If I were to come across this service last year, I'd be very surprised. But coming across it in 2008 isn't surprising at all, and that's the disturbing part.
Following the ongoing trend of localizing cybercrime (
Localizing Cybercrime - Cultural Diversity on Demand;
Localizing Cybercrime - Cultural Diversity on Demand Part Two) a new service takes the concept further by introducing a multilingual on demand social engineering service especially targeting scammers and fraudsters that are unable to "properly scam an international financial institution" due to the language limitations. What is the service all about? Currently offering to "talk cybercrime on behalf of you", the service is charging $9 for a call with increased use of it leading to the usual price discounts falling to $6 per call. The languages covered and the male/female voices available are as follows :
- English (3 male voices and 2 female ones)- German (2 male voices and 1 female one)- Spanish (1 male voice and 2 female ones)- Italian (1 male voice and 1 female one)- French (1 male voice and 1 female one)If the service was only advertising male or female English voices, I'd suspect it of being run by a single individual using a commercial voice changer application, however, due to the fact that it's currently offering male and female voices in 5 languages, there's a great chance that these are in fact separate people they're working with. The ugly part is that the whole business model is very well thought of in the sense that given that fact that certain banks or online services can automatically freeze the assets to which the cybercriminal has access to, the service, through its multilingual capabilities can indeed convince the institution in the authenticity of the Spanish caller that's indeed Spanish based on the stolen personal information provided by the cybercriminal in the first place.
Where's the trade-off for cybercriminals? They would have to very specific in order for the service to work, meaning, they would have to use it as a intermediary by sharing data regarding compromised banking accounts, expected courier deliveries obtained through fraudulent means (stolen credit card details), and the service reserves the right not to work with them. Consequently, the people working with the service easily act as the weakest link in the process of exposing ongoing cybercrime or real-life crime activities, and compared to plain
simple localization in the sense of translation services, the real nature of the type of conversations and impersonation happening through this one should be pretty obvious to the people offering their natural cultural diversity and voices for sale.
Despite that monetizing social engineering is not new, monetizing (accomplice) voices, and running a social engineering ring definitely is.
In one of those "better late than never" type of situations, last month members of the Global Islamic Media Front were busted in Germany. The group is largely known due to their releases and propaganda of the Technical Mujahid E-zine (Part Two) and the Mujahideen Secrets encryption tool (Second Version). GIMF was distributing its multimedia through popular Web 2.0 video sharing sites, perfectly fitting into the profile of the majority of cyber jihadist groups.
