Facebook Photo Album Themed Malware Campaign, Mass SQL Injection Attacks Courtesy of AS42560

A spamvertised through Facebook personal messages, Photo Album themed campaign, with the domain IP responding to ZeuS C&Cs, combined with an indirect connection between this campaign and the "100,000+ Scareware Serving Fake YouTube Pages Campaign", followed by a domain portfolio used in a currently active mass SQL injection attack serving CVE-2007-5659 exploits, parked within the same AS as the Facebook's campaign itself.

What else is missing? The details of course.

DM spamvertised URL: online-photo-albums.org - 77.78.239.4, AS42560, BA-GLOBALNET-AS - Email: protect@privacy.com.ua

Detection rate: album.exe - Win32.DownloaderReno; Backdoor.Win32.Kbot.anj - Result: 12/41 (29.27%)
MD5: d24aa2c364d4b86f75a09362c952a838
SHA1: 3973c547b64d166ae807eec494c373efd53ac04c

Creates 1.exe; 2.exe and the self-destructing 3.exe. Detection rates:
- 1.exe - Result: 0/41 (0.00%)
MD5: fbd0a495d3409123d0e90a9a734cbbc1
SHA1: ce527267f50b433c622e5da0db5515a4d2e4ae9c

- 2.exe - Win32.DownloaderReno; Sus/UnkPacker - Result: 10/41 (24.39%)
MD5: 7a4feaf8d9acf982d0cbeb437e4f7c3d
SHA1: 39b280d0d2ec505a94415f7a9468a547fee51c66

with 3.exe phoning back to the following domain, also responding to the original campaign's IP 77.78.239.4
spmfb3309.com /ab/setup.php?act=filters&id=BWKJD0NWLt3pn2Vh6YIhhBe3&ver=2

inetnum:        77.78.239.0 - 77.78.240.255
netname:        MAXIMUS-NET-SERVICES
remarks: ### in case of abuse please contact: godaccs@gmail.com ###
descr:          Maximus hosting services
country:        MD
admin-c:        JB1004
tech-c:         JB1004
status:         ASSIGNED PA
mnt-by:         BA-GLOBALNET
changed:        bosko@globalnet.ba 20100528
source:         RIPE

person:         Jerkovic Bosko
address:        Josipa Vancasa 10
address:        71000 Sarajevo
address:        Bosnia and Herzegovina
phone:          +387 33 221093
e-mail:         bosko@globalnet.ba
nic-hdl:        JB1004
mnt-by:         BA-GLOBALNET
changed:        bosko@globalnet.ba 20070309
source:         RIPE

Surprise, surprise, where do we know that godaccs@gmail.com abuse email from? From the previously profiled "Dissecting the 100,000+ Scareware Serving Fake YouTube Pages Campaign". In particular:

- AS43134, Donstroy Ltd; Emails: donstroitel@mail.com; godaccs@gmail.com
- AS42560, MAXIMUS-NET-SERVICES; Emails: godaccs@gmail.com

Responding to 77.78.239.4 (online-photo-albums.org) are also the following domains:
hyporesist.com - Email: Kyle.MoodyAl@yahoo.com - Used to register ever52592g.com; miror-counter.org; mnfrekjivr.com
newsbosnia.org - Email: qggrvpvwiw@whoisservices.cn - ZeuS crimeware C&C
online-photo-albums.org - Email: protect@privacy.com.ua
search-static.org - Email: Kyle.MoodyAl@yahoo.com
spmfb2299.com - Email: laycxpqguk@whoisservices.cn
spmfb3309.com - Email: qhyfafvqyh@whoisservices.cn
vostokgear.org - Email: afgjvubuym@whoisservices.cn

Where's the mass SQL injection attack connection? Within AS42560, responding to 77.78.239.56 are also the following domains, part of the campaign:

google-server09.info - Email: kit00066@gmail.com
google-server10.info - Email: kit00066@gmail.com
google-server11.info - Email: kit00066@gmail.com
google-server12.info - Email: kit00066@gmail.com
google-server14.info - Email: kit00066@gmail.com
google-server29.info - Email: kit00066@gmail.com
google-server31.info - Email: kit00066@gmail.com
jhuiuhxfgxhlfkjhjth.info - Email: kit00066@gmail.com
jhuiuhxfgxhtfkjhjth.info - Email: kit00066@gmail.com
jhuluhxfgxhlfkjhjth.info - Email: kit00066@gmail.com
top-teen-porn.info - Email: kit00066@gmail.com

Sample mass injection URLs:
google-server09.info/ urchin.js
google-server10.info/ urchin.js
google-server11.info/ urchin.js
google-server12.info/ urchin.js
google-server14.info/ urchin.js
google-server29.info/ urchin.js
google-server31.info/ urchin.js
jhuiuhxfgxhlfkjhjth.info/ urchin.js
jhuiuhxfgxhtfkjhjth.info/ urchin.js
jhuluhxfgxhlfkjhjth.info/ urchin.js

Detection rate:
- urchin.js - Trojan.JS.Redirector.ca (v); JS:Downloader-LP - Result: 4/41 (9.76%)
MD5: 3f2bc50c30ed8e7997b3de3d528d0ed5
SHA1: 66d6edef711516201f20fce676175ad16777e162

Sample exploitation structure from the mass SQL injection campaign:
- google-server31.info /urchin.js
        - Scanner-Album.com/?affid=382&subid=landing - 91.212.127.19, AS49087, Telos-Solutions-AS - Email: systemman_mk@gmail.com
            - websitecoolgo.com/cgi-bin /158 - 91.188.59.220 - AS6851, BKCNET "SIA" IZZI - Email: marcomarcian@hotmailbox.com
                - websitecoolgo.com /cgi-bin/random content leading to CVE-2007-5659

Parked on 91.212.127.19 (Scanner-Album.com), AS49087, Telos-Solutions-AS:
automaticsecurityscan.com - Email: robertwatkins@hotmailbox.com
bigsecurityscan.com - Email: robertwatkins@hotmailbox.com
bigsecurityscan.com - Email: robertwatkins@hotmailbox.com
blacksecurityscan.com - Email: robertwatkins@hotmailbox.com
edscorpor.com - Email: leonschmura@hotmailbox.com
edsctrum.com - Email: admin@edsfiles.com
edsfiles.com - Email: leonschmura@hotmailbox.com
edsfilles.com - Email: leonschmura@hotmailbox.com
edsletter.com - Email: leonschmura@hotmailbox.com
edslgored.com - Email: leonschmura@hotmailbox.com
edsnewter.com - Email: leonschmura@hotmailbox.com
edsogos.com - Email: leonschmura@hotmailbox.com
edsspectr.com - Email: leonschmura@hotmailbox.com
edstoox.com - Email: leonschmura@hotmailbox.com
findsecurityscan.com - Email: robertwatkins@hotmailbox.com
memory-scanner.com - Email: systemman_mk@gmail.com
onefindup.org - Email: JamesHying@xhotmail.net
scanner-album.com - Email: systemman_mk@gmail.com
scanner-definition.com - Email: rutkowski_m3@gmail.com
scanner-hardware.com - Email: systemman_mk@gmail.com
scanner-master.com - Email: systemman_mk@gmail.com
scanner-models.com - Email: systemman_mk@gmail.com
scanner-profile.com - Email: systemman_mk@gmail.com
scanner-programming.com - Email: systemman_mk@gmail.com
scanner-supplies.com - Email: rutkowski_m3@gmail.com
scanner-tips.com - Email: systemman_mk@gmail.com
searchdubles.org - Email: MerleMeisin@xhotmail.net
searchmartiup.org - Email: MerleMeisin@xhotmail.net
searchprasup.org - Email: MerleMeisin@xhotmail.net
searchprodinc.org - Email: MerleMeisin@xhotmail.net
searchprodinc.org - Email: MerleMeisin@xhotmail.net
searchtanup.org - Email: MerleMeisin@xhotmail.net

Responding to 91.188.59.220 and 91.188.59.221 (websitecoolgo.com) within AS6851, BKCNET "SIA" IZZI are also the following domains participation in different campaigns:
internetgotours.com - Email: marcomarcian@hotmailbox.com
mediaboomgo.com - Email: paulalameda@hotmailbox.com
mediagotech.com - Email: marcomarcian@hotmailbox.com
mediaracinggo.com - Email: paulalameda@hotmailbox.com
netgozero.com - Email: marcomarcian@hotmailbox.com
nethealthcarego.com - Email: marcomarcian@hotmailbox.com
networkget.com - Email: marcomarcian@hotmailbox.com
networksportsgo.com - Email: marcomarcian@hotmailbox.com
patricknetgo.com - Email: paulalameda@hotmailbox.com
webaliveget.com - Email: paulalameda@hotmailbox.com
webcoolgo.com - Email: paulalameda@hotmailbox.com
webgettraffic.com - Email: paulalameda@hotmailbox.com
webgetwisdom.com - Email: marcomarcian@hotmailbox.com
webgetwise.com - Email: marcomarcian@hotmailbox.com
webgoengine.com - Email: paulalameda@hotmailbox.com
webgosolutions.com - Email: paulalameda@hotmailbox.com
webmagicgo.com - Email: paulalameda@hotmailbox.com
websitecoolgo.com - Email: marcomarcian@hotmailbox.com
websiteget.com - Email: marcomarcian@hotmailbox.com

The rise of custom abuse emails, conveniently offered to cybercrime-friendly dedicated customers?

It's worth pointing out that godaccs@gmail.com a.k.a Complife, Ltd is conveniently responsible for- AS42560, BA-GLOBALNET-AS; AS43134, Donstroy Ltd; and AS42560, MAXIMUS-NET-SERVICES, followed by piotrek89@gmail.com responsible for AS6851, BKCNET "SIA" IZZI (used by the Koobface gang, also seen in the following campaigns Spamvertised iTunes Gift Certificates and CV Themed Malware Campaigns; GoDaddy's Mass WordPress Blogs Compromise Serving Scareware).

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter.

Dissecting the 100,000+ Scareware Serving Fake YouTube Pages Campaign

Researchers from eSoft are reporting on 135,000 Fake YouTube pages currently serving scareware, in between using multiple monetization/traffic optimization tactics for the hijacked traffic.

Based on the campaign's structure, it's pretty clear that the template-ization of malware serving sites (Part Two) is not dead. Let's dissect the campaign, it's structure, the monetization/traffic optimization tactics used, list all the domains+URLs involved, and establish multiple connections (in the face of AS6851, BKCNET "SIA" IZZI) to recent malware campaigns -- cybercriminals are often customers of the same cybercrime-friendly provider.

The campaign is relying on a typical mix of compromised and purely malicious sites, but is using not just an identical template, but identical campaign structure, which remains pretty static for the time being. Upon visiting one of the sites and meeting the referrer requirement -- Google works fine -- the hardcoded preload.php loads, which is always pointing to the same IP, using a randomly generated  code, which changes over time - 91.188.60.126/?q=jzhaf - AS6851, BKCNET "SIA" IZZI

-------------------
inetnum:        91.188.60.0 - 91.188.60.255
netname:        ATECH-SAGADE
descr:          Sagade Ltd.
descr:          Latvia, Rezekne, Darzu 21
descr:          +371 20034981
remarks:        abuse-mailbox: piotrek89@gmail.com
country:        LV
admin-c:        TMCD111-RIPE
tech-c:         TMCD111-RIPE
status:         ASSIGNED PA
mnt-by:         AS6851-MNT
changed:        taner@bkc.lv 20100423
source:         RIPE

role:           TMCD Admin Contacts
address:        Ieriku 67a, Riga, LV-1084
org:            ORG-TMDA1-RIPE
e-mail:         bkc@bkc.lv
admin-c:        AS1606-RIPE
admin-c:        TP422-RIPE
tech-c:         RF2443-RIPE
tech-c:         IR106-RIPE
nic-hdl:        TMCD111-RIPE
changed:        taner@bkc.lv 20081023
source:         RIPE
-------------------

