Friday, October 03, 2008

Inside a Managed Spam Service

A managed spam vendor always has to raise the stakes during its introduction period on the market. But what happens when a market follower starts using the market leader's proprietary managed spamming system, and is able to provide better spamming rates at a cheaper prices?  Market forces and unethical competition at its best.

So, what is this market challenger using the monopolist's -- in respect to managed spamming services not spam in general -- proprietary system (Spamming vendor launches managed spamming service) up to anyway? Promising and delivering, 1, 400,000 emails daily, 60,000 mails per hour, and 100 emails per minute. What we've got here are the spam metrics out of 5 already finished spam campaigns that has managed to sent out a million spam emails using only 2000 malware infected hosts. Also, CC-ing and BCC-ing made it possible to multiple the effect of the campaign and increase the total number of emails spammed. Talking about benchmarks, 789 emails per minute at a rate of 12/13 emails per second is a pretty good one, considering it's only 2k bots that they were using. What they also promise is automatic rotation of IPs upon automatically checking them against public blacklists, and a mix rotation of IPs from their own netblocks located in Russia and Germany with the fresh IPs coming from the newly infected hosts.

Earlier this month, I discussed the market leader's managed spamming system, access to which they also offer for rent :

"An inside look of the system obtained on 2008-08-12 indicates that they are indeed capable of delivering what they promise - speed, simplicity and 5000 malware infected hosts. Moreover, the attached screenshot demonstrates that 20 different email databases can be simultaneously used resulting in 16,523,247 emails about to get spammed using 52 different macroses. Furthermore, what they refer to as a dynamic set of regional servers aiming to ensure that the central server never gets exposed, is in fact fast-flux which depending on how many bots they are willing to put into “rtsegional server mode” shapes the size of the fast-flux network at a later stage."

With cutting edge managed spam services like the ones currently in circulation, it remains to be seen whether or not spammers would migrate to this outsourcing model, or continue coming up with adaptive ways to send out their scams and malware on their own.

Syndicating Google Trends Keywords for Blackhat SEO

Several hundred Windows Live Spaces and AOL Journals, are currently syndicating the most popular keywords provided by Google Trends, and are consequently hijacking the top search queries exposing users to Zlob codecs.

Here are some same bogus blogs used in the campaign, naturally pre-registered long before they executed it :

vinniedigg18 .spaces.live.com
journals.aol .com/iolatour16
fredabreak02 .spaces.live.com
thedaalerts01 .spaces.live.com
allisonpolls08 .spaces.live.com
rheabreak18 .spaces.live.com
racquellog17 .spaces.live.com
monikavideo11 .spaces.live.com
journals.aol .com/shelvakill27
tomekadigg26 .spaces.live.com
ivahnet19 .spaces.live.com
journals.aol .com/louisathere13
allisonpolls08 .spaces.live.com
valericatch03 .spaces.live.com
journals.aol .com/iolatour16
hadleycue01 .spaces.live.com
journals.aol .com/staceyliving01
collettebreak17 .spaces.live.com
journals.aol .com/nataliablog16
natalymore26 .spaces.live.com


A comprehensive listing of the blogs involved can be downloaded here.

What do all of these bogus blogs have in common? The fact that they are all being abused by a single malware campaign, and the Keep it Simple Stupid mentality only a lazy malware campaigner can take advantage of. All of the blogs as using a central redirection domain, shutting it down or blocking it renders the number of bogus blogs is circulation irrelevant. In this case, the domain in question is video.xmancer.org (216.195.59.75).

Here are the the rest of the domains participating in the campaign, as well as the parked ones at the corresponding IPs :

video.xmancer .org (216.195.59.75)
buynowbe .com
loveniche .com
antivirus-freecheck .com
jetelephone .cn
reducki .cn
woteenhas .cn
lilaloft .cn


clipztimes .com (78.157.143.235)
imagelized .com
vidzdaily .com


gotmovz .com (78.108.177.91)
dwnld-clips .com

movwmstream .com (77.91.231.183)
newwmpupdate .com
zaeplugin .com
movaccelerator .com
optimwares .com
piterserv .com


moviesportal2008p .com (72.232.183.154)
movieportal2008a .com
funnyportal2008l .com
starsportal2008p .com
softportal2008p .com
movieportal2008q .com


In short, despite that the campaign is poised to attract generic search traffic, it's a self-exposing blackhat SEO campaign since each and every blog participating is also linking to the rest of the ones within the ecosystem.

Related posts:
Blackhat SEO Redirects to Malware and Rogue Software
Blackhat SEO Campaign at The Millennium Challenge Corporation
Massive IFRAME SEO Poisoning Attack Continuing
Massive Blackhat SEO Targeting Blogspot
The Invisible Blackhat SEO Campaign
Attack of the SEO Bots on the .EDU Domain
p0rn.gov - The Ongoing Blackhat SEO Operation
The Continuing .Gov Blackat SEO Campaign
The Continuing .Gov Blackhat SEO Campaign - Part Two
Compromised Sites Serving Malware and Spam