Tuesday, October 27, 2009

Ongoing FDIC Spam Campaign Serves Zeus Crimeware

UPDATED - Wednesday, October 28, 2009: A "New Facebook Login System" spam campaign is in circulation, launched by the same botnet. Sampled updatetool.exe once again interacts with the Zeus command and control at 193.104.27.42.

Message sample 01: "In an effort to make your online experience safer and more enjoyable, Facebook will be implementing a new login system that will affect all Facebook users. These changes will offer new features and increased account security. Before you are able to use the new login system, you will be required to update your account. A new Facebook Update Tool has been released for your account. Please download and install the tool using the link below."

Message sample 02: "Dear Facebook user, In an effort to make your online experience safer and more enjoyable, Facebook will be implementing a new login system that will affect all Facebook users. These changes will offer new features and increased account security. Before you are able to use the new login system, you will be required to update your account. Click here to update your account online now. If you have any questions, reference our New User Guide. Thanks, The Facebook Team"


Participating fast-fluxed domains include:
easder1e.co .uk
easder1g.co .uk
easder1l.co .uk
easder1m.co .uk
easder1q.co .uk
nytre4rt.co .uk
nytre4ru.co .uk
nyuy12qwa.co .uk
nyuy12qwf.co .uk
nyuy12qwg.co .uk
nyuy12qws.co .uk
nyuy12qwz.co .uk
ololii.co .uk
ololiw.co .uk
ololiy.co .uk
ololiz.co .uk
tygerah.co .uk
tygerak.co .uk
tygeraw.co .uk
tygeraz.co .uk
yh1qak.co .uk
yh1qal.co .uk
yh1qao.co .uk
yhaqwe1a.co .uk
yhaqwe1q.co .uk
yhaqwe1r.co .uk
yhaqwi1g.co .uk
yhaqwi1h.co .uk
yhaqwi1l.co .uk
yhaqwi1m.co .uk
yhaqwi1p.co .uk
yhhherasde.co .uk
yhhherasdp.co .uk
yhhheraski.co .uk
yhhheraskog.co .uk
yhhheraskol.co .uk
yhhheraskoy.co .uk


n111sae .eu
n111sak .eu
n111sap .eu
n111saq .eu
n111say .eu
n111saz .eu
nyuh1awa .eu
nyuh1awb .eu
nyuh1awc .eu
nyuh1awd .eu
nyuh1awe .eu
nyuh1awf .eu
nyuh1awg .eu
nyuh1awh .eu
nyuh1awm .eu
nyuh1awn .eu
nyuh1aws .eu
nyuh1awt .eu
nyuh1awv .eu
nyuh1awx .eu
nyuh1awz .eu
nyuy12qwf .eu
nyuy12qwg .eu
nyuy12qws .eu


nyuy12qws .eu
ololii .eu
ololiw .eu
ololiy .eu
ololiz .eu
rrref1aaz .eu
rrref1akz .eu
rrref1okz .eu
rrref1ykz.eu
rrrefjokz .eu
saaasak .eu
saaasav .eu
tygerah .eu
tygerak .eu
tygeraw .eu
ujihkei .eu
ujihkni .eu
ujihkoi .eu
ujihkui .eu
yh1qao .eu
yh1qaz .eu
yy1azsva .eu
yy1azsvq .eu
yy1azsvz .eu
yyy1asvf .eu
yyy1azsy .eu
yyy1azvg .eu
yyy1zsve .eu


New DNS servers of notice:
ns1.a-recruitmnt .com
ns1.applesilver .com
ns1.cheryks .com
ns1.barbaos .net
ns1.laktocountry .net


An ongoing spam campaign impersonating The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, is attempting to drop zeus samples by enticing users into installing pdf.exe and word.exe.

"Subject: FDIC has officially named your bank a failed bank

Body: You have received this message because you are a holder of a FDIC-insured bank account. Recently FDIC has officially named the bank you have opened your account with as a failed bank, thus, taking control of its assets. You need to visit the official FDIC website and perform the following steps to check your Deposit Insurance Coverage."

Sampled malware obtains a Zeus crimeware from a known command and control location (193.104.27.42), already blacklisted by the Zeus Tracker. The campaign is related to the periodical "Microsoft Outlook Update" campaigns, since both campaigns have been sharing fast-flux infrastructure under the same infected hosts, using identical domains.

Fast-fluxed domains participating in the FDIC spam campaign:
bbttyak.co .uk
bbttyak.org .uk
bbttyam.co .uk
bbttyam.me .uk
bbttyap.co .uk
bbttyap.me .uk
bbttyaz.co .uk
bbttyaz.me .uk
gerrahawa .eu

gerrahowa .eu
gerrakawa .eu
gerrakowa .eu
gerralowa .eu
gerraoowa .eu
gerraoowa .eu
gerrasasa .eu
gerrasase .eu
gerrasasq .eu
h1erfae .eu
h1erfai .eu
h1erfaj .eu
h1erfaq .eu
h1erfar .eu
h1erfat .eu
h1erfau .eu
h1erfaw.eu
h1erfay .eu
heiiikok .eu
heiiikoy .eu
heiiikul .eu
heiiikum .eu

heiiikuv .eu
heiiikuy .eu
idllsit .com
ij1tli .net
immikiut1 .cz
j1t1iil .com
j1t1iil .eu

j1t1iil .net
lj1tli .com
lj1tli .net
lj1tll .com
lj1tll .net
ltlil1 .com
ltlil1 .net
modesftp .eu

nniuji1 .eu
nniujih .eu
nniujo1 .eu
nniukif .eu
nniukih .eu
nniukik .eu
nniukiw .eu
nniukiz .eu
nniuxih .eu
nniuxiw .eu
pouikib .eu
pouikic .eu
pouikie .eu
pouikif .eu
pouikig .eu
pouikir .eu
pouikis .eu
pouikit .eu
pouikiv .eu
pouikiw .eu
pouikix .eu
pouikiy .eu
t1fliil .tc
tj1fiil.co .nz
tj1fiil .com
tj1fiil .net
tj1fiil .tc


DNS servers of notice:
ns1.doctor-tomb .com
ns1.sortyn .com
ns1.asthomes .com
ns1.sunriseliny .com
ns1.racing-space .net
ns1.cerezit .net


The phoneback location 193.104.27.42 at AS12604 maintained by Kamushnoy Vladimir Vasulyovich (info@ctgm.info; vla.kam@ctgm.info with ctgm.info responding to 91.213.72.1) is the second Zeus command and control IP within the netblock, followed by 193.104.27.90.

Related posts:
Fake Microsoft patches themed malware campaigns spreading
Fake Microsoft patch malware campaign makes a comeback
The Multitasking Fast-Flux Botnet that Wants to Bank With You
Money Mule Recruiters use ASProx's Fast Fluxing Services
Managed Fast Flux Provider - Part Two
Managed Fast Flux Provider
Storm Worm's Fast Flux Networks
Fast Flux Spam and Scams Increasing
Fast Fluxing Yet Another Pharmacy Spam
Obfuscating Fast Fluxed SQL Injected Domains
Storm Worm Hosting Pharmaceutical Scams
Fast-Fluxing SQL injection attacks executed from the Asprox botnet

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog.

Wednesday, October 21, 2009

Koobface Botnet Redirects Facebook's IP Space to my Blog



Love me, love me, say that you love me. You know you're cherished when the Koobface botnet redirects Facebook Inc's entire IP space to your blog using HTTP Error 302 - Moved temporarily messages in an attempt to have Facebook's anti-malware crawlers hit my blog every time they visit a Koobface URL posted on the social networking site.


The result? Earlier this morning, I've noticed over 7,000 unique visits coming from Facebook Inc's IP space using active and automatically blogspot accounts part of the Koobface botnet as http referrers (New Koobface campaign spoofs Adobe's Flash updater), which is now officially relying on already infected hosts for the CAPTCHA recognition process. At first, I thought the Koobface gang has embedded an iFrame in order to achieve the effect, but the requests were coming from Facebook's IP space only.

A representative from Facebook's Security Incident Response Team just confirmed the development, and commented that they've added an exception, which is now visible since IPs from Facebook's IP space are no longer visiting my blog:

"Thanks for bringing this to our attention. I'm on the Security Incident Response team at Facebook and we just finished looking into this issue. We visit all links posted to Facebook as part of our link preview feature. We also take the opportunity to do some additional security screening to filter out bad content. Koobface in particular is fond of redirecting our requests to legitimate websites, and you seem to have done something to piss Koobface off. All visits to Koobface URLs from our IP space are currently being redirected to your blog."

The compete list of the automatically registered blogspot accounts, of whose existence Google's security team has already been notified are as follows:
1rykutviklingibtvedmongstad-vgnett .blogspot.com/
40-nrg .blogspot.com/
anyauujteykbrlzyt .blogspot.com/
bctdnvxyubozkute336 .blogspot.com/
bjfzibzxpjwfsri.blogspot .com/
bopscfmfdfkdcdk.blogspot .com/
bpucrtkuigcvuzd.blogspot .com/
dcljxlmkdpfyadlmk014.blogspot .com/
driwnhtqcifnewwy.blogspot .com/
fffgxdpmrhzepmwc172.blogspot .com/
frjutygrfzkfmumr.blogspot .com/
gbmasakrnbvduky-mhopomuytpmeo46.blogspot .com/
hmxmjrdpzncnania.blogspot .com/
hryuickbrfxpgkiqc-wnyohlytffli526.blogspot .com/
hxsdrjrbiesmulbp-mp775012.blogspot .com/
hz560607.blogspot .com/
irfwgrbghyzrnaajs-npqpnvzqrqqeziywhx8.blogspot .com/
isaqwpccpkvmmnffx.blogspot .com/
iunvrafuvbgykpap819.blogspot .com/
ixqowmtgwfvkaapq.blogspot .com/
jocdniqudpnszswn936.blogspot .com/
jxpxhokysarhvnfw-wvtbfawtlocf932 .blogspot.com/
kayaafwlllybvydpu.blogspot .com/
kfddbjhalrqkmqtoa.blogspot .com/
kutlvtfxkxbismwpci.blogspot .com/
kyqyiplztbsiwogx-hfnrmfxbkjzswjq964.blogspot .com/


kzbcbzhlgcnmmaveusdt2.blogspot .com/
lbwhvnvfmiwqypft-gt34676.blogspot .com/
lgjxsfcwkviythet.blogspot .com/
lvlcauoimpklqoj.blogspot .com/
moruokuamhtobznhwx.blogspot .com/
nfnnialisemtirdcq.blogspot .com/
pfmrjjvolrxsthdl.blogspot .com/
pywkyzxqcslnqyz907.blogspot .com/
qmhbxydgxfitnaosp.blogspot .com/
rfsnkstagwfwlkgr.blogspot .com/
rykutviklingibtvedmongstad-vgnett .blogspot.com/
scjftnvmcqiarvt-ni242558.blogspot .com/
skpjwfruzkzujvw.blogspot .com/
spfymrxnfiotvtrknf.blogspot .com/
sxcfugyjtvtwgxzvi.blogspot .com/
tbgkfbllzdtrcslpc741.blogspot .com/
unrrldfyuanstafa.blogspot .com/
vstikrflawgquztcn.blogspot .com/
wjfpuoiolcjvecszeb.blogspot .com/
wlaafuebvmdkaiavh.blogspot .com/
wnejhokyqkazwpu898.blogspot.com/
wqqcknikrlnowgri.blogspot .com/
xlmwrzdmywbibfwi742.blogspot .com/
yanksroadwinchangesalcsoutlook-mlbcom .blogspot.com/
yeqhabdnabhndbt.blogspot .com/
yzyweidzwor-cxgwufvosfam .blogspot.com/
zafxzlatzsmwysk.blogspot .com/
znfnxeaoiqhxldvmqo-atcsqbrkobwi408 .blogspot.com/
zqsvjeoqccknkfubc.blogspot .com/



The Koobface gang's use of basic blackhat SEO principles such as content cloaking are identical to their previous attempts to cover-up their malicious activities relying on pre-defined sets of http referrers of public search engines, or particular redirectors in order for their infections to take place.

Stay tuned for more developments on the Ali Baba and the 40 thieves LLC front, a.k.a as my Ukrainian "fan club". The circle is almost complete, a lot of recent events will be summarized shortly.

Related posts:
Koobface Botnet Dissected in a TrendMicro Report
Koobface Botnet's Scareware Business Model
Movement on the Koobface Front - Part Two
Movement on the Koobface Front
Koobface - Come Out, Come Out, Wherever You Are
Dissecting Koobface Worm's Twitter Campaign
Dissecting the Koobface Worm's December Campaign
Dissecting the Latest Koobface Facebook Campaign 
The Koobface Gang Mixing Social Engineering Vectors 

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog.

Koobface Botnet Redirects Facebook's IP Space to my Blog


Love me, love me, say that you love me. You know you're cherished when the Koobface botnet redirects Facebook Inc's entire IP space to your blog using HTTP Error 302 - Moved temporarily messages in an attempt to have Facebook's anti-malware crawlers hit my blog every time they visit a Koobface URL posted on the social networking site.

The result? Earlier this morning, I've noticed over 7,000 unique visits coming from Facebook Inc's IP space using active and automatically blogspot accounts part of the Koobface botnet as http referrers (New Koobface campaign spoofs Adobe's Flash updater), which is now officially relying on already infected hosts for the CAPTCHA recognition process. At first, I thought the Koobface gang has embedded an iFrame in order to achieve the effect, but the requests were coming from Facebook's IP space only.

A representative from Facebook's Security Incident Response Team just confirmed the development, and commented that they've added an exception, which is now visible since IPs from Facebook's IP space are no longer visiting my blog:

"Thanks for bringing this to our attention. I'm on the Security Incident Response team at Facebook and we just finished looking into this issue. We visit all links posted to Facebook as part of our link preview feature. We also take the opportunity to do some additional security screening to filter out bad content. Koobface in particular is fond of redirecting our requests to legitimate websites, and you seem to have done something to piss Koobface off. All visits to Koobface URLs from our IP space are currently being redirected to your blog."

The compete list of the automatically registered blogspot accounts, of whose existence Google's security team has already been notified are as follows:
1rykutviklingibtvedmongstad-vgnett .blogspot.com/
40-nrg .blogspot.com/
anyauujteykbrlzyt .blogspot.com/
bctdnvxyubozkute336 .blogspot.com/
bjfzibzxpjwfsri.blogspot .com/
bopscfmfdfkdcdk.blogspot .com/
bpucrtkuigcvuzd.blogspot .com/
dcljxlmkdpfyadlmk014.blogspot .com/
driwnhtqcifnewwy.blogspot .com/
fffgxdpmrhzepmwc172.blogspot .com/
frjutygrfzkfmumr.blogspot .com/
gbmasakrnbvduky-mhopomuytpmeo46.blogspot .com/
hmxmjrdpzncnania.blogspot .com/
hryuickbrfxpgkiqc-wnyohlytffli526.blogspot .com/
hxsdrjrbiesmulbp-mp775012.blogspot .com/
hz560607.blogspot .com/
irfwgrbghyzrnaajs-npqpnvzqrqqeziywhx8.blogspot .com/
isaqwpccpkvmmnffx.blogspot .com/
iunvrafuvbgykpap819.blogspot .com/
ixqowmtgwfvkaapq.blogspot .com/
jocdniqudpnszswn936.blogspot .com/
jxpxhokysarhvnfw-wvtbfawtlocf932 .blogspot.com/
kayaafwlllybvydpu.blogspot .com/
kfddbjhalrqkmqtoa.blogspot .com/
kutlvtfxkxbismwpci.blogspot .com/
kyqyiplztbsiwogx-hfnrmfxbkjzswjq964.blogspot .com/


kzbcbzhlgcnmmaveusdt2.blogspot .com/
lbwhvnvfmiwqypft-gt34676.blogspot .com/
lgjxsfcwkviythet.blogspot .com/
lvlcauoimpklqoj.blogspot .com/
moruokuamhtobznhwx.blogspot .com/
nfnnialisemtirdcq.blogspot .com/
pfmrjjvolrxsthdl.blogspot .com/
pywkyzxqcslnqyz907.blogspot .com/
qmhbxydgxfitnaosp.blogspot .com/
rfsnkstagwfwlkgr.blogspot .com/
rykutviklingibtvedmongstad-vgnett .blogspot.com/
scjftnvmcqiarvt-ni242558.blogspot .com/
skpjwfruzkzujvw.blogspot .com/
spfymrxnfiotvtrknf.blogspot .com/
sxcfugyjtvtwgxzvi.blogspot .com/
tbgkfbllzdtrcslpc741.blogspot .com/
unrrldfyuanstafa.blogspot .com/
vstikrflawgquztcn.blogspot .com/
wjfpuoiolcjvecszeb.blogspot .com/
wlaafuebvmdkaiavh.blogspot .com/
wnejhokyqkazwpu898.blogspot.com/
wqqcknikrlnowgri.blogspot .com/
xlmwrzdmywbibfwi742.blogspot .com/
yanksroadwinchangesalcsoutlook-mlbcom .blogspot.com/
yeqhabdnabhndbt.blogspot .com/
yzyweidzwor-cxgwufvosfam .blogspot.com/
zafxzlatzsmwysk.blogspot .com/
znfnxeaoiqhxldvmqo-atcsqbrkobwi408 .blogspot.com/
zqsvjeoqccknkfubc.blogspot .com/



The Koobface gang's use of basic blackhat SEO principles such as content cloaking are identical to their previous attempts to cover-up their malicious activities relying on pre-defined sets of http referrers of public search engines, or particular redirectors in order for their infections to take place.

Stay tuned for more developments on the Ali Baba and the 40 thieves LLC front, a.k.a as my Ukrainian "fan club". The circle is almost complete, a lot of recent events will be summarized shortly.

Related posts:
Koobface Botnet Dissected in a TrendMicro Report
Koobface Botnet's Scareware Business Model
Movement on the Koobface Front - Part Two
Movement on the Koobface Front
Koobface - Come Out, Come Out, Wherever You Are
Dissecting Koobface Worm's Twitter Campaign
Dissecting the Koobface Worm's December Campaign
Dissecting the Latest Koobface Facebook Campaign 
The Koobface Gang Mixing Social Engineering Vectors 

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog.

Tuesday, October 20, 2009

Scareware Serving Conficker.B Infection Alerts Spam Campaign

A fake "conficker.b infection alert" spam campaign first observed in April, 2009 (using the following scareware domains antivirus-av-ms-check .com; antivirus-av-ms-checker .com; ms-anti-vir-scan .com; mega-antiviral-ms .com back then) is once again circulating in an attempt to trick users into installing "antispyware application", in this case the Antivirus Pro 2010 scareware.

This campaign is directly related to last week's Microsoft Outlook update campaign, with both of these using identical download locations for the scareware.

The following is an extensive list of the domains involved in the campaigns:
abumaso3tkamid .com - Email: drawn@ml3.ru
afedodevascevo .com - Email: sixty@8081.ru
alertonabert .com - Email: flop@infotorrent.ru
alertonbgabert .com - Email: vale@e2mail.ru
alioneferkilo .com - Email: va@blogbuddy.ru
anobalukager .com - Email: chalkov@co5.ru
anobhalukager .com - Email: humps@infotorrent.ru
bufertongamoda .com - Email: kurt@8081.ru
buhafertadosag .com - Email: bias@co5.ru
buhervadonuska .com - Email: vale@e2mail.ru
bulakeskatorad .com - Email: bias@co5.ru
bulerkoseddasko .com - Email: bias@co5.ru
buleropihertan .com - Email: def@co5.ru
celiminerkariota .com - Email: morse@corporatemail.ru
certovalionas .com - Email: kurt@8081.ru
dabertugaburav .com - Email: def@co5.ru
elxolisdonave .com - Email: curb@cheapmail.ru
enkafuleskohuj .com - Email: kerry@freemailbox.ru
ertanueskayert .com - Email: xmas@co5.ru
ertonaferdogalo .com - Email: kerry@freemailbox.ru
ertu6nagertos .com - Email: recipe@isprovider.ru
ertubedewse .com - Email: weak@infotorrent.ru
ertugasedumil .com - Email: chalkov@co5.ru
ertugaskedumil .com - Email: humps@infotorrent.ru
ertunagertos .com - Email: def@co5.ru
erubamerkadolo .com - Email: kerry@freemailbox.ru

fedostalonkah .com - Email: bias@co5.ru
ftahulabedaso .com - Email: raced@corporatemail.ru
gumertagionader .com - Email: seize@e2mail.ru
huladopkaert .com - Email: chute@infotorrent.ru
iobacebauiler .com - Email: roy@corporatemail.ru
itorkalione .com - Email: pygmy@8081.ru
julionejurmon .com - Email: jacob@freemailbox.ru
julionermon .com - Email: pygmy@8081.ru
konitorsabure .com - Email: chalkov@co5.ru
konitorswabure .com - Email: humps@infotorrent.ru
lersolamaderg .com - Email: chalkov@co5.ru
lersolamgaderg .com - Email: humps@infotorrent.ru
linkertagubert .com - Email: kerry@freemailbox.ru
lionglenhrvoa .com - Email: sixty@8081.ru
liposdakoferda .com - Email: leaf@corporatemail.ru
lopastionertu .com - Email: cues@e2mail.ru
nebrafsofertu .com - Email: humps@infotorrent.ru
nuherfodaverta .com - Email: morse@corporatemail.ru
nulerotkabelast .com - Email: dealt@8081.ru
nulkersonatior .com - Email: dealt@8081.ru
obuleskinrodab .com - Email: xmas@co5.ru
ofaderhabewuit .com - Email: kerry@freemailbox.ru
okavanubares .com - Email: chalkov@co5.ru
okaveanubares .com - Email: humps@infotorrent.ru

onagerfadusak .com - Email: cues@e2mail.ru
orav4abustorabe .com - Email: drawn@ml3.ru
oscaviolaner .com - Email: larks@freemailbox.ru
ovuiobvipolak .com - Email: sixty@8081.ru
ovuioipolak .com - Email: bias@co5.ru
paferbasedos .com - Email: chalkov@co5.ru
pafersbasedos .com - Email: humps@infotorrent.ru
polanermogalios .com - Email: dealt@8081.ru
rdafergfvacex .com - Email: jacob@freemailbox.ru
rtugamer5tobes .com - Email: drawn@ml3.ru
rtugamertobes .com - Email: kw@co5.ru
scukonherproger .com - Email: kazoo@isprovider.ru
shuretrobaniso .com - Email: frail@infotorrent.ru
tarhujelafert .com - Email: raced@corporatemail.ru
tavakulio5nkab .com - Email: recipe@isprovider.ru
tavakulionkab .com - Email: def@co5.ru
tertunavogav .com - Email: la@freemailbox.ru
tertunwavogav .com - Email: drawn@ml3.ru
tsabunerkadosa .com - Email: humps@infotorrent.ru

tsarbunerkadosa .com - Email: humps@infotorrent.ru
tubanerdavaf .com - Email: chalkov@co5.ru
tubanerdavjaf .com - Email: halkov@co5.ru
uhajokalesko .com - Email: flop@infotorrent.ru
uhajokvfalesko .com - Email: flop@infotorrent.ru
ulioperdanogad .com - Email: vale@e2mail.ru
uliopewrdanogad .com - Email: kerry@freemailbox.ru
uplaserdunavats .com - Email: dealt@8081.ru
utka3merdosubor .com - Email: drawn@ml3.ru
utkamerdosubor .com - Email: kw@co5.ru
utorganedoskaw .com - Email: kerry@freemailbox.ru
utorgtanedoskaw .com - Email: xmas@co5.ru
uvgaderbotario .com - Email: def@co5.ru
vudermaguliermot .com - Email: leaf@corporatemail.ru
vuilerdomegase .com - Email: leaf@corporatemail.ru
vuilleskomandar .com - Email: seize@e2mail.ru
vulertagulermos .com - Email: dealt@8081.ru
vuretronulevka .com - Email: dealt@8081.ru
weragumasekasuke .com - Email: kazoo@isprovider.ru
werynaherdobas .com - Email: dealt@8081.ru

Despite the comprehensive portfolio of domains used, relying on spam to increase revenue from scareware sales is prone to fail, in this specific case due to the lack of event-based social engineering theme, something that was present in the first campaign.

Related posts:
Conficker's Scareware/Fake Security Software Business Model
Koobface Botnet's Scareware Business Model

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog.

Wednesday, October 14, 2009

Koobface Botnet Dissected in a TrendMicro Report

I'd like to thank the folks at TrendMicro for mentioning the message inserted by the Koobface gang (more love on a first-name basis from them) within their command and control infrastructure for nine days, greeting me for systematically kicking them out of their ISPs, and suspending their command and control domains, in a new report entitled The Heart of Koobface - C&C and Social Network Propagation:

"This simplistic C&C approach is, of course, very vulnerable to takedowns. After several KOOBFACE C&C takedown attempts initiated by Internet service providers (ISPs) and members of the security industry, the KOOBFACE gang realized the need for a more robust C&C infrastructure. 

Thus, on July 19, 2009, the KOOBFACE writers implemented a new C&C architecture that involved the use of proxy nodes to provide redundancy and to improve the survivability of their C&C should another takedown be attempted. A few days after the new KOOBFACE C&C infrastructure was implemented, the botnet was seen inserting a message (see below) for one of the security researchers tracking the malware’s domain activities.

This message run lasted nine days from July 22 to July 30, 2009. Based on this incident, we can safely assume that the KOOBFACE gang has been monitoring blogs, articles, write-ups, and analyses about their handiwork and was probably also keeping tabs on the various solutions deployed to counter the botnet’s attacks. Second, these people were thus quick to act and fix their creation’s weaknesses, as evidenced by its change in infrastructure. Finally, the botnet’s creators were bold enough to send taunting messages to security researchers.
"

Having the Koobface gang kicked out of their ISPs in 48 hours through close cooperation with China's CERT; BlueConnex Ltd; PacificRack.com; Oc3 Networks & Web Solutions Llc; Telos-Solutions-AS/Telos Solutions LTD, resulted in a single command and control domain which was active and using the services of UKSERVERS-MNT (AS42831), 78.110.175.15 in particular. Simply put, the Koobface botnet and the hundreds of thousands of infected hosts were not just sitting ducks, but ducks who've fallen asleep in the middle of the hunting season.

It's important to point out that the company (UKSERVERS-MNT) on purposely lied that the customer has been taken offline, allowed the Koobface gang to access the server since the gang claimed "it's a compromised customer and needs to clean-up the mess", then on purposely stopped responding to the smoothly going data sharing process, thereby allowing the Koobface gang to put their contingency plan in place.

The bottom line - based on already published and to-be published assessments of this group's activities, the Koobface botnet appears to be only the tip of the iceberg for the Ali baba and the 40 thieves cybercrime enterprise -- a self-describing message included by the Koobface gang. Their activities also prove a point - a single cybercrime enterprise can efficiently and automatically dominate the entire Web 2.0 threatscape, if they want to.

Related posts:
Koobface Botnet's Scareware Business Model
Movement on the Koobface Front - Part Two
Movement on the Koobface Front
Koobface - Come Out, Come Out, Wherever You Are
Dissecting Koobface Worm's Twitter Campaign
Dissecting the Koobface Worm's December Campaign
Dissecting the Latest Koobface Facebook Campaign 
The Koobface Gang Mixing Social Engineering Vectors 

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog.

Koobface Botnet Dissected in a TrendMicro Report

I'd like to thank the folks at TrendMicro for mentioning the message inserted by the Koobface gang (more love on a first-name basis from them) within their command and control infrastructure for nine days, greeting me for systematically kicking them out of their ISPs, and suspending their command and control domains, in a new report entitled The Heart of Koobface - C&C and Social Network Propagation:

"This simplistic C&C approach is, of course, very vulnerable to takedowns. After several KOOBFACE C&C takedown attempts initiated by Internet service providers (ISPs) and members of the security industry, the KOOBFACE gang realized the need for a more robust C&C infrastructure. 

Thus, on July 19, 2009, the KOOBFACE writers implemented a new C&C architecture that involved the use of proxy nodes to provide redundancy and to improve the survivability of their C&C should another takedown be attempted. A few days after the new KOOBFACE C&C infrastructure was implemented, the botnet was seen inserting a message (see below) for one of the security researchers tracking the malware’s domain activities.

This message run lasted nine days from July 22 to July 30, 2009. Based on this incident, we can safely assume that the KOOBFACE gang has been monitoring blogs, articles, write-ups, and analyses about their handiwork and was probably also keeping tabs on the various solutions deployed to counter the botnet’s attacks. Second, these people were thus quick to act and fix their creation’s weaknesses, as evidenced by its change in infrastructure. Finally, the botnet’s creators were bold enough to send taunting messages to security researchers.
"

Having the Koobface gang kicked out of their ISPs in 48 hours through close cooperation with China's CERT; BlueConnex Ltd; PacificRack.com; Oc3 Networks & Web Solutions Llc; Telos-Solutions-AS/Telos Solutions LTD, resulted in a single command and control domain which was active and using the services of UKSERVERS-MNT (AS42831), 78.110.175.15 in particular. Simply put, the Koobface botnet and the hundreds of thousands of infected hosts were not just sitting ducks, but ducks who've fallen asleep in the middle of the hunting season.

It's important to point out that the company (UKSERVERS-MNT) on purposely lied that the customer has been taken offline, allowed the Koobface gang to access the server since the gang claimed "it's a compromised customer and needs to clean-up the mess", then on purposely stopped responding to the smoothly going data sharing process, thereby allowing the Koobface gang to put their contingency plan in place.

The bottom line - based on already published and to-be published assessments of this group's activities, the Koobface botnet appears to be only the tip of the iceberg for the Ali baba and the 40 thieves cybercrime enterprise -- a self-describing message included by the Koobface gang. Their activities also prove a point - a single cybercrime enterprise can efficiently and automatically dominate the entire Web 2.0 threatscape, if they want to.

Related posts:
Koobface Botnet's Scareware Business Model
Movement on the Koobface Front - Part Two
Movement on the Koobface Front
Koobface - Come Out, Come Out, Wherever You Are
Dissecting Koobface Worm's Twitter Campaign
Dissecting the Koobface Worm's December Campaign
Dissecting the Latest Koobface Facebook Campaign 
The Koobface Gang Mixing Social Engineering Vectors 

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog.