Monday, April 21, 2008

China's CERT Annual Security Report - 2007

Every coin has two sides, and while China has long embraced unrestricted warfare and people's information warfare for conducting cyber espionage, China's networked infrastructure is also under attack, and is logically used as stepping stone to hit others country's infrastructures, thereby contributing to the possibility to engineer cyber warfare tensions.

A week ago, China's CERT released their annual security report (in Chinese for the time being), outlining the local threatscape with data indicating the increasing efficiency applied by Turkish web site defacement groups, in between the logical increases in spam/phishing and malware related incidents. Here's an excerpt from the report :

"According CNCERT / CC monitoring found that in 2007 China's mainland are implanted into the host Trojans alarming increase in the number of IP is 22 times last year, the Trojans have become the largest Internet hazards. Underground black mature industrial chain for the production and the large number of Trojans wide dissemination provides a very convenient conditions, Trojan horses on the Internet led to the proliferation of a lot of personal information and the privacy of data theft, to the personal reputation and cause serious economic losses; In addition, the Trojans also increasingly being used to steal state secrets and secrets of the state and enterprises incalculable losses, the Chinese mainland are implanted into the Trojan Horse computer controlled source, the majority in China's Taiwan region, the phenomenon has been brought to the agency's attention. Zombie network is still the basic network attacks platform means and resources. 2007 CNCERT / CC sampling found to be infected with a zombie monitoring procedures inside and outside the mainframe amounted to 6.23 million, of which China's mainland has 3.62 million IP addresses were implanted zombie mainframe procedures, and more than 10,000 outside the control server to China Host mainland control. Zombie networks primarily be used launch denial of service (DdoS) attacks, send spam, spread malicious code, as well as theft of the infected host of sensitive information, issued by the zombie network flow, distributed DDOS attack is recognized in the world problems not only seriously affect the operation of the Internet business, but also a serious threat to China's Internet infrastructure in the safe operation. 2007 China's Internet domain name registration and the use of quantitative rapid growth, reaching 11.93 million, an annual growth rate of 190.4 percent, while hackers use of domain names has become a major tool. Use of domain names, the attackers could be flexible, hidden website linked to the implementation of large-scale horse zombie network control, network malicious activities such as counterfeiting. Fast-Flux domain names, such as dynamic analysis technologies, resulting in accordance with the IP to the attacks more difficult to trace and block; 2007 domain names which has been in use analytical services for the existence of security flaws, the public domain analysis of the server domain hijacking security incidents, a large number of users without knowing the circumstances of their fishing lure to the site or sites containing malicious code, such incidents very great danger. Therefore, the strengthening of the management of domain names and domain names analytic system's security protection is very important."

6.23 million botnet participating hosts according to their stats, where 3.62 million are Chinese IPs is a great example of how the Chinese Internet infrastructure's getting heavily abused by experienced malware and botnet masters, primarily taking advantage of what's old school social engineering, and outdated malware infection techniques, which undoubtedly will work given China's immature and inexperienced from a security perspective emerging Internet generation.

Getting back to the globalization and efficiency of Turkish web site defacement groups' worldwide web application security audit, indicated in the report, according to China's CERT these are the top 10 defacers, where 7 are well known Turkish ones, and 3 are interestingly Chinese :

sinaritx - 1731 defacements
1923turk - 1417 defacements
the freedom - 1156 defacements
aLpTurkTegin - 1052 defacements
Mor0Ccan Islam Defenders Team - 864 defacements
iskorpitx - 761 defacements
lucifercihan - 525 defacements

It's also interesting to see pro-democratic Chinese hackers attacking homeland networks.

Cyber warfare tensions engineering is only starting to take place, and state sponsored or perhaps even tolerated cyber espionage building capabilities in order for the state to later on acquire the already developed resources and capabilities in a cost-effective manner. However, considering the recent cyber attacks against "Free Tibet" movements, as well as the DDoS attack attempts at CNN due to CNN's coverage of Tibet, Chinese cyber warriors continue demonstrating people's information warfare, and Internet PSYOPs by developing an anti-cnn.com (121.52.208.243) community, with some catchy altered images from the originals broadcasted worldwide, and with a special section to improve China's image across the world.

And logically, there's a PSYOPs centered malware released in the wild, a sample of which is basically embedding links to a non-existent domain, descriptive enough to point to TibetIsAPartOFChina.com :

%\CommonDocuments%\My Music\My Playlists\WWW.cgjSFGrz_TibetIsAPartOFChina.COM

%CommonDocuments%\My Music\WWW.bimStzno_TibetIsAPartOFChina.COM

%CommonDocuments%\My Videos\WWW.kUJs_TibetIsAPartOFChina.COM

%CommonPrograms%\Accessories\Accessibility\WWW.RSulr_TibetIsAPartOFChina.COM

%CommonPrograms%\Accessories\System Tools\WWW.aEGXBl_TibetIsAPartOFChina.COM

Now that's effective digital PSYOPs, isn't it? If you're visionary enough to tolerate the development of underground communities, whereas ensuring their nationalism level remain a priority for anything they do, you end up with a powerful cyber army whose every action perfectly fits with your political and military doctrine, without you even bothering to coordinate their efforts, thereby eliminating the need for a command and control structure.

Related posts:

China's Cyber Espionage Ambitions
Chinese Hackers Attacking U.S Department of Defense Networks
Inside the Chinese Underground Economy
China's Cyber Warriors - Video

Friday, April 18, 2008

Phishing Emails Generating Botnet Scaling

A bigger and much more detailed picture is starting to emerge, with yet another spammed malware campaign courtesy of the botnet that is so far responsible for a massive flood of fake Windows updates, phishing emails targeting the usual diverse set of brands, fake yahoo greeting cards, and most recently delivering "executable news items", through Backdoor.Agent.AJU malware infected hosts.

Within the first five minutes, thirty three (33) phishing emails attempted to be delivered out of a sample infected host, all of them targeting NatWest or The National Westminster Bank Plc. Here are some samples, that of course never made it out to their recipient :

- Sender Address: "NatWest Internet Banking '2008" to Recipient: <@fs1.ge.man.ac.uk>Subject: Natwest Bank Bankline: Confirm Your Login Email Content: //ver2.natwest-commercial3.com/customerupdate?tag=3D19ecygtKZDzrozrznhOzn These directives are to be sent and followed by all members of the NatWest Private and Corporate Natwest does apologize for any problems caused, and is very thankful for your cooperation. If you are not client of Natwest OnLine Banking please ignore this notice! *** This is robot generated message please do not reply *** (C) 2008 Natwest Bankline. All Rights Reserved. Attached File: "ods096.gif" (image/gif)


- Sender Address: "NatWest Bank On-line Banking'2008" to Recipient: <@bbc.co.uk> Subject: Natwest OnLine Banking Important Notice From Technical Department Id: 9044 Email Content: //ver2.natwest-commercial3.com/customerupdate?tag=3D15urOBFDffkOkhOvp These directives are to be sent and followed by all members of the NatWest Private and Corporate Natwest does apologize for any problems caused, and is very thankful for your cooperation. If you are not client of Natwest OnLine Banking please ignore this notice! *** This is robot generated message please do not reply *** (C) 2008 Natwest Bankline. All Rights Reserved. Attached File: "ods096.gif" (image/gif)

- Sender Address: "Natwest Bank Internet Banking Support" to Recipient: <@yahoo.co.uk> Subject: NatWest Private and Corporate: Confirm Your Login Password Email Content: //ver2.natwest-commercial3.com/customerupdate?tag=3D24ecyuczfscwzbDtcwhhOkhOvp These directives are to be sent and followed by all members of the NatWest Private and Corporate Natwest does apologize for any problems caused, and is very thankful for your cooperation. If you are not client of Natwest OnLine Banking please ignore this notice! *** This is robot generated message please do not reply *** (C) 2008 Natwest Bankline. All Rights Reserved.

- Sender Address: "Natwest Private and Corporate Support" to Recipient: <@yahoo.co.uk> Subject: Natwest Bankline Internet Banking Important: Submit Your Records id: 1191 Email Content: //pool32-nwolb20.com/customerupdate?cid=3D27kwszewcenzdFECKDtcwhhOkhOvp These directives are to be sent and followed by all customers of the Natwest On-line Banking NatWest Bank does apologize for the troubles caused to you, and is very thankful for your collaboration. If you are not user of NatWest Bank Digital Banking please delete this letter! *** This is automatically generated message please do not reply *** (C) 2008 Natwest Bank On-line Banking. All Rights Reserved. Attached File: "rwu909.gif" (image/gif)


- Sender Address: "Natwest Private and Corporate Support" to Recipient: <@56bridgwater.fsnet.co.uk> Subject: Natwest Internet Banking: Please Update Your Internet Banking Details Email Content: //pool32-nwolb20.com/customerupdate?cid=3D37kwszewcnnhrrDRCfszlaucndsOoerdnOkhOvp These directives are to be sent and followed by all customers of the Natwest On-line Banking NatWest Bank does apologize for the troubles caused to you, and is very thankful for your collaboration. If you are not user of NatWest Bank Digital Banking please delete this letter! *** This is automatically generated message please do not reply *** (C) 2008 Natwest Bank On-line Banking. All Rights Reserved. Attached File: "rwu909.gif" (image/gif)

What is making an impression besides the malicious economies of scale achieved on behalf of the malware infected hosts used for sending, and as we've already seen, hosting and phishing pages and the malware itslef? It's the campaing's targeted nature in respect to the segmented emails database used for achieving a better response rate. The National Westminster Bank Plcis a U.K bank, and 10 out of 15 email recepient are of U.K citizens, the rest are targeting Italian users. Malware variants signal their presence to 66.199.241.98/forum.php and try to obtain campaigns to participate in, this is a sample detection rate for the latest fake news items one, and more details on the domains and nameservers used in the latest campaign :

news_report-pdf_content.exe
Scanners result : 14/31 (45.17%)
Backdoor.Win32.Agent.gvk; Backdoor:Win32/Agent.ACG
File size: 45056 bytes
MD5...: c4849207a94d1db4a0211f88e84b0b59
SHA1..: 32ef2a074d563370f46738565ecf9bb53c75909c
SHA256: 12a124cc2352f3ef68ddf06e0ed111c617d95cffd807dc502ae474960a60411c

An internal nameservers ecosystem within the botnet, active and resolving :

ns1.ns4.ns2.ns3.id759.com
ns3.ns1.id759.com
ns1.ns2.ns1.ns4.ns2.ns3.id759.com
ns1.ns2.ns3.id759.com
ns1.ns2.ns4.id759.com
ns1.ns4.ns4.ns2.ns3.id759.com
ns2.id759.com
ns2.ns1.ns2.ns3.id759.com
ns2.ns1.ns2.ns4.id759.com
ns3.ns2.ns1.ns2.ns3.id759.com
ns4.ns1.ns1.ns2.ns3.id759.com

Yet another internal nameservers ecosystem within the botnet :

ns1.serial43.in
ns2.serial43.in
ns3.serial43.in
ns4.serial43.in
ns1.ns1.ns1.serial43.in
ns1.ns2.ns1.ns1.serial43.in
ns1.ns2.ns2.serial43.in
ns1.ns4.ns1.ns1.serial43.in
ns2.ns1.ns2.serial43.in
ns2.ns1.ns4.ns1.ns1.serial43.in
ns2.ns2.ns1.ns1.serial43.in

To sum up - these are all of the domains currently active and used for the malware/spam/phishing campaigns on behalf of this botnet :

server52.org
set45.net
site83.net
sid95.com
shell54.com
siteid64.com
setup36.com
share73.com
service28.biz

There are several scenarious related to this particular botnet. Despite that it's the same piece of malware that's successfully adding new zombies to the infected population, the diversity of the campaigns, as well as the fact that for instance share73.com is registered by casta4000 @ mail.ru and is into the "reklama uslug" business which translates to advertising services, in this case spam and phishing emails sending on demand, access to the botnet could be either offered on demand, or the service itself performed in a typical managed spamming appliance outsourced business model. Are they also vertically integrating in respect to the fast-fluxing? Yes they are, since they're achieving it without the need to hire a managed fast-flux provider, which isn't excluding the possibility that they aren't in fact one themselves, as it's evident they've got the capability to become one.

Wednesday, April 16, 2008

Fake Yahoo Greetings Malware Campaign Circulating

The persistence of certain botnet masters cannot remain unnoticed even if you're used to going through over a dozen active malware campaigns per day, in this case it's their persistence that makes them worth assessing and profiling. The botnet which I assesed in February, the one that was crunching out phishing emails and using the infected hosts for hosting the pages, and parking the phishing domains, is still operational this time starting a fake Yahoo Greetings malware campaign by spamming the cybersquatted domains and enticing the user into updating their flash player with a copy of Backdoor.Agent.AJU.

Upon visiting www4.yahoo.american-greeting.com.tag38.com/ecards/view.pd.htm it redirects to www3.yahoo.americangreetings.com.id759.com/ecards/view.pd.htm

id759.com is currently responding to 24.161.232.218; 24.192.140.204; 68.36.236.67; 76.230.108.105; 83.5.203.163; 85.109.42.164; 216.170.109.206 and also to set45.net; service28.biz; setup36.com and serves the Backdoor.Agent :

www3.yahoo.americangreetings.com.id759.com/ecards/get_new_flashplayer .exe

Scanners Result : 12/31 (38.71%)
Suspicious:W32/Malware!Gemini; W32/Agent.Q.gen!Eldorado
File size: 44544 bytes
MD5...: fe97eb8c0518005075fd638b33d5b165
SHA1..: d7a4258e37ce0dab0f7d770d1a9d979e921be07b
SHA256: 138d31ae1bbdec215d980c7b57be6e624c2f2e1cacd3934b77f50be8adabfb97

"Backdoor.Agent.AJU is a malicious backdoor trojan that is capable to run and open random TCP port in a multiple instances attempting to connect to its predefined public SMTP servers. It then spams itself in email with a file attached in zip and password protected format. Furthermore, the password is included in the body of the email."

tag38.com is responding to 211.142.23.21, and is a part of a scammy ecosystem of other phishing and malware related domains responding to the same IP. And these are the related subdomains impersonating Yahoo Greetings within :

american-greeting.ca.xml52.com
www5.yahoo.american-greeting.ca.xml52.com
www9.yahoo.americangreeting.ca.www05.net
yahoo.americangreetings.com.droeang.net
yahoo.americangreetings.com.s8a1.psmtp.com
yahoo.americangreetings.com.s8a2.psmtp.com
yahoo.americangreetings.com.s8b1.psmtp.com
yahoo.americangreetings.com.s8b2.psmtp.com
yahoo.americangreetings.droeang.net
yahoo.americangreeting.ca.www05.net
www6.yahoo.american-greetings.com.www05.net

What you see when in a hurry is not what you get when you got time to look at it twice. This and the previous campaign launched by the same party is a great example of risk and responsibility forwarding, in this case to the infected party, so what used to be a situation where an infected host was sending spamming and phishing emails only, is today's malicious hosting infrastructure on demand.

Web Email Exploitation Kit in the Wild

XSS exploitation within the most popular Russian, and definitely international in the long-term, web email service providers is also embracing the efficiency mindset as a process. This web based exploitation kit is great example of customization applied to publicly known XSS vulnerabilities within a segmented set of web sites, email providers in this case.

The kit's pitch automatically translated :

"Ie script contains vulnerability to 15 - not the most popular Russian postal services (except
buy), and one of the largest foreign mail servers that provide free mail - mail.com. Three of the vulnerabilities work only under Internet Explorer, all the rest - under Internet Explorer and Opera.

The system also includes a 16 ready-to-use pages feykovyh authorization to enter the mail. Thus the use of the script is that you choose a template-XSS (code obhodyaschy security filters for your desired mail server) on which the attack would take place, complete field for a minimum of sending letters (sender, recipient, the subject, message) and choose Type of stuffing: 1) your own yavaskript code (convenient option to insert malicious code with iframe) 2) code, driving the victim to a page feykovuyu authorization. In the first case, the victim is in the browser's just a matter of your own scripte but in the second case, the victim is redirected to a page with false authorization, there enters its data, which logiruyutsya you, and sent back to his box. For the script is simple and free hosting with support for sendmail, php, but nonetheless you should be aware that for more kachetvennoy work will not prevent you buy a beautiful domain. Also appearing inexpensive paid updated as closing loopholes in the mail filters."

Automating the process of phishing by using the vulnerable sites as redirectors can outpace the success of the Rock Phish kit whose key success factor relies on diversity of the brands targeted whereas all the campaigns operate on the same IP.

Moreover, as we've seen recently, highly popular and high-profile sites whose ever growing web applications infrastructure continues to grow, still remain vulnerable to XSS vulnerabilities which were used in a successful blackhat SEO poisoning campaign by injecting IFRAME redirectors to rogue security applications in between live exploit URLs. In fact, Ryan Singel is also pointing out on such existing vulnerability at the CIA.gov, showcasing that spear phishing in times when phishers, spammers and malware authors are consolidating, can be just as effective for conducting cyber espionage, just as gathering OSINT through botnets by segmenting the infected population is. Why try to malware infect the high-profile targets, when they could already be malware infected?

Furthermore, XSS vulnerabilities within banking sites are also nothing new, and as always the very latest XSS vulnerabilities will go on purposely unreported by the time phishers move onto new ones. How about the customer service aspect given that this XSS exploitation kit is yet another example of a proprietary underground tool? If the XSS vulnerabilities aren't working, custom zero day XSS vulnerabilities within the providers can be provided to the customer. Commercializing XSS vulnerabilities is one thing, embedding the exploits in a do-it-yourself type of tool another, but positioning the kit as a efficient way for running your "Request an Email Account to be Hacked" business is entirely another, which is the case with the kit.

In 2008, is the infamous quote "Hack the Planet!" still relevant, or has it changed to "XSS the Planet!" already, perhaps even "Remotely File Include the Planet!"?

Tuesday, April 15, 2008

Malware and Exploits Serving Girls

Descriptive domains such as beautiful-and-lonely-girl dot com, amateur homepage looking sites, a modest photo archive of different girls, apparently amateur malware spreaders think that spamming these links to as many people as possible would entice them into visting the sites, thus infecting themselves with malware.

It all started with Lonely Polina, than came lonely Ms. Polinka, and now we have Victoria. And despite that Polina and Polinka are both connected in terms of the malware served, and the natural RBN connection in face of HostFresh, as well as the site template used, Victoria is an exception. Some details on the recently spammed campaign :

voena.net (199.237.229.158) is also responding to prettyblondywoman.com, where the exploit (WebViewFolderIcon setSlice) and the malware (Trojan-Spy.Win32.Goldun) are served from voena.net/incoming.php and voena.net/get.php, both with a high detection rate 27/32 (84.38%).

Individual homepages are dead, and this is perhaps where the social engineering aspect of the attack fails, all these girls for sure have their MySpace profiles up and running already, in between taking advantage of a popular photo sharing service.

Monday, April 14, 2008

Localized Fake Security Software

Would you believe that in times when top tier antivirus vendors are feeling the heat from the malware authors' DoS attacks on their honeyfarms, and literally cannot keep up with their releases, someone out there is using an antivirus scanner that doesn't really exist? It's one thing to promote fake security software in a one-to-many communication channel by using a single language in a combination with cybersquatted domains, and entirely another to do the same in different languages. Localization for anything malicious is already taking place, as originally anticipated as an emerging trend back in 2006. The following currently active fake security software scams are promoted in Dutch, French, German, Italian, and you don't get to download them until you hand out your credit card details, and once you do so, you'll end up in the same situation just like many other people did in the past. Some sample fake brands :

