11467ab8

Known to have phoned back to the same malicious C&C server (67.23.112.226) are also the following malicious MD5s:
MD5: 53a7fc24cb19463f8df3f4fe3ffd79b9
MD5: 268b8bcacec173eace3079db709b9c69
MD5: 0faf6988dfeaa98241c19fd834eca194
MD5: 87f8ffeb17a72fda7cf28745fa7a6be8
MD5: c973f818a5f9326c412ac9c4dfaeb0bd

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog.

Hundreds of Google Play Apps Compromised, Lead to Mobile Malware

April 24, 2016
Malicious attackers, have, managed, to, infiltrate, and populate, Google Play, with, hundreds, of rogue, applications, exposing, users, to mobile, malware, compromising, the, integrity, of, their, devices, and, exposing, them, to, misleading, advertisements. Once, a socially, engineered, user, obtains, the, application, and, execute, it, their, device, the malware, phones, back, to, a malicious URL, exposing, the, integrity, confidentiality, and, availability, of, the, device.

Malicious attackers, often, rely, on, a variety of social engineering tactics, to, obtain, access, to, a user's device, including, the use, of, compromised, publisher's accounts, obtained, through, data mining, of botnet's of infected, population. Once, access, to, a particular, publisher's account, is, obtained, the malicious attackers, would, attempt, to use, a do-it-yourself, type, of, mobile, malware, generating tool, for, the, purpose, of, modifying, a legitimate, application, for, the, purpose, of, obtaining, access, to, a user's device.

Malicious attackers, are, also, known, to rely, on secondary, marketplaces, for, the, purpose, of, attempting, to, obtain, access, to user's, device, with, the, secondary, marketplaces, populated, with, rogue, and compromised, applications.

Once, a, socially, engineered, user, obtains, an, application, their, device, automatically, becomes, part, of, a, malicious attacker's, botnet, with, the malicious, attackers, relying on, a multitude, of monetization techniques, while, earning, fraudulently, obtained, revenue, in, the, process. Malicious attackers, are, also, known, to, rely, on, rogue, and, fraudulent, affiliate networks, for, the, purpose, of, monetizing, access, to, the, obtained, hosts, through, a, variety, of, rogue, advertising, networks, largely, set, up, for, the, purpose, of, earning, fraudulent, revenue, for, the, malicious attackers.

These affiliate networks, are, known, to, provide, managed, support, including, the, systematic, rotation of the command and control, server, and, the, availability, of, various, templates, empowering, malicious attackers, with, access, to, a, variety, of, fraudulent techniques, allowing, them, to, easily, monetize, access, to, the, infected hosts.

In this post, we'll profile, profile, the, Android.Spy.277.origin, mobile, malware, found, on hundreds, of applications, at Google Play, expose, the, malicious, infrastructure, behind, it, provide, MD5s, and, discuss, in, depth, the, various tactics, techniques, and procedures, utilized, by, malicious, attackers, for, the purpose, of, spreading, mobile, malware, attempting, to, trick, users, into, executing, malicious software, on their, devices.

Sample detection rate for a sample malware:
MD5: a51d7f8413aa3857a4682fa631d39054

Once executed the sample phones back to the following C&C server:
hxxp://startappexchange.com - 184.26.136.91; 184.26.136.113

The same malicious C&C server (startappexchange.com) is also known to have responded to the following IPs:
23.15.5.200
23.63.227.171
95.101.2.24
23.62.239.19
96.6.122.67
23.15.5.205
23.62.236.98
61.213.181.153
23.63.227.208
23.63.227.192
23.3.13.65
96.6.122.74
23.3.13.58
23.62.236.74
184.50.232.74
184.84.243.57
217.7.48.104
217.7.48.192
80.157.151.48
80.157.151.67
67.135.105.35
23.61.194.186
88.221.134.192
88.221.134.211
23.0.160.8
95.101.0.24
95.101.0.50
2.21.243.57
2.21.243.64
23.0.160.51
184.29.105.43
173.223.232.66
184.29.105.83
96.16.98.113
107.14.46.80
62.208.24.33
217.65.36.6

Related malicious MD5s known to have phoned back to the same C&C server:
MD5: 53958d60a2d52c99ad305ec105d47486
MD5: 45eaa4fc36c9a69b3ac78ddce7800daa
MD5: b355ed6fa08ef0415d4e7c6bc602f9a8
MD5: e4c7d87b7b20ae9555c6efe6466b32e6
MD5: 83a449691ff40cf9d3c8c4d7119aaea7

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog.