Why we cannot measure the real cost of cybercrime?

January 10, 2006
At the end of 2005, a rather contradictive statement was made, namely, that the costs of cybercrime have surpassed those of drug smuggling? And while I feel it has been made in order to highlight the threats posed by today's cyber insecurities, I find it a bit of an unrealistic one.

Mainly because of :

- the lack of centralized database and approach to keep track of, and measure the costs of cyber crime
Centralization is useful sometimes, and so is standardization. My point is that, doesn't matter how many metrics I go through on a monthly basis. They all have had different approaches while gathering their data. Estimated or projected loses are a tricky thing the way Donald Trump's valuation is largely based on his name brand. In this very same way, if we were to quantify the losses of a worldwide worm outbreak posed by direct attacks of the availability and integrity of networks and hosts, it would always be rather unrealistic, yet hopefully scientifically justified to a certain extend!

I feel it's about time the industry appoints a watchdog with an in-depth understanding of the concept. A watchdog that has the open source intelligence attitude, and the law enforcement backup to diffentiate online identity theft next to dumpest diving, and both, soft and hard dollar losses out of an event.

- the flawed approaches towards counting the TOC costs
"We had out network hit by a worm attack, where 200 out of 1000 desktops got successfully infected resulting in 4 hours downtime of the 200 desktops, and with the department's $15 hourly rate it resulted in direct loss of productivity." Rather common approach these days, what isn't included is the time the IT/Security department spent fixing the problem, the eventually
increased infosec budget (given the department takes advantage of the momentum and asks for more), and and potential law suits that may follow by other companies whose systems have been attacked by any of the 200 infected ones. A security incident shouldn't be isolated when it comes to costs, yet it's the best approach to bring some accountability, though, it's totally unrealistic. The butterfly effect has its word in both the real, and the financial world as well.

- the hard to quantify intellectual property theft
Continuing my thoughts from the abovementioned opinion, if we were to count the IT/Security department's associated costs, as well as the loss of productivity next to the hourly rate, especially when there's been a theft of intellectual property is easy, yet, untrue. If we were to
even estimate the potential dollar losses of intellectual property theft due to security breaches, it would surpass the U.S budget's deficit and reach levels of a developing economy's GDP, I bet that! The current inability of the industry to successfully quantify the costs of intellectual property theft, results in a mare estimation of the real costs of the cyber crime act. In this case, it's more complex that some want to believe.

- lack of disclosure enforcement
More and more states(U.S only, painfully true but the world is lacking behind) are adopting breach disclosure laws with the idea to prevent successful use of the information, seek accountability from the organizations/enterprises, and, hopefully result in even more clear metrics on what exactly is going on in the wild. However, the lack of acceptance, and sometimes,
even the awareness of being hacked is resulting into the highly underestimated, and actual picture in respect to the real state of cyber crime today. The more disclosure enforcement, and actual awareness of the breaches, the better the metrics, understanding of where the threats are going, and accountability for the organizations themselves.

- survey and metrics should always be a subject to question

The way a research company gathers survey and metrics data should always be a subject to questions. Even highly respected law enforcement agencies surveys and research, clearly indicate similarities, though when it comes to financial losses, every organization has a different measurement approaches and understanding of the concept. That is why, in the majority of cases, they aren't even aware of the actual long-term, or soft dollar losses directly posed by a single security breach. Evaluating assets, and assigning dollar values to intellectual property is tricky, and it could both, provide a more realistic picture of the actual losses, or overestimate
them due ot the company "falling in love" with the intellectual value of its breached information.

- companies fearing shame do not report the most relevant events today, online extortion or DDoS attacks
No company would publicly admit complying with online extortionists, and no matter how unprofessional it may sound, a LOT of companies pay not to have their reputation damaged, and it's not just public companies I'm talking about. How should a company react in such a situation, fight back, have it's web site shut down resulting in direct $ losses outpacing the sum requested by extortionists, or complying with the request, to later on having to deal with issue again? How much value would a company gain for fighting back, or for publicly stating of having such a problem, and complying with it? What's more, should quantifying a successful DDoS attack on a E-shop also include the downtime effect for the ISP's customers, given they don't null route
the site of course? And who's counting all these counts, and how far would their impact actually reach?

- the umatelized sales of people avoiding shopping online
A topic that is often neglected when it comes to E-commerce, is the HUGE number of people that aren't interested in participating(though they have the E-ability to do so), mainly because of the fear posed by cyber crime, having their credit card data stolen etc. The current revenues of E-commerce in my point of view, are nothing compared to what they could be given the industry's leaders gently unite in order to build awareness on their actions towards improving security. I also consider these people as a cost due to cyber crime!

At the bottom line, drug addicts don't exist because of drugs, but because of the society, and it may be easier to execute phishing attacks than smuggle cocaine from Mexico to the U.S, but this is where the real $$$ truly is from my point of view - drugzZzZzZzZ...................:)

Technorati tags :
,,,
Continue reading →

Would we ever witness the end of plain text communications?

January 10, 2006
Last week, a report released by the research firm In-Sat estimated that revenues for IP VPNs will double between 2004 and 2009 to $658 million.

Estimates should also be questioned, though the trend is very relevant these days. VPNs as a concept are the natural shift from avoiding plain text data exchange over the insecure by default Internet. Yet, secure communication channel doesn't mean actual attacks on the both, the channel and the host itself cannot be executed. Though, I think that avoiding plain text communications at all is a strategic step of a great important.

How you can take advantage of this trend?
Given the market is actively growing, namely a lot of new entrants, it would mean a lot of product/service choice and very competitive pricing schemes. Keep track of them, and ensure your TOC is as low as possible,think in the long-term.

What to keep in mind?
Do your homework, and while a newly established company offers might seem attractive compared to an established vendor's one in respect to pricing, don't ignore expertise and quality for a short-term deal. On the other hand, make sure you are aware of the fact, that vendors will rush into offering many other cross-sale services. We are already witnessing such vendors being as confident as to launch their own anti-virus solutions. That's exactly the type of companies whose product extension services you should avoid, as they are basically reinventing the wheel, with the idea to cut paying any royalties to the established anti virus vendors. TOC, experise, value oriented and flexible vendorare the things to keep in mind, given you don't have something else in mind?

Technorati tags :
, ,,
Continue reading →

Watch out your wallets!

January 10, 2006
The irony of today's, obviously not working loan system, has left a 22 years old Chicago student in debt of $412,000. A very scary event, that I feel could have been prevented if the loss was reported, and the bank giving the loans was somehow aware of the social status of the "borrower" :)

In case you are interested in knowing more about identity theft, go through the following :

ID Theft : When Bad Things Happen to Your Good Name
Coping with Identity Theft : Reducing the Risk of Fraud
The Problem of Identity Theft

Technorati tags :
,,, Continue reading →

Malware - future trends

January 09, 2006
I'm very excited to let you know that, I have finally managed to release my "Malware - future trends" publication. Basically, it will provide you with an overview of the current trends, the driving factors behind the scene, and some of the trends to come, from my point of view.

As factors contributing to the rise and success of malware I have pointed out :
- Documentation and howto's transformed into source code
- Vulnerabilities, even patches, easily turned into exploits
- Clear signs of consolidation on the malware scene
- The media as a fueling factor for growth
- Over 960M unique Internet users and their connectivity, or purchasing power
- The demand for illegal services

And as far as the trends themselves are concerned, I have indicated :
- Mobile malware will be successfully monetized
- Localization as a concept will attract the coders' attention
- Open Source Malware
- Anonymous and illegal hosting of (copyrighted) data
- The development of Ecosystem
- Rise in encryption and packers
- 0day malware on demand
- Cryptoviral extortion / Ransomware will emerge
- When the security solutions (antivirus etc.) ends up the security problem itself
- Intellectual property worms
- Web vulnerabilities, and web worms - diversity and explicit velocity
- Hijacking botnets and infected PCs
- Interoperability will increase the diversity and reach of the malware scene

Have an opinion? Feel I have somehow missed a point? Let me know, or directly comment on this post! Thanks folks!

Technorati Tags :
,,,,, Continue reading →

How to secure the Internet

January 04, 2006
I recently wondered, are there any existing government practices towards securing the entire Internet?

So I went though the U.S National Strategy to Security Cyberspace, to find out what is the U.S up to given it still maintains "control" of the Internet. What is the Internet's biggest weakness? No, it's not a sophisticated term, its a common word called design.

A fact that is often neglected as the core of all problems, is that the Net's design by itself was primarily developed for reseach purposes. That is, universities and scientists exchanging data, users whose activities would definitely not result in the following :)

- infect the competing Ivy League universities with malware, and "borrow" as much intellectual property as possible

- Conduct DNS poisoning and redirect their competition's site to their own one

- Eavesdrop on their fellow researcher's communications

The Internet wasn't mean to be as secure as we wished it could be today. So, when it became public and turned into today's part of daily life, I feel this weakness started to remerge on a harge scale.

Perhaps the second biggest vulnerability is the ability to forge source addresses, and given you can spoof the origins of your packet no accountability for a great deal of today's threats is present. IPv6 isn't the panacea of security, and would never be though. There are as a matter of fact a lot of vulnerabilities related to mostly, implementation, and awareness on the possibilities. But the introduction of IPv6 over the Internet, still remains an ambition for goverments and organizations across the world. As a matter of the the U.S DoD indicated their troubles while migrating to IPv6, but they desperately need it. Though, I greatly feel the sooner the better.

The current Internet IP space is so easily mapped and datamined, that on most occasions,such transparence is mostly beneficial to malicious attackers. I believe that security threats can indeed have a national security impact, of course, given their sevirity and actual abuse. Today's information and knowledge driven societies are largely dependent on information and technology infrastructure for most of their needs. This has on the other hand boosted a tremendous technological growth. It eventually resulted in an increased world productivity, but the dependance can also affect real life situations on certain ocassions.

Can cyberspace indeed influence real-life situations and cause havoc? Would someone wants to bring down the Internet, and how sound is this? What are the main driving factors behind the known weaknesses of the infrastructure, and how can their negative effects be prevented?

I greatly feel that the growth of E-governments, native Internet population, improved communication infrastructure, thus more bandwidth and opportunities,are crucial for the growth of a nation. The only weakness besides actual usability or utilization, is Security.

Going back to the report, it clearly highlights and takes into consideration both, soft and hard dollars. That is, enemies conducting espionage over companies, universities, or mapping key government, industry networks, and easily reachable known targets to be used later on. Hit-lists for potential targets can be easily gathered in today's open source intelligence world.

On a worldwide basis, the implications to the entire Internet posed by insecure DNS servers, and by the insecurities of the DNS protocol can undermine the Internet in itself. What happens when all sites are actually there, but remain unreachable worldwide? The 2002 attacks on the root Internet servers indeed acted as a wake up to the international community on how fragile the current system really can be.

Some of the obstacles for a secure Internet from my point of view consist of :

- Plain text communications are the easiest, most common way malicious attackers can abuse a nation's communications, excluding the fact that the majority of communications remain unencrypted

- Lack of evolving compliance, threats change so fast, that everyone can barely keep up with them, and what used to be "secured" yesterday, is vulnerable today

- Less procedures and strategies, more actions, perfecting planning is futile, by the time you end you planning process you would have to change everything. My point is, empower those who are able to execute real actions towards improving security.

- The gap between government, private and academic sectors is resulting in a lack of integrated early warning systems, that would eventually benefit everyone

- Realization of a nationwide client-side sensor, I have also considered Symante's utilization of their 120M client based as the biggest, most sensitive honeypot ever.

To sum up my ideas, migration to the, at least though to be more secure Internet2 , would take years and cost billions of dollars on a worldwide basis, yet it's worth it!

Have an opinion? Share it!

Technorati tags :
,,,, Continue reading →

Security quotes : a FSB (successor to the KGB) analyst on Google Earth

January 04, 2006
"Lt. Gen. Leonid Sazhin, an analyst for the Federal Security Service, the Russian security agency that succeeded the K.G.B., was quoted by Itar-Tass as saying: "Terrorists don't need to reconnoiter their target. Now an American company is working for them." A great quote, and I find it totally true. The point is, not to look for high-resolution imagery, but to harness the power of OSINT, improve their confidence by observing the targets "from the sky", and actually plan and coordinate its activities on huge territories. AJAX anyone? :)

However, the public has always been good at bringing the real issue to the rest of the world. There have been numerous attempts to spot sensitive locations, and I wouldn't be myself if I don't share the joys of the Eyeball Series with you. Of course, in case you haven't come across the initiative earlier. However, the way it gives terrorists or enemies these opportunities, it also serves the general public by acting as an evidence for the existence of espionage sentiments, here and there. Echelon's Yakima Research Station was spotted on GoogleMaps, originally by Cryptome, see the dishes there? Any thoughts in here? Can Microsft's Local Live with its highly differentiated bird eye view on important locations turn into a bigger risk the the popularity of Google's services?

Technorati tags :
,,,,, Continue reading →

Keep your friends close, your intelligence buddies closer!

January 04, 2006
Too much power always leads you to the dark side!

Cryptome has yesterday featured a excerpt from "State of the War : The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration" shredding more light on what the NSA used to be before 9/11 and how things changed at a later stage. In case you really want to find out more about the entire history of the NSA, go though "The Quest for Cryptologic Centralization and the Establishment of NSA, 1940-1952", and some of the most remarkable NSA released publication entitled "Eavesdropping on Hell : Historical Guide to Western Communications Intelligence and the Holocaust, 1939-1945".

My opinion - With no guards, the gates are always open. But who will watch the watchers when they start watching us?!

Even though, as Marine Corps General Alfred M. Gray have put it years ago "Communications without intelligence is noise, intelligence without communications is irrelevant", and so is privacy in the 21st century, period.

Technorati tags :
, , ,
Continue reading →

What's the potential of the IM security market? Symantec thinks big

January 04, 2006
Yesterday, Symantec, one of the world's leading security, and of course, storage providers aquired IMlogic, a leading provide of Instant Messaging security solutions. How sound is this move anyway? Doesn't Symantec already have the necessary experience in this field?

IMlogic has never been a build-to-flip company. Dating back to 2002, it has managed to secure important customers, Fortune 1000 companies as a matter of fact, and acts as a prefered choice for many of them. And given that enterprise IM is exploding, and so it home use, the real-time nature of this type of communication has always been acting as a hit-list in my mind. Client based vulnerabilities, social engineering attacks, auto-responding malware, and many other issues are among the current trends. How huge is the potential of IM security, or is it me just trying to think big in here, compared to Symantec's simple product line extension ambition?

Besides acting as another propagation vector for future malware releases, IM usege worldwide is already outpacing the most common form of Internet communication -- the email. A Radicati Group's research report entitled "Instant Messaging and Presence Market Trends, 2003-2007" indicates the same. The group predicts that :

- 1,439 million IM accounts in existence by 2007
- a very significant increase in corporate imlpementation of IM, from 60 million accounts today to 349 million in 2007.
- that's a degree of monopoly, as always!

Lucky you, Symantec!

With fear of being a pessimist, I have though witnessed how unique organizations and teams got eventually swallowed by the corporate world. And it's their know-how that I truly miss these days. You can though, still go through Symantec's constantly updating list of acquired companies, and it's evident they are fully committed to continue being a market and knowledge leader. I also recommend you read a great aricle at eWeek entitled IM Threats : The Dark Side of Innovation to find out more about the current trends. What's your attitude about them?!

Technorati tags :
, , , Continue reading →

Happy New Year folks!!

January 04, 2006
Dear friends and visitors,

Happy New Year and sincere apologies for the lack of updates on my blog recently. It's not that I have somehow stopped brainstorming on how to put my knowledge into neat posts, rather, I didn't have the time that I wanted to provide an in-depth overview of they key topics I had in mind :-)

I wish you all the best in 2006, thank for your feedback on my ideas, and keep ridin' on the road of intellectual exploration! Continue reading →

How to secure the Internet

January 04, 2006
I recently wondered, are there any existing government practices towards securing the entire Internet?

So I went though the U.S National Strategy to Security Cyberspace, to find out what is the U.S up to given it stillmaintains "control" of the Internet. What is the Internet's biggest weakness? No, it's not a sophisticated term, its a common word called design.



A fact that is often neglected as the core of all problems, is that the Net's design by itself was primarily developed for reseach purposes. That is, universities and scientists exchanging data, users whose activities would definitely not result in the following :)



- infect the competing Ivy League universities with malware, and "borrow" as much intellectual property as possible

- Conduct DNS poisoning and redirect their competition's site to their own one

- Eavesdrop on their fellow researcher's communications



The Internet wasn't mean to be as secure as we wished it could be today. So, when it became public and turned into today's part of daily life, I feel this weakness started to remerge on a harge scale.



Perhaps the second biggest vulnerability is the ability to forge source addresses, and given you can spoof the origins of your packet no accountability for a great deal of today's threats is present. IPv6 isn't the panacea of security, and would never be though. There are as a matter of fact a lot of vulnerabilities related to mostly, implementation, and awareness on the possibilities. But the introduction of IPv6 over the Internet, still remains an ambition for goverments and organizations across the world. As a matter of the the U.S DoD indicated their troubles while migrating to IPv6, but they desperately need it. Though, I greatly feel the sooner the better.



The current Internet IP space is so easily mapped and datamined, that on most occasions,such transparence is mostly beneficial to malicious attackers. I believe that security threats can indeed have a national security impact, of course, given their sevirity and actual abuse. Today's information and knowledge driven societies are largely dependent on information and technology infrastructure for most of their needs. This has on the other hand boosted a tremendous technological growth. It eventually resulted in an increased world productivity, but the dependance can also affect real life situations on certain ocassions.



Can cyberspace indeed influence real-life situations and cause havoc?
Would someone wants to bring down the Internet, and how sound is this? What are the main driving factors behind the known weaknesses of the infrastructure, and how can their negative effects be prevented?



I greatly feel that the growth of E-governments, native Internet population, improved communication infrastructure, thus more bandwidth and opportunities,are crucial for the growth of a nation. The only weakness besides actual usability or utilization, is Security.



Going back to the report, it clearly highlights and takes into consideration both, soft and hard dollars.


That is, enemies conducting espionage over companies, universities, or mapping key government, industry networks, and easily reachable known targets to be used later on. Hit-lists for potential targets can be easily gathered in today's open source intelligence world.



On a worldwide basis, the implications to the entire Internet posed by insecure DNS servers, and by the insecurities of the DNS protocol can undermine the Internet in itself. What happens when all sites are actually there, but remain unreachable worldwide? The 2002 attacks on the root Internet servers indeed acted as a wake up to the international community on how fragile the current system really can be.



Some of the obstacles for a secure Internet from my point of view consist of :

- Plain text communications are the easiest, most common way malicious attackers can abuse a nation's communications, excluding the fact that the majority of communications remain unencrypted

- Lack of evolving compliance, threats change so fast, that everyone can barely keep up with them, and what used to be "secured" yesterday, is vulnerable today

- Less procedures and strategies, more actions, perfecting planning is futile, by the time you end you planning process you would have to change everything. My point is, empower those who are able to execute real actions towards improving security.

- The gap between government, private and academic sectors is resulting in a lack of integrated early warning systems, that would eventually benefit everyone

- Realization of a nationwide client-side sensor, I have also considered Symante's utilization of their 120M client based as the biggest, most sensitive honeypot ever.



To sum up my ideas, migration to the, at least though to be more secure Internet2 , would take years and cost billions of dollars on a worldwide basis, yet it's worth it!



Have an opinion? Share it!



Technorati tags :

,,,, Continue reading →

Security quotes : a FSB (successor to the KGB) analyst on Google Earth

January 04, 2006
"Lt. Gen. Leonid Sazhin, an analyst for the Federal Security Service, the Russian security agency that succeeded the K.G.B., was quoted by Itar-Tass as saying: "Terrorists don't need to reconnoiter their target. Now an American company is working for them." A great quote, and I find it totally true. The point is, not to look for high-resolution imagery, but to harness the power of OSINT, improve their confidence by observing the targets "from the sky", and actually plan and coordinate its activities on huge territories. AJAX anyone? :)



However, the public has always been good at bringing the real issue to the rest of the world. There have been numerous attempts to spot sensitive locations, and I wouldn't be myself if I don't share the joys of the Eyeball Series with you. Of course, in case you haven't come across the initiative earlier.
However, the way it gives terrorists or enemies these opportunities, it also serves the general public by acting as an evidence for the existence of espionage sentiments, here and there. Echelon's Yakima Research Station was spotted on GoogleMaps, originally by Cryptome, see the dishes there? Any thoughts in here? Can Microsft's Local Live with its highly differentiated bird eye view on important locations turn into a bigger risk the the popularity of Google's services?



Technorati tags :

,,,,, Continue reading →

Keep your friends close, your intelligence buddies closer!

January 04, 2006
Too much power always leads you to the dark side!



Cryptome has yesterday featured a excerpt from "State of the War : The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration" shredding more light on what the NSA used to be before 9/11 and how things changed at a later stage. In case you really want to find out more about the entire history of the NSA, go though "The Quest for Cryptologic Centralization and the Establishment of NSA, 1940-1952", and some of the most remarkable NSA released publication entitled "Eavesdropping on Hell : Historical Guide to Western Communications Intelligence and the Holocaust, 1939-1945".



My opinion - With no guards, the gates are always open. But who will watch the watchers when they start watching us?!



Even though, as Marine Corps General Alfred M. Gray have put it years ago "Communications without intelligence is noise, intelligence without communications is irrelevant", and so is privacy in the 21st century, period.



Technorati tags :
, , ,
Continue reading →

What's the potential of the IM security market? Symantec thinks big

January 04, 2006
Yesterday, Symantec, one of the world's leading security, and of course, storage providers aquired IMlogic, a leading provide of Instant Messaging security solutions. How sound is this move anyway? Doesn't Symantec already have the necessary experience in this field?



IMlogic has never been a build-to-flip company. Dating back to 2002, it has managed to secure important customers, Fortune 1000 companies as a matter of fact, and acts as a prefered choice for many of them. And given that enterprise IM is exploding, and so it home use, the real-time nature of this type of communication has always been acting as a hit-list in my mind. Client based vulnerabilities, social engineering attacks, auto-responding malware, and many other issues are among the current trends.


How huge is the potential of IM security, or is it me just trying to think big in here, compared to Symantec's simple product line extension ambition? Besides acting as another propagation vector for future malware releases, IM usege worldwide is already outpacing the most common form of Internet communication -- the email. A Radicati Group's research report entitled "Instant Messaging and Presence Market Trends, 2003-2007" indicates the same.


The group predicts that :

 - 1,439 million IM accounts in existence by 2007
- a very significant increase in corporate imlpementation of IM, from 60 million accounts today to 349 million in 2007.
- that's a degree of monopoly, as always!



Lucky you, Symantec!



With fear of being a pessimist, I have though witnessed how unique organizatons and teams got eventually swallowed by the corporate world. And it's their know-how that I truly miss these days.
You can though, still go through Symantec's constantly updating list of acquired companies, and it's evident they are fully committed to continue being a market and knowledge leader. I also recommend you read a great aricle at eWeek entitled IM Threats : The Dark Side of Innovation to find out more about the current trends. What's your attitude about them?!



Technorati tags :
, , ,
Continue reading →

Insiders - insights, trends and possible solutions

December 19, 2005
A recent research of the content monitoring market, and the U.S 2004’s "Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage" I've recently read, prompted me to post an updated opinion on this largely unsolved issue.

I have been keeping an eye on the insider problem for quite some time, in fact, I have featured a short article entitled “Insiders at the workplace - trends and practical risk mitigation approaches” in Issue 18 of the monthly security newsletter you can freely subscribe yourself to!

Insider as a definition can be as contradictive as the word “cheater” is :-) Does an individual become an insider even when thinking about it, or turns into such prior to initiating an action defined as insider’s one? The same way, can someone be defined as a “cheater” just for thinking about what’s perceived as cheating, compared to actually doing anything?! :-) When does one become the other, and is this moment of any importance to tackling the problem?

The biggest trade-off as far as the insider’s problem is concerned is between dealing with the problem while ensuring productivity, and that the company’s work environment isn’t damaged -- exactly the opposite. And while productivity is extremely important, the direct, or most often indirect and long-term loss of intellectual property theft is currently resulting in a couple of billion dollar unmaterialized revenues for nations/enterprises across the globe.

Going through 2004's “Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage”, a major trend needs to be highlighted as I greatly believe it’s a global one, namely, private enterprises efforts to obtain access to sensitive technologies in unethical way, outpaces a foreign government’s efforts to do the same. Corporations spy more on one another than governments do, but is this truly accurate? I don’t think so! The use of freelancers, among them ex-intelligence officers or experienced detective agencies to conduct national funded economic espionage is a growing trend, and the lines in this area are so blur, we should therefore try to grasp the big picture when it comes to national competitiveness -- both companies and nations directly/indirectly benefit from possible economic/industrial espionage, and you can’t deny it!

Yet another important fact to keep in mind, is the unusually high success of the oldest, and most common sense social engineering attack -- asking!! In certain cases a social engineer will inevitably establish contact with customer-service obsessed personnel taking care of you all your requests! A certain organization’s members may experience troubles differentiating sensitive and secret information, not taking the first one as serious as they should. Even worse -- U.S Secret Service and CERT’s “Insider threat Study : Illicit Cyber Activity in the Banking and Finance sector” reveal that,”83% of the insider threat cases took place physically from within the insider’s organization, and another 70% in all cases, the incidents took place during normal working hours”! No secretaries or CEO’s logging in at 3:00AM, and in this case, the lack of detected security incidents posed by insiders, means they are already happening!

Though, I have always looked at the insider’s issue, from both negative and positive point of view. Can an insider be of any use for the good of a free speech organization or a government? Yes, it can if you take into account the U.S government’s efforts to locate democratically minded individuals living in countries with restrictive regimes, or active Internet censorship efforts.

Now given, you are truly interested in the democratization of this particular region, and not another successful PSYOPS operation, being able to locate, establish, and actually, maintain contact with these individuals will prove crucial in case of a objective picture of what exactly is going on there! Ignoring the local, totally biased news streaming for certain regions, and focusing on locating insiders within rogue states has been a common practice for years.

Is there a market for protecting from intellectual property theft and sensitive information leakage? If so, how does it ensures today’s digital workplace, and road warriors’s flexibility is not sacrificed for the sake of protecting the company’s resources? Mind you, the current solutions scratch only the surface of the issue -- creating digital signatures of data and trying to spot it leaving the network. While a commonly accepted approach, it’s like one way authentication(passwords) when it comes to access control-- the first line of defense, but among the many other!

The insiders’ problem is far more broader one and given the today’s complexity and connectivity, a possible insider’s actions will most often constitute of normal daily activities. But what is the market up to anyway?

Currently, the content monitoring market is steadily growing fueled by the need of ensuring information marked as sensitive, or intellectual property doesn’t leave the company’s premises, or is alerted when someone attempts to transfer it, due to negligance or on purposely!

The main players are : Vontu, Tablus, Reconnex, and Vericept.

Whereas these solutions are a great concept,they all mainly rely on content analysis,and sensitive information signatures,monitoring multiple exit point)(email,web,chats,forums,p2p,ftp, even telnet), namely, reactive protection, while sophisticated insider’s actions may remain hidden due to covert channels or 0day vulnerabilities in the vendor’s product for instance!

Something else to consider, is should a IP(intellectual property) trap be considered as a benchmark for insider tensions?! In other words, should you consider an employee that has been on purposely sent a link containing company information he/she isn’t supposed to have access to, but has clicked to obtain it? Stanford thinks – yes! The University suspended potential candidates for obtaining info on their admission process only by following a link..you are either a one or zero, right?

Honeypots targeting insiders have also been discussed a long time ago by Lance Spitzner, from the Honeynet Project. Another proactive protection would be to look for patterns defined as malicious behavioral based mostly.

From an organization’s point of view, take into consideration the following :
- Clearly communicate the consequences, both individual and career, in case an insider is somehow identified, based on the company’s perception of the problem
- Ensure the momentum of negative attitude towards the organization is minimized to the minimum to ensure the lack of to-be-developed post-effect negative sentiments
- Do no fell victim of the common misunderstanding that technology is the key to the solution. Insiders are the people your technology resources empower to do their daily tasks, technology is as often happens, the faciliator of certain actions
- Does system identification accountability have any actual effect? My point, does as user’s loss of accounting data, resulting in successful attack is anyhow prosecuted/tolerated. If it isn’t, this puts any employee in extremely favorable “it wasn’t my fault” position, where the data could be shared, on purposely exposed, sold, pretended to be stolen etc.
- Building active awareness towards the company’s efforts and commitment to fighting the problem will inevitably discourage the less motivated wannabe insiders, or at least make them try harder!

From a nation’s point of view, the following issues should be taken into consideration :
- In today’s increasingly transparent and based on digital flow of information marketplace, open source intelligence capabilities played a leading role in the development of cost-effective competitive intelligence solutions. Even though, nations or their companies are very interested in exploiting today’s globalized world.
- Ensuring the adequate security level of the private and academic sectors’ infastructure(where research turns into products and services, or exactly the opposite) through legislations, or further incentives, will improve the national competitiveness, while preserving the current R&D innovations, as secret as necessary.
- Outsourcing should be considered as a important factor contributing to information leakage, and the individuals involved, or the company’s screening practices, should be carefully examined.
- A fascinating publication that I recently read is “Quantifying National Information Leakage” describing the implications of the Internet’s distributed nature, namely to what extend, U.S Internet traffick is leaking around the world, where it “passes by”. A nation’s habit or lack of efficient alternative of plain-text communications can prove tricky if successfully exploited. Of course, this doesn’t include conspiracy scenarios of major certificate authorities breached into.

The insiders’ problem will remain an active topic for discussion for years to come given its complexity and severity of implications. Insiders’s metrics are a key indicator for patterns tracking, whereas their creativity shouldn't be underestimated at any cost!

In case you are interested in various recommended reading, statistics, and other people’s point of view, try this research :

Continue reading →

Cyberterrorism - don't stereotype and it's there!

December 19, 2005
I wrote my first article on “Cyberterrorism – an analysis”(in Bulgarian, HiComm Magazine) back in 2003, arguing that Cyberterrorism is a fully realistic scenario, given you don’t picture terrorists melting down nuclear power plants over the Internet, but an organization determined to achieve all of its objectives, and using the digital medium to do so.



My second article "Cyberterrorism and Cyberwars - how real's the threat?"(in Bulgarian, CIO.bg) was greatly extended, and so was my understanding of the concept by the time. I often come across badly structured articles on the topic, even worse, ones starting to discuss the wrong concept -- the biased one! Where terrorists try to attack the critical infrastructure, well, they wouldn’t, they’d rather abuse instead of destroying it!



Merely evaluating a terrorist groups ability to conduct devastating DDoS attacks, or hack into U.S government computers, is the biased wrong concept I just mentioned. If terrorist groups want DDoS power, they wouldn’t rewrite their training manuals, instead, they would simply hire the people to do it, or request on point’n’click interface for their actions. Can this kill a person? If yes, how come, if not, is this Cyberterrorism at all?

Thinking about complex topics always involves dimensional approach, understanding of motives, and implying a little bit of marginal thinking to grasp the big picture. Terrorists killing people over the Internet myth is greatly influenced by the success of any terrorist organization’s “PR” activities – spread fear, and build active propaganda though taking lives, and distributing the freely available media later on. So, if no lives are taken, why call it terrorism? Mainly because, cyberterrorism in my point of view isn’t an entirely new concept as some try to put it, it’s an extension of real life terrorism activities into cyberspace, and its evolution at a later stage.

Starting from the basic premises that terrorists need to communicate with each other, keep themselves up-to-date in today’s OSINT(open-source intelligence world), recruit potential members, and continue their active propaganda taking advantage of Internet’s many joys, in respect to anonymity(given it’s achieved), speed, and a bit of a black humor – interactivity!

Cyberterrorism as a concept from my point of view consists of their need for :

- platform for communication
No other medium can provide better speed, connectivity, and most importantly anonymity, given it’s achieved and understood, and it often is. Plain encryption might seem the obvious answer, but to me it’s steganography, having the potential to fully hide within legitimate (at least looking) data flow. Another possibility is the use secret sharing schemes. A bit of a relevant tool that can be fully utilized by any group of people wanting to ensure their authenticity and perhaps everyone’s pulse, is SSSS - Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme. And no, I’m not giving tips, just shredding light on the potential in here! The way botnets of malware can use public forums to get commands, in this very same fashion, terrorists could easily hide sensitive communications by mixing it with huge amounts of public data, while still keeping it secret.

- platform for open source intelligence

Undoubtedly, there has never been so much publicly accessible information that could aid in the organizing and plotting terrorist acts. Measure the impact of a certain bombing? – check out the news and figure out what has changed ever since, research and obtain digital photos, even satellite imagery, it’s available. Try to figure out the latest specifications for RFID passports to come, and why it matters to you – keep on reading the specifications..! Transparency is always tricky!

The way a government can successfully identify terrorist sentiments around the Web, even precise sites to be put under close surveillance, terrorists on the other hand keep track of each and every major/minor global change anyhow affecting their goals or ambitions.