SpyGuardPro; PCSecureSystem; AntiWorm2008; WinSecureAv; MenaceRescue; PCVirusless; LifeLongPC; NoChanceForVirus; MenaceMonitor; TrojansFilter; TrojansFilter; LongLifePC; KnowHowProtection; BestsellerAntivirus; PCVirusSweeper; AVSystemCare; AVSecurityPlus; AVSecurityPlus; PCAssertor; PoseidonAntivirus; TrustedAntivirus; PCBoosterPro; DefensiveSystem; GoldenAntiSpy; AntiSpywareSuite; AntiMalwareShield; AntivirusPCSuite; AntivirusForAll; TrustedProtection; NoWayVirus; AntiSpywareConductor; AntiSpywareMaster; TurnkeyAntiVirus; YourSystemGuard;

Portfolio one :

alfaantivirus.com
antivirusalmassimo.com
farrevirus.com
fomputervagt.com
figitalerschutz.com
flmejorcuidado.com
ferramentantivirus.com
filterprogram.com
filtredevirus.com
geeninfectie.com
harddrivefilter.com
keineinfektionen.com
longueviepc.com
maseg.net
nonstopantivirus.com
pcantivirenloesung.com
pcsystemschutz.com
plutoantivirus.com
psbeveiligingssysteem.com
riendevirus.com
securepcguard.com
sekyuritikojo.com
sistemadedefensa.com
sumejorantivirus.com
totaltrygghet.com
viruscontrolleuer.com
viruswacht.com
votremeilleurantivirus.com
zeusantivirus.com

Portfolio two :

advancedcleaner.com
alltiettantivirus.com
antispionage.com
antispionagepro.com
antispypremium.com
antispywarecontrol.com
antispywaresuite.com
antiver2008.com
antivirusaskeladd.com
antivirusfiable.com
antivirusforall.com
antivirusforalla.com
antivirusfueralle.com
antivirusgenial.com
antivirusmagique.com
antivirusordi.com
antivirusparatodos.com
antiviruspcpakke.com
antiviruspcsuite.com
antiviruspertutti.com
antivirusscherm.com
antiworm2008.com
antiwurm2008.com
archivoprotector.com
avsystemcare.com
avsystemshield.com
barrevirus.com
bastioneantivirus.com
bestsellerantivirus.com
bortmedvirus.com
cerovirus.com
debellaworm2008.com
defensaantimalware.com
defensaantivirus.com
drivedefender.com
exterminadordevirus.com
fiksdinpc.com
mijnantivirus.com
mobileantiviruspro.com
norwayvirus.com
nowayvirus.com
pcantivirenloesung.com
plutoantivirus.com
viruscontrolleuer.com
zebraantivirus.com
zeusantivirus.com

Portfolio three :

pcsecuresystem.com
antiworm2008.com
winsecureav.com
menacerescue.com
pcvirusless.com
lifelongpc.com
nochanceforvirus.com
menacemonitor.com
trojansfilter.com
longlifepc.com
knowhowprotection.com
bestsellerantivirus.com
pcvirussweeper.com
antiespiadorado.com
avsecurityplus.com
apolloantivirus.com
pcassertor.com
menacesecure.com
poseidonantivirus.com
trustedantivirus.net
pcboosterpro.com
defensivesystem.com
goldenantispy.com
avsystemcare.com
trustedantivirus.com
antimalwareshield.com
avsystemcare.com
antiviruspcsuite.com
antivirusforall.com
trustedprotection.com
nowayvirus.com
pcantiviruspro.com
antispywareconductor.com
antispywaremaster.com
turnkeyantivirus.com
yoursystemguard.com

Just like a previous proactive incident response where I pointed out that these fake security applications are starting to appear as the final output in malicious campaigns injected
at high profile sites, ensuring that your customers or infrastructure cannot connect to these, will render current and upcoming massive IFRAME injected or embedded attacks pointless at least from the perspective of serving the rogue software.