Moreover, the second traffic optimization strategy takes place by loading two different subdomains from byethost4.com, where another redirection takes place, this time loading the bogus mybookface.net - 209.51.195.115 - Email: hostorgadmin@googlemail.com

Sample campaign structure:
- compromised_site.com
    - compromised_site.com/preload.php
        - 91.188.60.126/?q=jzhaf
        - popal.byethost4.com/mlk.php?sub=2&r=google.com
        - trash.byethost14.com/tick.php?sub=1&r=google.com
            - cnbutterfly.com/contact.php?uid=2034 - 74.81.93.227
            - simulshop.com/contact.php?uid=2034 - 88.198.177.74
                - www3.smartbestav10.co.cc - 74.118.194.78

Domains involved in the campaign:
action-force.net
anytimeopen.com
atomizer.net
auto.ideazzz.ru
avmarket.com.ua
baby-car.ru
babystart.eu
badlhby.com
bestseller4you.at
butikk.losnaspelet.no
clubshirts.info
companions411.biz
egeoptik.com
e-life.com.mxl
eshop.mr-servis.cz
evage.biz
eventhorizon.biz
fliq.de
freestyle-shop.ch
gameartisans.org
gawex.com.pl
gct.ro
geraeuschwelten.de
ignitionlb.info
imalaya.eu
indovic.net
irpen.biz
jasoncorrick.co.uk
lojavirtual.versameta.pt
machineinterface.net
nitmail.com
olek.co.uk
opco.co.ir

pahomefinance.net
pcmall.ro
prozoomhosting.net
rcchina.com.cn
recoverinstyle.net
relogio-de-ponto.com.pt
rhodiola.com.mx
shop.ullihome.de
shopzone.ir
sink-o-mania.com
sklep.autorud.pl
sklep1.vinylove.pl
snews.com.tw
soposhinvitations.com
standrite.com
teoflowerbulbs.ro
triominos.ru
webmas.ca
wesellmac.com
wireandthewood.com
1classfilter.be
24shopping.nl
9mama.pl
apwireless.ca
bazarnet.com.mx
bead.shop-in-hk.com
bicigrino.info
bridezion.de
buenapetito.net
calicompras.com
candjconsulting.us
carpcompany.nl
casacristorey.com.mx
cheekybrats.com.au
chiri-junior.nl
corporate-pc.com
deesis.com.pl
derise.ee
digitalelectronicsolutions.biz
dj1stop.com
firsaturunlerim.com
gentian.no
guihua.com.hk
hydromasaze.com
iranagrishop.com
issanni.net

• Complete list of the actual URLs involved in the campaign; Pastebin

jasoncorrick.co.uk
klimuszko.net
krasevka.si
kundalinibooks.com.au
kuub.com
lanpower.se
leathershop.be
ludf.net
marinestores.biz
microdermals.com
mingfai.info
minitar.com.tw
msproductions.be
murgiaintavola.it
mvchorus.org
nettohoffnung.de
paketic.com
parisa.lt
pentruacasa.com
promotechmexico.com.mx
pursuitspt1.com
quadroufo.com
quecumbar.co.uk
rotas.lt
sammlereck.info
sensicacciaepesca.com
skintwo.biz
sklep.af.com.pl
sklep.kafti.com
sklep.mago.com.pl
skleplotniczy.pl
skriptorium.at
smscom.nl
spine.com.br
szemuvegkeret.com
teldatawarehouse.com
tiouw.nl
uptowntrellis.co.nz
viasapia.com.br
vita-bhv.nl
widlak-market.com
wscll2.net
xfour.es
yeti.com.pl

Detection for the scareware, and the manual install binary:
- install.exe - Trojan.FakeAlert.CCS; FraudTool.Win32.SecurityTool (v) - Result: 16/40 (40%) - MD5: 3562be54671a1326eeef8bcfc85bd2a0
- packupdate107_2034.exe - Packed.Win32.Krap.an; TrojWare.Win32.Trojan.Fakealert.4193280 - Result: 10/41 (24.4%) - MD5: 991bba541e1872191ec5eb88c7de1f30

Upon execution the sample phones back to:
update2.protect-helper.com - 95.169.186.25 - Email: gkook@checkjemail.nl
update1.free-guard.com - 95.169.186.25 - Email: gkook@checkjemail.nl

- install.48728.exe - Trojan.FakeAV; TrojanDownloader:Win32/Renos.KX - Result: 26/41 (63.42%) - MD5: 15281c3f3fac1ccdaf43e2b26d32a887

Upon execution the sample phones back to:
movieartsworld.com - 216.240.146.119 - Email: elaynecroft@ymail.com
firstnationarts.com - 66.96.219.38 (redskeltonarts.com, southard_cheryl@yahoo.com) - Email: harold_ward@ymail.com
sportfishingarts.com - 66.199.229.230 (greenbeearts.com, heiserdenise@ymail.com) - Email: rodericknovak@rocketmail.com
bestgreatarts.com - 64.191.44.73 (freesurrealarts.com, ghuertas@rocketmail.com) - Email: jeffreyespey@ymail.com
spacevisionarts.com - 69.10.35.253 (picturegraffitoarts.com, ganthony46@rocketmail.com) - Email: mosleyjason@rocketmail.com
smallspacearts.com - 64.20.35.3 (dvdvideoarts.com, ganthony46@rocketmail.com) - Email: mosleyjason@rocketmail.com

Based on cross-checking across different data sets, 91.188.60.126 - AS6851, BKCNET "SIA" IZZI is also known to have been used by at least 4 other members of the affiliate network. Naturally, their "signature" can be seen across multiple ASs as well.

Same scareware affiliate program is seen on the following IPs, using a different set of affiliate partners:
194.8.250.154/news.php?land=20&affid=12400 - AS43134, Donstroy Ltd; Emails: donstroitel@mail.com; godaccs@gmail.com
194.8.250.155./news.php?land=20&affid=12400
194.8.250.157/news.php?land=20&affid=42500
194.8.250.158./news.php?land=20&affid=42500
91.188.60.118/news.php?land=20&affid=50900 - AS6851, Sagade Ltd.; Emails: piotrek89@gmail.com;
91.188.60.124/news.php?land=20&affid=12800
91.188.60.126/news.php?land=20&affid=15600
91.188.60.146/news.php?land=20&affid=20102
91.188.60.147/news.php?land=20&affid=20102
91.188.60.147/news.php?land=20&affid=20102
91.213.157.165/news.php?land=20&affid=50900 - AS13618, PE "Sattelecom"; Emails: tt@sattelecom.biz
77.78.239.71/news.php?land=20&affid=12400 - AS42560, MAXIMUS-NET-SERVICES; Emails: godaccs@gmail.com; bosko@globalnet.ba
77.78.239.76/news.php?land=20&affid=12400
77.78.239.77/news.php?land=20&affid=15603

As for AS6851, BKCNET "SIA" IZZI, the same AS is also seen in the following campaigns, find below an excerpt from a previous post, emphasizing on the Koobface gang connection, in the sense that they're both customers of the same cybecrime-friendly ISP.

• Spamvertised iTunes Gift Certificates and CV Themed Malware Campaigns
• GoDaddy's Mass WordPress Blogs Compromise Serving Scareware
• Dissecting the Mass DreamHost Sites Compromise

What's so special about AS6851, BKCNET "SIA" IZZI anyway? It's the Koobface gang connection in the face of urodinam.net, which is also hosted within AS6851, currently responding to 91.188.59.10. More details on urodinam.net:

• Koobface Botnet's Scareware Business Model
• Koobface Botnet's Scareware Business Model - Part Two

Moreover, on the exact same IP where Koobface gang's urodinam.net is parked, we also have the currently active 1zabslwvn538n4i5tcjl.com - Email: michaeltycoon@gmail.com, serving client side exploits using the Yes Malware Exploitation kit - 91.188.59.10 /temp/cache/PDF.php; admin panel at: 1zabslwvn538n4i5tcjl.com /temp/admin/index.php

For the time being, the following domains, IPs are all active within AS6851, BKCNET "SIA" IZZI:
1zabslwvn538n4i5tcjl.com - 91.188.59.10 - Email: michaeltycoon@gmail.com
hotxxxtubevideo.com - 91.188.59.74
ruexp1.ru - Email: krahil@mail.ru
hotxtube.in - 91.188.59.74 - Email: lordjok@gmail.com
get-money-now.net - 91.188.59.211 - Email: noxim@maidsf.ru
easy-ns-server.org - 91.188.60.3 - Email: russell1985@hotmail.com
fast-scanerr-online.org - 91.188.60.3 - Email: roberson@hotmail.com
my-antivirusplus.org - 91.188.60.3 - Email: FranciscoPGeorge@hotmail.com
myprotectonline.org - 91.188.60.3 - Email: FranciscoPGeorge@hotmail.com
sys-protect-online.org - 91.188.60.3 - Email: FranciscoPGeorge@hotmail.com
av-scaner-onlinemachine.com - 91.188.60.3 - Email: gershatv07@gmail.com
domen-zaibisya.com - 91.188.59.211 - Email: security2guard@gmail.com
directupdate.info - 91.188.60.10 - Email: MichaelBCarlson@gmail.com
91.188.59.50
91.188.60.3
91.188.59.112

Name servers of notice:
ns1.iil10oil0.com - 91.188.59.70
ns2.iil10oil0.com - 91.188.59.71

Domains using their services:
allforil1i.com - Email: lordjok@gmail.com
allforyouplus.net - Email: leshapopovi@gmail.com
alltubeforfree.com - Email: lordjok@gmail.com
allxtubevids.net - Email: lordjok@gmail.com
downloadfreenow.in - Email: lordjok@gmail.com
enteri1llisec.in - Email: leshapopovi@gmail.com
freeanalsextubemovies.com - Email: lordjok@gmail.com
freetube06.com - Email: lordjok@gmail.com
freeviewgogo.com - Email: leshapopovi@gmail.com
homeamateurclips.com - Email: lordjok@gmail.com
hotfilesfordownload.com
hotxtube.in - Email: lordjok@gmail.com
porntube2000.com - Email: welolseeees@gmail.com
porntubefast.com - Email: welolseeees@gmail.com
porn-tube-video.com - Email: welolseeees@gmail.com
skachivay.com
visiocarii1l.net - Email: leshapopovi@gmail.com
xhuilil1ii.com - Email: lordjok@gmail.com
yourbestway.cn - Email: haucheng@yahoo.com
youvideoxxx.com - Email: jonnytrade@gmail.com

Take down actions are in place, meanwhile, consider going through the "Ultimate Guide to Scareware Protection".

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter.

Dissecting the Ongoing U.S Federal Forms Themed Blackhat SEO Campaign - Part Two

UPDATED: Sunday, June 06, 2010.
The new redirections currently take place through www4.greatav40-td.co.cc/?uid=213&pid=3&ttl=51545746f5c (93.190.141.40) and www1.avscaner-40pr.co.cc (217.23.5.52).

Parked on 93.190.141.40, AS49981, WorldStream are also:
www3.justsoft12-td.co.cc
www3.donrart55-td.co.cc
www3.donrart57-td.co.cc
www3.donrart59-td.co.cc
www4.swintermz.cz.cc
www3.goldvox-50td.xorg.pl
www3.goldvox-60td.xorg.pl
www3.goldvox-52td.xorg.pl
www3.goldvox-54td.xorg.pl
www3.goldvox-64td.xorg.pl
www3.goldvox-56td.xorg.pl
www3.goldvox-58td.xorg.pl
www1.check-saveyour-pc-now.in
www1.in-safe-keepmyzone.in
www1.makesafe-scan-forsure.com

Detection rate:
- packupdate107_213.exe - Trojan.Fakealert.origin; Mal/FakeAV-BW - Result: 12/41 (29.27%)

Upon execution, the sample phones back to:
update1.free-guard.com - 95.169.186.25; 188.124.5.64 - Email: gkook@checkjemail.nl
update2.protect-helper.com - 78.159.108.170 - Email: gkook@checkjemail.nl
secure2.protectzone.net - 91.207.192.24 - Email: gkook@checkjemail.nl
secure1.protect-zone.com - 209.212.147.241 - Email: gkook@checkjemail.nl
secure1.protect-zone.com - 209.212.147.241 - Email: gkook@checkjemail.nl
www5.securitymasterav.com - 91.207.192.25 - Email: gkook@checkjemail.nl
update2.free-guard.net - Email: gkook@checkjemail.nl
report.land-protection.com - 188.124.7.156 - Email: gkook@checkjemail.nl
report.goodguardz.com - 93.186.124.94 - Email: gkook@checkjemail.nl
report.zoneguardland.com - 93.186.124.91 - Email: gkook@checkjemail.nl
report1.stat-mx.xorg.pl - 109.196.132.41 - Email: gkook@checkjemail.nl
secure1.protect-zone.com - 209.212.147.241 - Email: gkook@checkjemail.nl
74.125.45.100
74.82.216.3

Parked on 95.169.186.25 (AS31103, KEYWEB-AS); 188.124.5.64 (AS44565, VITAL TEKNOLOJI) are also:
www3.justsoft11-td.co.cc
www3.justsoft12-td.co.cc
www4.swintermz.cz.cc
www4.trustzone17-td.xorg.pl
www3.coantys-41td.xorg.pl
www3.coantys-42td.xorg.pl
www3.coantys-46td.xorg.pl
www4.miymiy3.com
update1.free-guard.com
useguard.com
update1.useguard.com
www2.avcleaner30-pd.co.cc
www1.favoritav30-pd.co.cc
www2.avcleaner32-pd.co.cc
www2.avcleaner34-pd.co.cc
www1.favoritav34-pd.co.cc
www2.avcleaner36-pd.co.cc
www1.favoritav36-pd.co.cc
www3.avprotector54-td.xorg.pl
www3.avprotector56-td.xorg.pl
update1.free-guard.com
update1.winsystemupdates.com

Remember the massive blackhat SEO campaign using U.S Federal Forms themed keywords, which was extensively profiled in August, 2009?

• Blackhat SEO Campaign Hijacks U.S Federal Form Keywords, Serves Scareware
• U.S Federal Forms Blackhat SEO Themed Scareware Campaign Expanding
• Dissecting the Ongoing U.S Federal Forms Themed Blackhat SEO Campaign
• Koobface-Friendly Riccom LTD - AS29550 - (Finally) Taken Offline - multiple connections

The cybercriminals behind it, never really stopped feeding new domains, including compromised ones, naturally diversifying the set of topics in order to serve scareware. Now that enough data is gathered, naturally exposing connections within the cybercrime ecosystem which would be communicated using the "perfect timing, perfect channel" philosophy, it's time to dissect the online campaign, expose the entire portfolio of domains involved, and, of course, take it down.

What particularly interesting about this gang, is their clear understanding of QA (quality assurance) for the sake of increase OPSEC (operational security). Just like the previous campaigns, each individual domain involved in the campaign is registered using a separate email, in the majority of cases it's an automatically registered one. With or without the QA, there's no escape from the monetization vector - in this case, and like many other - scareware.

Domains used in the blackhat SEO campaign, none of these are currently flagged as harmful:
1ip5p8h.co.cc - Email: mijkzh@gmail.com
1us51n.co.cc - Email: mqxd2r2@gmail.com
aifmydpuhv.co.cc - Email: kent.attonis9140@yahoo.com
amquijycpntb.co.cc - Email: volf.aittala1388@yahoo.com
aqejhilmvb.co.cc - Email: amandeep.terrisse8102@yahoo.com
arnepqjya.co.cc - Email: vkpnzxn@gmail.com
bekqjcra.co.cc - Email: yaala.benardos7911@yahoo.com
benyd.co.cc - Email: lexyb610@gmail.com
bestdesision.co.cc - Email: an9020@bk.ru
bipilyqomyusvuhy.co.cc - Email: eeclllw3xqu19tr9wb@gmail.com
bjalumericz.co.cc - Email: diamond.aittala4367@yahoo.com
chammaope.co.cc - Email: wefergss@ukr.net
coebfjqmkhsn.co.cc - Email: kent.attonis9140@yahoo.com
comp-s.co.cc - Email: stas14423321@mail.ru
eynuqacjrtiz.co.cc - Email: ketina.tomsic2552@yahoo.com
getmoney4me.co.cc - Email: finalizer12@mail.ru
goumucnypuxuhyikzi.co.cc - Email: ekx7roq8p5hrd61tah@gmail.com
hiokirygohxinugohu.co.cc - Email: q88zh7dwshibteg05l@gmail.com
hryjhuklo.co.cc - Email: fgyuhedgdrfghhio@ymail.com
ibdumycp.co.cc - Email: madelyn.ajai1243@yahoo.com
ifohviwihuuxitqoil.co.cc - Email: bsowez9usp1u8cjyxp@gmail.com
ifyfgybyuxisoffu.co.cc - Email: 5nrg2bgm2og0cloxpf@gmail.com
ihquyrvutyridyuwyj.co.cc - Email: wh1p9c5f0jwlvn5jlq@gmail.com
ijojinhuxifykygysu.co.cc - Email: lq7s26llpq2sxbcyd9@gmail.com
imdjrsfybnav.co.cc - Email: sarig.ajaye7737@yahoo.com
incom-sale.co.cc - Email: wisha700_5@yahoo.com
inoltoumydonulijuk.co.cc - Email: e6pgu8mamts6fco5ik@gmail.com
iroqimcuohubizgooh.co.cc - Email: sku0cthz7ttgzwaqzw@gmail.com
iwanti.co.cc - Email: justtobebeauty@gmail.com
iyqvogx.co.cc - Email: do.co.lo.k.oh.o.ngo.v.o@gmail.com
jepabhto.co.cc - Email: festas.mcilsey1646@yahoo.com
kiaxmh4.co.cc - Email: kiaxmh@kiaxmh.com
kiboinikixuvquliro.co.cc - Email: 5k2j7bnpxzgkoyibb0@gmail.com
krghiqyiht.co.cc - Email: ouhegtlx@yahoo.com
kyogpylymypusulojo.co.cc - Email: rrykuqs44ilgf2xd6q@gmail.com
ltcsi0.co.cc - Email: v9xodcm@gmail.com
omsuimuhysjoujiqip.co.cc - Email: nattyxbfpvcaivauf6@gmail.com
opimuzxiyrxigoiwur.co.cc - Email: ebiy9hwt817zs5m0wa@gmail.com
ostozuorypofitjuti.co.cc - Email: 2rdo8uwh14y5mqckkh@gmail.com

pqusrzycd.co.cc - Email: adalricus.aijala4749@yahoo.com
ptvibnrjeayh.co.cc - Email: miliani.mccomrick3922@yahoo.com
pubaxj.co.cc - Email: runuk8976@gmail.com
pucrsnihoqy.co.cc - Email: dalila.babusek8958@yahoo.com
qbhomskuine.co.cc - Email: keona.canose6839@yahoo.com
qcumoyh.co.cc - Email: bethiah.mcglasky5891@yahoo.com
qyczejdlita.co.cc - Email: abegail.woitkoski3075@yahoo.com
ridcamybv.co.cc - Email: laurentius.diamandoglou5401@yahoo.com
rithubmolnda.co.cc - Email: adalynn.aiololo3070@yahoo.com
riyvroiqfoydcilifo.co.cc - Email: irjghmpq7w9t0ah6rz@gmail.com
rnoqzydjuia.co.cc - Email: ieuan.calcutt9416@yahoo.com
rpdkjuaft.co.cc - Email: worley.biernacka1945@yahoo.com
rybidlzck.co.cc - Email: ander.airwyk9339@yahoo.com
ryliydulivuvdojo.co.cc - Email: b5657927wcdn48k3u2@gmail.com
rywutydymoxyodygyt.co.cc - Email: e8fzpd2yzy4w8hf7t4@gmail.com
sdemfjotuc.co.cc - Email: annemarie.bichan3685@yahoo.com
search-portal.co.cc - Email: akhmadarroyan@gmail.com
siycugufryyrkoylky.co.cc - Email: v5o71m4qiy5is0zcs3@gmail.com
sounluolvuoxyqixky.co.cc - Email: ay2643zdi8kywwu444@gmail.com
sprqucoatz.co.cc - Email: vindhya.perilean5722@yahoo.com
ucywmuziboytylwi.co.cc - Email: m45267tiipj7xk9n71@gmail.com
unotufukujygugusto.co.cc - Email: qe2m9s1abdvw02g1p3@gmail.com
upykhogupiybuwojyz.co.cc - Email: 7ea7iulbkzmfp0grso@gmail.com
usbokuycryocyjykqi.co.cc - Email: 5fnuzbof36ug19ly7f@gmail.com
vobyumfoodzygubuyv.co.cc - Email: mjkexe0d9gaqkzihlo@gmail.com
xepepele969.co.cc - Email: bemumoro6654@gmail.com
xodovumuycguhyujip.co.cc - Email: zeqa6hr6kltwpt6eis@gmail.com
yfwiiwoqwipihovo.co.cc - Email: 87koy5ljr5j4oe9dcm@gmail.com
ygitysbocysokuujok.co.cc - Email: qa0gvqsa8t3dr5u3yr@gmail.com
ykraivec.co.cc - Email: wergr@ukr.net
ynywyvtioxiloghoin.co.cc - Email: g955emcus8z0dbfebs@gmail.com
yourbestchose.co.cc - Email: daan900@bk.ru
yzirukwoilokocpohi.co.cc - Email: scqnbtps908moi8rgx@gmail.com

The .co.cc domains portfolio responds to the following IPs, parked on them are also related malicious domains:
69.163.236.70
78.159.114.244
82.146.50.101
82.146.54.111
82.146.50.156
82.146.54.116
82.146.54.118
82.146.54.119
82.146.54.122
82.146.54.129
82.146.50.183
82.146.54.143
82.146.50.184
82.146.50.188
82.146.54.150
82.146.50.193
82.146.50.194
82.146.50.213
82.146.54.177
82.146.51.237
82.146.53.244
82.146.54.62
82.146.54.69
82.146.54.84
84.16.236.31
84.16.236.32
84.16.229.42
89.149.202.106
89.149.226.127
89.149.201.224
89.149.255.174
89.149.255.20
89.149.238.225
89.149.255.21
89.149.200.47
89.149.237.83
92.63.105.179
92.63.105.191
92.63.98.239
94.76.205.176
94.76.205.177
94.76.205.178
94.76.205.180
94.76.205.182
94.76.205.183
94.76.205.184
174.121.196.227
174.120.128.62
188.120.231.249
205.234.222.169
212.95.56.102
212.95.56.104
212.95.56.89
212.95.56.92
212.95.56.93
212.95.56.95
212.95.56.96

Compromised sites part of the blackhat SEO campaign:
kleertjesenmooi.nl
knapadvies.nl
kruidendreef60.nl
kruijspunt.nl
ktf-texel.nl
lali.nl
laplanchette.nl
lenzfilm.nl
leuveld.nl
liana-makeup.com
lidavanvelzensportmassage.nl
lief4kids.com
logamklusmaster.nl
lookingblueeye.nl
luccie-007.nl
lucmeubelbouw.nl
lukasart.nl
maakkennismetkennis.nl
magisoft.be
magnetenspecialist.nl
mahu-services.nl
maismoe.nl
makaroni.info
malena-team.nl
maliebaanutrecht.nl

Once the end user clicks on a link found within Google's index, a tiny .js checks the referrers (compromised_site.nl/directory/randomcontent.js) and the redirection takes place. For instance:
- www3.donrart58-td.co.cc/ ?uid=213&pid=3&ttl=21f4e73673b - 93.190.141.41 - Email: mailwork.abc@gmail.com
    - www2.uberguardzz6.com - 94.228.220.114 - Email: gkook@checkjemail.nl
        - www1.favoritav31-pd.co.cc - 188.124.5.66 - Email: mailwork.abc@gmail.com
            - www2.avcleaner44-pd.co.cc - 93.190.139.214 - Email: mailwork.abc@gmail.com

Where do we know the same campaigner (?uid=213&pid=3&ttl=21f4e73673b) from? From related campaigns.

Parked on 93.190.141.41, donrart58-td.co.cc, AS49981 WorldStream are also:
www3.justsoft11-td.co.cc
www3.donrart56-td.co.cc
www1.newav31-pr.co.cc
www3.goldvox-51td.xorg.pl
www3.goldvox-61td.xorg.pl
www3.goldvox-53td.xorg.pl
www3.goldvox-55td.xorg.pl
www3.goldvox-57td.xorg.pl
www3.goldvox-59td.xorg.pl
www1.bestdefender-58p.xorg.pl
www4.miymiy3.com - 93.190.141.41 - Email: gkook@checkjemail.nl
www3.ruboidmon-60td.com - 93.190.141.41 - Email: gkook@checkjemail.nl

Parked on 188.124.5.66, favoritav31-pd.co.cc, AS44565 VITAL TEKNOLOJI are also:
www2.avcleaner31-pd.co.cc
www2.avcleaner35-pd.co.cc
www3.avprotector51-td.xorg.pl
www3.avprotector53-td.xorg.pl
www3.avprotector55-td.xorg.pl
www3.avprotector57-td.xorg.pl
www3.omgsaveit4.com - 74.118.194.76 - Email: gkook@checkjemail.nl
useguard.com - 95.169.186.25 - Email: gkook@checkjemail.nl
update1.useguard.com - 95.169.186.25 - Email: gkook@checkjemail.nl
www4.miymiy2.net - Email: gkook@checkjemail.nl

Parked on 95.169.186.25, AS31103, KEYWEB-AS are also:
www3.justsoft10-td.co.cc
www4.freewarez10-td.co.cc
www3.justsoft11-td.co.cc
www3.justsoft12-td.co.cc
www3.avforyou23-td.co.cc
www4.swintermz.cz.cc
www4.trustzone16-td.xorg.pl
www4.trustzone17-td.xorg.pl
www4.trustzone19-td.xorg.pl
www3.coantys-41td.xorg.pl
www3.vointuas-81td.xorg.pl
www3.coantys-42td.xorg.pl
www3.coantys-46td.xorg.pl
www4.miymiy3.com
useguard.com

Detection rate:
- packupdate_107_213.exe - TROJ_FRAUD.SMAF; Mal/FakeAV-AX - Result: 28/40 (70%)

Phones back to:
update1.useguard.com - 95.169.186.25 - Email: gkook@checkjemail.nl
update2.guardinuse.net - 78.159.108.171 - Email: gkook@checkjemail.nl
secure1.protect-zone.com - 209.212.147.241 - Email: gkook@checkjemail.nl
secure2.protectzone.net - 91.207.192.24 - Email: gkook@checkjemail.nl
report.goodguardz.com - 93.186.124.94 - Email: gkook@checkjemail.nl
74.82.216.3/ncr - interesting HOSTS file modification

O1 - Hosts: 74.125.45.100 4-open-davinci.com
O1 - Hosts: 74.125.45.100 securitysoftwarepayments.com
O1 - Hosts: 74.125.45.100 privatesecuredpayments.com
O1 - Hosts: 74.125.45.100 secure.privatesecuredpayments.com
O1 - Hosts: 74.125.45.100 getantivirusplusnow.com
O1 - Hosts: 74.125.45.100 secure-plus-payments.com
O1 - Hosts: 74.125.45.100 http://www.getantivirusplusnow.com
O1 - Hosts: 74.125.45.100 http://www.secure-plus-payments.com
O1 - Hosts: 74.125.45.100 http://www.getavplusnow.com
O1 - Hosts: 74.125.45.100 safebrowsing-cache.google.com
O1 - Hosts: 74.125.45.100 urs.microsoft.com
O1 - Hosts: 74.125.45.100 http://www.securesoftwarebill.com
O1 - Hosts: 74.125.45.100 secure.paysecuresystem.com
O1 - Hosts: 74.125.45.100 paysoftbillsolution.com
O1 - Hosts: 74.125.45.100 protected.maxisoftwaremart.com
O1 - Hosts: 74.82.216.3 http://www.google.com
O1 - Hosts: 74.82.216.3 google.com
O1 - Hosts: 74.82.216.3 google.com.au
O1 - Hosts: 74.82.216.3 http://www.google.com.au
O1 - Hosts: 74.82.216.3 google.be
O1 - Hosts: 74.82.216.3 http://www.google.be
O1 - Hosts: 74.82.216.3 google.com.br
O1 - Hosts: 74.82.216.3 http://www.google.com.br
O1 - Hosts: 74.82.216.3 google.ca
O1 - Hosts: 74.82.216.3 http://www.google.ca
O1 - Hosts: 74.82.216.3 google.ch
O1 - Hosts: 74.82.216.3 http://www.google.ch
O1 - Hosts: 74.82.216.3 google.de
O1 - Hosts: 74.82.216.3 http://www.google.de
O1 - Hosts: 74.82.216.3 google.dk
O1 - Hosts: 74.82.216.3 http://www.google.dk
O1 - Hosts: 74.82.216.3 google.fr
O1 - Hosts: 74.82.216.3 http://www.google.fr
O1 - Hosts: 74.82.216.3 google.ie
O1 - Hosts: 74.82.216.3 http://www.google.ie
O1 - Hosts: 74.82.216.3 google.it
O1 - Hosts: 74.82.216.3 http://www.google.it
O1 - Hosts: 74.82.216.3 google.co.jp
O1 - Hosts: 74.82.216.3 http://www.google.co.jp
O1 - Hosts: 74.82.216.3 google.nl
O1 - Hosts: 74.82.216.3 http://www.google.nl
O1 - Hosts: 74.82.216.3 google.no
O1 - Hosts: 74.82.216.3 http://www.google.no
O1 - Hosts: 74.82.216.3 google.co.nz
O1 - Hosts: 74.82.216.3 http://www.google.co.nz
O1 - Hosts: 74.82.216.3 google.pl
O1 - Hosts: 74.82.216.3 http://www.google.pl
O1 - Hosts: 74.82.216.3 google.se
O1 - Hosts: 74.82.216.3 http://www.google.se
O1 - Hosts: 74.82.216.3 google.co.uk
O1 - Hosts: 74.82.216.3 http://www.google.co.uk
O1 - Hosts: 74.82.216.3 google.co.za
O1 - Hosts: 74.82.216.3 http://www.google.co.za
O1 - Hosts: 74.82.216.3 http://www.google-analytics.com
O1 - Hosts: 74.82.216.3 http://www.bing.com
O1 - Hosts: 74.82.216.3 search.yahoo.com
O1 - Hosts: 74.82.216.3 http://www.search.yahoo.com
O1 - Hosts: 74.82.216.3 uk.search.yahoo.com
O1 - Hosts: 74.82.216.3 ca.search.yahoo.com
O1 - Hosts: 74.82.216.3 de.search.yahoo.com
O1 - Hosts: 74.82.216.3 fr.search.yahoo.com
O1 - Hosts: 74.82.216.3 au.search.yahoo.com

What's so interesting about it anyway? Exact same modification was seen in "Koobface Botnet's Scareware Business Model - Part Two", in regard to the Google IP 74.125.45.100.

Take down actions are already taking place, updated will be posted as soon as new developments emerge.

Related research on blackhat SEO campaigns:
The ultimate guide to scareware protection
A Diverse Portfolio of Scareware/Blackhat SEO Redirectors Courtesy of the Koobface Gang 
Massive Scareware Serving Blackhat SEO, the Koobface Gang Style
A Peek Inside the Managed Blackhat SEO Ecosystem
Dissecting a Swine Flu Black SEO Campaign
Massive Blackhat SEO Campaign Serving Scareware
From Ukrainian Blackhat SEO Gang With Love
From Ukrainian Blackhat SEO Gang With Love - Part Two
From Ukraine with Scareware Serving Tweets, Bogus LinkedIn/Scribd Accounts, and Blackhat SEO Farms
From Ukraine with Bogus Twitter, LinkedIn and Scribd Accounts
Fake Web Hosting Provider - Front-end to Scareware Blackhat SEO Campaign at Blogspot 

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter.

Vendor of Mobile Spying Apps Drives Biz Model Through DIY Generators

It's always worth monitoring the developments in the commercial mobile spying apps space. In particular, the inevitable customerization/customization of their services.

A shady vendor of such applications, is attempting to migrate from the mass market model of competing vendors, by offering its potential customers to ability to generate their own .sis files, for the spying app targeting Symbian 0S 9 platform. The DIY features also include the ability to self sign their own certificates. The price tag? A hefty price tag of £3000, and no refunds offered.

What's their true motivation behind the release of the DIY generation tool? It appears that they are primarily interested with scaling their business operations, allowing potential resellers the option to automatically generate the spying apps. Although the self-signing certificate option is interesting, mobile malware authors continue abusing Symbian Foundation's certificate signing process, surprisingly, by using bogus company names with no public reference of their existence.

Thanks to the improving monetization models for mobile malware (e.g. calling/SMSing premium rate numbers), mobile malware authors are only starting to realize/abuse the potential of the micro payments market segment.

Related posts on mobile malware:
The future of mobile malware - digitally signed by Symbian?
Commercial spying app for Android devices released
iHacked: jailbroken iPhones compromised, $5 ransom demanded
New Symbian-based mobile worm circulating in the wild
New mobile malware silently transfers account credit
Transmitter.C mobile malware spreading in the wild
Transmitter.C Mobile Malware in the Wild
Proof of Concept Symbian Malware Courtesy of the Academic World
Commercializing Mobile Malware
Mobile Malware Scam iSexPlayer Wants Your Money

Related posts on SMS Ransomware:
New ransomware locks PCs, demands premium SMS for removal
Mac OS X SMS ransomware - hype or real threat?
SMS Ransomware Displays Persistent Inline Ads
6th SMS Ransomware Variant Offered for Sale
5th SMS Ransomware Variant Offered for Sale
4th SMS Ransomware Variant Offered for Sale
3rd SMS Ransomware Variant Offered for Sale
SMS Ransomware Source Code Now Offered for Sale

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter.

Summarizing Zero Day's Posts for May

The following is a brief summary of all of my posts at ZDNet's Zero Day for May, 2010. You can also go through previous summaries, as well as subscribe to my personal RSS feed, Zero Day's main feed, or follow me on Twitter:

Recommended reading: 

• Should a targeted country strike back at the cyber attackers?  
• Hotmail's new security features vs Gmail's old security features  
• Study finds the average price for renting a botnet
• 5 reasons why the proposed ID scheme for Internet users is a bad idea

01. Foxit Reader intros new Safe Reading feature
02. Should a targeted country strike back at the cyber attackers?
03. Malware Watch: iTunes gift certificates, Skype worm, fake CVs and greeting cards
04. Wardriving police: password protect your wireless, or face a fine
05. Research: 1.3 million malicious ads viewed daily
06. Malware Watch: Rogue Facebook apps, fake Amazon orders, and bogus Adobe updates
07. Hotmail's new security features vs Gmail's old security features
08. Study finds the average price for renting a botnet
09. 5 reasons why the proposed ID scheme for Internet users is a bad idea

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter.

Spamvertised Client-Side Exploits Serving Adult Content Themed Campaign

There's no such thing as free porn, unless there are client-side exploits in the unique value proposition's mix.

A currently spamvertised campaign is doing exactly the same, in between relying on the recent CVE-2010-0886 vulnerability. Let's dissect the campaign, and combine the assessment with historical OSINT data, given the fact that the 2nd phone back location, including the binary hosted there are currently down.

• Key summary point: although the exploitation is taking place, the campaign is currently failing to drop actual binary, returning NOEXEFILE error message. The post will be updated once the situation changes.

a

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter.