Thursday, October 20, 2011

Dissecting the Ongoing Mass SQL Injection Attack


The ongoing mass SQL injection attack, has already affected over a million web sites. Cybercriminals performing active search engines reconnaissance have managed to inject a malicious script into ASP ASP.NET websites.

From client-side exploits to bogus Adobe Flash players, the campaign is active and ongoing. In this intelligence brief, we'll dissect the campaign and establish a direct connection between the campaign and last March's Lizamoon mass SQL injection attack.

SQL injected domains -- thanks to Dasient's Tufan Demir for the ping:
nbnjki.com/urchin.js - 146.185.248.3 - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com
jjghui.com/urchin.js - 146.185.248.3 - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com
bookzula.com/ur.php - 146.185.248.3 - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com
bookgusa.com/ur.php - 146.185.248.3 - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com
dfrgcc.com/ur.php - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com
statsl.com/ur.php - 111.22.111.111 - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com
milapop.com/ur.php - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com
jhgukn.com/ur.php - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com
vovmml.com/ur.php - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com
bookvivi.com/ur.php - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com

Responding to 146.185.248.3 is also file-dl.com; bookfula.com and bookvila.com - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com

Detection rate for urchin.js:
urchin.js - Trojan.JS.Redirector - 17/42 (40.5%)
MD5   : 4387f9be5af4087d21c4b44b969a870f
SHA1  : 8a47842ccf6d642043ee8db99d0530336eef6b99
SHA256: 975e62fe1d9415b9fa06e8f826f776ef851bd030c2c897bc3fbee207519f8351

The redirections take place as follows:
  • bookzula.com/ur.php -> www3.topasarmy.in/?w4q593n= - Email: bill.swinson@yahoo.com -> firstrtscaner.rr.nu
  • nbnjkl.com/urchin.js -> power-wfchecker.in/?1dlia916= - Email: bill.swinson@yahoo.com
bill.swinson@yahoo.com has also been used to register the following scareware-serving domains:
uberble-safe.in
uberate-safe.in
best-jsentinel.in
topantivir-foru.in
personalscannerlg.in
rideusfor.in
hardbsy-network.in
enablesecureum.in
hardynauchecker.in
best-jsentinel.in
smartklhdefense.in
smartaasecurity.in
personal-scan-4u.in
unieve-safe.in
safe-solutionsoft.in
hugeble-cure.in
topsecuritykauu.in
personalcleansoft.in
powerscanercis.in
topksfsecurity.in
hard-antivirbjb.in
strong-guardbxz.in
smart-suiteguard.in
thebestkrearmy.in
smart-guardianro.in
freeopenscanerpo.in
best-networkqjo.in
hard-antivirbjb.in
smartantivir-scanner.in
most-popularsoftcontent.in
bester-msecuriity.in
doneahme.in
strong-checkerwrt.in
safepowerforu.in
safe-securityarmy.in
personal-bpsentinel.in
personalcleansoft.in
ostestsystemri.in
saveinternet-guard.in
just-perfectprotection.in
firstholdermvq.in
just-perfectprotection.in
allcle-safe.in
brawaidme.in
uniind-safe.in
moreaz-fine.in
trueeox-safe.in
safexanet.in
personal-internet-foryou.in



For the time being, the campaing is redirecting to a fake YouTube page enticing users into downloading a bogus Adobe Flash player in order to view the video.

Detection rate for the bogus Adobe Flash player:
scandisk.exe - Backdoor:Win32/Simda.A - 8/43 (18.6%)
MD5   : fb4c93935346d2d8605598535528506e
SHA1  : 0ff7ccd785c0582e33c22f9b21156929ba7abaeb
SHA256: b204586cbac1606637361dd788b691f342cb1c582d10690209a989b040dab632

Upon execution the sample phones back to:
209.212.147.141/chrome/report.html
98.142.243.64/chrome/report.html

update.19runs10q3.com - 65.98.83.115

The same phone back locations have been used in a variety of related malware -- thanks to Kaspersky's David Jacoby for the ping. For instance, in this malware sample that's also phoning back to the same URLs, we have active HOSTS file modification as follows:

