In the overwhelming sea of information, access to timely, insightful and independent open-source intelligence (OSINT) analyses is crucial for maintaining the necessary situational awareness to stay on the top of emerging security threats. This blog covers trends and fads, tactics and strategies, intersecting with third-party research, speculations and real-time CYBERINT assessments, all packed with sarcastic attitude
Thursday, April 01, 2010
Summarizing Zero Day's Posts for March
The following is a brief summary of all of my posts at ZDNet's Zero Day for March, 2010.
You can also go through previous summaries, as well as subscribe to my personal RSS feed, Zero Day's main feed, or follow me on Twitter:
Recommended reading - TROYAK-AS: the cybercrime-friendly ISP that just won't go away; The current state of the crimeware threat - Q&A and From Russia with (objective) spam stats
01. Police arrest Mariposa botnet masters, 12M+ hosts compromised
02. Vodafone HTC Magic shipped with Conficker, Mariposa malware
03. Mac OS X SMS ransomware - hype or real threat? + Gallery
04. TROYAK-AS: the cybercrime-friendly ISP that just won't go away
05. Facebook password reset themed malware campaign in the wild
06. The current state of the crimeware threat - Q&A
07. From Russia with (objective) spam stats
08. Survey: Millions of users open spam emails, click on links
09. Trivial security flaw in popular iPhone app leads to privacy leak
10. Report: 64% of all Microsoft vulnerabilities for 2009 mitigated by Least Privilege accounts
This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter.
Independent Security Consultancy, Threat Intelligence Analysis (OSINT/Cyber Counter Intelligence) and Competitive Intelligence research on demand. Insightful, unbiased, and client-tailored assessments, neatly communicated in the form of interactive reports - because anticipating the emerging threatscape is what shapes the big picture at the end of the day. Approach me at dancho.danchev@hush.com
Tuesday, March 30, 2010
Money Mule Recruitment Campaign Serving Client-Side Exploits
Remember Cefin Consulting & Finance, the bogus, money mule recruitment company that ironically tried to recruit me last month?
They are back, with a currently ongoing money mule recruitment campaign, this time not just attempting to recruit gullible users, but also, serving client-side exploits (CVE-2009-1492; CVE-2007-5659) through an embedded javascript on each and every page within the recruitment site.
Let's dissect the campaign, expose the client-side exploits serving domains, the Zeus-crimeware serving domains parked within the same netblock as the mule recruitment site itself, to ultimately expose a bogus company for furniture hosting a pretty descriptive cv.exe that is dropped on the infected host.
Initial recruitment email sent from financialcefin@aol.com:
Hello, Our Company is ready to offer full and part time job in your region. It is possible to apply for a well-paid part time job from your state. More information regarding working and cooperation opportunities will be sent upon request. Please send all further correspondence ONLY to Company's email address: james.mynes.cf@gmail.com Best regards
Response received:
Greetings,
Cefin Consulting & Finanace company thanks you for being interested in our offer. All additional information about our company you may read at our official site. www.ceffincfin.com Below the details of vacancy operational scheme:
1. The payment notice and the details of the beneficiary for further payment transfer will be e-mailed to your box. All necessary instructions regarding the payment will be enclosed.
2. As a next step, you'll have to withdraw cash from our account.
3. Afterwards you shall find the nearest Western Union office and make a transfer. Important: Only your first and last names shall be mentioned in the Western Union Form! No middle name (patronymic) is written! Please check carefully the spelling of the name, as it has to correspond to the spelling in the Notice.
4. Go back home soonest possible and advise our operator on the payment details (Sender’s Name, City, Country, MTCN (Money Transfer Control Number), Transfer Amount).
5. Our operator will receive the money and send it to the customer.
6. Please be ready to accept and to make similar transfers 2-5 times a week or even more often. Therefore you have to be on alert to make a Western Union payment any time.
Should you face any problems incurred in the working process, don’t hesitate to contact our operator immediately. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact us by e-mail. If you have understood the meaning of work and ready to begin working with us, please send us your INFO in the following format:
1) First name 2) Last name 3) Country 4) City 5) Zip code 6) Home Phone number, Work Phone number, Mobile Phone number 7) Bank account info: a) Bank name b) Account name c) Account number d) Sort code 8) Scan you passport or driver license
2010 © Cefin Consulting & Finance
All right reserved.
Money mule recruitment URL: ceffincfin.com - 93.186.127.252 - Email: winter343@hotmail.com - currently flagged as malicious.
Once obfuscated, the javascript attempts to load the client-side exploits serving URL click-clicker.com /click/in.cgi?3 - 195.78.109.3; 195.78.108.221 - Email: aniwaylin@yahoo.com, or click-clicker.com - 195.78.109.3 - Email: aniwaylin@yahoo.com.
Sample campaign structure:
- click-clicke.com /cgi-bin/plt/n006106203302r0009R81fc905cX409b2ddfY0a607663Z0100f055
Parked on the same IP (91.213.174.52) are also the following client-side exploit serving domains:
click-reklama.com - Email: tahli@yahoo.com
googleinru.in - Email: mirikas@gmail.com
Within AS29106, VolgaHost-as PE Bondarenko Dmitriy Vladimirovich, we also have the following client-side exploits/crimeware friendly domains:
benlsdenc.com - Email: blablaman25@gmail.com
nermdusa.com - Email: polakurt69@gmail.com
mennlyndy.com - Email: albertxxl@gmail.com
kemilsy.com - Email: VsadlusGruziuk@gmail.com
benuoska.com - Email: godlikesme44@gmail.com
Name server of notice ns1.ginserdy.com - 93.186.127.205 - Email: albertxxl@gmail.com and ns1.ndnsgw.net - 195.78.109.3 - Email: aniwaylin@yahoo.com. have been also registered using the same emails as the original client-side exploit serving domains.
