Monday, September 14, 2009

Ukrainian "Fan Club" Features Malvertisement at NYTimes.com

If my Ukrainian "fan club" can exploit weaknesses in the online ad publishing model for scareware serving purposes, anyone else could.

Yesterday, the NYTimes.com posted a note to readers, confirming that a malvertisement campaign somehow made on their web site, resulting in the automatic exposure of users to scareware:

"Some nytimes.com readers have reported seeing a pop-up box warning them about a virus and directing them to a site that claims to offer antivirus software. We believe this was generated by an unauthorized advertisement and are working to prevent the problem from recurring. If you see such a warning, we suggest that you not click on it. Instead, quit and restart your Web browser."

Who's behind this malvertising campaign? Let the data speak for itself.

According to a published assessment of the campaign, the redirector and scareware domains involved in the malvertising incident are also in circulating in blackhat SEO campaigns courtesy of the Ukrainian gang (the post is updated daily with the very latest redirector and scareware domains pushed by the gang).

In the NYTimes.com malvertising attacks, that's sex-and-the-city .cn (parked at 94.102.48.29 where the rest of their redirectors are) acting as redirector leading to the protection-check07 .com scareware, parked on the very same IPs (91.212.107.5; 94.102.51.26; 88.198.107.25) like the rest of the new scareware domains systematically updated once or twice during a 24 hours period, again courtesy of the "fan club".

The last sample in circulation, phones back to windowsprotection-suite .net - Email: gertrudeedickens@text2re.com; mysecurityguru .cn - 64.86.16.170 - Email: andrew.fbecket@gmail.com also maintains secure-pro .cn; and to securemysystem .net - Email: gertrudeedickens@text2re.com

The NYTimes.com malvertisement assessment also highlights tradenton .com - 212.117.166.69 - Email: shawn@tradenton.com as the domain used in the ad rotation. Interestingly, related malvertisement domains managed by the same gang, have already been reported in related malvertising attacks, are also parked on the same IP:
relunas .com - Email: admin@relunas.com
kennedales .com - Email: admin@kennedales.com
harlingens .com - Email: admin@harlingens.com
newadsresults .com - Email: ritaj@gmail.com
waveadvert .com - Email: lindahg@yahoo.com

As always, what would originally seem as an isolated incident orchestrated by yet to be analyzed cybecrime gang, is in fact a great example of underground multitasking in action through the convergence of different attack tactics, courtesy of a single cybercrime enterprise.

Related malvertising posts:
Malicious Advertising (Malvertising) Increasing
MSN Norway serving Flash exploits through malvertising
Fake Antivirus XP pops-up at Cleveland.com
Scareware pops-up at FoxNews

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog.

Monday, September 07, 2009

News Items Themed Blackhat SEO Campaign Still Active

According to a blog post at PandaLabs, a massive and very persistent blackhat SEO campaign exclusively hijacking "hot BBC and CNN news" related keywords has once again popped-up on their radars. The campaign itself has been active since April, when I last analyzed it.

What has changed?

Instead of relying on purely malicious domains, the Ukrainian fan club, the one with the Koobface connection, remains the most active blackhat SEO group on the Web, and due to the quality of the historical OSINT making it possible to detect their activity -- practice which prompts them to insult back -- they're also starting to put efforts into making it look like it's another group.

However, knowing  the tools and tactics that they use, next to evident efficiency-centered mentality, they continue leaving minor leads that make it possible to establish a direct relationship between the group, the Koobface worm and the majority of blackhat SEO campaigns launched during the last couple of months across the entire Web.

The "News Items" themed blackhat SEO campaign is also serving scareware from the domains already participating in the U.S Federal Forms themed blackhat SEO campaign, what's new is the typical dynamic change of the redirectors in place.

Let's dissect a sample campaign currently parked at coolinc.info. Once the http referrer checks are met, bernie-madoff.coolinc .info/fox-25-news.html executes the campaign through a static images/ads.js located on all of the subdomains participating in campaign (bernie-madoff.coolinc .info/images/ads.js; eenadu-epaper.hmsite .net/images/ads.js) with generic detection triggered only by Sophos as Mal/ObfJS-CI.

