Summarizing ZDNet's Zero Day Posts for May

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June 06, 2012

The following is a brief summary of all of my posts at ZDNet's Zero Day for May, 2012. You can subscribe to my personal RSS feedZero Day's main feed, or follow me on Twitter:

 
01. Is Mozilla's Firefox 'click-to-play' feature a sound response to drive-by malware attacks?
02. Rogue Firefox extension hijacks browser sessions
03. Spamvertised 'PayPal payment notifications' lead to client-side exploits and malware
04. Israeli Institute for National Security Studies compromised, serving Poison Ivy DIY malware
05. Researchers spot new Web malware exploitation kit
06. 2012 Olympics themed malware circulating in the wild
07. New ransomware impersonates the U.S Department of Justice
08. Localized ransomware variants circulating in the wild
09. Cybercriminals offer bogus fraud insurance services
10. Researchers spot fake mobile antivirus scanners on Google Play
11. The cyber security implications of Iran's government-backed antivirus software
12. Q&A of the week: 'The current state of the cyber warfare threat' featuring Jeffrey Carr
13. Researchers intercept Tatanga malware bypassing SMS based transaction authorization
14. New SpyEye plugin takes control of crimeware victims' webcam and microphone
15. Comcast phishing site contains valid TRUSTe seal
16. Q&A of the Week: 'The current state of the cybercrime ecosystem' featuring Mikko Hypponen

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter. Continue reading →

Dissecting the Ongoing Client-Side Exploits Serving Lizamoon Mass SQL Injection Attacks

0
May 08, 2012
The Lizamoon mass SQL injection attacks gang is continuing to efficiently inject malicious code on hundreds of thousands of legitimate sites, for the purpose of serving fake security software -- also known as scareware -- and client-side exploits.

The latest round of the campaign is serving client-side exploits through multiple redirections taking place once the end user loads the malicious script embedded on legitimate sites. In comparison, in the past the gang used to monetize the hijacked traffic by serving scareware and bogus Adobe Flash Players.

What are some of the currently SQL injected malicious domains? How does the redirection take place? Did they take into consideration basic QA (quality assurance) tactics into place? Let's find out.


Currrently injected malicious domains are parked at 31.210.100.242 (AS42926, RADORE Hosting), with the following domains currently responding to that IP:
skdjui.com/r.php - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com
njukol.com/r.php - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com
hnjhkm.com/r.php - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com
nikjju.com/r.php - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com
hgbyju.com/r.php - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com
uhjiku.com/r.php - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com
uhijku.com/r.php - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com
werlontally.net/r.php - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com

March's round of malicious domains was hosted at 91.226.78.148 (AS56697, LISIK-AS OOO “Byuro Remontov “FAST”).

The redirection takes us to these two domains: www3.topcumaster.com - 75.102.21.120 (AS23352, SERVERCENTRAL)

Parked at 75.102.21.120 are also the following domains:
www3.personal-scanera.com - Email: benji.rubes@yahoo.com
www3.personalvoguard.com - Email: benji.rubes@yahoo.com
www3.hard-zdsentinel.com - Email: benji.rubes@yahoo.com
www3.bestbxcleaner.com - Email: benji.rubes@yahoo.com
www3.topcumaster.com - Email: benji.rubes@yahoo.com
www3.safe-defensefu.com - Email: benji.rubes@yahoo.com

and www1.safe-wnmaster.it.cx - 217.23.8.123 (AS49981, WorldStream)

Parked on 217.23.8.123 are also the following client-side exploits serving domains part of the Lizamoon mass SQL injection attacks:
www1.thebestscannerdc.it.cx/i.html
www1.safebh-defense.it.cx/i.html
www1.strongdkdefense.it.cx/i.html
www2.best-czsuite.it.cx/i.html
www1.smartmasterf.it.cx/i.html
www1.simplescanerei.it.cx/i.html
www1.bestic-network.it.cx/i.html
www1.topqonetwork.it.cx/i.html
www2.topasnetwork.it.cx/i.html
www1.powerynetwork.it.cx/i.html
www1.simplemasterzk.it.cx/i.html
www1.powerneholder.it.cx/i.html
www1.personalkochecker.it.cx/i.html
www1.smarthdschecker.it.cx/i.html
www1.safebacleaner.it.cx/i.html
www1.strongzkcleaner.it.cx/i.html
www1.topumcleaner.it.cx/i.html
www1.topgdscanner.it.cx/i.html
www1.smartwoscanner.it.cx/i.html
www1.safe-wnmaster.it.cx/i.html
www1.powervmaster.it.cx/i.html
www1.top-armyvs.it.cx/i.html
www2.saveocsoft.it.cx/i.html
www1.top-zjsoft.it.cx/i.html
www1.powerdefensekt.it.cx/i.html
www1.best-scanersw.it.cx/i.html
www1.powermb-security.it.cx/i.html
www1.strongxd-security.it.cx/i.html
www1.strongbtsecurity.it.cx/i.html

Client side exploits, CVE-2010-0188 and CVE-2012-0507 in particular are served through the i.html file located on these hosts. In order for the client-side exploitation process to take place, the redirection chain must be correct, if not the server will return a "404 Error Message" when requesting a specific file part of the campaign. There are no HTTP referrer checks in place, at least for the time being. What's particularly interesting about the current campaign, is that during a period of time, it will on purposely serve a "404 Error Message" no matter what happens.

Updates will be posted, as soon as new developments emerge.

Related posts:
This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter.
Continue reading →

Dissecting the Ongoing Client-Side Exploits Serving Lizamoon Mass SQL Injection Attacks

May 08, 2012
The Lizamoon mass SQL injection attacks gang is continuing to efficiently inject malicious code on hundreds of thousands of legitimate sites, for the purpose of serving fake security software -- also known as scareware -- and client-side exploits.

The latest round of the campaign is serving client-side exploits through multiple redirections taking place once the end user loads the malicious script embedded on legitimate sites. In comparison, in the past the gang used to monetize the hijacked traffic by serving scareware and bogus Adobe Flash Players.

What are some of the currently SQL injected malicious domains? How does the redirection take place? Did they take into consideration basic QA (quality assurance) tactics into place? Let's find out.


Currrently injected malicious domains are parked at 31.210.100.242 (AS42926, RADORE Hosting), with the following domains currently responding to that IP:
skdjui.com/r.php - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com
njukol.com/r.php - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com
hnjhkm.com/r.php - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com
nikjju.com/r.php - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com
hgbyju.com/r.php - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com
uhjiku.com/r.php - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com
uhijku.com/r.php - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com
werlontally.net/r.php - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com

March's round of malicious domains was hosted at 91.226.78.148 (AS56697, LISIK-AS OOO “Byuro Remontov “FAST”).

The redirection takes us to these two domains: www3.topcumaster.com - 75.102.21.120 (AS23352, SERVERCENTRAL)

Parked at 75.102.21.120 are also the following domains:
www3.personal-scanera.com - Email: benji.rubes@yahoo.com
www3.personalvoguard.com - Email: benji.rubes@yahoo.com
www3.hard-zdsentinel.com - Email: benji.rubes@yahoo.com
www3.bestbxcleaner.com - Email: benji.rubes@yahoo.com
www3.topcumaster.com - Email: benji.rubes@yahoo.com
www3.safe-defensefu.com - Email: benji.rubes@yahoo.com

and www1.safe-wnmaster.it.cx - 217.23.8.123 (AS49981, WorldStream)

Parked on 217.23.8.123 are also the following client-side exploits serving domains part of the Lizamoon mass SQL injection attacks:
www1.thebestscannerdc.it.cx/i.html
www1.safebh-defense.it.cx/i.html
www1.strongdkdefense.it.cx/i.html
www2.best-czsuite.it.cx/i.html
www1.smartmasterf.it.cx/i.html
www1.simplescanerei.it.cx/i.html
www1.bestic-network.it.cx/i.html
www1.topqonetwork.it.cx/i.html
www2.topasnetwork.it.cx/i.html
www1.powerynetwork.it.cx/i.html
www1.simplemasterzk.it.cx/i.html
www1.powerneholder.it.cx/i.html
www1.personalkochecker.it.cx/i.html
www1.smarthdschecker.it.cx/i.html
www1.safebacleaner.it.cx/i.html
www1.strongzkcleaner.it.cx/i.html
www1.topumcleaner.it.cx/i.html
www1.topgdscanner.it.cx/i.html
www1.smartwoscanner.it.cx/i.html
www1.safe-wnmaster.it.cx/i.html
www1.powervmaster.it.cx/i.html
www1.top-armyvs.it.cx/i.html
www2.saveocsoft.it.cx/i.html
www1.top-zjsoft.it.cx/i.html
www1.powerdefensekt.it.cx/i.html
www1.best-scanersw.it.cx/i.html
www1.powermb-security.it.cx/i.html
www1.strongxd-security.it.cx/i.html
www1.strongbtsecurity.it.cx/i.html

Client side exploits, CVE-2010-0188 and CVE-2012-0507 in particular are served through the i.html file located on these hosts. In order for the client-side exploitation process to take place, the redirection chain must be correct, if not the server will return a "404 Error Message" when requesting a specific file part of the campaign. There are no HTTP referrer checks in place, at least for the time being. What's particularly interesting about the current campaign, is that during a period of time, it will on purposely serve a "404 Error Message" no matter what happens.

Updates will be posted, as soon as new developments emerge.

Related posts:
SQL Injection Through Search Engines Reconnaissance
Massive SQL Injections Through Search Engine's Reconnaissance - Part Two
Massive SQL Injection Attacks - the Chinese Way
Cybercriminals SQL Inject Cybercrime-friendly Proxies Service
GoDaddy's Mass WordPress Blogs Compromise Serving Scareware
Dissecting the WordPress Blogs Compromise at Network Solutions
Yet Another Massive SQL Injection Spotted in the Wild
Smells Like a Copycat SQL Injection In the Wild
Fast-Fluxing SQL Injection Attacks
Obfuscating Fast-fluxed SQL Injected Domains Continue reading →

Summarizing Webroot's Threat Blog Posts for March

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April 09, 2012
The following is a brief summary of all of my posts at Webroot's Threat Blog for March, 2012. You can subscribe to my Webroot's Threat Blog RSS Feed or follow me on Twitter:

01. New service converts malware-infected hosts into anonymization proxies
02. Spamvertised ‘Temporary Limit Access To Your Account’ emails lead to Citi phishing emails
03. A peek inside the Darkness (Optima) DDoS Bot
04. Research: proper screening could have prevented 67% of abusive domain registrations
05. Spamvertised ‘Your accountant license can be revoked’ emails lead to client-side exploits and malware
06. Spamvertised ‘Google Pharmacy’ themed emails lead to pharmaceutical scams
07. Research: U.S accounts for 72% of fraudulent pharmaceutical orders
08. Millions of harvested U.S government and U.S military email addresses offered for sale
09. Spamvertised ‘Your tax return appeal is declined’ emails serving client-side exploits and malware
10. Malicious USPS-themed emails circulating in the wild
11. Spamvertised LinkedIn notifications serving client-side exploits and malware
12. Tens of thousands of web sites affected in ongoing mass SQL injection attack
13. Spamvertised Verizon-themed ‘Your Bill Is Now Available’ emails lead to ZeuS crimeware
14. Spamvertised ‘Scan from a Hewlett-Packard ScanJet’ emails lead to client-side exploits and malware

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter.  Continue reading →

Summarizing Webroot's Threat Blog Posts for February

0
March 07, 2012
The following is a brief summary of all of my posts at Webroot's Threat Blog for February, 2012. You can subscribe to my Webroot's Threat Blog RSS Feed or follow me on Twitter:

01. Research: Google’s reCAPTCHA under fire
02. Spamvertised ‘You have 1 lost message on Facebook’ campaign leads to pharmaceutical scams
03. A peek inside the Smoke Malware Loader
04. Researchers spot Citadel, a ZeuS crimeware variant
05. Researchers intercept two client-side exploits serving malware campaigns
06. Pharmaceutical scammers launch their own Web contest
07. The United Nations hacked, Team Poison claims responsibility
08. Report: Internet Explorer 9 leads in socially-engineered malware protection
09. Twitter adds HTTPS support by default
10. Spamvertised “Hallmark ecard” campaign leads to malware
11. Report: 3,325% increase in malware targeting the Android OS
12. Why relying on antivirus signatures is simply not enough anymore
13. Researchers intercept malvertising campaign using Yahoo’s ad network
14. A peek inside the Ann Malware Loader
15. Spamvertised ‘Termination of your CPA license’ campaign serving client-side exploits
16. How cybercriminals monetize malware-infected hosts
17. A peek inside the Elite Malware Loader
18. BlackHole exploit kits gets updated with new features

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter.  Continue reading →

Who's Behind the Koobface Botnet? - An OSINT Analysis

0
January 09, 2012
It's full disclosure time.

In this post, I will perform an OSINT analysis, exposing one of the key botnet masters behind the infamous Koobface botnet, that I have been extensively profiling and infiltrating since day one. I will include photos of the botnet master, his telephone numbers, multiple email addresses, license plate for a BMW, and directly connect him with the infrastructure -- now offline or migrated to a different place -- of Koobface 1.0.

The analysis is based on a single mistake that the botnet master made - namely using his personal email for registering a domain parked within Koobface's command and control infrastructure, that at a particular moment in time was directly redirecting to the ubiquitous fake Youtube page pushed by the Koobface botnet.

Let's start from the basics. Here's an excerpt from a previous research conducted on the Koobface botnet:

However, what the Koobface gang did was to register a new domain and use it as Koobface C&C again parked at the same IP, which remains active - zaebalinax.com Email: krotreal@gmail.com - 78.110.175.15 - in particular zaebalinax.com/the/?pid=14010 which is redirecting to the Koobface botnet. Two more domains were also registered and parked there, u15jul .com and umidsummer .com - Email: 2009polevandrey@mail.ru which remain in stand by mode at least for the time being.

The Koobface botnet master's biggest mistake is using the Koobface infrastructure for hosting a domain that was registered with the botnet master's personal email address. In this case that zaebalinax.com and krotreal@gmail.com. zaebalinax.com is literally translated to "Gave up on Linux". UPDATED: Multiple readers have to contacted me to point out that zaebalinax is actually translated to "f*ck you all" or "you all are p*ssing me off".

The same email krotreal@gmail.com was used to advertise the sale of Egyptian Sphynx kittens on 05.09.2007:

The following telephone belonging to Anton was provided - +79219910190. The interesting part is that the same telephone was also used in another advertisement, this time for the sale of a BMW:


Photos of the BMW, offered for sale, by the same Anton that was using the Koobface infrastructure to host zaebalinax.com Email: krotreal@gmail.com:


 License plane for Anton's newest BMW:
Upon further analysis, it becomes evident that his real name is Anton Nikolaevich Korotchenko (Антон Николаевич Коротченко). Here are more details of this online activities:

Real name: Anton Nikolaevich Korotchenko (Антон Николаевич Коротченко)
City of origin: St. Petersburg
Primary address: Omskaya st. 26-61; St. Petersburg; Leningradskaya oblast,197343
Associated phone numbers obtained through OSINT analysis, not whois records:
+79219910190
+380505450601
050-545-06-01
ICQ - 444374
Emails: krotreal@yahoo.com
krotreal@gmail.com
krotreal@mail.ru
krotreal@livejournal.com
newfider@rambler.ru
WM identification (WEB MONEY) : 425099205053
Twitter account: @KrotReal; @Real_Koobface
Flickr account: KrotReal
Vkontakte.ru Account: KrotReal; tonystarx 
Foursquare Account: KrotReal

Photos of Koobface botnet's master Anton Nikolaevich Korotchenko (Антон Николаевич Коротченко):

Also, a chat log from 2003, identifies KrotReal while he's using the following IP -  krotreal@ip-534.dialup.cl.spb.ru

How do you trigger a change that would ultimately affect the entire cybercrime ecosystem? By personalizing cybercrime.

Go through previous research conducted on the Koobface botnet:
Koobface Redirectors and Scareware Campaigns Now Hosted in Moldova
The Koobface Gang Wishes the Industry "Happy Holidays"
Koobface Gang Responds to the "10 Things You Didn't Know About the Koobface Gang Post"
10 things you didn't know about the Koobface gang
How the Koobface Gang Monetizes Mac OS X Traffic
Koobface Botnet's Scareware Business Model - Part Two
Koobface Botnet's Scareware Business Model
From the Koobface Gang with Scareware Serving Compromised Site
Koobface Botnet Starts Serving Client-Side Exploits
Koobface-Friendly Riccom LTD - AS29550 - (Finally) Taken Offline
Dissecting Koobface Gang's Latest Facebook Spreading Campaign
Koobface - Come Out, Come Out, Wherever You Are
Dissecting Koobface Worm's Twitter Campaign
Koobface Botnet Redirects Facebook's IP Space to my Blog
Koobface Botnet Dissected in a TrendMicro Report
Massive Scareware Serving Blackhat SEO, the Koobface Gang Style
Movement on the Koobface Front - Part Two
Movement on the Koobface Front
Dissecting the Koobface Worm's December Campaign
The Koobface Gang Mixing Social Engineering Vectors
Dissecting the Latest Koobface Facebook Campaign

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter. Continue reading →