Sample detection rates, and phone back locations:
- cefin.js - Troj/IFrame-DY - Result: 1/42 (2.39%)
- clicker.pdf - Exploit.PDF-JS.Gen; Exploit:Win32/Pdfjsc.EM - Result: 21/42 (50.00%)
- clicker2.exe - TR/Sasfis.akdv.1; Trojan.Sasfis.akdv.1; Trojan.Win32.Sasfis.akdv - Result: 18/42 (42.86%)
- cv.exe - Trojan.Siggen1.15304 - Result: 3/42 (7.15%)
- 1.exe - Suspicious:W32/Malware!Gemini - Result: 4/42 (9.53%)
Upon execution, the sample phones back to Oficla/Sasfis C&C at socksbot.com /isb/gate.php?magic=121412150001&ox=2-5-1-2600&tm=3&id=24905431&cache=4154905385& - 195.78.109.3 - Email: aniwaylin@yahoo.com which drops pozitiv.md/master/cv.exe - 217.26.147.24 - Email: v.pozitiv@mail.ru from the web site of a fake company for furniture (PoZITIVe SRL).
Interestingly, today the update location has been changed to tds-style.spb.ru /error/1.exe. Detection rate:
- 1.exe - Suspicious:W32/Malware!Gemini - Result: 4/42 (9.53%)
Keeping the money mules on a short leash series, are prone to expand. Stay tuned!
Related coverage of money laundering in the context of cybercrime:
Keeping Money Mule Recruiters on a Short Leash - Part Three
Money Mule Recruiters on Yahoo!'s Web Hosting
Dissecting an Ongoing Money Mule Recruitment Campaign
Keeping Money Mule Recruiters on a Short Leash - Part Two
Keeping Reshipping Mule Recruiters on a Short Leash
Keeping Money Mule Recruiters on a Short Leash
Standardizing the Money Mule Recruitment Process
Inside a Money Laundering Group's Spamming Operations
Money Mule Recruiters use ASProx's Fast Fluxing Services
Money Mules Syndicate Actively Recruiting Since 2002
This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter.
They are back, with a currently ongoing money mule recruitment campaign, this time not just attempting to recruit gullible users, but also, serving client-side exploits (CVE-2009-1492; CVE-2007-5659) through an embedded javascript on each and every page within the recruitment site.
Let's dissect the campaign, expose the client-side exploits serving domains, the Zeus-crimeware serving domains parked within the same netblock as the mule recruitment site itself, to ultimately expose a bogus company for furniture hosting a pretty descriptive cv.exe that is dropped on the infected host.
Initial recruitment email sent from financialcefin@aol.com:
Hello, Our Company is ready to offer full and part time job in your region. It is possible to apply for a well-paid part time job from your state. More information regarding working and cooperation opportunities will be sent upon request. Please send all further correspondence ONLY to Company's email address: james.mynes.cf@gmail.com Best regards
Response received:
Greetings,
Cefin Consulting & Finanace company thanks you for being interested in our offer. All additional information about our company you may read at our official site. www.ceffincfin.com Below the details of vacancy operational scheme:
1. The payment notice and the details of the beneficiary for further payment transfer will be e-mailed to your box. All necessary instructions regarding the payment will be enclosed.
2. As a next step, you'll have to withdraw cash from our account.
3. Afterwards you shall find the nearest Western Union office and make a transfer. Important: Only your first and last names shall be mentioned in the Western Union Form! No middle name (patronymic) is written! Please check carefully the spelling of the name, as it has to correspond to the spelling in the Notice.
4. Go back home soonest possible and advise our operator on the payment details (Sender’s Name, City, Country, MTCN (Money Transfer Control Number), Transfer Amount).
5. Our operator will receive the money and send it to the customer.
6. Please be ready to accept and to make similar transfers 2-5 times a week or even more often. Therefore you have to be on alert to make a Western Union payment any time.
1) First name 2) Last name 3) Country 4) City 5) Zip code 6) Home Phone number, Work Phone number, Mobile Phone number 7) Bank account info: a) Bank name b) Account name c) Account number d) Sort code 8) Scan you passport or driver license
2010 © Cefin Consulting & Finance
All right reserved.
Money mule recruitment URL: ceffincfin.com - 93.186.127.252 - Email: winter343@hotmail.com - currently flagged as malicious.
Once obfuscated, the javascript attempts to load the client-side exploits serving URL click-clicker.com /click/in.cgi?3 - 195.78.109.3; 195.78.108.221 - Email: aniwaylin@yahoo.com, or click-clicker.com - 195.78.109.3 - Email: aniwaylin@yahoo.com.
Sample campaign structure:
- click-clicke.com /cgi-bin/plt/n006106203302r0009R81fc905cX409b2ddfY0a607663Z0100f055
Parked on the same IP (91.213.174.52) are also the following client-side exploit serving domains:
click-reklama.com - Email: tahli@yahoo.com
googleinru.in - Email: mirikas@gmail.com
Within AS29106, VolgaHost-as PE Bondarenko Dmitriy Vladimirovich, we also have the following client-side exploits/crimeware friendly domains:
benlsdenc.com - Email: blablaman25@gmail.com
nermdusa.com - Email: polakurt69@gmail.com
mennlyndy.com - Email: albertxxl@gmail.com
kemilsy.com - Email: VsadlusGruziuk@gmail.com
benuoska.com - Email: godlikesme44@gmail.com
Name server of notice ns1.ginserdy.com - 93.186.127.205 - Email: albertxxl@gmail.com and ns1.ndnsgw.net - 195.78.109.3 - Email: aniwaylin@yahoo.com. have been also registered using the same emails as the original client-side exploit serving domains.
Sample detection rates, and phone back locations:
- cefin.js - Troj/IFrame-DY - Result: 1/42 (2.39%)
- clicker.pdf - Exploit.PDF-JS.Gen; Exploit:Win32/Pdfjsc.EM - Result: 21/42 (50.00%)
- clicker2.exe - TR/Sasfis.akdv.1; Trojan.Sasfis.akdv.1; Trojan.Win32.Sasfis.akdv - Result: 18/42 (42.86%)
- cv.exe - Trojan.Siggen1.15304 - Result: 3/42 (7.15%)
- 1.exe - Suspicious:W32/Malware!Gemini - Result: 4/42 (9.53%)
Upon execution, the sample phones back to Oficla/Sasfis C&C at socksbot.com /isb/gate.php?magic=121412150001&ox=2-5-1-2600&tm=3&id=24905431&cache=4154905385& - 195.78.109.3 - Email: aniwaylin@yahoo.com which drops pozitiv.md/master/cv.exe - 217.26.147.24 - Email: v.pozitiv@mail.ru from the web site of a fake company for furniture (PoZITIVe SRL).
Interestingly, today the update location has been changed to tds-style.spb.ru /error/1.exe. Detection rate:
- 1.exe - Suspicious:W32/Malware!Gemini - Result: 4/42 (9.53%)
Keeping the money mules on a short leash series, are prone to expand. Stay tuned!
Related coverage of money laundering in the context of cybercrime:
Keeping Money Mule Recruiters on a Short Leash - Part Three
Money Mule Recruiters on Yahoo!'s Web Hosting
Dissecting an Ongoing Money Mule Recruitment Campaign
Keeping Money Mule Recruiters on a Short Leash - Part Two
Keeping Reshipping Mule Recruiters on a Short Leash
Keeping Money Mule Recruiters on a Short Leash
Standardizing the Money Mule Recruitment Process
Inside a Money Laundering Group's Spamming Operations
Money Mule Recruiters use ASProx's Fast Fluxing Services
Money Mules Syndicate Actively Recruiting Since 2002
This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter.
Independent Security Consultancy, Threat Intelligence Analysis (OSINT/Cyber Counter Intelligence) and Competitive Intelligence research on demand. Insightful, unbiased, and client-tailored assessments, neatly communicated in the form of interactive reports - because anticipating the emerging threatscape is what shapes the big picture at the end of the day. Approach me at dancho.danchev@hush.com
Money Mule Recruitment Campaign Serving Client-Side Exploits
Remember Cefin Consulting & Finance, the bogus, money mule recruitment company that ironically tried to recruit me last month?
They are back, with a currently ongoing money mule recruitment campaign, this time not just attempting to recruit gullible users, but also, serving client-side exploits (CVE-2009-1492; CVE-2007-5659) through an embedded javascript on each and every page within the recruitment site.
Let's dissect the campaign, expose the client-side exploits serving domains, the Zeus-crimeware serving domains parked within the same netblock as the mule recruitment site itself, to ultimately expose a bogus company for furniture hosting a pretty descriptive cv.exe that is dropped on the infected host.
Initial recruitment email sent from financialcefin@aol.com:
Hello, Our Company is ready to offer full and part time job in your region. It is possible to apply for a well-paid part time job from your state. More information regarding working and cooperation opportunities will be sent upon request. Please send all further correspondence ONLY to Company's email address: james.mynes.cf@gmail.com Best regards
Response received:
Greetings,
Cefin Consulting & Finanace company thanks you for being interested in our offer. All additional information about our company you may read at our official site. www.ceffincfin.com Below the details of vacancy operational scheme:
1. The payment notice and the details of the beneficiary for further payment transfer will be e-mailed to your box. All necessary instructions regarding the payment will be enclosed.
2. As a next step, you'll have to withdraw cash from our account.
3. Afterwards you shall find the nearest Western Union office and make a transfer. Important: Only your first and last names shall be mentioned in the Western Union Form! No middle name (patronymic) is written! Please check carefully the spelling of the name, as it has to correspond to the spelling in the Notice.
4. Go back home soonest possible and advise our operator on the payment details (Sender’s Name, City, Country, MTCN (Money Transfer Control Number), Transfer Amount).
5. Our operator will receive the money and send it to the customer.
6. Please be ready to accept and to make similar transfers 2-5 times a week or even more often. Therefore you have to be on alert to make a Western Union payment any time.
Should you face any problems incurred in the working process, don’t hesitate to contact our operator immediately. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact us by e-mail. If you have understood the meaning of work and ready to begin working with us, please send us your INFO in the following format:
1) First name 2) Last name 3) Country 4) City 5) Zip code 6) Home Phone number, Work Phone number, Mobile Phone number 7) Bank account info: a) Bank name b) Account name c) Account number d) Sort code 8) Scan you passport or driver license
2010 © Cefin Consulting & Finance
All right reserved.
Money mule recruitment URL: ceffincfin.com - 93.186.127.252 - Email: winter343@hotmail.com - currently flagged as malicious.
Once obfuscated, the javascript attempts to load the client-side exploits serving URL click-clicker.com /click/in.cgi?3 - 195.78.109.3; 195.78.108.221 - Email: aniwaylin@yahoo.com, or click-clicker.com - 195.78.109.3 - Email: aniwaylin@yahoo.com.
Sample campaign structure:
- click-clicke.com /cgi-bin/plt/n006106203302r0009R81fc905cX409b2ddfY0a607663Z0100f055
Parked on the same IP (91.213.174.52) are also the following client-side exploit serving domains:
click-reklama.com - Email: tahli@yahoo.com
googleinru.in - Email: mirikas@gmail.com
Within AS29106, VolgaHost-as PE Bondarenko Dmitriy Vladimirovich, we also have the following client-side exploits/crimeware friendly domains:
benlsdenc.com - Email: blablaman25@gmail.com
nermdusa.com - Email: polakurt69@gmail.com
mennlyndy.com - Email: albertxxl@gmail.com
kemilsy.com - Email: VsadlusGruziuk@gmail.com
benuoska.com - Email: godlikesme44@gmail.com
Name server of notice ns1.ginserdy.com - 93.186.127.205 - Email: albertxxl@gmail.com and ns1.ndnsgw.net - 195.78.109.3 - Email: aniwaylin@yahoo.com. have been also registered using the same emails as the original client-side exploit serving domains.
Sample detection rates, and phone back locations:
- cefin.js - Troj/IFrame-DY - Result: 1/42 (2.39%)
- clicker.pdf - Exploit.PDF-JS.Gen; Exploit:Win32/Pdfjsc.EM - Result: 21/42 (50.00%)
- clicker2.exe - TR/Sasfis.akdv.1; Trojan.Sasfis.akdv.1; Trojan.Win32.Sasfis.akdv - Result: 18/42 (42.86%)
- cv.exe - Trojan.Siggen1.15304 - Result: 3/42 (7.15%)
- 1.exe - Suspicious:W32/Malware!Gemini - Result: 4/42 (9.53%)
Upon execution, the sample phones back to Oficla/Sasfis C&C at socksbot.com /isb/gate.php?magic=121412150001&ox=2-5-1-2600&tm=3&id=24905431&cache=4154905385& - 195.78.109.3 - Email: aniwaylin@yahoo.com which drops pozitiv.md/master/cv.exe - 217.26.147.24 - Email: v.pozitiv@mail.ru from the web site of a fake company for furniture (PoZITIVe SRL).
Interestingly, today the update location has been changed to tds-style.spb.ru /error/1.exe. Detection rate:
- 1.exe - Suspicious:W32/Malware!Gemini - Result: 4/42 (9.53%)
Keeping the money mules on a short leash series, are prone to expand. Stay tuned!
Related coverage of money laundering in the context of cybercrime:
Keeping Money Mule Recruiters on a Short Leash - Part Three
Money Mule Recruiters on Yahoo!'s Web Hosting
Dissecting an Ongoing Money Mule Recruitment Campaign
Keeping Money Mule Recruiters on a Short Leash - Part Two
Keeping Reshipping Mule Recruiters on a Short Leash
Keeping Money Mule Recruiters on a Short Leash
Standardizing the Money Mule Recruitment Process
Inside a Money Laundering Group's Spamming Operations
Money Mule Recruiters use ASProx's Fast Fluxing Services
Money Mules Syndicate Actively Recruiting Since 2002
This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter.
They are back, with a currently ongoing money mule recruitment campaign, this time not just attempting to recruit gullible users, but also, serving client-side exploits (CVE-2009-1492; CVE-2007-5659) through an embedded javascript on each and every page within the recruitment site.
Let's dissect the campaign, expose the client-side exploits serving domains, the Zeus-crimeware serving domains parked within the same netblock as the mule recruitment site itself, to ultimately expose a bogus company for furniture hosting a pretty descriptive cv.exe that is dropped on the infected host.
Initial recruitment email sent from financialcefin@aol.com:
Hello, Our Company is ready to offer full and part time job in your region. It is possible to apply for a well-paid part time job from your state. More information regarding working and cooperation opportunities will be sent upon request. Please send all further correspondence ONLY to Company's email address: james.mynes.cf@gmail.com Best regards
Response received:
Greetings,
Cefin Consulting & Finanace company thanks you for being interested in our offer. All additional information about our company you may read at our official site. www.ceffincfin.com Below the details of vacancy operational scheme:
1. The payment notice and the details of the beneficiary for further payment transfer will be e-mailed to your box. All necessary instructions regarding the payment will be enclosed.
2. As a next step, you'll have to withdraw cash from our account.
3. Afterwards you shall find the nearest Western Union office and make a transfer. Important: Only your first and last names shall be mentioned in the Western Union Form! No middle name (patronymic) is written! Please check carefully the spelling of the name, as it has to correspond to the spelling in the Notice.
4. Go back home soonest possible and advise our operator on the payment details (Sender’s Name, City, Country, MTCN (Money Transfer Control Number), Transfer Amount).
5. Our operator will receive the money and send it to the customer.
6. Please be ready to accept and to make similar transfers 2-5 times a week or even more often. Therefore you have to be on alert to make a Western Union payment any time.
1) First name 2) Last name 3) Country 4) City 5) Zip code 6) Home Phone number, Work Phone number, Mobile Phone number 7) Bank account info: a) Bank name b) Account name c) Account number d) Sort code 8) Scan you passport or driver license
2010 © Cefin Consulting & Finance
All right reserved.
Money mule recruitment URL: ceffincfin.com - 93.186.127.252 - Email: winter343@hotmail.com - currently flagged as malicious.
Once obfuscated, the javascript attempts to load the client-side exploits serving URL click-clicker.com /click/in.cgi?3 - 195.78.109.3; 195.78.108.221 - Email: aniwaylin@yahoo.com, or click-clicker.com - 195.78.109.3 - Email: aniwaylin@yahoo.com.
Sample campaign structure:
- click-clicke.com /cgi-bin/plt/n006106203302r0009R81fc905cX409b2ddfY0a607663Z0100f055
Parked on the same IP (91.213.174.52) are also the following client-side exploit serving domains:
click-reklama.com - Email: tahli@yahoo.com
googleinru.in - Email: mirikas@gmail.com
Within AS29106, VolgaHost-as PE Bondarenko Dmitriy Vladimirovich, we also have the following client-side exploits/crimeware friendly domains:
benlsdenc.com - Email: blablaman25@gmail.com
nermdusa.com - Email: polakurt69@gmail.com
mennlyndy.com - Email: albertxxl@gmail.com
kemilsy.com - Email: VsadlusGruziuk@gmail.com
benuoska.com - Email: godlikesme44@gmail.com
Name server of notice ns1.ginserdy.com - 93.186.127.205 - Email: albertxxl@gmail.com and ns1.ndnsgw.net - 195.78.109.3 - Email: aniwaylin@yahoo.com. have been also registered using the same emails as the original client-side exploit serving domains.
Sample detection rates, and phone back locations:
- cefin.js - Troj/IFrame-DY - Result: 1/42 (2.39%)
- clicker.pdf - Exploit.PDF-JS.Gen; Exploit:Win32/Pdfjsc.EM - Result: 21/42 (50.00%)
- clicker2.exe - TR/Sasfis.akdv.1; Trojan.Sasfis.akdv.1; Trojan.Win32.Sasfis.akdv - Result: 18/42 (42.86%)
- cv.exe - Trojan.Siggen1.15304 - Result: 3/42 (7.15%)
- 1.exe - Suspicious:W32/Malware!Gemini - Result: 4/42 (9.53%)
Upon execution, the sample phones back to Oficla/Sasfis C&C at socksbot.com /isb/gate.php?magic=121412150001&ox=2-5-1-2600&tm=3&id=24905431&cache=4154905385& - 195.78.109.3 - Email: aniwaylin@yahoo.com which drops pozitiv.md/master/cv.exe - 217.26.147.24 - Email: v.pozitiv@mail.ru from the web site of a fake company for furniture (PoZITIVe SRL).
Interestingly, today the update location has been changed to tds-style.spb.ru /error/1.exe. Detection rate:
- 1.exe - Suspicious:W32/Malware!Gemini - Result: 4/42 (9.53%)
Keeping the money mules on a short leash series, are prone to expand. Stay tuned!
Related coverage of money laundering in the context of cybercrime:
Keeping Money Mule Recruiters on a Short Leash - Part Three
Money Mule Recruiters on Yahoo!'s Web Hosting
Dissecting an Ongoing Money Mule Recruitment Campaign
Keeping Money Mule Recruiters on a Short Leash - Part Two
Keeping Reshipping Mule Recruiters on a Short Leash
Keeping Money Mule Recruiters on a Short Leash
Standardizing the Money Mule Recruitment Process
Inside a Money Laundering Group's Spamming Operations
Money Mule Recruiters use ASProx's Fast Fluxing Services
Money Mules Syndicate Actively Recruiting Since 2002
This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter.
Tags:
Client-Side Exploits,
Client-Side Vulnerabilities,
Cybercrime,
Exploits,
Hacking,
Information Security,
Money Laundering,
Money Mule,
Money Mule Recruitment,
Security,
Vulnerabilities
Independent Security Consultancy, Threat Intelligence Analysis (OSINT/Cyber Counter Intelligence) and Competitive Intelligence research on demand. Insightful, unbiased, and client-tailored assessments, neatly communicated in the form of interactive reports - because anticipating the emerging threatscape is what shapes the big picture at the end of the day. Approach me at dancho.danchev@hush.com
Monday, March 29, 2010
Copyright Lawsuit Filed Against You Themed Malware Campaign
Having just received a copy of what appears to be the last active domain involved in last week's "Copyright Lawsuit filed against you" themed malware campaign, it's time to conduct a brief assessment of its inner workings.
Subject used: Copyright Lawsuit filed against you
Sample message: March 24, 2010
Crosby & Higgins
350 Broadway, Suite 300
New York, NY 10013
To Whom It May Concern:
On the link bellow is a copy of the lawsuit that we filed against you in court on March 11, 2010. Currently the Pretrail Conference is scheduled for April 11th, 2010 at 10:30 A.M. in courtroom #36. The case number is 3485934. The reason the lawsuit was filed was due to a completely inadequate response from your company for copyright infrigement that our client Touchstone Advisories Inc is a victim of Copyright infrigement
www.touchstoneadvisorsonline.com /lawsuit/suit_documents.doc
Touchstone Advisories Inc has proof of multiple Copyright Law violations that they wish to present in court on April 11th, 2010.
Sincerely,
Mark R. Crosby
Crosby & Higgins LLP
Detection rates:
- complaint.doc - Downloader.Lapurd - Result: 22/39 (56.42%)
- complaint_docs.pdf - Trojan-Clicker.Win32.Cycler.odn - Result: 27/42 (64.29%)
Samples phone back to:
- 121.14.149.132 /fwq/indux.php?U=RANDOM_DATA - AS4134, CHINA-TELECOM China Telecom
- 121.14.149.132 /hia12/ter.php?u=UserName&c=COMPUTERNAME&v=RANDOM_DATA
Active C&C administration panel at: 121.14.149.132 /hia12/sca.php - returns "SSL ONLY.. USE HTTPS"
Spamvertised domains involved in the campaign:
- touchstoneadvisorsonline.com /lawsuit/suit_documents.doc - 72.167.232.84
- marcuslawcenter.com /s/r439875.doc - 173.201.145.1 - Email: info@tedvernon.com
- danilison.com/suit /complaint.doc - 72.167.183.15
- daughtersofcolumbus.com /suit/complaint.doc - ACTIVE - 173.201.97.1 - Email: charlenej@stny.rr.com
The same phone back IP was also profiled in another campaign from January, 2010.
Clearly, the cybercriminals behind it are aiming to stay beneath the radar, by relying on not so well profiled malicious infrastructure, combined with newly introduced campaigns in an attempt to make it harder to establish historical connections (Read about the "aggregate-and-forget" concept in respect to botnets/malware) between the rest of the their malicious activities.
This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter.
Subject used: Copyright Lawsuit filed against you
Sample message: March 24, 2010
Crosby & Higgins
350 Broadway, Suite 300
New York, NY 10013
To Whom It May Concern:
On the link bellow is a copy of the lawsuit that we filed against you in court on March 11, 2010. Currently the Pretrail Conference is scheduled for April 11th, 2010 at 10:30 A.M. in courtroom #36. The case number is 3485934. The reason the lawsuit was filed was due to a completely inadequate response from your company for copyright infrigement that our client Touchstone Advisories Inc is a victim of Copyright infrigement
www.touchstoneadvisorsonline.com /lawsuit/suit_documents.doc
Touchstone Advisories Inc has proof of multiple Copyright Law violations that they wish to present in court on April 11th, 2010.
Sincerely,
Mark R. Crosby
Crosby & Higgins LLP
Detection rates:
- complaint.doc - Downloader.Lapurd - Result: 22/39 (56.42%)
- complaint_docs.pdf - Trojan-Clicker.Win32.Cycler.odn - Result: 27/42 (64.29%)
Samples phone back to:
- 121.14.149.132 /fwq/indux.php?U=RANDOM_DATA - AS4134, CHINA-TELECOM China Telecom
- 121.14.149.132 /hia12/ter.php?u=UserName&c=COMPUTERNAME&v=RANDOM_DATA
Active C&C administration panel at: 121.14.149.132 /hia12/sca.php - returns "SSL ONLY.. USE HTTPS"
Spamvertised domains involved in the campaign:
- touchstoneadvisorsonline.com /lawsuit/suit_documents.doc - 72.167.232.84
- marcuslawcenter.com /s/r439875.doc - 173.201.145.1 - Email: info@tedvernon.com
- danilison.com/suit /complaint.doc - 72.167.183.15
- daughtersofcolumbus.com /suit/complaint.doc - ACTIVE - 173.201.97.1 - Email: charlenej@stny.rr.com
The same phone back IP was also profiled in another campaign from January, 2010.
Clearly, the cybercriminals behind it are aiming to stay beneath the radar, by relying on not so well profiled malicious infrastructure, combined with newly introduced campaigns in an attempt to make it harder to establish historical connections (Read about the "aggregate-and-forget" concept in respect to botnets/malware) between the rest of the their malicious activities.
This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter.
Independent Security Consultancy, Threat Intelligence Analysis (OSINT/Cyber Counter Intelligence) and Competitive Intelligence research on demand. Insightful, unbiased, and client-tailored assessments, neatly communicated in the form of interactive reports - because anticipating the emerging threatscape is what shapes the big picture at the end of the day. Approach me at dancho.danchev@hush.com
Wednesday, March 24, 2010
Zeus Crimeware/Client-Side Exploits Serving Campaign in the Wild
UPDATED: Friday, March 26, 2010: In a typical multi-tasking fashion like the one we've seen in previous campaigns, more typosquatted domains are being introduced, this time using the well known IRS Fraud Application theme. What's worth pointing out is that, just like the "Scareware, Sinowal, Client-Side Exploits Serving Spam Campaign in the Wild" campaign from last week, the current one is also launched on Friday.The reason? A pointless attempt by the gang to increase the lifecycle of the campaign.
- Sample URL: irs.gov.faodqt.com.pl /fraud.applications/application/statement.php
- Client-side exploits serving iFrame URL: klgs.trfafsegh.com /index.php
- Sample detection rate: tax-statement.exe - Trojan-Spy.Win32.Zbot - Result: 29/42 (69.05%), phones back to shopinfmaster .com/cnf/shopinf.jpg
Spamvertised and currently active fast-fluxed domains include:
fercca.com.pl
fercci.com.pl
ferkci.com.pl
fercki.com.pl
foodat.com.pl
foocit.com.pl
forcit.com.pl
footit.com.pl
ferckt.com.pl
forckt.com.pl
foodot.com.pl
footot.com.pl
faodqt.com.pl
foodyt.com.pl
redee3e.com
redee3e.com.pl
redee3e.pl
redee3o.com.pl
eddpiii.com.pl
eddsiii.com.pl
eddsiip.com.pl
eddsiui.com.pl
eddsiuo.com.pl
eddsiuy.com.pl
edduiip.com.pl
edduiiz.com.pl
edduyiz.com.pl
edouyiz.com.pl
ekouyiz.com.pl
Name server of notice:
ns1.globalistory.net - 87.117.245.9 - Email: tompsongand@aol.com
One of TROYAK-AS's most aggressive customers (used to host their Zeus C&Cs there) for Q1, 2010, is once again (latest campaign is from March 12th 2010 - Scareware, Sinowal, Client-Side Exploits Serving Spam Campaign in the Wild) attempting to build a crimeware botnet, by spamvertising the well known PhotoArchive theme, in between serving client-side exploits using an embedded iFrame on the domains in question.
In terms of quality assurance, the campaign is continuing to use it's proven campaign structure. The actual pages are hosting a binary for manual download, in between the iFrame which would inevitably drop the Zeus crimeware.
Just like in previous campaigns, the gang continues to exclusively registering its domains using the ALANTRON BLTD. domain registrar. Let's dissect the ongoing campaign's structure, and expose the domains, and ASs participating in it.
Sample URL/subdomain structure:
archive.pasweq.co.kr /id1007zx/get.php?email=email@mail.com
photostock.pasweq.co.kr
archives.pasweq.co.kr
letitbit.pasweq.co.kr
photobank.pasweq.co.kr
photosbank.pasweq.co.kr
photostock.pasweq.co.kr
Sample message: "Photos Archives Hosting has a zero-tolerance policy against ILLEGAL content. All archives and links are provided by 3rd parties. We have no control over the content of these pages. We take no responsibility for the content on any website which we link to, please use your own discretion while surfing the links. © 2007-2009, Photos Archives Hosting Group, Inc.- ALL RIGHTS RESERVED."
Sample iFrame campaign structure:
- cogs.trfafsegh.com /index.php
- cogs.trfafsegh.com /l.php
- cogs.trfafsegh.com /statistics.php
- klgs.trfafsegh.com /index.php
- klgs.trfafsegh.com /l.php
- klgs.trfafsegh.com /statistics.php
Parked on the same IP where the iFrame domain is are also the following Zeus C&Cs - dogfoog.net - Email: drier@qx8.ru; countrtds.ru - Email: thru@freenetbox.ru - AS4134 (CHINANET-BACKBONE No.31,Jin-rong Street)Detection rates: zeus.js - Trojan.JS.Agent.bik - 1/41 (2.44%) serving update.exe - PWS:Win32/Zbot.gen!R - Result: 17/42 (40.48%), PhotoArchive.exe - Trojan.Zbot - Result: 18/41 (43.91%). The client-side exploitation is relying on the Phoenix Exploit's Kit.
Samples phone back to: shopinfmaster.com /cnf/shopinf.jpg - 78.2.153.153; 75.172.92.77; 78.84.78.179; 86.106.228.77; 184.56.245.136;68.49.19.6 - Email: Duran@example.com shopinfmaster.com /shopinf/gate.php
Relying on the ns1.starwarfan.net name server, which is also connected to other Zeus crimeware C&Cs which also respond the same IPs - smotri123.com - Email: smot-smot@yandex.ru domainsupp.net - Email: ErnestJBooth@example.com

Active and fast-fluxed subdomains+domains participating in the campaign:
pasweokz.com - Email: romavesela@yahoo.com
pasweq.co.kr - Email: romavesela@yahoo.com
archive.pasweokz.com
archive.pasweq.co.kr
archives.pasweokz.com
archives.pasweq.co.kr
letitbit.pasweokz.com
letitbit.pasweq.co.kr
photobank.pasweokz.com
photobank.pasweq.co.kr
photosbank.pasweokz.com
photosbank.pasweq.co.kr
photoshock.pasweokz.com
photoshock.pasweq.co.kr
photostock.pasweokz.com
photostock.pasweq.co.kr
Name servers currently in use were also seen in February, 2010 (IRS/PhotoArchive Themed Zeus/Client-Side Exploits Serving Campaign in the Wild)
ns1.addressway.net - 87.117.192.79 - Email: poolbill@hotmail.com
ns1.skc-realty.com - 87.117.192.79 - Email: skc@realty.net
Updates will be posted as soon as new developments emerge. Consider going through the related posts, to catch up with the gang's activities for Q1, 2010.
Related posts:
Scareware, Sinowal, Client-Side Exploits Serving Spam Campaign in the Wild
TROYAK-AS: the cybercrime-friendly ISP that just won’t go away
AS50215 Troyak-as Taken Offline, Zeus C&Cs Drop from 249 to 181
Outlook Web Access Themed Spam Campaign Serves Zeus Crimeware
Pushdo Serving Crimeware, Client-Side Exploits and Russian Bride Scams
PhotoArchive Crimeware/Client-Side Exploits Serving Campaign in the Wild
Tax Report Themed Zeus/Client-Side Exploits Serving Campaign in the Wild
Keeping Money Mule Recruiters on a Short Leash - Part Two
This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter.
Independent Security Consultancy, Threat Intelligence Analysis (OSINT/Cyber Counter Intelligence) and Competitive Intelligence research on demand. Insightful, unbiased, and client-tailored assessments, neatly communicated in the form of interactive reports - because anticipating the emerging threatscape is what shapes the big picture at the end of the day. Approach me at dancho.danchev@hush.com
Tuesday, March 23, 2010
GazTransitStroy/GazTranZitStroy: From Scareware to Zeus Crimeware and Client-Side Exploits
Remember 2009's GazTransitStroy/GazTranZitStroy LLC, AS29371?
The fake Russian gas company whose motto was "In gaz we trust"? It appears that in order to stay competitive within the cybercrime ecosystem, they are now diversifying their offerings from hosting scareware domains and redirectors, to active Zeus crimeware campaigns, next to client-side exploits serving campaigns used as the infection vector.
- Go through previous posts detailing their activities: GazTranzitStroyInfo - a Fake Russian Gas Company Facilitating Cybercrime; GazTransitStroy/GazTranZitStroy Rubbing Shoulders with Petersburg Internet Network LLC
houstonhotelreal.com - 91.212.41.88 - Email: admin@houstonhotelreal.com
doctormiler.com - 91.212.41.14 - Email: cheburaskogro@yahoo.com
pipiskin.hk - 91.212.41.40 - Email: admin@pipiskin.hk
lopokerasandco.hk - 91.212.41.89 - Email: admin@lopokerasandco.hk
aervrfhu.ru - 91.212.41.88/109.196.143.60 - Email: samm_87@email.com
updateinfo22.com - 91.212.41.60/193.148.47.60 - Email: moonbeam@konocti.net
tumasolt.com - 91.212.41.123 - Email: stuns@5mx.ru
91.212.41.80
91.212.41.79
91.212.41.78
To this week's active Zeus campaigns:
cpadm21.cn - 91.212.41.31 - Email: Dalas_Illarionov@yahooo.com
doctormiler.com - 91.212.41.14 - Email: cheburaskogro@yahoo.com
91.212.41.80
91.212.41.79
91.212.41.78
GazTransitStroy is still in operation, acting as route for malicious activity, in the very same way it was interacting with other cyber-crime friendly ASs (EUROHOST-NET/Eurohost LLC) during 2009. Let's take a quick snapshot of malicious activity currently taking place at AS29371.