See related post:  Sampling Malicious Activity Inside Cybercrime-Friendly Search Engines

www.google.com.=87.125.87.99;
google.com.=87.125.87.103;
google.com.au.=87.125.87.104;
www.google.com.au.=87.125.87.147;
google.be.=77.125.87.148;
www.google.be.=77.125.87.149;
google.com.br.=77.125.87.109;
www.google.com.br.=77.125.87.150;
google.ca.=77.125.87.152;
www.google.ca.=77.125.87.153;
google.ch.=77.125.87.155;
www.google.ch.=77.125.87.158;
google.de.=77.125.87.160;
www.google.de.=77.125.87.161;
google.dk.=92.125.87.123;
www.google.dk.=92.125.87.160;
google.fr.=92.125.87.154;
www.google.fr.=92.125.87.134;
google.ie.=92.125.87.170;
www.google.ie.=92.125.87.177;
google.it.=92.125.87.173;
www.google.it.=92.125.87.147;
google.co.jp.=92.125.87.103;
www.google.co.jp.=84.125.87.147;
google.nl.=84.125.87.103;
www.google.nl.=84.125.87.147;
google.no.=84.125.87.103;
www.google.no.=84.125.87.147;
google.co.nz.=84.125.87.103;
www.google.co.nz.=84.125.87.147;
google.pl.=84.125.87.103;
www.google.pl.=64.125.87.147;
google.se.=64.125.87.103;
www.google.se.=64.125.87.147;
google.co.uk.=64.125.87.103;
www.google.co.uk.=64.125.87.147;
google.co.za.=64.125.87.103;
www.google.co.za.=64.125.87.147;
www.google-analytics.com.=64.125.87.101;
www.bing.com.=92.123.68.97;
search.yahoo.com.=72.30.186.249;
www.search.yahoo.com.=72.30.186.249;
uk.search.yahoo.com.=87.248.112.8;
ca.search.yahoo.com.=100.6.239.84;
de.search.yahoo.com.=87.248.112.8;
fr.search.yahoo.com.=87.248.112.8;
au.search.yahoo.com.=87.248.112.8;
ad-emea.doubleclick.net.=64.125.87.101;
www.statcounter.com.=64.125.87.101;

The Lizamoon mass SQL injection connection

The same email used to register the SQL injected domains jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com has been used to register the Lizamoon mass SQL injection attack domains extensively profiled here - "Dissecting the Massive SQL Injection Attack Serving Scareware".

Related posts:
This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter.

Dissecting the Ongoing Mass SQL Injection Attack


The ongoing mass SQL injection attack, has already affected over a million web sites. Cybercriminals performing active search engines reconnaissance have managed to inject a malicious script into ASP ASP.NET websites.

From client-side exploits to bogus Adobe Flash players, the campaign is active and ongoing. In this intelligence brief, we'll dissect the campaign and establish a direct connection between the campaign and last March's Lizamoon mass SQL injection attack.

SQL injected domains -- thanks to Dasient's Tufan Demir for the ping:
nbnjki.com/urchin.js - 146.185.248.3 - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com
jjghui.com/urchin.js - 146.185.248.3 - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com
bookzula.com/ur.php - 146.185.248.3 - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com
bookgusa.com/ur.php - 146.185.248.3 - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com
dfrgcc.com/ur.php - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com
statsl.com/ur.php - 111.22.111.111 - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com
milapop.com/ur.php - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com
jhgukn.com/ur.php - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com
vovmml.com/ur.php - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com
bookvivi.com/ur.php - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com

Responding to 146.185.248.3 is also file-dl.com; bookfula.com and bookvila.com - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com

Detection rate for urchin.js:
urchin.js - Trojan.JS.Redirector - 17/42 (40.5%)
MD5   : 4387f9be5af4087d21c4b44b969a870f
SHA1  : 8a47842ccf6d642043ee8db99d0530336eef6b99
SHA256: 975e62fe1d9415b9fa06e8f826f776ef851bd030c2c897bc3fbee207519f8351

The redirections take place as follows:
  • bookzula.com/ur.php -> www3.topasarmy.in/?w4q593n= - Email: bill.swinson@yahoo.com -> firstrtscaner.rr.nu
  • nbnjkl.com/urchin.js -> power-wfchecker.in/?1dlia916= - Email: bill.swinson@yahoo.com
bill.swinson@yahoo.com has also been used to register the following scareware-serving domains:
uberble-safe.in
uberate-safe.in
best-jsentinel.in
topantivir-foru.in
personalscannerlg.in
rideusfor.in
hardbsy-network.in
enablesecureum.in
hardynauchecker.in
best-jsentinel.in
smartklhdefense.in
smartaasecurity.in
personal-scan-4u.in
unieve-safe.in
safe-solutionsoft.in
hugeble-cure.in
topsecuritykauu.in
personalcleansoft.in
powerscanercis.in
topksfsecurity.in
hard-antivirbjb.in
strong-guardbxz.in
smart-suiteguard.in
thebestkrearmy.in
smart-guardianro.in
freeopenscanerpo.in
best-networkqjo.in
hard-antivirbjb.in
smartantivir-scanner.in
most-popularsoftcontent.in
bester-msecuriity.in
doneahme.in
strong-checkerwrt.in
safepowerforu.in
safe-securityarmy.in
personal-bpsentinel.in
personalcleansoft.in
ostestsystemri.in
saveinternet-guard.in
just-perfectprotection.in
firstholdermvq.in
just-perfectprotection.in
allcle-safe.in
brawaidme.in
uniind-safe.in
moreaz-fine.in
trueeox-safe.in
safexanet.in
personal-internet-foryou.in



For the time being, the campaing is redirecting to a fake YouTube page enticing users into downloading a bogus Adobe Flash player in order to view the video.

Detection rate for the bogus Adobe Flash player:
scandisk.exe - Backdoor:Win32/Simda.A - 8/43 (18.6%)
MD5   : fb4c93935346d2d8605598535528506e
SHA1  : 0ff7ccd785c0582e33c22f9b21156929ba7abaeb
SHA256: b204586cbac1606637361dd788b691f342cb1c582d10690209a989b040dab632

Upon execution the sample phones back to:
209.212.147.141/chrome/report.html
98.142.243.64/chrome/report.html

update.19runs10q3.com - 65.98.83.115

The same phone back locations have been used in a variety of related malware -- thanks to Kaspersky's David Jacoby for the ping. For instance, in this malware sample that's also phoning back to the same URLs, we have active HOSTS file modification as follows:

See related post:  Sampling Malicious Activity Inside Cybercrime-Friendly Search Engines

www.google.com.=87.125.87.99;
google.com.=87.125.87.103;
google.com.au.=87.125.87.104;
www.google.com.au.=87.125.87.147;
google.be.=77.125.87.148;
www.google.be.=77.125.87.149;
google.com.br.=77.125.87.109;
www.google.com.br.=77.125.87.150;
google.ca.=77.125.87.152;
www.google.ca.=77.125.87.153;
google.ch.=77.125.87.155;
www.google.ch.=77.125.87.158;
google.de.=77.125.87.160;
www.google.de.=77.125.87.161;
google.dk.=92.125.87.123;
www.google.dk.=92.125.87.160;
google.fr.=92.125.87.154;
www.google.fr.=92.125.87.134;
google.ie.=92.125.87.170;
www.google.ie.=92.125.87.177;
google.it.=92.125.87.173;
www.google.it.=92.125.87.147;
google.co.jp.=92.125.87.103;
www.google.co.jp.=84.125.87.147;
google.nl.=84.125.87.103;
www.google.nl.=84.125.87.147;
google.no.=84.125.87.103;
www.google.no.=84.125.87.147;
google.co.nz.=84.125.87.103;
www.google.co.nz.=84.125.87.147;
google.pl.=84.125.87.103;
www.google.pl.=64.125.87.147;
google.se.=64.125.87.103;
www.google.se.=64.125.87.147;
google.co.uk.=64.125.87.103;
www.google.co.uk.=64.125.87.147;
google.co.za.=64.125.87.103;
www.google.co.za.=64.125.87.147;
www.google-analytics.com.=64.125.87.101;
www.bing.com.=92.123.68.97;
search.yahoo.com.=72.30.186.249;
www.search.yahoo.com.=72.30.186.249;
uk.search.yahoo.com.=87.248.112.8;
ca.search.yahoo.com.=100.6.239.84;
de.search.yahoo.com.=87.248.112.8;
fr.search.yahoo.com.=87.248.112.8;
au.search.yahoo.com.=87.248.112.8;
ad-emea.doubleclick.net.=64.125.87.101;
www.statcounter.com.=64.125.87.101;

The Lizamoon mass SQL injection connection

The same email used to register the SQL injected domains jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com has been used to register the Lizamoon mass SQL injection attack domains extensively profiled here - "Dissecting the Massive SQL Injection Attack Serving Scareware".

Related posts:
This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter.

Tuesday, October 18, 2011

Spamvertised IRS-themed "Last Notice" Emails Serving Malware


Cybercriminals are once again impersonating the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for malware-serving purposes. In this intelligence brief, we'll dissect the malware campaign.

Spamvertised attachment: IRS_Calculations_#ID6749.zip
Spamvertised message: Notice, There are arrears reckoned on your account over a period of 2010-2011 year. You will find all calculations according to your financial debt, enclosed. You have to pay out the debt by the 17 December 2011. Yours sincerely, IRS.

- Detection rate:
IRS_Calculations.exe - W32/Yakes.B!tr - 34/40 (85.0%)
MD5   : e44eb03582f030d30251e6be384f6b32
SHA1  : eaa3d76534d247d04987b8950965d0142d770b29
SHA256: 18386f49580298eee73688ce5e626a9e332886c25403a991495e0a3250c53e32

Upon execution phones back to:
bitgale.com/404.php?type=stats&affid=574&subid=01&iruns - 31.44.184.42; AS15884 - Email: davidsiddins@gxmailbox.com
shbsharri.com/arkivi_files/574-01.exe - returns "Bandwidth Limit Exceeded" - 74.55.50.202; AS21844 - Email: contact@privacyprotect.org
shbsharri.com/arkivi_files/setup.exe - returns "Bandwidth Limit Exceeded"
shbsharri.com/arkivi_files/sl16.exe - returns "Bandwidth Limit Exceeded"
shbsharri.com/arkivi_files/sssss.exe - returns "Bandwidth Limit Exceeded"
gansgansgroup.ru/true/index.php?cmd=getgrab - Connect to 91.229.90.139 on port 80 ... failed
gansgansgroup.ru/true/index.php?cmd=getproxy - Connect to 91.229.90.139 on port 80 ... failed
gansgansgroup.ru/true/index.php?cmd=getload&login=4117AF14E694E469C&sel=donat&ver=5.1&bits=0&file=1&run=ok
gansgansgroup.ru/true/index.php?cmd=getsocks&login=4117AF14E694E469C&port=11925

gansgansgroup.ru - 91.229.90.139; AS6753 (responding to 91.229.90.139 is also falcononfly2006.ru - Email: makrogerhouse@yandex.ru) - Email: gansgansgroup.ru@allperson.ru

The same email makrogerhouse@yandex.ru, has been linked to a previously spamvertised IRS-themed malware campaign.

Clearly, both campaigns have been launched by the same cybercriminal.

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter.

Sunday, October 09, 2011

Spamvertised "IRS notice" Serving Malware


Cybercriminals are spamvertising yet another malware-serving campaign. Impersonating the IRS, malicious attackers are attempting to entice end users into downloading and executing a malicious file attachment. 