- platform for propaganda/recruitment
Now, don’t picture “Outstanding CV, here’s the address of our training camp in Pakistan, please, first introduce the idea to your friends, then share the address. Nuke the planet!” type of conversation :-)

Recruitment over the Internet is a contradictive topic, and many will argue that it’s irrelevant. I can argue too that there are people for all kinds of things, from maintaining mailings lists, to acting as freelancers whenever a resource, like an infected PC for anonymous communication is needed. Believe it or not, terrorists are silently but very actively building a web presence. In fact, these days you could even download execution clips directly from a terrorist’s web site. What’s else to note is the irony of how many terrorists web sites are actually hosted on U.S service provider’s servers, and you keep on looking for them around the world, check your backyard before looking at the neighbors :-)

Another important aspect of recruiting in such a way, is the location of people with obsessive
islamic views, someone actively expressing his/her hate towards the U.S and actually being of any use. For instance, there are cases of terrorist propaganda malware, where the author(a teenager, or sophisticated attacks?!) clearly expresses his/her support towards a “cause”.
This case is like the one I mentioned in my previous post concerning insiders, that is the way U.S government looks for democracy minded individuals in restrictive regime countries(the Win32/Cycle.A.worm), the very same way terrorists could spot similarly minded individuals holding important positions or knowledge on certain topic. Are any of these people screaming for recruitment, and would somebody listen?

- direct attack exploitation possibllities (people eventually die?!)
Is the electronically obtained a major food manufacturer's facility truck schedules of any use to terrorists interested in eventually hijacking and

Someone once mentioned a scenario related to U.S RFID passports, namely a bomb could automatically detonate, given there’re certain number of "broadcasted", note the term, U.S citizens around, that’s scary, but how about the same applies to mobile malware detecting U.S carriers for the same purpose?!

In the last article I wrote on the topic, I made an argument on where’s the line of a 19 year’s old boy shutting down 911 through ingenious technique for the fun of it, and a terrorist organization exploiting vulnerability in the system at a crucial moment in time let’s say?! What if people die out of the teen’s actions, but the terrorists’ attempt is quickly detected? Should cyberterrorism be judged based on the motives, or who’s actually behind it? I think it’s a combination of both!

- indirect attack exploitation possibilities
Should a terrorists’ use of phishing attacks, where the revenues go directly into funding further terrorist activities, both, cyber, real-life actions be considered an option?
Should a terrorist’s actions for hiring a person, directly obtaining certain social numbers, sensitive and detailed financial information, or anything else to assist a successful identity theft, with the idea to impersonate for a real-life terrorist scenario be considered an option? Yes, they both should!
This particular list is endless, the scenarios I can only leave to someone else’s psychological
imagination!

My worst case scenarios,though, consist of terrorists realizing the impact a target/mass directed intellectual property theft, cryptoviral extortion attack targeting the majority of U.S businesses. And as I often say, it’s all a matter of coordination with the idea to increase the impact!

To conclude, Terrorists are not rocket scientists unless we make them feel so!
Consider going through the following research for different point of views, and key facts :

How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet
Continue reading →

Insiders - insights, trends and possible solutions

December 19, 2005
A recent research of the content monitoring market, and the U.S 2004’s "Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage" I've recently read, prompted me to post an updated opinion on this largely unsolved issue.

I have been keeping an eye on the insider problem for quite some time, in fact, I have featured a short article entitled “Insiders at the workplace - trends and practical risk mitigation approaches” in Issue 18 of the monthly security newsletter you can freely subscribe yourself to!

Insider as a definition can be as contradictive as the word “cheater” is :-) Does an individual become an insider even when thinking about it, or turns into such prior to initiating an action defined as insider’s one? The same way, can someone be defined as a “cheater” just for thinking about what’s perceived as cheating, compared to actually doing anything?! :-) When does one become the other, and is this moment of any importance to tackling the problem?

The biggest trade-off as far as the insider’s problem is concerned is between dealing with the problem while ensuring productivity, and that the company’s work environment isn’t damaged -- exactly the opposite. And while productivity is extremely important, the direct, or most often indirect and long-term loss of intellectual property theft is currently resulting in a couple of billion dollar unmaterialized revenues for nations/enterprises across the globe.

Going through 2004's “Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage”, a major trend needs to be highlighted as I greatly believe it’s a global one, namely, private enterprises efforts to obtain access to sensitive technologies in unethical way, outpaces a foreign government’s efforts to do the same. Corporations spy more on one another than governments do, but is this truly accurate? I don’t think so! The use of freelancers, among them ex-intelligence officers or experienced detective agencies to conduct national funded economic espionage is a growing trend, and the lines in this area are so blur, we should therefore try to grasp the big picture when it comes to national competitiveness -- both companies and nations directly/indirectly benefit from possible economic/industrial espionage, and you can’t deny it!

Yet another important fact to keep in mind, is the unusually high success of the oldest, and most common sense social engineering attack -- asking!! In certain cases a social engineer will inevitably establish contact with customer-service obsessed personnel taking care of you all your requests! A certain organization’s members may experience troubles differentiating sensitive and secret information, not taking the first one as serious as they should. Even worse -- U.S Secret Service and CERT’s “Insider threat Study : Illicit Cyber Activity in the Banking and Finance sector” reveal that,”83% of the insider threat cases took place physically from within the insider’s organization, and another 70% in all cases, the incidents took place during normal working hours”! No secretaries or CEO’s logging in at 3:00AM, and in this case, the lack of detected security incidents posed by insiders, means they are already happening!

Though, I have always looked at the insider’s issue, from both negative and positive point of view. Can an insider be of any use for the good of a free speech organization or a government? Yes, it can if you take into account the U.S government’s efforts to locate democratically minded individuals living in countries with restrictive regimes, or active Internet censorship efforts.
Now given, you are truly interested in the democratization of this particular region, and not another successful PSYOPS operation, being able to locate, establish, and actually, maintain contact with these individuals will prove crucial in case of a objective picture of what exactly is going on there! Ignoring the local, totally biased news streaming for certain regions, and focusing on locating insiders within rogue states has been a common practice for years.

Is there a market for protecting from intellectual property theft and sensitive information leakage? If so, how does it ensures today’s digital workplace, and road warriors’s flexibility is not sacrificed for the sake of protecting the company’s resources? Mind you, the current solutions scratch only the surface of the issue -- creating digital signatures of data and trying to spot it leaving the network. While a commonly accepted approach, it’s like one way authentication(passwords) when it comes to access control-- the first line of defense, but among the many other!

The insiders’ problem is far more broader one and given the today’s complexity and connectivity, a possible insider’s actions will most often constitute of normal daily activities. But what is the market up to anyway?

Currently, the content monitoring market is steadily growing fueled by the need of ensuring information marked as sensitive, or intellectual property doesn’t leave the company’s premises, or is alerted when someone attempts to transfer it, due to negligance or on purposely!

The main players are : Vontu, Tablus, Reconnex, and Vericept.
Whereas these solutions are a great concept,they all mainly rely on content analysis,and sensitive information signatures,monitoring multiple exit point)(email,web,chats,forums,p2p,ftp, even telnet), namely, reactive protection, while sophisticated insider’s actions may remain hidden due to covert channels or 0day vulnerabilities in the vendor’s product for instance!

Something else to consider, is should a IP(intellectual property) trap be considered as a benchmark for insider tensions?! In other words, should you consider an employee that has been on purposely sent a link containing company information he/she isn’t supposed to have access to, but has clicked to obtain it? Stanford thinks – yes! The University suspended potential candidates for obtaining info on their admission process only by following a link..you are either a one or zero, right?

Honeypots targeting insiders have also been discussed a long time ago by Lance Spitzner, from the Honeynet Project. Another proactive protection would be to look for patterns defined as malicious behavioral based mostly.
From an organization’s point of view, take into consideration the following :
- Clearly communicate the consequences, both individual and career, in case an insider is somehow identified, based on the company’s perception of the problem
- Ensure the momentum of negative attitude towards the organization is minimized to the minimum to ensure the lack of to-be-developed post-effect negative sentiments
- Do no fell victim of the common misunderstanding that technology is the key to the solution. Insiders are the people your technology resources empower to do their daily tasks, technology is as often happens, the faciliator of certain actions
- Does system identification accountability have any actual effect? My point, does as user’s loss of accounting data, resulting in successful attack is anyhow prosecuted/tolerated. If it isn’t, this puts any employee in extremely favorable “it wasn’t my fault” position, where the data could be shared, on purposely exposed, sold, pretended to be stolen etc.
- Building active awareness towards the company’s efforts and commitment to fighting the problem will inevitably discourage the less motivated wannabe insiders, or at least make them try harder!

From a nation’s point of view, the following issues should be taken into consideration :
- In today’s increasingly transparent and based on digital flow of information marketplace, open source intelligence capabilities played a leading role in the development of cost-effective competitive intelligence solutions. Even though, nations or their companies are very interested in exploiting today’s globalized world.
- Ensuring the adequate security level of the private and academic sectors’ infastructure(where research turns into products and services, or exactly the opposite) through legislations, or further incentives, will improve the national competitiveness, while preserving the current R&D innovations, as secret as necessary.
- Outsourcing should be considered as a important factor contributing to information leakage, and the individuals involved, or the company’s screening practices, should be carefully examined.
- A fascinating publication that I recently read is “Quantifying National Information Leakage” describing the implications of the Internet’s distributed nature, namely to what extend, U.S Internet traffick is leaking around the world, where it “passes by”. A nation’s habit or lack of efficient alternative of plain-text communications can prove tricky if successfully exploited. Of course, this doesn’t include conspiracy scenarios of major certificate authorities breached into.

The insiders’ problem will remain an active topic for discussion for years to come given its complexity and severity of implications. Insiders’s metrics are a key indicator for patterns tracking, whereas their creativity shouldn’t be understimated at any cost!

In case you are interested in various recommended reading, statistics, and other people’s point of view, try this research :
Continue reading →

IP cloaking and competitive intelligence/disinformation

December 14, 2005
SearchSecurity.com are running a great article entitled "IP cloaking becoming a business necessity", that I simply can't resist to express my opinion on.

Great concept that’s been around since the days of Anonymizer, who were perhaps the first enterprise to start targeting enterprise and government
users looking for ways to hide their online activities, be it unstructured data aggregation, competitive intelligence or simple end users' browsing.

Getting back to SearchSecurity's article, I don’t really consider a company’s SEC fillings or annual reports (found on any corporate web site) a trade secret! In this particular case, I bet it was extraoridinary traffic from known partners that tipped them that there's a sudden interest in the company's business performance. Any organization could easily look for patters on its web server, such as how often certain stakeholders visit it, given they use their associated netblocks, or ones known to be used by them. What to also to note is that, given the stakeholders in this case, employees, stockholders, suppliers, government, the general public or anyone else has a claim on the way the organization operates, it would be hard, pretty much impossible to differentiate intentions of any of these.

Small companies can easily measure their popularity among the big players, again, given these companies use their netblocks, but a large corporation with hundreds of thousands visitors, would have to put extra efforts in measuring, not only what's popular, but who's reading it, and are they on our watchlist.

How to compile these? Even though I'm certain someone out there has taken the time and effort to compile a Fortune 500 IP ranges list the way GovernmentSecurity.org have compiled a Government&Military; IP ranges list. I soon expect to see companies offering segmented service for watchlists like the ones I mentioned, for instance - law firms, financial institutions, non-profit organizations segmented on geographical location, let's say New York or Tokyo based ones. An in-house approach can always be applied by any company, no matter of its size, all you have to do is your homework at RIPE.net for instance :

RSA Security
Symantec
Sophos
Kaspersky
ISS(Internet Security Systems)

An important trend though, is how the transparency that the ICANN wants to build whenever a domain is registered in order to easily prosecure cyber criminals will open up countless opportunities for open source intelligence professionals or wannabe's. A recently released report by the U.S Government Accountability Office, found 2.3M domain names registered with false data, given that's just the result they came up by sampling. Here're also the important findings. Without any doubt, it should be known who's who in the Internet's domain and IP blocks space, but knowing it and complying with this due to regulations, or good will is going to lead to further consequences for your organization.

Let's take anti-virus vendors for instance. I often say that anti virus is a necessary evil - given it's active!! Signatures based defense is futile, windows of opportunities emerge faster, 0day threats contribute, and overall, malware is starting to attack on a segmented based level => less major outbreaks, but the rates of signature updates is still a benchmark the public and some of the vendors like talking about. Email-Worm.Win32.Doombot.b for instance, is a good example of how the malware author is rendering the antivirus software into a useless application, just by blocking it from accessing its(publicly available, easy to find out through sniffin' etc.) update locations.

Even though the author wish he/she could "write" to these locations, that's not necessary, but the temporary advantage of exposing the user/organization to a particular window of opportunity, by making sure access to removal instructions and actual updates is disabled! Doombot's list is short, and a bit of a common sense one compared to others. And as always, the general public, sick of ads, and parasites, have taken the effort to constantly release updated hosts files to tackle their concerns. I wonder when, and how are vendors going to address this important from my point of view issue?

IP cloaking at the corporate level is still in its early stages, but represents a growing market due the following factors, among many others of course :

- governments and intelligence agencies are actively taking advantage of open source intelligence, OSINT, and vendors are already starting to offer relevant services. The Anonymizer among others, has also specially government/enterprise tailored services

- enterprises are getting extremely conscious about what others know of their surfing interests, and what are stakeholders on their watchlist looking at, on any of their extranets or corporate web sites

- citizens from countries with extremely restrictive Internet censorship practices will fuel the market's growth even more

Further reading can be found at :
Protecting Corporations from Internet Counter-Intelligence
Cloaking types

Technorati tags :
,,,
Continue reading →

0bay - how realistic is the market for security vulnerabilities?

December 12, 2005
In Issue 19 (July, 2005) of the Astalavista Security Newsletter that I release on a monthly basis, I wrote an article entitled "Security Researchers and your organization caught in between?" whose aim was to highlight a growing trend, namely the monetization of vulnerability research, who benefits and who doesn't.

A recent, rather significant event at least for me covering and monitoring this issue for quite some time now, was an Ebay listing for a "brand new Microsoft Excel vulnerability". A bit ironical, but I had a chat with Dave Endler, director of security research at TippingPoint, and the issue of their future position as bidders for someone else's research were discussed a week before the Ebay's listing in Issue 23 (November, 2005) of Astalavista's Security Newsletter.


Two of today's most popular, and at least public commercial entities paying hard cash for security vulnerabilities are : iDefense, and the ZeroDayInitiative (TippingPoint).

But what is the need for creating such a market? Who wins and who loses? What are the future global implications for this trends, originally started by iDefense?

In any market, there are sellers and buyers, that's the foundation of trade besides the actual exchange of goods/services and the associated transaction. What happens when buyers increase, is that sellers tend to increase as well, and, of course, exactly the opposite. Going further, every economy, has its black/underground or call it whatever you want variation. And while some will argue a respected researcher will contribute to the the development of even more botnets, who says it has to be respected to come with a vulnerability worth purchasing?! It's a Metasploit world, isn't it?!

Going back to the market's potential. Sellers get smarter, transparency is build given more buyers join seeking to achieve their objectives in this case, provide proactive protection to their clients only, and build an outstanding, hopefully loyal researchers' database. These firms, to which I refer as buyers have happened to envision the fact that there are thousands of skilled vulnerability researchers', who are amazingly capable, but aren't getting a penny out of releasing their vulnerabilities research. Ego is longer important, and getting $ for research on a free will basis is a proven capitalistic approach. What these companies(and I bet many more vendors will open themselves for such a service) didn't take into consideration in my opinion, is that, starting to work with people giving $ as the ultimate incentive will prove tricky in the long-term.

What will happen of the Swiss cheese of software(yet the one that dominates 95% of the OS market today) Microsoft starts bidding for security vulnerabilities in its products? Bankruptcy is not an option, while I doubt they will ever take this into consideration, mainly because it would seriously damage a market sector, the information security one. Imagine, just for a sec. that Microsoft decides to seriously deal with all its vulnerabilities? But today's lack of accountability for software vendors' actions related to vulnerabilities is making it even worse. If MS doesn't get sued for not releasing a patch in any time frame given, why should we, the small compared to MS vendor care?

Howard Schmidt, former White House cybersecurity adviser, once proposed that programmers should be held responsible for releasing vulnerable code. I partly agree with him, you cannot cut costs in order to meet product/marketing deadlines while hiring low skilled programmers who do not take security into consideration, which opens another complex discussion on what should a developer focus on these days - efficiency or security, and where's the trade-off?

I originally commented on this event back then :
The position of Schmidt prompts him to address critical issues and look for very strategic solutions which may not be favored by the majority of the industry as I’m reading through various news comments and blogs. I personally think, he has managed to realize the importance of making a distinction in how to tackle the vulnerabilities problem,who’s involved, and who can be influenced, where the ultimate goal is to achieve less vulnerable and poorly coded software. Software vendors seek profitability, or might actually be in the survival stage of their existence, and as obvious as it may seem, they facts huge costs, and extremely capable coders or employees tend to know their price! 

What’s the mention are the tech industry’s “supposed to be” benchmarks for vulnerabilities management, picture an enterprise with the “IE is the swiss cheese in the software world in terms of vulnerabilities, and yet no one is suing Microsoft over delayed patches” – lack of any incentives, besides moral ones, in case there’re clear signs and knowledge that efficiency is not balanced with security. And that’s still a bit of a gray area in the development world.

Vulnerabilities simply cannot exist, and perhaps the biggest trade-off we should also face is the enormous growth of interactive applications, innovation approaches for disseminating information, with speeds far outpacing the level of attention security gets. Eventually, we all benefit out of it, web application vulnerabilities scanners and consultants get rich, perhaps the (ISC)² should take this into consideration as well :-)

Even though you could still do the following :
- build awareness towards common certifications addressing the issue
- ensure your coders understand the trade-offs between efficiency and security and are able to apply certain marginal thinking, whereas still meet their objectives
- as far as accountability is concerned, do code auditing with security in mind and try figure out who are those that really don’t have a clue about security, train them
- constantly work on improving your patch release practices, or fight the problem from another point of view

But unless, coders, and software vendors aren’t given incentives, or obliged under regulations (that would ultimately result in lack of innovation, or at least a definite slow down), you would again have to live with uncertainly, and outsource the threats posed by this issue. M icrosoft’s “Improving Web Application Security: Threats and Countermeasures” book, still provides a very relevant information.

Slashdot’s discussion


What also bothers me, is how is the virginity of the vulnerability identified? I mean, what if I have already found it, developed an exploit for it, sold it to the underground, and cashed with the industry as well, and no one came across it on his/her :) honeyfarm? The researcher's reputation is a benchmark, but in the long-term, the competitive market that's about to appear, will force the buyers to start working on a mass basis. There's a definitely a lot to happen!

Welcome to the wonderful world of purchasing 0-day security vulnerabilities! Have an enemy, bid for his ownage, have a competitor, own them without having to attract unnecessary attention, I'm just kiddin' of course, although the possibilities are disturbing.

What I really liked about this important moment in vulnerability research, was that it was about time the security researchers wanted to see how valued their research is in terms of the only currency that matters in the process - the hard one. In my point of view, monetizing the vulnerabilities research market wasn't the best strategic approach on fighting 0-day vulnerabilities, in this case, ensure you have the most impressive minds on your side, and that your clients get hold of the latest vulnerabilities before the public does.

So - who's the winner - it's...Symantec who first realized the long-term importance of security vulnerabilities, and where, both researchers and actual vulnerabilities are - Bugtraq/SecurityFocus, by acquiring it for US$75 million in cash, back in 2002, and later one integrating its joys into the DeepSight Analyzer - remarkable. Both from a strategic point of view, and mainly because that, by the time any post on any of the associated mailing lists doesn't get approved, it's Symantec's staff having first look at what's to come for the day of everyone.

SecurityFocus is running a story about the Ebay vulnerability listing, and so is eWeek, Slashdot also picked up the story. It was about time for everyone, given it actually happened during the weekend :-)


 
Technorati tags :
Continue reading →