Detection rate for the Zeus crimeware phoning back to GazTransitStroy/GazTranZitStroy:
- Trojan.Zbot - Result: 8/41 (19.52%)
- TROJ_KRAP.SMDA - Result: 5/42 (11.91%)
- Packed.Win32.Krap.ae - Result: 10/42 (23.81%)
Client-side exploits (Spammer:Win32/Tedroo.AB; Win32:FakeAlert-JJ - Result: 31/42 (73.81%) serving domains/admin panels parked at 91.212.41.87:
hvcvjxcc.cn - Email: wang9619@163.com
fyyxqftc.cn - Email: wang9619@163.com
qymgeejd.cn - Email: wang9619@163.com
gjjdrgqf.cn - Email: wang9619@163.com
gdttjkug.cn - Email: wang9619@163.com
pgcnbgkk.cn - Email: wang9619@163.com
xvrlomwk.cn - Email: wang9619@163.com
bfhqrmtm.cn - Email: wang9619@163.com
cfssixsn.cn - Email: wang9619@163.com
vxoyqgcp.cn - Email: wang9619@163.com
hjwbxhqr.cn - Email: wang9619@163.com
frrszqot.cn - Email: wang9619@163.com
axaldjqt.cn - Email: wang9619@163.com
aafoocgv.cn - Email: wang9619@163.com
It's worth pointing out that fact that in February, a much more extensive portfolio of domains was parked on 195.88.190.30, with a small part of them, now responding to GazTransitStroy/GazTranZitStroy AS:
arufeudv.cn - Email: wang9619@163.com
axaldjqt.cn - Email: wang9619@163.com
bbivbblr.cn - Email: wang9619@163.com
cfssixsn.cn - Email: wang9619@163.com
dcueqzke.cn - Email: wang9619@163.com
drghzeap.cn - Email: wang9619@163.com
fqfmyvii.cn - Email: wang9619@163.com
gjjdrgqf.cn - Email: wang9619@163.com
gokzlykr.cn - Email: wang9619@163.com
gwsdwxae.cn - Email: wang9619@163.com
icnzlxyo.cn - Email: wang9619@163.com
inkqoevl.cn - Email: wang9619@163.com
izhdjcsu.cn - Email: wang9619@163.com
lsggdniu.cn - Email: wang9619@163.com
maaltsxg.cn - Email: wang9619@163.com
mdftfxek.cn - Email: wang9619@163.com
ntvftguu.cn - Email: wang9619@163.com
pgcnbgkk.cn - Email: wang9619@163.com
rbpwnrss.cn - Email: wang9619@163.com
rzwdcsey.cn - Email: wang9619@163.com
urybtnfb.cn - Email: wang9619@163.com
uzfbhofi.cn - Email: wang9619@163.com
vnvxltpr.cn - Email: wang9619@163.com
vordquyo.cn - Email: wang9619@163.com
xvrlomwk.cn - Email: wang9619@163.com
ycgezkpu.cn - Email: wang9619@163.com
ykcdffei.cn - Email: wang9619@163.com
yvuxksuk.cn - Email: wang9619@163.com
zdzhecim.cn - Email: wang9619@163.com
Fake codecs serving domains parked at 91.212.41.88:
real-time-tube.com - Email: admin@free-new-sex-video.com
myusmailservice.com
video-chronicle.com - Email: neujelivsamomdeli@safe-mail.net
yahoo-movies-online.com - Email: admin@yahoo-movies-online.com
houstonhotelreal.com - Email: admin@houstonhotelreal.com
sex-tapes-celebs.com - Email: wnscandals@gmail.com
evertrands.com - Email: moldavimo@safe-mail.net
myusmailservices.com - Email: admin@myusmailservices.com
xplacex.com - Email: i.jahmurphy@gmail.com
xsebay.com - Email: admin@xsebay.com
exsebay.com - Email: admin@exsebay.com
video-info.info - Email: videinfo@gmail.com
partner777.net - Email: potenciallio@safe-mail.net
video-trailers.net - Email: fullhdvid@gmail.com
primusdns.ru - Email: samm_87@email.com
aervrfhu.ru - Email: samm_87@email.com
Sample redirection takes place through the following sampled domain:
- yahoo-movies-online.com/ iframe7.php
- real-web-tube.com/ xplay.php?id=40018 - 59.53.91.124
- multimediasupersite.com/ video-plugin.40018.exe - 62.212.66.93
Serving video-plugin.40018.exe - W32/FakeAlert.FT.gen!Eldorado - Result: 10/42 (23.81%), which phones back to:
yourartmuseum.com/fakbwq.php?q=RANDOM - 66.96.219.38 - Email: davidearhart@rocketmail.com
rareartonline.com - 64.191.44.73 - Email: fellows@nonpartisan.com
sportscararts.com - 209.159.146.234 - Email: cdaniels@pennsylvania.usa.com
expressautoarts.com - 69.10.35.253 - Email: cdaniels@pennsylvania.usa.com
zenovy.com/resolution.php - 66.96.222.198
bokwer.com/borders.php - 64.120.144.119
Domains hosting the fake codec plugin are parked at 62.212.66.93:
bestinternetmedia.com - Email: shoemaker@angelic.com
supermediaworld.com - Email: shoemaker@angelic.com
hottrackdvd.com - Email: bailey@theplate.com
multimediatoolguide.com - Email: severson@therange.com
thebettermovie.com - Email: bailey@theplate.com
movietoolonline.com - Email: severson@therange.com
movietoolvideo.com - Email: shann@techie.com
movielocationinfo.com - Email: maldonado@toke.com
bestmultimediademo.com - Email: mcchristian@ymail.com
dvddatacenter.com - Email: maldonado@toke.com
videotooldirect.com - Email: shann@techie.com
In gaz they trust, cybercriminals I don't trust.
This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter.
Independent Security Consultancy, Threat Intelligence Analysis (OSINT/Cyber Counter Intelligence) and Competitive Intelligence research on demand. Insightful, unbiased, and client-tailored assessments, neatly communicated in the form of interactive reports - because anticipating the emerging threatscape is what shapes the big picture at the end of the day. Approach me at dancho.danchev@hush.com
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