Thursday, February 02, 2012

Summarizing Webroot's Threat Blog Posts for January


The following is a brief summary of all of my posts at Webroot's Threat Blog for January, 2012. You can subscribe to my Webroot's Threat Blog RSS Feed or follow me on Twitter:

01. Millions of harvested emails offered for sale
02. Email hacking for hire going mainstream
03. Mass SQL injection attack affects over 200,000 URLs
04. A peek inside the PickPocket Botnet
05. A peek inside the Cythosia v2 DDoS Bot
06. Google announces new anti-malware features in Chrome
07. Adobe issues a patch for critical security holes in Reader and Acrobat
08. Inside a clickjacking/likejacking scam distribution platform for Facebook
09. Zappos.com hacked, 24 million users affected
10. Inside AnonJDB – a Java based malware distribution platforms for drive-by downloads
11. How malware authors evade antivirus detection
12. A peek inside the Umbra malware loader
13. How phishers launch phishing attacks
14. Researchers intercept a client-side exploits serving malware campaign
15. A peek inside the uBot malware bot
16. Cisco releases ‘Cisco Global Threat Report’ for 4Q11
17. Cybercriminals generate malicious Java applets using DIY tools

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter.

Wednesday, February 01, 2012

Summarizing ZDNet's Zero Day Posts for January


The following is a brief summary of all of my posts at ZDNet's Zero Day for January, 2012. You can subscribe to my personal RSS feedZero Day's main feed, or follow me on Twitter:


01. 'Most beautiful' scams proliferate on Facebook
02. Android users hit by scareware scam
03. 'Remove Facebook Timeline' themed scam circulating on Facebook
04. Fake Kim Jong-il video distributing malware
05. Researchers spot pharmaceutical spam campaign using QR Codes
06. Report: Conficker and AutoRun infections proliferating
07. Researchers spot scammers using fake browser plug-ins
08. New variants of premium rate SMS trojan 'RuFraud' detected in the wild
09. Research: Spammers actively harvesting emails from Twitter in real-time
10. DreamHost hacked, mass password-reset issued

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter.

Monday, January 09, 2012

Who's Behind the Koobface Botnet? - An OSINT Analysis

It's full disclosure time.

In this post, I will perform an OSINT analysis, exposing one of the key botnet masters behind the infamous Koobface botnet, that I have been extensively profiling and infiltrating since day one. I will include photos of the botnet master, his telephone numbers, multiple email addresses, license plate for a BMW, and directly connect him with the infrastructure -- now offline or migrated to a different place -- of Koobface 1.0.

The analysis is based on a single mistake that the botnet master made - namely using his personal email for registering a domain parked within Koobface's command and control infrastructure, that at a particular moment in time was directly redirecting to the ubiquitous fake Youtube page pushed by the Koobface botnet.

Let's start from the basics. Here's an excerpt from a previous research conducted on the Koobface botnet:

However, what the Koobface gang did was to register a new domain and use it as Koobface C&C again parked at the same IP, which remains active - zaebalinax.com Email: krotreal@gmail.com - 78.110.175.15 - in particular zaebalinax.com/the/?pid=14010 which is redirecting to the Koobface botnet. Two more domains were also registered and parked there, u15jul .com and umidsummer .com - Email: 2009polevandrey@mail.ru which remain in stand by mode at least for the time being.

The Koobface botnet master's biggest mistake is using the Koobface infrastructure for hosting a domain that was registered with the botnet master's personal email address. In this case that zaebalinax.com and krotreal@gmail.com. zaebalinax.com is literally translated to "Gave up on Linux". UPDATED: Multiple readers have to contacted me to point out that zaebalinax is actually translated to "f*ck you all" or "you all are p*ssing me off".

The same email krotreal@gmail.com was used to advertise the sale of Egyptian Sphynx kittens on 05.09.2007:

The following telephone belonging to Anton was provided - +79219910190. The interesting part is that the same telephone was also used in another advertisement, this time for the sale of a BMW:


Photos of the BMW, offered for sale, by the same Anton that was using the Koobface infrastructure to host zaebalinax.com Email: krotreal@gmail.com:


 License plane for Anton's newest BMW:
Upon further analysis, it becomes evident that his real name is Anton Nikolaevich Korotchenko (Антон Николаевич Коротченко). Here are more details of this online activities:

Real name: Anton Nikolaevich Korotchenko (Антон Николаевич Коротченко)
City of origin: St. Petersburg
Primary address: Omskaya st. 26-61; St. Petersburg; Leningradskaya oblast,197343
Associated phone numbers obtained through OSINT analysis, not whois records:
+79219910190
+380505450601
050-545-06-01
ICQ - 444374
Emails: krotreal@yahoo.com
krotreal@gmail.com
krotreal@mail.ru
krotreal@livejournal.com
newfider@rambler.ru
WM identification (WEB MONEY) : 425099205053
Twitter account: @KrotReal; @Real_Koobface
Flickr account: KrotReal
Vkontakte.ru Account: KrotReal; tonystarx 
Foursquare Account: KrotReal

Photos of Koobface botnet's master Anton Nikolaevich Korotchenko (Антон Николаевич Коротченко):

Also, a chat log from 2003, identifies KrotReal while he's using the following IP -  krotreal@ip-534.dialup.cl.spb.ru

How do you trigger a change that would ultimately affect the entire cybercrime ecosystem? By personalizing cybercrime.

Go through previous research conducted on the Koobface botnet:
Koobface Redirectors and Scareware Campaigns Now Hosted in Moldova
The Koobface Gang Wishes the Industry "Happy Holidays"
Koobface Gang Responds to the "10 Things You Didn't Know About the Koobface Gang Post"
10 things you didn't know about the Koobface gang
How the Koobface Gang Monetizes Mac OS X Traffic
Koobface Botnet's Scareware Business Model - Part Two
Koobface Botnet's Scareware Business Model
From the Koobface Gang with Scareware Serving Compromised Site
Koobface Botnet Starts Serving Client-Side Exploits
Koobface-Friendly Riccom LTD - AS29550 - (Finally) Taken Offline
Dissecting Koobface Gang's Latest Facebook Spreading Campaign
Koobface - Come Out, Come Out, Wherever You Are
Dissecting Koobface Worm's Twitter Campaign
Koobface Botnet Redirects Facebook's IP Space to my Blog
Koobface Botnet Dissected in a TrendMicro Report
Massive Scareware Serving Blackhat SEO, the Koobface Gang Style
Movement on the Koobface Front - Part Two
Movement on the Koobface Front
Dissecting the Koobface Worm's December Campaign
The Koobface Gang Mixing Social Engineering Vectors
Dissecting the Latest Koobface Facebook Campaign

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter.