The Cost of Anonymizing a Cybercriminal's Internet Activities - Part Four

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August 23, 2013
Continuing the "The Cost of Anonymizing a Cybercriminal's Internet Activities" series, in this post, I'll profile an API-supporting, blackhat SEO-friendly vendor of anonymization services, which is currently offering hundreds of thousands of compromised SSH accounts, HTTP/HTTPs based (compromised) proxies, and the ubiqutous for the cybercrime ecosystem, Socks 4/5 servers.

Catch up with related research on the topic:
The service is currently offering access to 180,331 compromised SSH accounts, 9597 HTTP/HTTPS proxies, and 110,185 (compromised) Socks servers located virtually all over the World.

How are they gaining access to this accounting data in the first place? Despite the overall availability of brute-forcing tools, in 2013, one of the most popular tactic for obtaining stolen/compromised accounting data, remains the practice of 'data mining' a botnet's already infected 'population' for virtually anything kind of accounting data, to be later on monetized through multiple distribution/abuse channels.

Sample screenshots of the anonymization service:




Sample screenshots of the API in action:




What's also worth emphasizing on is the fact, that, the service is not just targeting potential cybercriminals wanting to anonymize their Internet activities, but also, black hat SEO monetizers, who now have access to hundreds of thousands of fresh Socks servers for the purpose of abusing them on their way to monetize their fraudulent/malicious campaigns.

Vertical market integration, or the one-stop-shop market model, has always been an inseparable part of the cybercrime ecosystem, as it increases the probability that a cybercriminal's one-stop-shop would immediately occupy a larger market share within the cybercrime ecosystem, consequently resulting in more revenue from the facilitation of fraudulent and malicious activity.

Some of the most popular instances of this trendy business concept applied by cybercriminals internationally, include but are not limited to the following real-life underground market propositions:
  • A vendor of mobile spamming services would not only offer the actual spamming process, but also, offer harvested mobile mobile numbers as a value-added service, next to the on demand harvesting of mobile numbers for any given geographical region.
  • A vendor of managed spam services, would also offer the option to buy segmented and geolocated, as well as often validated, email addresses, with the ability to perform custom harvesting for any given country
  • A vendor of managed iFraming platform would also offer access to hijacked traffic to be automatically converted to malware-infected hosts through the platform, with additional services including as for instance, managed crypting of the iFrame/malicious script in real-time
  • An author of Web malware exploitation kit, would be also offering managed iFrame/script crypting services next to bulletproof hosting in case the customer desires those
The cost of anonymizing a cybercriminal's Internet activities in this particular case? The price is shaped based on the anonymization method of choice.

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter. Continue reading →

Vendor of Scanned Fake IDs, Credit Cards and Utility Bills Targets the French Market Segment

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August 22, 2013
Continuing the series of blog posts detailing the very latest efficiency/quality/scalability/universal business concepts oriented underground market propositions for fake IDs, credit cards and utility bills, in this post I'll discuss an example of market segmentation in terms of supplying them, through an ad targeting potential cybercriminals based in France, or international cybercriminals wanting to enter the French market.

Catch up with previous research on the topic:
What's so special about this underground market proposition, anyway? It's the market segmentation taking place through the eyes of the vendor, as well as the diversity of scanned .PSD Photoshop templates, the non-modifiable scanned documents, and the actual availability of physical fake IDs, all of them exclusively targeting the French market segment.

Sample screenshot of the advertisement:
There are several types of vendors contributing to the currently mature state of the market for fake IDs/documents, or to the cybercrime ecosystem in general. Let's discuss the most popular types of market players.

Among the rarest type of such vendors is the experienced one who tends not to advertise at public or commercially accessible cybercrime-friendly communities. Although it would seem fairly logical to assume that the applied OPSEC (Operational Security) would be directly proportional with the decrease in processed orders since it would limit the visibility of his services within the cybercrime ecosystem, that's not necessarily the case when quality, experience, sophisticated, and, of course, high profit margins based on perceived value come into play. In between the lack of mass advertisements, the vendor would also not list his contact details, and would only do business with cybercriminals with proven reputation within not just the community in question, but also, across the entire ecosystem.

Next are those vendors who'd sacrifice OPSEC, for the sake of reaching as many customers as possible in an attempt to monetize this market 'touch point' with other prospective cybercriminals. They advertise on public and on commercially accessible cybercrime-friendly communities, usually have a decent reputation, with generally positive feedback from their customers, and of course, never fail to 'deliver' what they pitch.

There's yet another type of such vendors, worth discussing. It's those who 'populate' a newly launched community with their propositions, and most often target novice cybercriminals with zero understanding of cybercrime ecosystem reputation dynamics, who are still looking to purchase this desired, but largely commoditized underground market good.

With more vendors of fake IDs/documents popping up across the entire ecosystem, the series of blog posts profiling their activities, are prone to expand.

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter. Continue reading →

Vendor of Scanned Fake IDs, Credit Cards and Utility Bills Targets the French Market Segment

August 22, 2013
Continuing the series of blog posts detailing the very latest efficiency/quality/scalability/universal business concepts oriented underground market propositions for fake IDs, credit cards and utility bills, in this post I'll discuss an example of market segmentation in terms of supplying them, through an ad targeting potential cybercriminals based in France, or international cybercriminals wanting to enter the French market.

Catch up with previous research on the topic:
What's so special about this underground market proposition, anyway? It's the market segmentation taking place through the eyes of the vendor, as well as the diversity of scanned .PSD Photoshop templates, the non-modifiable scanned documents, and the actual availability of physical fake IDs, all of them exclusively targeting the French market segment.

Sample screenshot of the advertisement:
There are several types of vendors contributing to the currently mature state of the market for fake IDs/documents, or to the cybercrime ecosystem in general. Let's discuss the most popular types of market players.

Among the rarest type of such vendors is the experienced one who tends not to advertise at public or commercially accessible cybercrime-friendly communities. Although it would seem fairly logical to assume that the applied OPSEC (Operational Security) would be directly proportional with the decrease in processed orders since it would limit the visibility of his services within the cybercrime ecosystem, that's not necessarily the case when quality, experience, sophisticated, and, of course, high profit margins based on perceived value come into play. In between the lack of mass advertisements, the vendor would also not list his contact details, and would only do business with cybercriminals with proven reputation within not just the community in question, but also, across the entire ecosystem.

Next are those vendors who'd sacrifice OPSEC, for the sake of reaching as many customers as possible in an attempt to monetize this market 'touch point' with other prospective cybercriminals. They advertise on public and on commercially accessible cybercrime-friendly communities, usually have a decent reputation, with generally positive feedback from their customers, and of course, never fail to 'deliver' what they pitch.

There's yet another type of such vendors, worth discussing. It's those who 'populate' a newly launched community with their propositions, and most often target novice cybercriminals with zero understanding of cybercrime ecosystem reputation dynamics, who are still looking to purchase this desired, but largely commoditized underground market good.

With more vendors of fake IDs/documents popping up across the entire ecosystem, the series of blog posts profiling their activities, are prone to expand. Continue reading →

The Cost of Anonymizing a Cybercriminal's Internet Activities - Part Three

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August 21, 2013
Over the years, I've been persistently highlighting the abuse of compromised hosts as either 'stepping stones', or as the primary facilitators for 'island hopping' campaigns, empowering those using them with the necessary non-attributable 'know-how' to not just anonymize their Internet activities, but also, engineer cyber warfare tensions.

The utilization of hacked/compromised hosts/PCs as 'island hopping' points, or as 'stepping stones', continues to take place in 2013, with more managed cybercrime-friendly services offering access to compromised hosts located virtually all over the World, access to which can be bought in a cost-effective manner, thanks to the available discounts or price discrimination schemes.

Catch up with previous research on the topic:
What has changed over the years? Is the once thought the be the future of anonymization for cybercrime-friendly activities, 'proxy chaining' -- think chaining of connections between multiple malware-infected hosts -- still relevant today? Or was the concept largely replaced by log and data retention free cybercrime-friendly VPN providers, that continue popping up on everyone's radar?

Since 2010, a HTTPS-supporting, DIY multiple gates application (proxy which can be a Socks 4/Socks 5 compromised host given it has been properly configured for the purpose) managing, Man-in-the-Middle "attack" performing -- in order to randomize for anonymization purposes -- cookie/headers modifying of the requests performed through the "chaining" of compromised hosts/servers, has been commercially available for cybercriminals to take advantage of.

Let's take a close look at this state of the art gate/proxy chaining cybercrime-friendly application.

Sample screenshots of the application's interface:





The application's author is also known to have been released custom builds for various cybercrime-friendly forums:

Some of its core features include:
[+] HTTPS support for php-gates, needs OpenSSL
[+] Ability to set a password on the gate.
[+] Ability to work with a gate, through any procs (HTTP (S), SOCKS4, SOCKS5).
[+] Working with gated exclusively via the method GET, which provides protection from detection by the log files on the server.
[+] Ability to set Cookies, transferred during handling to the gate. This is useful for hiding the code in the files of the site gate. Format: "cookie = value; cookie2 = ;"
[+] Processing of each compound is in a separate stream.
[+] Ability to unlimited downloads and uploads of large files (in case of inability to bypass restrictions set_time_limit () can download files in a few times, provided support to resume from the target server).
[+] Preprocessing mechanism optimizes queries under HTTP 1.0.
[+] The presence of an encryption key must be specified (purely symbolic encryption to hide traffic from prying eyes), and all data, including the password for the gate are transmitted in encrypted form. Enable / disable the encryption does not require editing the code gate.
[+] Ability to work with several gates. In this case, each assigned a specific gated User-Agent (assigned by chance) that does not allow the target site to link together the requests from different gates.
[+] Ability to add a request to the target site header X-Forwarded-For, X-Real-Ip and Via with random IP-addresses (in this case, sites that use mechanisms for determining the visitor's IP address on these titles or used mod_realip, will benefit from logging bogus addresses, as these headlines mislead the site administrator).
[+] Ability to select the interface to listen to.
[+] More statistics on network connections, there are different levels of profiling queries (and no logs are written to the file).
[+] Support chains gates.
[+]-Chain of 3 modes:
- Direct sequence (traffic passes through a series of gates that you clearly stated)
- Random chain (each request is passed through a randomly builds a chain of gates)
- Casual chain with specific output gate time (similar to the previous mode, except that the final gate remains constant.
[+] Ability to speed up surfing through the chain by local caching IP-addresses.
[+] Support for HTTPS gates are not independent of their number.
[+] Using a cascade encryption - the ability to use any number of gates with different encryption keys.
[+] Built-checker gates.
[+] You can check all the gates at once, or each gate individually when adding / editing.
[+] Built-in gates.
[+] Ability to insert code in the gate pre-generated table of permutations. This eliminates the need to store the encryption key directly to the Gate, and generate a table for each access to the gate.
[+] Automate the process of creating a masked gate with Cookies
[+] Ability to delete from the code perevodoa lines and tabs.
[+] Ability to set proivolnyh request headers.
[+] Ability to define hosts, which will be sent to a specific heading.
[+] Ability to temporarily activate / deactivate a specific heading.

[+] Gain Control key to 2048 bits (256 bytes) using md5
[+] Complete independence from each other bytes (including the order of the bytes and encrypted block length).
[+] The variable number of rounds of permutations, depending on the key.
[+] Partly salt as XOR'a-byte hash key.


With the ease of assessing a malware-infected host's bandwidth thanks to the overall availability of such an option among the most popular managed services offering access to such hosts, it shouldn't be surprising to consider that a potential cybercriminal using this application, would be in a perfect position to create -- in a DIY fashion -- a stable anonymous network, to further assist him on his way to achieve his fraudulent or purely malicious objectives.

The bottom line? What's the cost of anonymizing a cybercriminal's Internet activities? 1,900 rubles or $57.53 for the application, in this particular case.

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter. Continue reading →

Spamvertised 'Confirmed Facebook Friend Request' Themed Emails Serve Client-Side Exploits

August 15, 2013
A currently circulating malicious spam campaign, entices users into thinking that they've received a legitimate 'Friend Confirmation Request' on Facebook. In reality thought, the campaign attempts to exploit client-side vulnerabilities, CVE-2010-0188 in particular.