Spamvertised message: Tax notice, There are arrears reckoned on your account over a period of 2010-2011 year. You will find all calculations according to your financial debt, enclosed. Sincerely, Internal Revenue Service


Detection rate:
Calculations.exe - TrojanDownloader:Win32/Dofoil.D - 33/43 (76.7%)
MD5   : 178bb562d9c0ef2b0a87467dcbd945ee
SHA1  : 9ef75146aeb27102a1e5662284f369a43144225c
SHA256: d1551934d60033c871b377015c8be65d608b33543f149369d1e70361e06dc05e

Upon execution, it phones back to falcononfly2006.ru/blog/task.php?bid=2bfc680038ba2be7&os=5-1-2600&uptime=0&rnd=150156

falcononfly2006.ru - 91.229.90.139, AS6753 - Email: makrogerhouse@yandex.ru

makrogerhouse@yandex.ru is also associated with the following domains:
diamondexchange2011.ru
philippinemoney2011.ru
Bedownloader2011.ru
dolcekomarenoro2011.ru
forsalga102.ru
runescapegpge2011.ru
yomwarayom2001.ru
philippinemoney2011.ru
moneymgmt2011.ru
moneykeep2011.ru
firewallmakeover.ru
czechmoney2011.ru
communityspace2911.ru
brazilianmoney2011.r
u

Monitoring of the campaign is ongoing.

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter.

Tuesday, October 04, 2011

Spamvertised "NACHA security nitification" Serving Malware - Historical OSINT


The following intelligence brief will offer historical OSINT on the "NACHA security nitification" -- the typo is intentionally left as this is how the original campaign was spamvertised -- malware campaign.

Spamvertised body:
Dear Valued Client,We strongly believe that your account may have been compromised. Due to this, we cancelled the last ACH transactions:-(ID: 13104924)-(ID: 04804768)-(ID: 37527025)-(ID: 51633547)initiated from your bank account by you or any other person, who might have access to your account.Detailed report on initiated transactions and reasons for cancellation can be found in the attachment. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The ACH transaction (ID: 83612541), recently sent from your bank account (by you or any other person), was rejected by the Electronic Payments Association.
###############################################
Canceled transaction
Transaction ID:     83612541
Reason of rejection     See details in the report below
Transaction Report     report_1409.pdf.zip (ZIP archive, Adobe PDF)
###############################################
13450 Sunrise Valley Drive, Suite 100 Herndon, VA 20171 (703) 561-1100

2011 NACHA - The Electronic Payments Association


Spamvertised attachments: report_1409.pdf.zip; Report-8764.zip

Detection rate:
Report-8764.exe - Gen:Trojan.Heur.FU.bqW@amtJU@oi - 39/43 (90.7%)
MD5   : 7c131fa05e01fc32d8f4efe53aa883d1
SHA1  : 14d52d76dd7ccc595554486027634bf8c9877036
SHA256: 1ad11c1193f0dbcae3766e5cb4094acc137c10430d615e55470cbc41ce6cd03a

Upon execution the sample phones back to:
onemoretimehi.ru/piety.exe - 188.65.208.59; 178.208.91.192 - Email: admin@onemoretimehi.ru
onemoretimehi.ru/ftp/g.php

piety.exe - MD5: 4bd87ecc4423f0bc15e229ecbf33aa2c
onemoretimehi.ru/tops.exe - MD5: f076dbc365ec7bfc438ad3c728702122; 86c7489ac539a0b57a4d075e723075f0

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter.

Summarizing ZDNet's Zero Day Posts for September


The following is a brief summary of all of my posts at ZDNet's Zero Day for September. You can subscribe to my personal RSS feed, Zero Day's main feed, or follow me on Twitter:

01. Spamvertised 'Facebook notification' leads to exploits and malware 
02. Google, Mozilla and Microsoft ban the DigiNotar Certificate Authority in their browsers 
03. Microsoft themed ransomware variant spotted in the wild 
04. 'Man in wheelchair falls down the elevator shaft' scam spreading on Facebook 
05. New ransomware variant uses false child porn accusations 
06. Russian Embassy in London hit by a DDoS attack 
07. uTorrent.com hacked, serving scareware 
08. Bank of Melbourne Twitter account hacked, spreading phishing links 
09. Malicious spam campaigns proliferating 
10. Spamvertised 'We are going to sue you' emails lead to malware 
11. XSS bug in Skype for iPhone, iPad allows address book theft 
12. Researcher releases details on 6 SCADA vulnerabilities 
13. DIY botnet kit spotted in the wild 
14. New Mac OS X trojan poses as malicious PDF file 
15. Survey: 60 percent of users use the same password across more than one of their online accounts

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter.