I've recently took the time and effort and process a huge number of cybercrime-friendly forum communities by using my employer WhoisXML API's Web Site Screenshot generating API in bulk and here are the results. Enjoy!
Big news. I've recently decided to convert my personal blog into a pre-order landing page for my 756 pages long upcoming personal memoir in the world of hacking and security circa the 90's up to present day including an elaboration on my security blogging cybercrime research and threat intelligence gathering including OSINT and independent contractor analysis expertise and experience for the purpose of lauching my personal memoir and making it publicly accessible in December, 2021 both in print and in multiple E-book formats for the general public or basically anyone who drops me a line at dancho.danchev@hush.com in terms of possible pre-order where the print version is priced at $35 and the E-book version is priced at $20.
What you can do in order to obtain access to my upcoming memoir? Drop me a line at dancho.danchev@hush.com in terms of possible pre-order including to participate in my pre-order newsletter where I will send you a direct message once the memoir is ready to be released with the official release date scheduled for December, 2021.
Some sample content includes:
It's the Facebook message that came from one of your infected friends pointing you to an on purposely created bogus Bloglines blog serving fake YouTube video window, that I have in mind. The Koobface gang has been mixing social engineering vectors by taking the potential victim on a walk through legitimate services in order to have them infected without using any client-side vulnerabilities.
Interestingly, since underground multitasking is becoming a rather common practice, the bogus blog has also been advertised within a blackhat SEO farm using the following blogs, currently linking to several hundred bogus Google Groups accounts :
The original real-time OSINT analysis of the Russian cyberattacks against Georgia conducted on the 11th of August, not only closed the Russia vs Georgia cyberwar case for me personally, but also, once again proved that real-time OSINT is invaluable compared to historical OSINT using a commercial social network visualization/data mining tool which cannot and will never be able to access the Dark Web, accessible only through real-time CYBERINT practices.
The value of real-time OSINT in such people's information warfare cyberattacks -- with Chinese hacktivists perfectly aware of the meaning of the phrase -- relies on the relatively lower operational security (OPSEC) the initiators of a particular campaign apply at the beginning, so that it would scale faster and attract more participants. What the Russian government was doing is fueling the (cyber) fire - literally, since all it takes for a collectivist socienty's cyber militia to organize, is a "call for action" which was taking place at the majority of forums, with the posters of these messages apparently using a spamming application to achieve better efficiency.
"Furthermore, coming up with Social Network analysis of the cyberattacks would produce nothing more but a few fancy graphs of over enthusiastic Russian netizen's distributing the static list of the targets. The real conversations, as always, are happening in the "Dark Web" limiting the possibilities for open source intelligence using a data mining software. Things changed, OPSEC is slowly emerging as a concept among malicious parties, whenever some of the "calls for action" in the DDoS attacks were posted at mainstream forums, they were immediately removed so that they don't show up in such academic initiatives"
It wouldn't make sense if this was the first time Russian hacktivists are maintaining the same rhythm as real-life events - which of course isn't.
When you get the "privilege" of getting DDoS-ed by a high profile DDoS for hire service used primarily by cybercriminals attacking other cybercriminals, you're officially doing hell of a good job exposing money laundering scams.
So, the ultimate question - who's behind the GPcode ransomware? It's Russian teens with pimples, using E-gold and Liberty Reserve accounts, running three different GPcode campaigns, two of which request either $100 or $200 for the decryptor, and communicating from Chinese IPs. Here are all the details regarding the emails they use, the email responses they sent back, the currency accounts, as well their most recent IPs used in the communication :
Of course the Klingons did it, or you were naive enough to even think for a second that Russians were behind it at the first place? Of the things I hate most, it's lowering down the quality of the discussion I hate the most. Even if you're excluding all the factual evidence (Coordinated Russia vs Georgia cyber attack in progress), common sense must prevail.
"civilians trained as soldiers but not part of the regular army; the entire body of physically fit civilians eligible by law for military service; a military force composed of ordinary citizens to provide defense, emergency law enforcement, or paramilitary service, in times of emergency; without being paid a regular salary or committed to a fixed term of service; an army of trained civilians, which may be an official reserve army, called upon in time of need; the national police force of a country; the entire able-bodied population of a state; or a private force, not under government control; An army or paramilitary group comprised of citizens to serve in times of emergency"
The Koobface Facebook worm -- go through an assessment of a previous campaign -- is once again making its rounds across social networking sites, Facebook in particular. Therefore, shall we spill a big cup of coffee over the malware campaigners efforts for yet another time? But of course.
What follows are the surprises, namely, despite the fact that Koobface is pitched as a Facebook worm, according to their statistics -- go through a previously misconfigured malware campaign stats -- the majority of unique visitors from the December's campaign appear to have been coming from Friendster. As for the exact number of visitors hitting their web counter, counting as of 7 November 2008, 12:58, with 91,109 unique visitors on on 07 Nov, Fri and another 53,260 on 08 Nov, Sat before the counter was deleted, the cached version of their web counter provides a relatively good sample.
Malware serving URLs part of Koobface worm's December's campaign, based on the identical counter used across all the malicious domains :
Sample malware infected hosts used by the redirectors :
119.234.7 .230:7777/?ch=&ea=
Exposing Bulgaria's Largest Data Leak - An OSINT Analysis
Exposing the Black Basta Ransomware Group - Part Three
Exposing the Conti Ransomware Gang - An OSINT Analysis
Azerbaijanian Embassies in Pakistan and Hungary Serving Malware
Joining Team Astalavista.box.sk - Official Project Re-Launch - Join us Today!
Profiling a Currently Active High-Profile Cybercriminals Portfolio of Ransomware-Themed Extortion Email Addresses
New Project - Malware C&C Domains Offensive Network Reconnaissance Monitoring Project
Profiling a Currently Active Portfolio of High-Profile Cybercriminal Jabber and XMPP Accounts
Dissecting 'Operation Ababil' - an OSINT Analysis
RSS Feed