Client-side exploits serving URL:
hxxp://facebook.com.n.find-friends.lindoliveryct.net:80/news/facebook-onetime.php?dpheelxa=1l:30:1l:1g:1j&pkvby=h&rzuhhh=1h:33:1o:2v:32:1o:2v:1o:1j:1m&ycxlcvr=1f:1d:1f:1d:1f:1d:1f

Detection rate for the malicious PDF: MD5: 39326c9a2572078c379eb6494dc326ab - detected by 3 out of 45 antivirus scanners as PDF/Blacole-FAA!39326C9A2572; Exploit:Win32/CVE-2010-0188; Exploit.Script.Pdfka.btvxj

Domain name reconnaissance:
facebook.com.n.find-friends.lindoliveryct.net - 66.230.163.86; 95.111.32.249; 188.134.26.172 - Email: zsupercats@yahoo.com

Responding to the same IPs (66.230.163.86; 95.111.32.249; 188.134.26.172) are also the followig malicious domains:
actiry.com - Email: stritton@actiry.com
askfox.net - Emai: bovy@askfox.net
bnamecorni.com
briltox.com - Email: lyosha@briltox.com
condalinneuwu37.net
condrskajaumaksa66.net
cyberflorists.su - Email: mipartid@gmx.com
evishop.net - Email: hardwicke@evishop.net
exnihujatreetrichmand77.net
gondorskiedelaahuetebanj88.net
gotoraininthecharefare88.net
liliputttt9999.info - Email: dolgopoliy.alexei@yandex.ru
lucams.net - Email: renault@lucams.net
micnetwork100.com - Email: 369258wq@sina.com
musicstudioseattle.net- Email: rexona1948@live.com
nvufvwieg.com - Email: 369258wq@sina.com
partyspecialty.su - Email: mipartid@gmx.com
pinterest.com.onsayoga.net
quill.com.account.settings.musicstudioseattle.net
seoworkblog.net - Email: mendhamnewjersey@linuxmail.org
seoworkblog.net
tigerdirect.com.secure.orderlogin.asp.palmer-ford.net
tor-connect-secure.com - Email: 369258wq@sina.com
vip-proxy-to-tor.com


Name servers used in these campaigns:
Name Server: NS1.TEMPLATESWELL.NET - 94.249.254.48 - Email: freejob62@rocketmail.com
Name Server: NS1.THEGALAXYATWORK.COM - 94.249.254.48 - Email: samyideaa@yahoo.com
Name Server: NS1.MOBILE-UNLOCKED.NET - 91.227.220.104 - Email: usalifecoach47@mail.com
Name Server: NS2.MOBILE-UNLOCKED.NET - 32.100.2.98
Name Server: NS1.KNEESLAPPERZ.NET
Name Server: NS1.MEDUSASCREAM.NET - 37.247.108.250 - Email: m_mybad@yahoo.com
Name Server: NS1.CREDIT-FIND.NET - 194.209.82.222 - Email: mendhamnewjersey@linuxmail.org
Name Server: NS1.GONULPALACE.NET - 194.209.82.222 - Email: mitinsider@live.com
Name Server: NS1.NAMASTELEARNING.NET - 93.178.205.234 - Email: minelapse2001@outlook.com
Name Server: NS2.NAMASTELEARNING.NET
- 205.28.29.52

The following malicious MD5s are also known to have phoned back to the same IPs/were downloaded from the same IPs in the past:
MD5: e08c8ed751a3fc36bc966e47b76e2863
MD5: f507b822651d2fbc82a98e4cc7f735a2
MD5: e08c8ed751a3fc36bc966e47b76e2863
MD5: f88d6a7381c0bbac1b1558533cfdfd62
MD5: 11be39e64c9926ea39e6b2650624dab4
MD5: ea893fb04cc536ff692cc3177db7e66f
MD5: c8f8b4c0fced61f8a4d3b2854279b4ef
MD5: 93bae01631d10530a7bac7367458abea
MD5: 199b8cf0ffd607787907b68c9ebecc8b
MD5: 6b1bef6fb45f5c2d8b46a6eb6a2d5834
MD5: 9eb6ed284284452f7a1e4e3877dded2d
MD5: efacf1c2c6b33f658c3df6a3ed170e2d
MD5: 7c70d5051826c9c93270b8c7fc9d276f
MD5: dcb378d6033eed2e01ff9ab8936050a0
MD5: 8556f98907fd74be9a9c1b3bf602f869


Updates will be posted as soon as new developments take place. Continue reading →

Dissecting a Sample Russian Business Network (RBN) Contract/Agreement Through the Prism of RBN's AbdAllah Franchise

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August 10, 2013

The Russian Business Network (RBN), is perhaps the most speculated, buzzed about, cybercrime enterprise in the World, a poster child for fraudulent activity 'streaming' from 'Mother Russia', in the eyes of respected/novice security/cybercrime researchers across the globe.

However, what a huge percentage of the researchers who're just catching up with its 'fraudulent performance metrics' over the years, don't realize, is how a newly emerged bulletproof hosting provider, managed to end up, as the World's most prolific source of fraudulent/malicious activity.

Hint: Basic business concepts like franchising, signalling the early stages of the modernization/professionalization of cybercrime, where being the benchmark has had a direct inspirational impact in the 'hearts and minds' of current and potential cybercriminals, then and now.

Case in point is Abdallah Internet Hizmetleri also known as AbdAllah (VN), an ex-RBN darling relying on the franchise business concept.

In this post, I'll discuss a sample contract/contractual agreement that every one of its customers had to sign before doing business with them, which in the broader context leads to a situation, where while the franchise is publicly advertising the bulletproof hosting services for trojans, exploits, warez, adult content, drop projects, botnets and spam, it's explicitly forbidding such activities -- with some visible exceptions -- in its contractual agreement.

What does this mean? It means that the Russian Business Network, the benchmark for the majority of ex/currently active bulletproof hosting providers, has been (legally) forwarding the responsibility for the fraudulent activity to its customers, in between reserving the right to act and deactivate their accounts if they ever violate the agreement/contract. The first thing that comes to my mind when it comes to the RBN 'reaction' in a socially oriented manner, are the infamous RBN Fake Account Suspended Notices, and that's just for starters, indicating a deteriorated understanding of malicious/fraudulent activity, with high profit margins in mind.

Let's go through the contract/agreement that every customer used to sign, before doing cybercrime-friendly business with them, both in original Russian, and automatically translated in English.

Sample AbdAllah (VN) Contractual Bulletproof Hosting Agreement/Contract in Russian:
1. ПРЕДМЕТ ДОГОВОРА

1.1. Заказчик поручает, а ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЬ берет на себя обязательства по размещению и/или регистрации виртуального сервера ЗАКАЗЧИКА в сети Интернет.

2. УСЛОВИЯ ВЫПОЛНЕНИЯ ДОГОВОРА

2.1. По заключению настоящего договора ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЬ производит первоначальную установку и настройку виртуального сервера и обеспечивает ЗАКАЗЧИКА необходимой информацией для администрирования виртуального сервера.

2.2. ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЬ обеспечивает доступ в сети Интернет к виртуальному серверу, а так же работоспособность всех доступных сервисов ЗАКАЗЧИКА круглосуточно в течение семи дней в неделю.

3. ЦЕНЫ И ПОРЯДОК ОПЛАТЫ

3.1. Стоимость и порядок оплаты работ по настоящему договору на момент его заключения определяется в соответствии с действующими условиями, распространяемыми сотрудниками по E-Mail и/или ICQ.

3.2. Оплата вносится ЗАКАЗЧИКОМ в счет оплаты услуги поддержки виртуального веб-сервера ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЕМ. ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЬ вправе приостановить предоставление услуг при отрицательном состоянии счета.

3.3. Все выделенные серверы предоставляются в состоянии UNMANAGED, т.е администраторы ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЯ могут, но не ОБЯЗАНЫ настраивать арендуемый сервер. За любую настройку сервера ЗАКАЗЧИКА, либо скриптов на нём - взымается плата в размере 50 USD/за 1 час работы администратора ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЯ по Вашему вопросу, минимум пол часа. Полное администрирование сервера специалистами ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЯ стоит 250 USD в месяц. Бесплатно осуществляется перезагрузка сервер (если нет автоматической формы для этого).

3.4. В случае не оплаты услуг ЗАКАЗЧИКОМ в последний день биллингового периода, данные ЗАКАЗЧИКА удаляются по наступлению новых суток без возвратно. В случае виртуального хостинга удаляется аккаунт и все бэкапы данного аккаунта, в случае аренды сервера (dedicated или vps) сервер снимается с обслуживания, форматируются жесткие диски.

4. ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТЬ СТОРОН

4.1. ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЬ не несет ответственности перед ЗАКАЗЧИКОМ или третьими сторонами за любые задержки, прерывания, ущерб или потери, происходящие из-за:
(а) дефектов в любом электронном или механическом оборудовании, не принадлежащем ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЮ;
(б) проблем при передаче данных или соединении, произошедших не по вине ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЯ ;
(в) вследствие обстоятельств непреодолимой силы в общепринятом смысле, т.е. чрезвычайными силами и непредотвратимыми обстоятельствами, не подлежащими разумному контролю;
(г) давление властей.

4.2. При расторжении Договора по инициативе ЗАКАЗЧИКА, неиспользованная часть аванса ЗАКАЗЧИКУ не возвращается.

4.3. ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЬ оставляет за собой право приостановить обслуживание ЗАКАЗЧИКА или расторгнуть договор в безусловном порядке без возвращения средств заказчику в следующих случаях:

- размещение детской порнографии и зоофилии в любом виде;

- попытки взлома, несанкционированного проникновения на сервер, в аккаунты других клиентов, попытки порчи оборудования или программного обеспечения;

- попытки взлома правительственных организаций в любом виде;

- попытки спама любого рода с наших серверов виртуального хостинга, кроме как через соксы;

- попытки фишинга банков (кража денег);

- размещение информации по торговле оружием и наркотиками, торговля людьми или органами людей, вызывающие межнациональную и религиозную рознь, призывающую к войне и насилию;

- неоправданная перегрузка вычислительных мощностей сервера виртуального хостинга (допускается использовать не более 5% мощности процессора и не более 128Мб оперативной памяти сервера);

- попытки взлома с серверов (dedicated и виртуальный хостинг) - серверы, которые расположены рядом в стойке, либо клиентов этой же страны, где расположен сервер;

- оскорбление в любой форме сотрудников сервиса.


4.4. ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЬ не отвечает за содержание информации, размещаемой ЗАКАЗЧИКОМ.

4.5. ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЬ не будет нести ответственности за любые затраты или ущерб, прямо или косвенно возникшие в результате использования услуги вэб хостинга.

4.6. MoneyBack за выделенный сервер возможен только в том случае, если недоступность данного сервера происходит по вине ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЯ, ввиду того, что ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЬ оплачиваем полную стоимость сервера в Дата-Центр. Также возможна замена сервера.

4.7. Размещение сайтов ЗАКАЗЧИКА, рекламируемых SPAMом на серверах ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЯ (как виртаульного хостинга, так и dedicated) оплачивается отдельно из расчета объема писем. При объёмах от 5млн до 10млн =1000 USD - 1500 USD в месяц за сервер в Китае или ГонгКонге, либо 150 USD неделя или 500 USD в месяц за виртуальный хостинг, более 10-20 млн.  = 200 USD неделя либо 2000$ за выделенный сервер.

4.8. ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЬ обязуется делать ежедневные резервные копии аккаунта ЗАКАЗЧИКА на сторонний сервер (только виртуальный хостинг).

4.9. ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЬ обязуется решать самостоятельно все жалобы (абузы/abuse), не привлекая к этому ЗАКАЗЧИКА и без вмешательства в данные ЗАКАЗЧИКА. ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЬ не решает жалобы (абузы/abuse) от полиции, крупных правительственных организаций и VerSign.

4.10. ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЬ не дает никаких гарантий, что домен ЗАКАЗЧИКА не будет заблокирован по любым причинам, а особенно таким как любой вид SPAMа, fraud, phishing и т.п.

5. КОНФИДЕНЦИАЛЬНАЯ ИНФОРМАЦИЯ

5.1. Стороны обязуются без обоюдного согласия не передавать третьим лицам либо использовать иным способом, не предусмотренным условиями Договора, организационно-технологическую, коммерческую, финансовую и иную информацию, составляющую секрет для любой из сторон (далее - "конфиденциальная информация") при условии, что:

- такая информация имеет действительную или потенциальную коммерческую ценность в силу ее неизвестности третьим лицам;

- к такой информации нет свободного доступа на законном основании;

- обладатель такой информации принимает надлежащие меры к обеспечению ее конфиденциальности.

5.2. Стороны обязуются, без обоюдного согласия, не передавать третьим лицам сведения о содержании и условиях Договора.

5.3. ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЬ обязуется предотвращать запись логов на серверах виртуального хостинга и маршрутизирующем оборудовании.

5.4. Будьте внимательны, сотрудники ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЯ не запрашивают пароли от аккаунтов виртуального хостинга и выделенных серверов. Исключением является ситуация, когда ЗАКАЗЧИК просить произвести какие-либо работы на его Выделенном Сервере.



 
Automatically translated Russian Business Network (RBN) Contractual Agreement/Contract:
1. SUBJECT OF CONTRACT

1.1. Customer Requests, but ARTIST is committed to the placement and / or registration CUSTOMER virtual server on the Internet.

2. CONDITIONS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TREATY

2.1. At the conclusion of this treaty ARTIST produces initial setup and configuration of the virtual server and provides the necessary information for CUSTOMER virtual server administration.

2.2. ARTIST provides access to the Internet to the virtual server, as well as efficiency of all available services CUSTOMER day seven days a week.

3. PRICES AND ORDER OF PAYMENT

3.1. Cost and arrangements of works under this contract at the time of its conclusion is determined in accordance with existing conditions, the staff distributed by E-Mail and / or ICQ.

3.2. Payment is made ZAKAZCHIKOM as payment services support virtual web server ISPOLNITELEM. ARTIST right to suspend the provision of services at a negative status of the account.

3.3. All dedicated servers are provided in a position UNMANAGED ie ISPOLNITELYA administrators can, but not OBYAZANY tune rented server. For any server setup CUSTOMER or scripts on it - charge of $ 50 USD / for 1 hour administrator ISPOLNITELYA to your question, at least half an hour. The full server administration specialists ISPOLNITELYA worth USD 250 per month. Free done rebooting the server (if not automatic form for this).

3.4. If no payment ZAKAZCHIKOM bill on the last day of the period, the data are removed CUSTOMER new offensive on days without reciprocating. In the case of virtual hosting account and removed all of your backups, in case the rental server (dedicated or vps) server is removed from service, formatted hard drives.

4. RESPONSIBILITY OF PARTIES

4.1. ARTIST no responsibility to ZAKAZCHIKOM or third parties for any delays, interruptions, damage or losses that occur because of:
(a) defects in any electronic or mechanical equipment, not belonging ISPOLNITELYU;
(b) problems in the transfer of data or connection that occurred through no fault ISPOLNITELYA;
(c) due to force majeure circumstances, in the conventional sense, that is, nepredotvratimymi forces and emergency circumstances, not subject to reasonable control;
(g) pressure from the authorities.

4.2. At the dissolution of the Treaty on the initiative CUSTOMER, ZAKAZCHIKU unused portion of the advance is not refundable.

4.3. ARTIST reserves the right to suspend or terminate CUSTOMER service contract in order without the unconditional return of customer funds in the following cases:

-- Locating and zoofilii child pornography in any form;

-- attempted burglary, unauthorized entry to the server, in the accounts of other customers, trying to damage equipment or software;

-- attempted burglary governmental organizations in any form;

-- spam attempts of any kind from our servers hosting virtual except through SOCKS;

-- phishing attempts banks (stealing money);

-- posting on the arms trade and drug trafficking, or human organs, causing inter-ethnic and religious discord, calling for war and violence;

-- unjustified computing power overload virtual server hosting (which is allowed to use no more than 5% of CPU capacity, and no more than 128 MB of RAM server);

-- attempted burglary of servers (and dedicated virtual hosting) - servers, which are located next to the rack, a customer in the same country where the server;

-- insulting to any form of service personnel.


4.4. ARTIST is not responsible for the content of the information posted ZAKAZCHIKOM.

4.5. ARTIST shall not be liable for any costs or damages arising directly or indirectly from the use of Web hosting services.

4.6. MoneyBack for dedicated server is possible only in case the inaccessibility of the fault occurs on the server ISPOLNITELYA, because ARTIST pay for the full cost of a server in Data Center. Also possible replacement server.

4.7. Placing sites CUSTOMER advertised on servers ISPOLNITELYA SPAM (as virtaulnogo hosting, and dedicated) is charged separately at the rate of the volume of letters. With volume of 5 million to 10 million USD = 1000 - 1500 USD per month for the server in China or Gong Konge or 150 USD week, or 500 USD per month for a virtual hosting, a 10-20 million = 200 USD week, or $ 2000 for a dedicated server.

4.8. ARTIST undertakes to do daily backups CUSTOMER account for the third-party server (only virtual hosting).

4.9. ARTIST undertakes to decide all complaints (abuzy / abuse), are not engaging in the CUSTOMER and without interference in the CUSTOMER data. ARTIST does not solve complaints (abuzy / abuse) from the police, government organizations and major VerSign.

4.10. ARTIST gives no guarantees that the domain CUSTOMER not be blocked for any reason, but especially like any kind of SPAM, fraud, phishing, etc.

5. CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

5.1. The Parties undertake without the unanimous consent not to transfer to third parties or used in any other way other than prescribed conditions Treaty, organizational and technological, commercial, financial and other information, which is the secret to any of the parties (hereinafter - "confidential information"), provided that:

-- this information is actual or potential commercial value by virtue of its unknown third parties;

-- to such information no free access to the lawful;

-- holds such information shall take appropriate steps to ensure its confidentiality.

5.2. The Parties undertake, without unanimous consent, not to transfer to third parties about the content and conditions of the Treaty.

5.3. ARTIST undertakes to prevent logging on servers and virtual hosting routing equipment.

5.4. Be careful, do not require employees ISPOLNITELYA passwords from virtual hosting accounts and dedicated servers. The exception is when CUSTOMER request to any work for his Vydelennom Server.


Excluding the direct offering of managed servers for spam sending in the actual agreement/contract, and the fact that their abuse department is virtually non-existent, the contact explicitly prohibits related malicious/fraudulent activity. Naturally, that's not the case when AbdAllah (VN) used to advertise its bulletproof hosting service across cybercrime-friendly communities, "back in the day":


In 2013, despite the overall availability of RBN-like bulletproof hosting providers, cybercriminals continue experimenting with abusing legitimate infrastructure in an attempt to mitigate the risk of having their activities exposed. Various cases throughout the last couple of years include:
The "best" is yet to come.

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter. Continue reading →

Dissecting a Sample Russian Business Network (RBN) Contract/Agreement Through the Prism of RBN's AbdAllah Franchise

August 10, 2013

The Russian Business Network (RBN), is perhaps the most speculated, buzzed about, cybercrime enterprise in the World, a poster child for fraudulent activity 'streaming' from 'Mother Russia', in the eyes of respected/novice security/cybercrime researchers across the globe.

However, what a huge percentage of the researchers who're just catching up with its 'fraudulent performance metrics' over the years, don't realize, is how a newly emerged bulletproof hosting provider, managed to end up, as the World's most prolific source of fraudulent/malicious activity.

Hint: Basic business concepts like franchising, signalling the early stages of the modernization/professionalization of cybercrime, where being the benchmark has had a direct inspirational impact in the 'hearts and minds' of current and potential cybercriminals, then and now.

Case in point is Abdallah Internet Hizmetleri also known as AbdAllah (VN), an ex-RBN darling relying on the franchise business concept.

In this post, I'll discuss a sample contract/contractual agreement that every one of its customers had to sign before doing business with them, which in the broader context leads to a situation, where while the franchise is publicly advertising the bulletproof hosting services for trojans, exploits, warez, adult content, drop projects, botnets and spam, it's explicitly forbidding such activities -- with some visible exceptions -- in its contractual agreement.

What does this mean? It means that the Russian Business Network, the benchmark for the majority of ex/currently active bulletproof hosting providers, has been (legally) forwarding the responsibility for the fraudulent activity to its customers, in between reserving the right to act and deactivate their accounts if they ever violate the agreement/contract. The first thing that comes to my mind when it comes to the RBN 'reaction' in a socially oriented manner, are the infamous RBN Fake Account Suspended Notices, and that's just for starters, indicating a deteriorated understanding of malicious/fraudulent activity, with high profit margins in mind.

Let's go through the contract/agreement that every customer used to sign, before doing cybercrime-friendly business with them, both in original Russian, and automatically translated in English.

Sample AbdAllah (VN) Contractual Bulletproof Hosting Agreement/Contract in Russian:
1. ПРЕДМЕТ ДОГОВОРА

1.1. Заказчик поручает, а ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЬ берет на себя обязательства по размещению и/или регистрации виртуального сервера ЗАКАЗЧИКА в сети Интернет.

2. УСЛОВИЯ ВЫПОЛНЕНИЯ ДОГОВОРА

2.1. По заключению настоящего договора ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЬ производит первоначальную установку и настройку виртуального сервера и обеспечивает ЗАКАЗЧИКА необходимой информацией для администрирования виртуального сервера.

2.2. ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЬ обеспечивает доступ в сети Интернет к виртуальному серверу, а так же работоспособность всех доступных сервисов ЗАКАЗЧИКА круглосуточно в течение семи дней в неделю.

3. ЦЕНЫ И ПОРЯДОК ОПЛАТЫ

3.1. Стоимость и порядок оплаты работ по настоящему договору на момент его заключения определяется в соответствии с действующими условиями, распространяемыми сотрудниками по E-Mail и/или ICQ.

3.2. Оплата вносится ЗАКАЗЧИКОМ в счет оплаты услуги поддержки виртуального веб-сервера ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЕМ. ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЬ вправе приостановить предоставление услуг при отрицательном состоянии счета.

3.3. Все выделенные серверы предоставляются в состоянии UNMANAGED, т.е администраторы ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЯ могут, но не ОБЯЗАНЫ настраивать арендуемый сервер. За любую настройку сервера ЗАКАЗЧИКА, либо скриптов на нём - взымается плата в размере 50 USD/за 1 час работы администратора ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЯ по Вашему вопросу, минимум пол часа. Полное администрирование сервера специалистами ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЯ стоит 250 USD в месяц. Бесплатно осуществляется перезагрузка сервер (если нет автоматической формы для этого).

3.4. В случае не оплаты услуг ЗАКАЗЧИКОМ в последний день биллингового периода, данные ЗАКАЗЧИКА удаляются по наступлению новых суток без возвратно. В случае виртуального хостинга удаляется аккаунт и все бэкапы данного аккаунта, в случае аренды сервера (dedicated или vps) сервер снимается с обслуживания, форматируются жесткие диски.

4. ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТЬ СТОРОН

4.1. ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЬ не несет ответственности перед ЗАКАЗЧИКОМ или третьими сторонами за любые задержки, прерывания, ущерб или потери, происходящие из-за:
(а) дефектов в любом электронном или механическом оборудовании, не принадлежащем ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЮ;
(б) проблем при передаче данных или соединении, произошедших не по вине ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЯ ;
(в) вследствие обстоятельств непреодолимой силы в общепринятом смысле, т.е. чрезвычайными силами и непредотвратимыми обстоятельствами, не подлежащими разумному контролю;
(г) давление властей.

4.2. При расторжении Договора по инициативе ЗАКАЗЧИКА, неиспользованная часть аванса ЗАКАЗЧИКУ не возвращается.

4.3. ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЬ оставляет за собой право приостановить обслуживание ЗАКАЗЧИКА или расторгнуть договор в безусловном порядке без возвращения средств заказчику в следующих случаях:

- размещение детской порнографии и зоофилии в любом виде;

- попытки взлома, несанкционированного проникновения на сервер, в аккаунты других клиентов, попытки порчи оборудования или программного обеспечения;

- попытки взлома правительственных организаций в любом виде;

- попытки спама любого рода с наших серверов виртуального хостинга, кроме как через соксы;

- попытки фишинга банков (кража денег);

- размещение информации по торговле оружием и наркотиками, торговля людьми или органами людей, вызывающие межнациональную и религиозную рознь, призывающую к войне и насилию;

- неоправданная перегрузка вычислительных мощностей сервера виртуального хостинга (допускается использовать не более 5% мощности процессора и не более 128Мб оперативной памяти сервера);

- попытки взлома с серверов (dedicated и виртуальный хостинг) - серверы, которые расположены рядом в стойке, либо клиентов этой же страны, где расположен сервер;

- оскорбление в любой форме сотрудников сервиса.


4.4. ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЬ не отвечает за содержание информации, размещаемой ЗАКАЗЧИКОМ.

4.5. ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЬ не будет нести ответственности за любые затраты или ущерб, прямо или косвенно возникшие в результате использования услуги вэб хостинга.

4.6. MoneyBack за выделенный сервер возможен только в том случае, если недоступность данного сервера происходит по вине ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЯ, ввиду того, что ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЬ оплачиваем полную стоимость сервера в Дата-Центр. Также возможна замена сервера.

4.7. Размещение сайтов ЗАКАЗЧИКА, рекламируемых SPAMом на серверах ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЯ (как виртаульного хостинга, так и dedicated) оплачивается отдельно из расчета объема писем. При объёмах от 5млн до 10млн =1000 USD - 1500 USD в месяц за сервер в Китае или ГонгКонге, либо 150 USD неделя или 500 USD в месяц за виртуальный хостинг, более 10-20 млн.  = 200 USD неделя либо 2000$ за выделенный сервер.

4.8. ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЬ обязуется делать ежедневные резервные копии аккаунта ЗАКАЗЧИКА на сторонний сервер (только виртуальный хостинг).

4.9. ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЬ обязуется решать самостоятельно все жалобы (абузы/abuse), не привлекая к этому ЗАКАЗЧИКА и без вмешательства в данные ЗАКАЗЧИКА. ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЬ не решает жалобы (абузы/abuse) от полиции, крупных правительственных организаций и VerSign.

4.10. ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЬ не дает никаких гарантий, что домен ЗАКАЗЧИКА не будет заблокирован по любым причинам, а особенно таким как любой вид SPAMа, fraud, phishing и т.п.

5. КОНФИДЕНЦИАЛЬНАЯ ИНФОРМАЦИЯ

5.1. Стороны обязуются без обоюдного согласия не передавать третьим лицам либо использовать иным способом, не предусмотренным условиями Договора, организационно-технологическую, коммерческую, финансовую и иную информацию, составляющую секрет для любой из сторон (далее - "конфиденциальная информация") при условии, что:

- такая информация имеет действительную или потенциальную коммерческую ценность в силу ее неизвестности третьим лицам;

- к такой информации нет свободного доступа на законном основании;

- обладатель такой информации принимает надлежащие меры к обеспечению ее конфиденциальности.

5.2. Стороны обязуются, без обоюдного согласия, не передавать третьим лицам сведения о содержании и условиях Договора.

5.3. ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЬ обязуется предотвращать запись логов на серверах виртуального хостинга и маршрутизирующем оборудовании.

5.4. Будьте внимательны, сотрудники ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЯ не запрашивают пароли от аккаунтов виртуального хостинга и выделенных серверов. Исключением является ситуация, когда ЗАКАЗЧИК просить произвести какие-либо работы на его Выделенном Сервере.



 
Automatically translated Russian Business Network (RBN) Contractual Agreement/Contract:
1. SUBJECT OF CONTRACT

1.1. Customer Requests, but ARTIST is committed to the placement and / or registration CUSTOMER virtual server on the Internet.

2. CONDITIONS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TREATY

2.1. At the conclusion of this treaty ARTIST produces initial setup and configuration of the virtual server and provides the necessary information for CUSTOMER virtual server administration.

2.2. ARTIST provides access to the Internet to the virtual server, as well as efficiency of all available services CUSTOMER day seven days a week.

3. PRICES AND ORDER OF PAYMENT

3.1. Cost and arrangements of works under this contract at the time of its conclusion is determined in accordance with existing conditions, the staff distributed by E-Mail and / or ICQ.

3.2. Payment is made ZAKAZCHIKOM as payment services support virtual web server ISPOLNITELEM. ARTIST right to suspend the provision of services at a negative status of the account.

3.3. All dedicated servers are provided in a position UNMANAGED ie ISPOLNITELYA administrators can, but not OBYAZANY tune rented server. For any server setup CUSTOMER or scripts on it - charge of $ 50 USD / for 1 hour administrator ISPOLNITELYA to your question, at least half an hour. The full server administration specialists ISPOLNITELYA worth USD 250 per month. Free done rebooting the server (if not automatic form for this).

3.4. If no payment ZAKAZCHIKOM bill on the last day of the period, the data are removed CUSTOMER new offensive on days without reciprocating. In the case of virtual hosting account and removed all of your backups, in case the rental server (dedicated or vps) server is removed from service, formatted hard drives.

4. RESPONSIBILITY OF PARTIES

4.1. ARTIST no responsibility to ZAKAZCHIKOM or third parties for any delays, interruptions, damage or losses that occur because of:
(a) defects in any electronic or mechanical equipment, not belonging ISPOLNITELYU;
(b) problems in the transfer of data or connection that occurred through no fault ISPOLNITELYA;
(c) due to force majeure circumstances, in the conventional sense, that is, nepredotvratimymi forces and emergency circumstances, not subject to reasonable control;
(g) pressure from the authorities.

4.2. At the dissolution of the Treaty on the initiative CUSTOMER, ZAKAZCHIKU unused portion of the advance is not refundable.

4.3. ARTIST reserves the right to suspend or terminate CUSTOMER service contract in order without the unconditional return of customer funds in the following cases:

-- Locating and zoofilii child pornography in any form;

-- attempted burglary, unauthorized entry to the server, in the accounts of other customers, trying to damage equipment or software;

-- attempted burglary governmental organizations in any form;

-- spam attempts of any kind from our servers hosting virtual except through SOCKS;

-- phishing attempts banks (stealing money);

-- posting on the arms trade and drug trafficking, or human organs, causing inter-ethnic and religious discord, calling for war and violence;

-- unjustified computing power overload virtual server hosting (which is allowed to use no more than 5% of CPU capacity, and no more than 128 MB of RAM server);

-- attempted burglary of servers (and dedicated virtual hosting) - servers, which are located next to the rack, a customer in the same country where the server;

-- insulting to any form of service personnel.


4.4. ARTIST is not responsible for the content of the information posted ZAKAZCHIKOM.

4.5. ARTIST shall not be liable for any costs or damages arising directly or indirectly from the use of Web hosting services.

4.6. MoneyBack for dedicated server is possible only in case the inaccessibility of the fault occurs on the server ISPOLNITELYA, because ARTIST pay for the full cost of a server in Data Center. Also possible replacement server.

4.7. Placing sites CUSTOMER advertised on servers ISPOLNITELYA SPAM (as virtaulnogo hosting, and dedicated) is charged separately at the rate of the volume of letters. With volume of 5 million to 10 million USD = 1000 - 1500 USD per month for the server in China or Gong Konge or 150 USD week, or 500 USD per month for a virtual hosting, a 10-20 million = 200 USD week, or $ 2000 for a dedicated server.

4.8. ARTIST undertakes to do daily backups CUSTOMER account for the third-party server (only virtual hosting).

4.9. ARTIST undertakes to decide all complaints (abuzy / abuse), are not engaging in the CUSTOMER and without interference in the CUSTOMER data. ARTIST does not solve complaints (abuzy / abuse) from the police, government organizations and major VerSign.

4.10. ARTIST gives no guarantees that the domain CUSTOMER not be blocked for any reason, but especially like any kind of SPAM, fraud, phishing, etc.

5. CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

5.1. The Parties undertake without the unanimous consent not to transfer to third parties or used in any other way other than prescribed conditions Treaty, organizational and technological, commercial, financial and other information, which is the secret to any of the parties (hereinafter - "confidential information"), provided that:

-- this information is actual or potential commercial value by virtue of its unknown third parties;

-- to such information no free access to the lawful;

-- holds such information shall take appropriate steps to ensure its confidentiality.

5.2. The Parties undertake, without unanimous consent, not to transfer to third parties about the content and conditions of the Treaty.

5.3. ARTIST undertakes to prevent logging on servers and virtual hosting routing equipment.

5.4. Be careful, do not require employees ISPOLNITELYA passwords from virtual hosting accounts and dedicated servers. The exception is when CUSTOMER request to any work for his Vydelennom Server.


Excluding the direct offering of managed servers for spam sending in the actual agreement/contract, and the fact that their abuse department is virtually non-existent, the contact explicitly prohibits related malicious/fraudulent activity. Naturally, that's not the case when AbdAllah (VN) used to advertise its bulletproof hosting service across cybercrime-friendly communities, "back in the day":


In 2013, despite the overall availability of RBN-like bulletproof hosting providers, cybercriminals continue experimenting with abusing legitimate infrastructure in an attempt to mitigate the risk of having their activities exposed. Various cases throughout the last couple of years include:
The "best" is yet to come.

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter. Continue reading →

Summarizing Webroot's Threat Blog Posts for July

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August 01, 2013

The following is a brief summary of all of my posts at Webroot's Threat Blog for July, 2013. You can subscribe to Webroot's Threat Blog RSS Feed, or follow me on Twitter:


01. Cybercriminals experiment with Tor-based C&C, ring-3-rootkit empowered, SPDY form grabbing malware bot
02. Deceptive ads targeting German users lead to the ‘W32/SomotoBetterInstaller’ Potentially Unwanted Application (PUA)
03. Newly launched underground market service harvests mobile phone numbers on demand
04. Novel ransomware tactic locks users’ PCs, demands that they participate in a survey to get the unlock code
05. Spamvertised ‘Export License/Invoice Copy’ themed emails lead to malware
06. Cybercriminals spamvertise tens of thousands of fake ‘Your Booking Reservation at Westminster Hotel’ themed emails, serve malware
07. New commercially available mass FTP-based proxy-supporting doorway/malicious script uploading application spotted in the wild
08. Fake ‘iGO4 Private Car Insurance Policy Amendment Certificate’ themed emails lead to malware
09. Tens of thousands of spamvertised emails lead to the Win32/PrimeCasino PUA (Potentially Unwanted Application)
10. Spamvertised ‘Vodafone U.K MMS ID/Fake Sage 50 Payroll’ themed emails lead to (identical) malware
11. New commercially available Web-based WordPress/Joomla brute-forcing tool spotted in the wild
12. Rogue ads targeting German users lead to Win32/InstallBrain PUA (Potentially Unwanted Application)
13. Yet another commercially available stealth Bitcoin/Litecoin mining tool spotted in the wild
14. Deceptive ‘Media Player Update’ ads expose users to the rogue ‘Video Downloader/Bundlore’ Potentially Unwanted Application (PUA)
15. Newly launched ‘HTTP-based botnet setup as a service’ empowers novice cybercriminals with bulletproof hosting capabilities
16. Fake ‘Copy of Vodafone U.K Contract/Your Monthly Vodafone Bill is Ready/New MMS Received’ themed emails lead to malware
17. Rogue ads lead to the ‘Free Player’ Win32/Somoto Potentially Unwanted Application (PUA)
18. How much does it cost to buy one thousand Russian/Eastern European based malware-infected hosts?
19. Custom USB sticks bypassing Windows 7/8's AutoRun protection measure going mainstream
20. DIY commercially-available ‘automatic Web site hacking as a service’ spotted in the wild

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter. Continue reading →

Instagram Under Fire as Cybercriminals Release New DIY Fake Account Registration/Management/Promotion Tool

July 23, 2013
In 2013, CAPTCHAs represent an outdated approach for a Web site wanting to prevent the efficient and systematic abuse of its services.

This fact, largely driven by the rise of cost-effective CAPTCHA solving solutions offered by low-waged individuals internationally over the last couple of years, continues to empower virtually anyone possessing the right cybercrime-friendly tools, with the ability to abuse any major Web property in a potentially fraudulent or malicious way.

In this post, I'll profile one of the most recently released DIY fake account registration/management/promoting tool, targeting Instagram, highlight its core features, as well as emphasize on the true impact that these tools are having on some of the world's most popular Web properties.

Sample screenshots of the tool in action:















Some of its core features are:
  • support for multi-threads
  • set number ot accounts to generate using a single proxy (malware-infected host)
  • randomization of the posted bogus content to avoid easy detection of the pattern
  • male/female fake account creating capabilities
  • mass account validity checking capabilities
  • CAPTCHA-solving integration with third-party CAPTCHA solving services
Over the years, I've been extensively profiling campaigns utilizing purely legitimate infrastructure for achieving the fraudulent/malicious objectives set by the cybercriminal behind the campaign. These cases demonstrate that cybercriminals continue to pursue the efficient and systematic abuse of legitimate Web properties, which on the other hand, continue relying on CAPTCHA challenges to differentiate between bots and humans using the site, forgetting that it's actually humans solving the CAPTCHAs for the their customers.

Known cases of abuse of legitimate infrastructure for fraudulent/malicious purposes over the years include:
Bogus "Shocking Video" Content at Scribd Exposes Malware Monetization Scheme Through Parked Domains
Fake Codec Serving Domains from Digg.com's Comment Spam Attack
Bogus LinkedIn Profiles Redirect to Malware and Rogue Security Software
Dissecting the Bogus LinkedIn Profiles Malware Campaign
From Ukraine with Scareware Serving Tweets, Bogus LinkedIn/Scribd Accounts, and Blackhat SEO Farms
Celebrity-Themed Scareware Campaign Abusing DocStoc and Scribd
Celebrity-Themed Scareware Campaign Abusing DocStoc
From Ukraine with Bogus Twitter, LinkedIn and Scribd Accounts
Pharmaceutical Spammers Targeting LinkedIn Continue reading →