We’ve decided to take a closer look at the U.S Elecetion 2016 interference provoked by several spear phishing and malicious campaigns courtesy of Russia for the purpose of offering and providing actionable threat intelligence including possible attribution clues for some of the known participants in this campaign potentially assisting fellow researchers and Law Enforcement on its way to track down and prosecute the cybercriminals behind these campaigns.
In this analysis we’ll take a closer look at the Internet connected infrastructure behind the U.S Election 2016 campaign in terms of malicious activity and offer practical and relevant including actionable threat intelligence on their whereabouts.
Sample malicious and fraudulent C&C domains known to have participated in the U.S Elections 2016 campaign:
linuxkrnl[.]net
accounts-qooqle[.]com
account-gooogle[.]com
accoounts-google[.]com
account-yahoo[.]com
accounts-googlc[.]com
accoutns-google[.]com
addmereger[.]com
akamainet[.]net
akamaivirusscan[.]com
apple-icloud-services[.]com
apple-notification[.]com
arabianbusinessreport[.]com
azamtelecom[.]com
babylonn[.]com
baengmail[.]com
boobleg[.]com
chinainternetservices[.]com
com-hdkurknfkjdnkrnngujdknhgfr[.]com
combin-banska-stiavnica[.]com
cvk-leaks[.]com
fb-security[.]com
g00qle[.]com
global-exchange[.]net
googlesetting[.]com
hlbnk[.]com
homesecuritysystems-sale[.]com
icloud-localisation[.]com
imperialc0nsult[.]com
informationen24[.]com
interglobalswiss[.]com
intra-asiarisk[.]com
invest-sro[.]com
iphone-onlineshopping[.]net
kur4[.]com
lastdmp[.]com
localisation-apple-icloud[.]com
localisation-apple-support[.]com
localisation-mail[.]com
login-163[.]com
login-kundenservice[.]com
magic-exchange[.]com
mail-apple-icloud[.]com
mailpho[.]com
malprosoft[.]com
medicalalertgroup[.]com
megafileuploader[.]com
mfadaily[.]com
mfapress[.]com
militaryexponews[.]com
msoftonline[.]com
myaccountgoogle[.]com
myaccountsgoogle[.]com
mydomainlookup[.]net
mypmpcert[.]com
net-a-porter-coupon[.]com
newiphone-online[.]net
newiphone-supply[.]net
newreviewgames[.]com
nobel-labs[.]net
nvidiaupdate[.]com
obamacarerx[.]net
onlinecsportal[.]com
pass-google[.]com
password-google[.]com
paydaytoday-uk[.]com
pb-forum[.]com
planetaryprogeneration[.]com
regionoline[.]com
security-notifications[.]com
service-facebook[.]com
servicesupdates[.]com
set121[.]com
set132[.]com
set133[.]com
sicherheitsteam-pp[.]com
sicherheitsteam-pp[.]net
skypeupdate[.]com
smp-cz[.]com
soft-storage[.]com
solutionmanualtestbank[.]com
ssl-icloud[.]com
team-google[.]com
techlicenses[.]com
techlicenses[.]net
ua-freedom[.]com
updates-verify[.]com
us-mg7mail-transferservice[.]com
us-westmail-undeliversystem[.]com
us6-yahoo[.]com
vatlcan[.]com
wordpressjointventure[.]com
ya-support[.]com
yandex-site[.]com
yepost[.]com
Related malicious and fraudulent emails known to have participated in the U[.]S Elections 2016 campaign:
julienobruno@hotmail[.]com
jenna[.]stehr@mail[.]com
s[.]simonis@mail[.]com
domreg@247livesupport[.]biz
kumarhpt@yahoo[.]com
aksnes[.]thomas@yahoo[.]com
yingw90@yahoo[.]com
andre_roy@mail[.]com
myprimaryreger@gmail[.]com
okorsukov@yahoo[.]com
tzubtfpx5@mail[.]ru
annaablony@mail[.]com
jamesyip823@gmail[.]com
tmazaker@gmail[.]com
emmer[.]brown@mail[.]com
qupton@mail[.]com
adel[.]rice@mail[.]com
trainerkart2@gmail[.]com
cowrob@mail[.]com
direct2playstore@gmail[.]com
cffaccll@mail[.]com
drgtradingllc@gmail[.]com
jack2020@outlook[.]com
pdkt00@Safe-mail[.]net
david_thompson62@aol[.]com
distardrupp@gmail[.]com
perplencorp@gmail[.]com
spammer11@superrito[.]com
jilberaner@yahoo[.]de
snowyowl@jpnsec[.]com
asainchuk@gmail[.]com
OKEKECHIDIC@GMAIL[.]COM
abelinmarcel@outlook[.]fr
idesk[.]corp[.]apple[.]com@gmail[.]com
mutantcode@outlook[.]fr
pier@pipimerah[.]com
vrickson@mail[.]com
prabhakar_malreddy@yahoo[.]com
Sample related email known to have participated in the U[.]S Elections 2016 campaign:
jack2020@outlook[.]com
Sample Maltego Graph of a sample malicious and fraudulent domain registrant known to have participated in the U.S Election 2016 campaign:
Sample related domains known to have participated in the U.S Elections 2016 campaign:
support-forum[.]org
oceaninformation[.]org
vodafoneupdate[.]org
succourtion[.]org
eascd[.]org
northropgruman[.]org
apple-iphone-services[.]com
localisation-security-icloud[.]com
applesecurity-supporticloud[.]com
icloud-iphone-services[.]com
icloud-id-localisation[.]com
apple-localisation-id[.]com
identification-icloud-id[.]com
cloud-id-localisation[.]com
support-security-icloud[.]com
identification-apple-id[.]com
localisation-apple-security[.]com
security-icloud-localisation[.]com
dabocom[.]com
quick-exchange[.]com
hygani[.]com
hztx88[.]com
sddqgs[.]net
qufu001[.]com
lutushiqi[.]com
gsctgs[.]com
tazehong[.]com
hthgj[.]com
kvistberga[.]com
bjytj[.]net
cqhuicang[.]com
softbank-tech[.]com
osce-press[.]org
maxidea[.]tw
sdti[.]tw
gmailcom[.]tw
zex[.]tw
gain-paris-notaire[.]fr
loto-fdj[.]fr
client-amzon[.]fr
idse-orange[.]fr
rgraduzkfghgd[.]com
jmhgjqtmhanoncp[.]com
stwdchstclovuzk[.]com
puxqtyrwzuzybgzehc[.]com
maatil[.]com[.]ng
surestbookings[.]com
asatuyouth[.]org[.]ng
hanna[.]ng
hostlink[.]com[.]ng
sirbenlimited[.]com
dce[.]edu[.]ng
eventsms[.]com[.]ng
krsbczmxwdsjwtizmx[.]com
alizirwzyjazurof[.]com
zslipanehule[.]com
cxotonspmjkxw[.]com
wpifmhyjkxyt[.]com
ngvsngpwdidmn[.]com
imperialvillas[.]com[.]ng
lipyhgpofsnifste[.]com
flexceeweb[.]com
fgfcpkdcnebgduls[.]com
shinjiru[.]us
supportchannel[.]net
couponofferte[.]com
psepaperindustrial[.]com
lakws[.]com
perplencorp[.]com
lbchemtrade[.]com
viaggibelli[.]com
liontitco[.]com
svendiamo[.]com
orogenicgroup[.]com
giudeviaggio[.]com
greenskill[.]net
siteseditor[.]net
e-mail-supports[.]com
biplen[.]com
infradesajohor[.]com
dealhot[.]net
suanmin[.]com
on9on9[.]com
accoutns-google[.]com
puroniq[.]com
sinqa[.]com
sadihadi[.]com
mrangkang[.]com
terumbu[.]com
phygitail[.]com
veraniq[.]com
potxr[.]com
icraw[.]com
thearoid[.]com
teempo[.]com
parblue[.]com
mydomainlookup[.]net
adrianvonziegler[.]net
zetindustries[.]com
researchs[.]com[.]ng
joymoontech[.]com
researchmaterials[.]com[.]ng
james823[.]com
oneibeauty[.]net
We’ll continue monitoring the campaign and post updates as soon as new developments take place.
Stay tuned!
Continue reading →Exposing Aleksandr Zhukov from the Media Methane Rogue Fraudulent and Malicious Advertising Enterprise - An OSINT Analysis
0Russia's SVR Launches "SecureDrop" Similar National Security Threats Soliciting Web Site on the Dark Web - An Analysis
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-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Dear blog readers,
Remember the DVD of the Weekend blog post series? I've decided to resume posting high-quality YouTube video and movies worth watching with the idea to continue the series. In this post I've decided to share the Red Joan movie trailer which is a high-profile espionage movie which you should definitely consider watching.
Stay tuned!
Continue reading →In this post I'll provide actionable intelligence on the infrastructure used by the "Jabber ZeuS" gang including personally identifiable information for Evgeniy Mikhaylovich Bogachev and some of his known associates.
Sample Personal Photos of Evgeniy Mikhaylovich Bogachev:
Slavik's IM and personal email including responding IP:
bashorg@talking.cc - 112.175.50.220
Personal Address:
Lermontova Str. Anapa, Russian Federation
Instant Messaging account:
lucky12345@jabber.cz
Related name servers:
ns.humboldtec.cz - 88.86.102.49
ns2.humboldtec.cz - 188.165.248.173
Related domains part of a C&C phone-back location:
hxxp://slaviki-res1.com
hxxp://slavik1.com - 91.213.72.115
hxxp://slavik2.com
hxxp://slavik3.com
Slavik's primary email:
luckycats2008@yahoo.com
Slavik's ICQ numbers:
ICQ - 42729771
ICQ - 312456
Related emails known to have participated in the campaign:
alexgarbar-chuck@yahoo.com
bollinger.evgeniy@yandex.ru
charajiang16@gmail.com
Related domains known to have participated in the campaign:
hxxp://visitcoastweekend.com - 103.224.182.253; 70.32.1.32; 192.184.12.62; 141.8.224.93; 69.43.160.163
hxxp://incomeet.com - 192.186.226.71; 66.199.248.195
hxxp://work.businessclub.so
Related information on his colleague (chingiz) as seen in the attached screenshot:
Real Name: Galdziev Chingiz
Related domains known to have participated in the campaign:
hxxp://fizot.org
hxxp://fizot.com - 50.63.202.35; 184.168.221.33
hxxp://poymi.ru - 109.206.190.54
Related name servers known to have participated in the campaign:
ns1.fizot.com - 35.186.238.101
ns2.fizot.com
Related domain including an associated email using the same name server:
hxxp://averfame.org - harold@avereanoia.org
Google Analytics ID: UA-3816538
Related domains known to have participated in the campaign:
hxxp://awmproxy.com
hxxp://pornxplayer.com
Related emails known to have participated in the campaign:
fizot@mail.ru
xtexgroup@gmail.com
xtexcounter@bk.ru
Related domains known to have responded to the same malicious and fraudulent IP - 178.162.188.28:
hxxp://dnevnik.cc
hxxp://xvpn.ru
hxxp://xsave.ru
hxxp://anyget.ru
hxxp://nezayti.ru
hxxp://proproxy.ru
hxxp://hitmovies.ru
hxxp://appfriends.ru
hxxp://naraboteya.ru
hxxp://naraboteya.ru
hxxp://awmproxy.com
hxxp://zzyoutube.com
hxxp://pornxplayer.com
hxxp://awmproxy.net
hxxp://checkerproxy.net
Related domains known to have participated in the campaign:
hxxp://fizot.livejournal.com/
hxxp://russiaru.net/fizot/
Instant Messaging Account:
ICQ - 795781
Related personally identifiable information of Galdziev Chingiz:
hxxp://phpnow.ru
ICQ - 434929
Email: info@phpnow.ru
Related domains known to have participated in the campaign:
hxxp://filmv.net
hxxp://finance-customer.com
hxxp://firelinesecrets.com
hxxp://fllmphpxpwqeyhj.net
hxxp://flsunstate333.com
Related individuals known to have participated in the campaign:
Slavik, Monstr, IOO, Nu11, nvidiag, zebra7753, lexa_Mef, gss, iceIX, Harderman, Gribodemon, Aqua, aquaSecond, it, percent, cp01, hct, xman, Pepsi, miami, miamibc, petr0vich, Mr. ICQ, Tank, tankist, Kusunagi, Noname, Lucky, Bashorg, Indep, Mask, Enx, Benny, Bentley, Denis Lubimov, MaDaGaSka, Vkontake, rfcid, parik, reronic, Daniel, bx1, Daniel Hamza, Danielbx1, jah, Jonni, jtk, Veggi Roma, D frank, duo, Admin2010, h4x0rdz, Donsft, mary.J555, susanneon, kainehabe, virus_e_2003, spaishp, sere.bro, muddem, mechan1zm, vlad.dimitrov, jheto2002, sector.exploits
Related Instant Messaging accounts and emails known to have participated in the campaign:
iceix@secure-jabber.biz
shwark.power.andrew@gmail.com
johnlecun@gmail.com
gribodemon@pochta.ru,
glazgo-update-notifier@gajim.org
gribo-demon@jabber.ru
aqua@incomeet.com
miami@jabbluisa.com
um@jabbim.com
hof@headcounter.org
theklutch@gmail.com
niko@grad.com
Johnny@guru.bearin.donetsk.au
petr0vich@incomeet.com
mricq@incomeet.com
T4ank@ua.fm
tank@incomeet.com
getreadysafebox.ru
john.mikleymaiI.com
aIexeysafinyahoo.corn
rnoscow.berlin@yahoo.com
cruelintention@email.ru,
bind@ernail.ru
firstmen17@rarnbler.ru
benny@jabber.cz
airlord1988@gmail.com
bxl@hotmail.com
i_amhere@hotmail.fr
daniel.h.b@universityofsutton.com
princedelune@hotmail.fr
bxl_@msn.com
danibxl@hotmail.fr
danieldelcore@hotmail.com.
d.frank@jabber.jp
d.frank@0nl1ne.at
duo@jabber.cn
fering99@yahoo.com
secustar@mail.ru
h4x0rdz@hotmail.com
Donsft@hotmail.com
mary.j555@hotmail.com
susanneon@googlemail.com
kainehabe@hotmail.com
virus_e_2003@hotmail.com
spanishp@hotmail.com
sere.bro@hotmail.com
lostbuffer@hotmail.com
lostbuffer@gmail.com
vlad.dimitrov@hotmail.com
jheto2002@gmail.com
sector.exploits@gmail.com
We'll post new updates as soon as new developments take place.
Related posts:
Exposing Iran's Most Wanted Cybercriminals - FBI Most Wanted Checklist - OSINT Analysis
Who's Behind the Syrian Electronic Army? - An OSINT Analysis Continue reading →
Appreciate my rhetoric. In this post I'll provide actionable intelligence on a key DDoS for hire service that was primarily used in the Russia vs Georgia Cyber Attacks circa 2009 including the DDoS attack against Bobbear.co.uk.Related actionable intelligence on the campaign:
hxxp://setx.in - Email: info@antiddos.eu - setx.mail@gmail.com - hxxp://httpdoc.info - hxxp://fakamaza.info. The last one with the email address "team@russia-vs-georgia.org" in the WHOIS info.
Related malicious URLs known to have participated in the campaign:
hxxp://cxim.inattack.ru/www7/www/auth.php
Related malicious URLs known to have participated in the campaign:
hxxp://h278666y.net/main/load.exe
hxxp://h278666y.net/www/auth.php
Related malicious MD5s known to have participated in the campaign:
MD5: 34413180d372a9e66d0d59baf0244b8f
MD5: 42e4bbd47d322ec563c86c636c3f10b9
MD5: ed36b42fac65236a868e707ee540c015
MD5: c9fa1c95ab4ec1c1d46abe5445fb41e4
hxxp://cxim.inattack.ru/www3/www/
hxxp://i.clusteron.ru/bstatus.php
Related malicious URLs known to have participated in the campaign:
hxxp://svdrom.cn
Related malicious URLs known to have participated in the campaign:
hxxp://203.117.111.52/www7/www/getcfg.php
Related malicious domains known to have participated in the campaign:
hxxp://cxim.inattack.ru/www2/www/stat.php
hxxp://cxim.inattack.ru/www3/www/stat.php
hxxp://cxim.inattack.ru/www4/www/stat.php
hxxp://cxim.inattack.ru/www5/www/stat.php
hxxp://cxim.inattack.ru/www6/www/stat.php
hxxp://finito.fi.funpic.org/black/stat.php
hxxp://logartos.org/forum/stat.php - 195.24.78.242
hxxp://weberror.cn/be1/stat.php
hxxp://prosto.pizdos.net/_lol/stat.php
hxxp://h278666y.net/www/stat.php - 72.233.60.254 Continue reading →
Historical OSINT - A Peek Inside The Georgia Government's Web Site Compromise Malware Serving Campaign - 2010
How come? In this post I'll provide actionable intelligence on what appears to be a currently active Brazilian supporter of the Cyber Attacks that took place circa 2009 with the idea to discuss in-depth the tools and motivation for launching the campaign of the cybercriminals behind it.
Sample malicious URL known to have participated in the campaign:
hxxp://geocities.ws/thezart/
It's 2010 and I'm coming across to a malicious and fraudulent file repository that can be best described as a key actor that managed to participate perhaps even orchestrate the Russia vs Georgia cyber attacks circa 2009. Who is this individual? How did he manage to contribute to the Russian vs Georgia cyber attacks? Did he rely on active outsourcing or was he hired to perform the orchestrated DDoS for hire attacks that took place back then? Keep reading.
It appears that a Brazilian user known as The Zart managed to participated in the Russia vs Georgia cyber attacks circa 2009 relying on a variety of tools and techniques known as:
- DNS Amplification Attacks
- Web Site Defacement Tools
- Targeted Spreading of Vulnerable Legitimate Web Sites
- Automated Web-Site Exploitation - Long Tail of The Malicious Web
which basically resulted in a self-mobilized militia that actually participated and launched the Russia vs Georgia cyber attacks circa 2009.
Related posts:
The Russia vs Georgia Cyber Attack
Who's Behind the Georgia Cyber Attacks?
DDoS Attack Graphs from Russia vs Georgia's Cyberattacks
Real-Time OSINT vs Historical OSINT in Russia/Georgia Cyberattacks Continue reading →
The Russia vs Georgia Cyber Attack
"Who’s behind it? The infamous Russian Business Network, or literally every Russian supporting Russia’s actions? How coordinated and planned the cyber attack is, and do we actually have a relatively decent example of cyber warfare combining PSYOPs (psychological operations), and self-mobilization of the local Internet users by spreading “For our motherland, brothers!” or “Your country is calling you!” hacktivist messages across web forums. Let’s find out, in-depth. With the attacks originally starting to take place several weeks before the actual “intervention” with Georgia President’s web site coming under DDoS attack from Russian hackers in July, followed by active discussions across the Russian web on whether or not DDoS attacks and web site defacements should in fact be taking place, which would inevitably come as a handy tool to be used against Russian from Western or Pro-Western journalists, the peak of DDoS attack and the actual defacements started taking place as of Friday."
Some of the tactics used :
distributing a static list of targets, eliminate centralized coordination of the attack, engaging the average internet users, empower them with DoS tools; distributing lists of remotely SQL injectable Georgian sites; abusing public lists of email addresses of Georgian politicians for spamming and targeted attacks; destroy the adversary’s ability to communicate using the usual channels -- Georgia's most popular hacking portal is under DDoS attack from Russian hackers.
Some of the parked domains acting as command and control servers for one of the botnets at 79.135.167.22 :
yandexshit .com
ad.yandexshit .com
a-nahui-vse-zaebalo-v-pizdu .com
killgay .com
ns1.guagaga .net
ns2.guagaga .net
ohueli .net
pizdos .net
googlecomaolcomyahoocomaboutcom.net
Actual command and control locations :
a-nahui-vse-zaebalo-v-pizdu .com/a/nahui/vse/zaebalo/v/pizdu/
prosto.pizdos .net/_lol/
Consider going through the complete coverage of what's been happening during the weeked. Considering the combination of tactics used, unless the conflict gets solved, more attacks will definitely take place during the week. Continue reading →
Who's Who in Cyber Warfare?
China
"Beijing’s intelligence services continue to collect science and technology information to support the government’s goals, while Chinese industry gives priority to domestically manufactured products to meet its technology needs. The PLA maintains close ties with its Russian counterpart, but there is significant evidence that Beijing seeks to develop its own unique model for waging cyber warfare."
Iran
"The armed forces and technical universities have joined in an effort to create independent cyber R & D centers and train personnel in IT skills; and second, Tehran actively seeks to buy IT and military related technical assistance and training from both Russia and India."
Russia
"Russia’s armed forces, collaborating with experts in the IT sector and academic community, have developed a robust cyber warfare doctrine. The authors of Russia’s cyber warfare doctrine have disclosed discussions and debates concerning Moscow’s official policy. “Information weaponry,” i.e., weapons based on programming code, receives paramount attention in official cyber warfare doctrine."
Technology as the next Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) was inevitable development, what's important to keep in mind is knowing who's up to what, what are the foundations of their military thinking, as well as who's copying attitude from who. Having the capacity to wage offensive and defense cyber warfare is getting more important, still, military thinkers of certain countries find network centric warfare or total renovation of C4I communications as the panacea when dealing with their about to get scraped conventional weaponry systems. Convergence represents countless opportunities for waging Cyber Warfare, offensive one as well, as I doubt there isn't a country working on defensive projects.
In a previous post Techno-Imperialism and the Effect of Cyberterrorism I also provided detailed overview of the concept and lots of real-life scenarios related to Cyberterrorism, an extension of Cyber warfare capabilities. It shouldn't come as a surprise to you, that a nation's military and intelligence personnel have, or seek to gain access to 0day security vulnerabilities, the currency of trade in today's E-society as well as recruiting local "renegades".
Undermining a nation's confidence in its own abilities, the public's perception of inevitable failure, sophisticated PSYOPS, "excluded middle" propaganda, it all comes down to who's a step ahead of the event by either predicting or intercepting its future occurrence. Information is not power, it's noise turning into Knowledge, one that becomes power -- if and when exercised. Continue reading →
Travel Without Moving - Typhoon Class Submarines
Moreover, I'm also actively covering various emerging Space Warfare issues, and with the recent speculation that the Okno ELINT complex in Tajikistan is becoming Russian and different "schools of thought", there's a lot to come for sure. Google Maps/Earth did not only restart the real estate industry, it made the world a smaller place, a more competitive one, and hopefully a safer one if security counts here.
As of today, I decided to start posting a weekly section, the "Travel Without Moving" series, presenting interesting and publicly obtained imagery of sights that somehow made me an impression. The other day I came across to a (perhaps scraped by now) Typhoon Class Submarines at GoogleSightseeing.com -- the largest and quietest types of submarines.
That's perhaps the perfect moment to mention the cool pictures of a Soviet Underground Submarine Base in the Nuclear Submarine Base that "Until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 Balaklava was one of the most secret towns in Russia. 10km south eas of Sevastopol on the Black Sea Coast, this small town was the home to a Nuclear Submarine Base." Take a tour for yourself! Continue reading →
Why's that radar screen not blinking over there?
"Russian military planes flew undetected through the U.S. zone of the Arctic Ocean to Canada during recent military exercises, a senior Air Force commander said Saturday. The commander of the country's long-range strategic bombers, Lieutenant General Igor Khvorov, said the U.S. Air Force is now investigating why its military was unable to detect the Russian bombers. They were unable to detect the planes either with radars or visually," he said."
SpaceWar.com, and several other sites/agencies also picked up the story, still its truthfulness, excluding the lack of coverage, can always be questioned, as "by the end of the year, two more Tu-160s will be commissioned for the long-range strategic bomber fleet, Khorov said." So, while I agree with him on the visual confirmation issue, such an achievement is hell of an incentive for commissioning more planes, isn't it? Moreover, should the what used to be, the world's largest radar - The Over-The-Horizon Backscatter Radar have been scrapped given Iran's (and not only) nuclear ambitions, or the ongoing space warfare doctrine would be the logical successor in here?
Let's for instance assume it actually happened, and take the reverse approach -- it actually happened in Russia too, back in 1987, and it wasn't a senior air force commander that did it, if he did, but 19 years old Mathias Rust who landed on the Red Square itself.
More details will follow for sure, so stay tuned, meanwhile take a look at Google Earth's Community spot link on Mathias's landing.
UPDATE
Nice article on the topic, and a great quote as well "Scanning containers full of sneakers for a 'nuke in a box' is not a really thoughtful thing."
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Military, Radar, Bomber Continue reading →























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