Through a series of redirectors - usanews2009 .com/index.php - 78.46.129.170 - Email: derrick2@mail.ru; newscnn2009 .com/index.php - 193.9.28.62 - Email: derrick2@mail.ru; cnnnews2009 .com/index.php - 91.203.146.38 - EMail: derrick2@mail.ru; the user is redirected to the scareware domain through justintimberlakestream .com/?pid=95&sid=4e6ffe - 193.169.12.70; Email: info@zebrainvents.com.

The scareware itself (phones back to worldrolemodeling .com/?b=1s1 - 193.169.12.71) is dynamically served through 78.46.201.89; 193.169.12.70 and 92.241.177.207 with an diverse portfolio of fake security software domains parked there.

Parked at 92.241.177.207 are:
best-scanpc .com
bestscanpc .org
downloadavr2 .com
downloadavr3 .com
trucount3005 .com
antivirus-scan-2009 .com
antivirusxppro-2009 .com
advanced-virus-remover-2009 .com
advanced-virusremover-2009 .com
advanced-virus-remover2009 .com
advanced-virusremover2009 .com
best-scanpc .com
bestscanpc .com
xxx-white-tube .com
rude-xxx-tube .com
blue-xxx-tube .com
trucountme .com
10-open-davinci .com
vs-codec-pro .com
vscodec-pro .com
1-vscodec-pro .com
download-vscodec-pro .com
v-s-codecpro .com
antivirus-2009-ppro .com
onlinescanxppro .com
downloadavr .com
bestscanpc .info
bestscanpc .net
ns1.megahostname .biz
ns2.megahostname .biz


Parked at 78.46.201.89 (IP used in the U.S Federal Forms themed blackhat SEO campaign) are also:
virscan-online1 .com
virscan-live1 .com
antivirus-promo-scan1 .com
valueantivirusshop1 .com
megaspywarescan2 .com
worldbestonlinescanner2 .com
hqvirusscanner2 .com
warningmalwarealert2 .com
totalspywarescan3 .com
antivirus-promo-scanner3 .com
bewareofvirusattacks3 .com
totalspywarescan4 .com
worldbestonlinescan5 .com
megaspywarescan5 .com
totalspywarescan5 .com
hqvirusscanner5 .com
warningmalwarealert5 .com
hqvirusscanner8 .com
antivirus-promo-scan9 .com
worldbestonlinescan9 .com
antivir-scan-my-pc .com
antivir-scan-online .com


remove-all-pc-adware .com
antivir-my-pc-scan .com
leading-malware-scan .com
leading-antispyware-scan .com
antivirus-promo-scan .com
tryantivir-scan .com
leading-antivirus-scan .com
megaspywarescan .com
totalspywarescan .com
worldsbestantivirscan .com
awardantivirusscan .com
winningantivirusscan .com
tryantivirusscan .com
worldsbestscan .com
tryantivir-scanner .com
worldbestonlinescanner .com
tryantivirscanner .com
tryantivirusscanner .com
hqvirusscanner .com
worldsbestscanner .com
antivirscanmycomputer .com
warningvirusspreads .com
bewareofvirusattacks .com
secure.web-software-payments .com
warningmalwarealert .com
warningspywarealert .com
warningvirusalert .com


Parked at 193.169.12.70 are also more scareware domains/payment gateways/malware redirectors used in the campaign:
colonizemoon2010 .com
blastertroops2011 .com
virscan-online1 .com
virscan-live1 .com
antivirus-promo-scan1 .com
valueantivirusshop1 .com
megaspywarescan2 .com
worldbestonlinescanner2 .com
hqvirusscanner2 .com
warningmalwarealert2 .com
antivirus-promo-scanner3 .com
bewareofvirusattacks3 .com
totalspywarescan4 .com
worldbestonlinescan5 .com
megaspywarescan5 .com
totalspywarescan5 .com
hqvirusscanner5 .com
warningmalwarealert5 .com
hqvirusscanner8 .com
antivirus-promo-scan9 .com
worldbestonlinescan9 .com
antivir-scan-my-pc .com
becomemybestfriend .com
bravemousepride .com
antivir-scan-online .com
emphasis-online .com
justseethisonline .com
futureshortsonline .com


remove-all-pc-adware .com
waitforsunrise .com
funpictureslive .com
justintimberlakestream .com
antivir-my-pc-scan .com
leading-malware-scan .com
leading-antispyware-scan .com
antivirus-promo-scan .com
tryantivir-scan .com
leading-antivirus-scan .com
totalspywarescan .com
worldsbestantivirscan .com
awardantivirusscan .com
winningantivirusscan .com
tryantivirusscan .com
worldsbestscan .com
tryantivir-scanner .com
worldbestonlinescanner .com
tryantivirscanner .com
tryantivirusscanner .com
hqvirusscanner .com
worldsbestscanner .com
antivirscanmycomputer .com
obbeytheriver .com
obamanewterror .com
warningvirusspreads .com
watch2010movies .com
primeareanetworks .com
investmenttooltips .com
executive-officers .com
newsoverworldhot .com
management-overview .com
justthingsyouneedtoknow .com
criticalmentality .com


In between the central redirectors, counters from known domains affiliated with the Ukrainian fan club are also embedded as iFrames - sexualporno .ru/admin/red/counter2.html (74.54.176.50; Email: skypixre@nm.ru) leading to sexualporno .ru/admin/red/mwcounter.html. Parked on 74.54.176.50 are related domains that were once using the ddanchev-suck-my-dick.php redirection, such as sexerotika2009 .ru; celki2009 .ru; seximalinki .ru and videoxporno .ru, as well as the de-facto counter used by the gang - c.hit.ua/hit?i=6001.

Does this admin/red directory structure ring a bell? But, of course. In fact the ddanchev-suck-my-dick redirectors originally introduced by the Ukrainian fan club are still in circulation - for instance not only is videoxporno .ru/admin/red/ddanchev-suck-my-dick.php (parked at the very same 74.54.176.50) still active, but the gang has pushed an update to all of their campaigns, once again establishing a direct connection between previous ones and the ongoing "News Items" themed one.

The ddanchev-suck-my-dick.php file has a similar Mac, Firefox and Chrome check just like the U.S federal forms themed campaign, and the original "Hot News" themed campaigns - if (navigator.appVersion.indexOf("Mac")!=-1) window.location="http://www.zml.com/?did=5663";[. The script also includes a central iFrame from the now known malicious coolinf .info - dash-store.coolinc .info/images/levittpedofil.html which redirects to 1008.myhome .tv/888.php, popoz.wo .tc/p/go.php?sid=4 and 1009.wo .tc/8/ss.php to finally load the now known justintimberlakestream .com/?pid=42&sid=8f68b5.

The bottom line - the Ukrainian "fan club" is a very decent example of a multitasking cybecrime enterprise that is not only systematically abusing all the major Web 2.0 services, but is also directly involved with the Koobface botnet.

Monitoring of their campaigns, and take down actions would continue.

Related posts:
Dissecting the Ongoing U.S Federal Forms Themed Blackhat SEO Campaign
U.S Federal Forms Blackhat SEO Themed Scareware Campaign Expanding
Blackhat SEO Campaign Hijacks U.S Federal Form Keywords, Serves Scareware
A Peek Inside the Managed Blackhat SEO Ecosystem

Historical OSINT of the group's blackhat SEO campaigns pushing Koobface samples, and the connections between the campaigns:
Movement on the Koobface Front - Part Two -- detailed account of the domain suspension and direct ISP take down actions against the gang during the last month
Movement on the Koobface Front
Koobface - Come Out, Come Out, Wherever You Are
Dissecting a Swine Flu Black SEO Campaign
Massive Blackhat SEO Campaign Serving Scareware
From Ukrainian Blackhat SEO Gang With Love
From Ukrainian Blackhat SEO Gang With Love - Part Two
From Ukraine with Scareware Serving Tweets, Bogus LinkedIn/Scribd Accounts, and Blackhat SEO Farms
From Ukraine with Bogus Twitter, LinkedIn and Scribd Accounts
Fake Web Hosting Provider - Front-end to Scareware Blackhat SEO Campaign at Blogspot

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog.

Thursday, September 03, 2009

SMS Ransomware Displays Persistent Inline Ads


SMS-based micro-payments are clearly becoming the monetization channel of choice for the majority of cybercriminals engaging in ransomware campaigns. The logic behind this emerging trend is fairly simple, and as everything else in the cybercrime underground these days, it has to do with efficiency.

Compared to micro-payments, the 2008's monetization channel used by GPcode in terms of E-gold and Liberty Reserve accounts communicated over email -- with cases where the gang wasn't even bothering to respond to infected victims looking for ways to pay the ransom -- looks like a time-consuming and largely inefficient way to "interact" with the victims.


Another recently released SMS-based ransomware showing persistent ads within the browser sessions of infected victims, and demanding a premium-rate SMS for removal, is the very latest indication of the micro-payment monetization channel trend.

The DIY ransomware is offered for sale at $100, with the typical "value-added" services in the form of managed undetected binaries through crypting. Since the command and control interface is web based (php+mysql), the author is actively experimenting with new features such as scheduled appearing of the ads, inventory of banners and affiliate program links, and the ability to use multiple SMS numbers next to multiple unlocking codes.

Are the currently active ransomware "vendors" trendsetters or are they still in experimental mode?

The business model of SMS-based ransomware is clearly lucrative, especially in situations where cybercriminals are known to combine two or three different monetization tactics. However, compared to the high profit-margins which cybecriminals earn through the scareware business model, SMS-based ransomware remains a developing market segment.

Related posts:
6th SMS Ransomware Variant Offered for Sale
5th SMS Ransomware Variant Offered for Sale
4th SMS Ransomware Variant Offered for Sale
3rd SMS Ransomware Variant Offered for Sale
SMS Ransomware Source Code Now Offered for Sale
New ransomware locks PCs, demands premium SMS for removal
Who's Behind the GPcode Ransomware?
Identifying the Gpcode Ransomware Author

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog.

SMS Ransomware Displays Persistent Inline Ads

SMS-based micro-payments are clearly becoming the monetization channel of choice for the majority of cybercriminals engaging in ransomware campaigns. The logic behind this emerging trend is fairly simple, and as everything else in the cybecrime underground these days, it has to do with efficiency.

Compared to micro-payments, the 2008's monetization channel used by GPcode in terms of E-gold and Liberty Reserve accounts communicated over email -- with cases where the gang wasn't even bothering to respond to infected victims looking for ways to pay the ransom -- looks like a time-consuming and largely inefficient way to "interact" with the victims.

Another recently released SMS-based ransomware showing persistent ads within the browser sessions of infected victims, and demanding a premium-rate SMS for removal, is the very latest indication of the micro-payment monetization channel trend.

The DIY ransomware is offered for sale at $100, with the typical "value-added" services in the form of managed undetected binaries through crypting. Since the command and control interface is web based (php+mysql), the author is actively experimenting with new features such as scheduled appearing of the ads, inventory of banners and affiliate program links, and the ability to use multiple SMS numbers next to multiple unlocking codes.

Are the currently active ransomware "vendors" trendsetters or are they still in experimental mode?

The business model of SMS-based ransomware is clearly lucrative, especially in situations where cybercriminals are known to combine two or three different monetization tactics. However, compared to the high profit-margins which cybecriminals earn through the scareware business model, SMS-based ransomware remains a developing market segment.

Related posts:
6th SMS Ransomware Variant Offered for Sale
5th SMS Ransomware Variant Offered for Sale
4th SMS Ransomware Variant Offered for Sale
3rd SMS Ransomware Variant Offered for Sale
SMS Ransomware Source Code Now Offered for Sale
New ransomware locks PCs, demands premium SMS for removal
Who's Behind the GPcode Ransomware?
Identifying the Gpcode Ransomware Author

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog.

Tuesday, September 01, 2009

Summarizing Zero Day's Posts for August

The following is a brief summary of all of my posts at ZDNet's Zero Day for August.

You can also go through previous summaries for July, June, May, April, March, February, January, December, November, October, September, August and July, as well as subscribe to my personal RSS feed or Zero Day's main feed.

Notable articles include - Does Twitter's malware link filter really work?; IE8 outperforms competing browsers in malware protection -- again, and Research: 80% of Web users running unpatched versions of Flash/Acrobat

01. Dead-finger tech: 3G USB Modem, Prestigio Powerbank 501
02. Does Twitter's malware link filter really work?
03. Fake Microsoft patch malware campaign makes a comeback
04. Plugins compromised in SquirrelMail's web server hack
05. Absolute Software downplays BIOS rootkit claims
06. Federal forms themed blackhat SEO campaign serving scareware
07. Microsoft's Bing invaded by pharmaceutical scammers
08. Campaign Monitor hacked, accounts used for spamming
09. New Mac OS X DNS changer spreads through social engineering
10. IE8 outperforms competing browsers in malware protection -- again
11. Research: 80% of Web users running unpatched versions of Flash/Acrobat
12. The most dangerous celebrities to search for in 2009
13. Source code for Skype eavesdropping trojan in the wild
14. Snow Leopard's malware protection only scans for two trojans

Monday, August 24, 2009

6th SMS Ransomware Variant Offered for Sale

"Your copy of Windows has been blocked! You're using an unlicensed version of it! In order to continue using it, you must receive the unlock key. All you have to do is follow these steps: You must send a SMS message. You will receive an activation code once you do so. Enter the code and unlock your copy of Windows."

Anticipating the potential for monetization, cybercriminals are investing more time and resources into coming up with new features for their SMS based ransomware releases. Two of the very latest releases indicate their motivation and long-term ambitions into this newly emerged micro-payment ransomware channel.

What's new, is the social engineering element, the self-replication potential through removable media, and the contingency planning through the use of multiple SMS numbers in case one of the numbers gets shut down. Let's go through some of the features of two newly released SMS ransomware variants offered for $20, and $30 respectively.

What's worth emphasizing on in respect to the first release, is that it's Windows 7 compatible, and is the first SMS ransomware that allows scheduled lock down after infection -- presumably, the author included this feature in order to make it harder for the victim to recognize how he got infected at the first place -- as well as multiple SMS numbers for contingency planning.

Key features include:
- Clean interace
- Bypasses Safe Mode
- Locks down the taskbar or any combination of keys that could allow a user to close the application
- The error message can be customized
- Ability to use multiple-unlock codes
- Ability to use multiple SMS numbers from where the activation code will be obtained
- Ability to lock the system immediately upon infection, or after a given period of tim
- Auto-starting features, self-removal upon entering the correct activation code, and ensuring that the victim would no longer be infected with this release through the use of mutex-es.
- This SMS ransomware is Windows 7 compatible

The majority of SMS based ransomware is relying on the "Unlicensed Windows Copy" theme, but the first self-replicating through removable media propagation such ransomware is signaling a trend to come - social engineering throuhg impersonation in a typical scareware style. This release can be easily described as the first scareware with micro-payment ransom element offered for sale.

Basically, it attempts to impersonate Kaspersky Lab Antivirus Online and trick the infected user into thinking that Kaspersky has detected a piece of malware, has blocked it but since the malware changes its encryption algorithm the user has to send a SMS costing 150 rubles in order to receive the SMS that will block the malware.

This release also includes a timer, and a message explaining that re-installing Windows wouldn't change the situation in an attempt to further trick the user into sending the messsage. The release is exclusively released for Windows XP and is not Windows Vista compatible.

Cybercriminals are known to understand the benefits of converging different successful and well proven tactics across different propagation/infection vectors. Now that we've seen scareware with elements of ransomware, as well as hijacking a browser session's ads and demanding ransom to remove the adult content, it's only a matter of time to witness a micro-payment driven scareware campaign distributed through blackhat SEO and the usual channels.

Related posts:
5th SMS Ransomware Variant Offered for Sale
4th SMS Ransomware Variant Offered for Sale
3rd SMS Ransomware Variant Offered for Sale
SMS Ransomware Source Code Now Offered for Sale
New ransomware locks PCs, demands premium SMS for removal

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog.