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Not necessarily in real-time (
Syndicating Google Trends Keywords for Blackhat SEO) but scareware/fake security software distributors quickly attempted to
capitalize on the anticipated traffic related to this weekend's
Twitter XSS worm StalkDaily/Mikeyy.
What's particularly interesting about this campaign, is not the fact that all of the currently active domains are operated by the same individual/group of individuals or that their blackhat SEO farms are growing to cover a much wider portfolio of keywords.
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It's a tiny
usa.js script (e.g
my1.dynalias .org/usa.js) hosted on all of the domains, which takes advantage of a simple evasive practice - referrer checking in order to serve or not to serve the malicious content.
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For instance, deobfuscated the script checks whether the user is coming from the following search engines
var se = new Array("google", "msn", "aol.com", "yahoo", " comcast"); if (document.referrer)ref = document.referrer;. If the user/researcher is basically wandering around, a blackhat SEO page with no malicious redirections would be served.
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The following are all of the currently active and participating domains/subdomains:
tran.tr.ohost .de actual.homelinux .comachyutheil.ac.ohost .deaprln.getmyip .comeast.homeftp .org my1.dynalias .orgmy2.dynalias .orgmy3.dnsalias .orgmy5.webhop .org
The redirection process consists of two layers. The first one is redirecting to
hjgf .ru/go.php?sid=5 (88.214.198.25) and then to
msscan-files-antivir .com (195.88.81.93), and the second one takes place through a well
known malicious doorway redirecting domain
hqtube .com/to_traf_holder.html (88.85.66.116) that either serves a fake codec that's dropping the scareware, or
the scareware itself from
files.ms-load-av .com. The rest of the scareware/fake security software domains participating in the campaigns are as follows:
msscan-files-antivir .com (195.88.81.93) - Coi Carol Email:
car0sta0@gmail.comhot-girl-sex-tube .com - Erica Thomas Email:
gerrione@gmail.commsscan-files-antivir .com
msscanner-top-av .com - Mui Arnold Email:
arnoebr@gmail.com
msscanner-files-av .com
antivir-4pc-ms-av .com - Jason Munguia Email:
jasmung@gmail.comThe bottom line - the campaign looks like a typical event-based blackhat SEO portfolio diversification practice.
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