Adult Network of 1448 Domains Compromised

0
September 15, 2008
With millions of malware infected PCs participating in a botnet, the probability that a high profile end user whose domain portfolio consisting of over 1,400 high trafficked adult web sites, would end up having his accounting data stolen, is gradually increasing.

That seems to be the case with the CPanel of the Bang Bros network of adult web sites, the accounting data for which was obtained through a botnet in which the administrator seems to have been unknowingly participating in. None of the sites have been embedded with malware so far, however, taking into consideration the high traffic this adult network attracts as well as the fact that he person managing the domains portfolio is part of a botnet, that may change pretty fast.

A single malware infection always triggers the entire malicious effect, from the malware automatically SQL injection vulnerable sites, and providing infrastructure for scams and fraudulent activities, to allowing the botnet master to parse the huge log of stolen accounting data and look for Cpanels and anything allowing him to efficiently compromise a network of sites he wouldn't have been able to compromise if it wasn't the "weakest link" centralizing the entire portfolio in a single location.

And whereas for the time being, propositions for selling compromised CPanel accounts are mostly random, in the long term, fueled by the demand for compromised domains, we may witness the emergence of yet another market segment in the underground economy, with price ranges based on the pagerank of the domain in question, the type of browsers and the traffic sources visiting it. Until then, SQL injections through search engines reconnaissance executed through a botnet, will remain the efficient tactic of choice for abusing legitimate domains as redirectors to malicious ones. Continue reading →

Summarizing August's Threatscape

0
September 10, 2008
Following the previous summaries of June's and July's threatscape based on all the research published during the month, it's time to summarize August's threatscape.

August's threatscape was dominated by a huge increase of rogue security software domains made possible due to the easily obtainable templates for the sites, several malware campaigns targeting popular social networking sites, Russian's organized cyberattack against Georgia with evidence on who's behind it pointing to "everyone" and a few botnets dedicated to the attack making the whole process easy to outsource and turn responsibility into an "open topic", several new web based botnet management kits and tools found in the wild, evidence that the 76service may in fact be going mainstream since the concept of cybercrime as a service is already emerging, and, of course, a peek at India's CAPTCHA solving economy, where the best comment I've received so far is that every site should embrace reCAPTCHA, so that while solving CAPTCHAs and participating in the abuse of these services in question, they would be also digitizing books. As usual, August was a pretty dynamic month for the middle of summer, with everyone excelling in their own malicious field.

01. McAfee's Site Advisor Blocking n.runs AG - "for starters"
False positives are rather common, especially when you're aiming to protect the end user from himself and not let him gain access to "hacking tools", but you're flagging security tools as badware and missing over half the SQL injected domains currently in the wild due to the fact that SiteAdvisor's community still haven't reviewed them - that's not good

02. The Twitter Malware Campaign Wants to Bank With You
Twitter, just like every Web 2.0 application, isn't and shouldn't be treated as a unique platform for dissemination of malware, since it's dissemination of malware "as usual". This particular malware campaign was not just executed by a lone gunman, but also, was taking advantage of a flaw allowing the author to add new followers potentially exposing them to the malicious links serving banker malware. For the the time being, MySpace, Facebook and Twitter accounts are the very last thing a malicious attacker is interesting in puchasing accounting data for, but how come? It's all due to the oversupply of automatically registered accounts at other popular services, whose ecosystem of Internet properties empower cybercriminals with the ability to launch, host and distribute malware in between abusing the very same company's services for the blackhat SEO campaign and redirection services. Theoretically, a distributed network build upon the services provided by a single company is faily easy to accomplish due to the single login authentication applied everywhere. A singly bogus Gmail account results in a blackhat SEO hosting blogspot account, flash based redirector hosted at Picasa, and a couple of thousands of spam emails sent automatically sent through Gmail in order to abuse it's trusted email reputation
 
03. Compromised Web Servers Serving Fake Flash Players
If aggressiveness matter, this campaign consisting of remotely injected redirection scripts at legitimate sites next to on purposely introduced malware oriented domains, was perhaps the most aggressive one during the month. Fake flash players, fake windows media players and fake youtube players are prone to increase as a social engineering tactic of choice due to the template-ization of malware serving sites for the sake of efficiency

04. Pinch Vulnerable to Remotely Exploitable Flaw
With Zeus vulnerable to a remotely exploitable flaw allowing cybercriminals to hijack other cybercriminal's Zeus botnet, private exploits targeting the still rather popular at least in respect to usefulness Pinch malware are leaking, allowing everyone including security researchers to take a peek at a particular campaign running unpatched Pinch gateway

05. Phishers Backdooring Phishing Pages to Scam One Another
Backdooring phishing pages is perhaps the most minimalistic approach a cybercriminal wanting to scam another cybercriminal is going to take. The far more beneficial approach that I've encountered on a couple of occassions so far, would be to backdoor a proprietary web malware exploitation kit, release it in the wild, let them put the time and efforts into launching the campaigns, then hijack their botnet. In fact, the possibilities for backdooring copycat web malware exploitation kits in order to take advantage of the momentum while introducing a non-existent kit has always been there at the disposal of malicious attackers. One thing's for sure - there's no such thing as a free web malware exploitation kit, just like there isn't such thing as a free phishing page

06. Email Hacking Going Commercial - Part Two
In between the scammers promising the Moon and asking for anything between $20 to $250 to hack into an email account, there are "legitimate" services taking advantage of web email hacking kits consisting of each and every known XSS vulnerability for a particular service in an attempt to increase the chances of the attacker. And given that the majority of these have been patched a long time ago, social engineering comes into play. Do these services have a future? Definitely as more and more people are in fact looking for and requesting such services, in fact, they're willing to pay a bonus considering how exotic it is for them to have any email that they provide hacked into and the accounting data sent back to them

07. The Russia vs Georgia Cyber Attack
Event of the month? Could be, but just like every "event of the moth" everyone seems to be once again restating their "selective retention" preferences. What is selective retention anyway? Selective retention is basically a situation where once Russian is attacking another country's infrastructure, you would automatically conclude that it's Russian FSB behind the attacks and consciously and subconsciously ignore all the research and articles telling you otherwise, namely that the FSB wouldn't even bother acknowledging Georgia's online presence, at least not directly. Moreover, talking about the FSB as the agency behind the cyberattacks indicates "selective retention", talking about FAPSI indicates better understanding of the subject.

In times when cybercrime is getting ever easier to outsource, anyone following the news could basically orchestrate a large scale DDoS attack against a particular country in order to forward the responsibility to any country that they want to. In Russia vs Georgia, you have a combination of a collectivist society that's possessing the capabilities to launch DDoS attacks, knows where and how to order them, and that in times when your country is engaged in a war conflict drinking beer instead of DDoS-sing the major government sites of the adversary is not an option.

Selective retention when combined with a typical mainstream media's mentality to "slice the threat on pieces" instead of turning the page as soon as possible, is perhaps the worst possible combination. Furthermore, coming up with Social Network analysis of the cyberattacks would produce nothing more but a few fancy graphs of over enthusiastic Russian netizen's distributing the static list of the targets. The real conversations, as always, are happening in the "Dark Web" limiting the possibilities for open source intelligence using a data mining software. Things changed, OPSEC is slowly emerging as a concept among malicious parties, whenever some of the "calls for action" in the DDoS attacks were posted at mainstream forums, they were immediately removed so that they don't show up in such academic initiatives

08. 76Service - Cybercrime as a Service Going Mainstream
The reappearance of the 76Service allowing everyone to log into a web based interface and collect all the accounting and financial data coming from malware infected hosts across the globe for the period of time for which they've bought access, indicates that what used to be proprietary services which were supposedly no longer available, are now being operated in a do-it-yourself fashion. Goods and products mature into services, so from a cost-benefit analysis perspective, outsourcing is naturally most beneficial even when it comes to cybercrime

09. Who's Behind the Georgia Cyber Attacks?
If it's the botnets used in the attacks, they are known, if it's about who's providing the hosting for the command and control, it's the "usual suspects", but just like previous discussion of the Russian Business Network, it remains questionable on whether or not they work on a revenue-sharing basis, are simply providing the anti-abuse hosting, or are the shady conspirators that every newly born RBN expert is positioning them to be.

Cheap conversation regarding the RBN ultimately serves the RBN, and just for the record, there's a RBN alternative in every country, but the only thing that remains the same are the customers, tracking the customers means exposing the RBN and the international franchises of their services, making it harder to identify their international operations. And given that the "tip of the iceberg", namely RBN's U.S operations remain in tact, talking about taking actions against their international operations in countries where cybercrime law is still pending, is yet another quality research into the topic building up the pile of research into the very same segments of the very same ISPs.

Just for the record - these "very same ISPs" are regular readers of my blog, and if you analyze their activities, they're definitely reading yours too, ironically, surfing through gateways residing within their netblock that are so heavily blacklisted due to the guestbook and forum spamming activities that their bad reputation usually ends up in another massive blackhat SEO campaign exposed.

10. Guerilla Marketing for a Conspiracy Site
Conspiracy theorists may in fact have a new wallpaper to show off with

11. Banker Malware Targeting Brazilian Banks in the Wild
When misinformed and not knowing anything about a particular underground segment, a potential cybercriminal would stick to using such primitive compared to the sophisticated banker malware kits currently in the wild. These sophisticated banker malware kits are often coming in a customer-tailored proposition, with their price increasing or decreasing based on the specific module to be included or excluded. For instance, a module targeting all the U.S banks that has been put in a "learning mode" long before it was made available to the customers can be requested and is often available with the business model build around the customer's wants 

12. Compromised Cpanel Accounts For Sale
Despite the massive SQL injection attacks, accounting data for Cpanel accounts coming from malware infected hosts seems to be once again coming into play, which isn't surprising given the filtering capabilities and log parsing tools today's botnet masters are empowered with. These very same compromised Cpanel accounts and the associated domains often end up so heavility abused that it's tactics like these that are driving the underground multitasking mentality, namely, abusing a single compromised account for each and every malicious online activity you can think of - even hosting banners for their blackhat SEO services

13. A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Two
In August we saw a peek of fake security software, neatly typosquatted domains whose authors earn revenue each and every time someone installs the software. The vendors behind this software are forwarding the entire process of driving traffic to those excelling in aggregating traffic and abusing it. As anticipated, underground multitasking started taking place within the fake security software domains, with the people behind them introducing client-side exploits in order to improve the monetization of the traffic coming to the sites

14. DIY Botnet Kit Promising Eternal Updates
There's no such thing as a (quality) free botnet kit. What's for free is often the leftovers from a single feature of a more sophisticated proprietary botnet kit. This one in particular is however trying to demonstrate that even a plain simple GUI botnet command and control software can achieve the results desired by an average script kiddie, and not necessarily satisfy the needs of the experienced botnet master

15. A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Three
As far as trends and fads are concerned, the majority of the domains are currently parked at up to four different IPs, with most of them going into a stand by mode once they get detected and reappear back couple of weeks later

16. Fake Celebrity Video Sites Serving Malware - Part Two
Due to the template-ization of fake celebrity video sites, and simple traffic management tools combined with blackhat SEO tactics, these sites are also prone to increase in the next couple of months

17. Web Based Botnet Command and Control Kit 2.0
It's releases like these that remind us of the amount of time, efforts and personal touch that a malicious attacker would put into such a management kit, currently acting as a personal benchmark as far as complexity and features indicating the coder's experience with botnets is concerned. What's he's failing to anticipate is that this kit is sooner or later going to turn into the "MPack of botnet management"

18. A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Four
Keep it coming, we'll keep it exposing until we end up getting down to the "fake software vendor" itself

19. Automatic Email Harvesting 2.0
Email harvesting is slowly maturing into a vertically integrated service provided by vendors of managed spamming services. This email harvesting module is aiming to close the page on text obfuscation in respect to fighting spam, and is successfully recognizing and collecting such publicly available emails. From a psychological perspective though, the end users who bothered to obfuscate their emails are less likely to fall victims into phishing scams, with the obfuscation speaking for a relatively decent situational awareness on how they emails end up in a spammer's campaign

20. Fake Porn Sites Serving Malware - Part Three
As a firm believer in sampling in order to draw conclusions on the big picture, an approach that has proven highly accurate in modeling historical and upcoming tactics and behavior, a single fake porn site serving malware campaign usually exposes a dozen of misconfigured redirectors, which thanks to their misconfiguration despite the evasive features available within the kits, expose another dozen of malware campaigns

21. Facebook Malware Campaigns Rotating Tactics
With no particular flaw exploited other than the social engineering tactic of using already compromised Facebook accounts who would automatically spam all their friends with links to flash files hosted at legitimate services, the more persistent the campaign is, the higher the chance that it will scale enough. This campaign in particular is mainly relying on rotation of tactics, namely different messages, different services and file extensions used in order to trick someone's friend into visiting the URL. With the number of users increasing, the most popular social networking sites are naturally going to be permanently under attacks from cybercriminals

22. Fake Security Software Domains Serving Exploits
Despite that it's a single brand, namely the International Virus Research Lab that's introducing client-side exploits within it's portfolio of domains, the opportunity for abuse may be noticed by the rest of the brands pretty fast

23. Exposing India’s CAPTCHA Solving Economy
Taking into consideration the mentality surrounding a particular country's cybercriminals, how they think, how they operate, what do they define as an opportunity, and how much personal efforts are they willing to put into their campaigns, I wouldn't be surpised if a Russian vendor offering 100,000 bogus Gmail accounts for sale has in fact outsourcing the account registration process to Indian workers, paid them pocket change and is then reselling them ten to twenty times higher than the price he originally paid for them.

The text based CAPTCHAs used at the major Internet portals and services, are so efficiently abused by this approach that continuing to use is directly undermining the trust these email providers and services often come with as granted Continue reading →

Summarizing Zero Day's Posts for August

0
September 04, 2008
Here's a concise summary of all of my posts at Zero Day for August. If interested, consider going through July's summary, subscribe yourself to my personal feed, or Zero Day's main feed, and stay informed.

Some of the notable articles are - Today's assignment : Coding an undetectable malware ; Coordinated Russia vs Georgia cyber attack in progress and Inside India's CAPTCHA solving economy.

01. Cuil's stance on privacy - "We have no idea who you are"
02. Phishers increasingly scamming other phishers
03. Today's assignment : Coding an undetectable malware
04. Consumer Reports urges Mac users to dump Safari, cites lack of phishing protection
05. Fake CNN news items malware campaign spreading rapidly
06. CNET's Clientside developer blog serving Adobe Flash exploits
07. Coordinated Russia vs Georgia cyber attack in progress
08. Researcher discovers Nokia S40 security vulnerabilities, demands 20,000 euros to release details
09. Intel proactively fixes security flaws in its chips
10. 1.5m spam emails sent from compromised University accounts
11. Fortune 500 companies use of email spoofing countermeasures declining
12. China busts hacking ring, managed to penetrate 10 gov't databases
13. Scammers caught backdooring chip and PIN terminals
14. SpamZa - opt in spamming service fighting to remain online
15. FEMA's PBX network hacked, over 400 calls made to the Middle East
16. Typosquatting the U.S presidential election - a security risk?
17. Hundreds of Dutch web sites hacked by Islamic hackers
18. Twitter's "me too" anti-spam strategy
19. Malware detected at the International Space Station
20. Taiwan busts hacking ring, 50 million personal records compromised
21. MSN Norway serving Flash exploits through malvertising
22. Inside India's CAPTCHA solving economy Continue reading →

The Commoditization of Anti Debugging Features in RATs

0
September 03, 2008
Is it a Remote Administration Tool (RAT) or is it malware? That's the rhetorical question, since RATs are not supposed to have built-in Virustotal submission for the newly generated server, antivirus software "killing" and firewall bypassing capabilities.

Taking a peek into some of commodity features aiming to make it harder to analyze the malware found in pretty much all the average DIY malware builders available at the disposal at the average script kiddies, one of the latest releases pitched as RAT while it's malware clearly indicates the commoditization and availability of such modules :

" - FWB (DLL Injection, The DLL is Never Written to Disk)
 - Decent Strong Traffic Encryption
 - Try to Unhook UserMode APIs
 - No Plugins/3rd Party Applications
 - 4 Startup Methods (Shell, Policies, ActiveX, UserInIt)
 - Set Maximum Connections
 - Built In File Binder
 - Multi Threaded Transfers
 - Anti Debugging (Anti VMware, Anti Sandboxie, Anti Norman Sandbox, Anti VirtualPC, Anti Anubis Sandbox, Anti CW Sandbox)
"

Malware coders or "malware modulators"? With the currently emerging malware as a web service toolkits porting common malware tools to the web, drag and drop web interfaces for malware building are definitely in the works. Continue reading →

Copycat Web Malware Exploitation Kits are Faddish

0
September 03, 2008
For the cheap cybercriminals not wanting to invest a couple of thousand dollars into purchasing a cutting edge web malware exploitation kit -- a pirated copy of which they would ironically obtained several moths later -- with all the related and royalty free updates coming with it, there are always the copycat malware kits like this one offered for $100.

Taking into consideration the proprietary nature of some of the kits, the business model of malware kits was mostly relying on their exclusive nature next to the number, and diversity of the exploits included in order to improve the infection rate. This simplistic assumption on behalf of the coders totally ignored the possibility of their kits leaking to the general public, or copies of the kits ending up as a bargain in particular underground deal where the once highly exclusive kit was offered as a bonus.

"Me too" web malware kits were a faddish way to enjoy the popularity of web malware kits like MPack and Icepack and try to cash in on that popularity by coming up average kits lacking any significant differentiation factors in the process. But just like the original and proprietary kits, whose authors didn't envision the long term growth strategy of integrating different services into their propositions or the kits themselves, the authors of copycat malware kits didn't bother considering the lack of long-term growth strategy for their releases. Branding in respect to releasing a Firepack malware kit to compete with Icepack which was originally released to compete with Mpack, has failed to achieve the desired results as well.

And with malware kits now a commodity, and underground vendors excelling in a particular practice with the long term objective to vertically integrate in their area of expertise -- think spammers offering localization of messages into different languages and segmented email databases from a specific country -- would we witness the emergence of managed cybercrime services charging a premium for providing fresh dumps of credit card numbers, PayPal, Ebay accounts or whatever the buyer is requesting?

That may well be the case in the long term.

Related posts:
Web Based Botnet Command and Control Kit 2.0
DIY Botnet Kit Promising Eternal Updates
Pinch Vulnerable to Remotely Exploitable Flaw
The Zeus Crimeware Kit Vulnerable to Remotely Exploitable Flaw
The Small Pack Web Malware Exploitation Kit
Crimeware in the Middle - Zeus
The Nuclear Grabber Kit
The Apophis Kit
The FirePack Exploitation Kit Localized to Chinese
MPack and IcePack Localized to Chinese
The Icepack Exploitation Kit Localized to French
The FirePack Exploitation Kit - Part Two
The FirePack Web Malware Exploitation Kit
The WebAttacker in Action
Nuclear Malware Kit
The Random JS Malware Exploitation Kit
Metaphisher Malware Kit Spotted in the Wild
The Black Sun Bot
The Cyber Bot
Google Hacking for MPacks, Zunkers and WebAttackers
The IcePack Malware Kit in Action Continue reading →

A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Five

0
September 02, 2008
The "campaign managers" behind these fake security software propositions are not just starting to take park them at up to three different locations, localize the sites to different languages and introduce client-side exploits, just in case the end user gets suspicious and doesn't install it, but also, the natural evasive practices. For instance, once some of their domains get detected and blocked, they put them in a stand by mode and relaunch them online in a week or so, or ensure that only those coming to the domains from where they are supposed to come - yet another blackhat SEO or SQL injection attack - are the only ones getting to see the download screen.

Some of the new additions parked at the same IPs offered by the "known suspects" include :

main-scanner .com - (77.244.220.138; 78.159.97.247; 89.149.209.251; 212.95.37.154)
scanner-mainpro .com
scanner-online1 .com
alldiskscheck300 .com
myscanners101 .com
download-a1 .com
scanner-online1 .com
multilang1 .com
ratemyblog1 .com
multisearch1 .com
filescheck-list303 .com
woodst-sale .com
scanner-mainpro .com
main-scanner .com
directrevisions .com


supersolution-freeantivirus .com - (213.155.2.69)
antivirus-bestsolution .net
antivirus4protection .net
antivirusproxp .com
freebest-antivirus .net
goodantivirus-free .net
noadwareantivirus .com
pwrantivirus2009 .com
solution-freeantivirus .com
supersolution-antivirus .com
supersolution-freeantivirus .com
antivirusdwl .com
securesoftdl .com
viva-codec .com
win-antivirus-protect .com
avxp-2008 .net
antivirusq .net
antivirus2008b .net
antivirus2008m .net
antivirus2008n .net
antivirus2008v .net
antivirus777 .com
antivirusq .net
antivirusr .net
antivirust .net
antivirusw .net
antivirusu .net
expressantivirus2009 .com
spywarezscan .net
antispywareq .net
free-anti-spywaree .net
avcheckyourpc .net


software-for-me08 .com - (78.157.143.250)
software-for-me-08 .com
softwarefor-me2008 .com
softwarefor-me-2008 .com
software-forme08 .com


doctor2antivirus .com - (217.112.94.226; 87.248.163.56)
doctor5antivirus .com
doctor6antivirus .com
doctor7antivirus .com
doctor8antivirus .com
doctorantivirus2008a .com
doctor-antivirus .com
bcodecnow .net


mysoftwarefreezone .com - (91.203.92.97)
hotvid44 .com
totsec2009 .com
getdefender2009 .com
totalsecure2009 .com
myveryprivatevid .com
mustseethatvid .com
onlythebestvid .com
ie-antivirus-order .com
ie-anti-virus .com
secure-order-box .com


secureexpertcleaner .com - (89.149.227.50)
bestxpclean2008 .com
virusremover2008 .com
registrydoctor2008 .com
securefileshredder .com
hypersecurefileshredder .com
bestsecureexpertcleaner .com


getdefender2009 .com - (58.65.238.34)
malwarebell .com
free-viruscan .com
tmptmpservvv .com
cometoseemyshow .com


getneededsoftware .com - (91.203.93.25)
gettotalsec2008 .com
thedownloadvid .com
scan.pc-antispyware-scanner .com
totalsecure2009 .com


wista-antivirus2009 .com - (216.255.179.203)
usawindowsupdates .com - (85.17.143.213)
mswindowsupdates .com

The campaigns and the hosting providers are continuously monitored, especially taking into consideration the fact that the domains are already appearing in Alexa's web rankings with sudden peaks of traffic.

Related posts:
Fake Security Software Domains Serving Exploits
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Four
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Three
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Two
Localized Fake Security Software
Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software
Got Your XPShield Up and Running?
Fake PestPatrol Security Software
RBN's Fake Security Software
Lazy Summer Days at UkrTeleGroup Ltd
Geolocating Malicious ISPs
The Malicious ISPs You Rarely See in Any Report Continue reading →

Exposing India’s CAPTCHA Solving Economy

0
August 29, 2008
"Are you a Human?" - once asked the CAPTCHA, and the question got answered by, well, a human, thousands of them to be precise. Speculations around one of the main weaknesses of CAPTCHA based authentication in the face of human CAPTCHA solvers, seems to have evolved into a booming economy in India during the past 12 months, with thousands of people involved.

The following article - "Inside India’s CAPTCHA solving economy" aims to expose legitimate data entry workers, whose business models and techniques are in fact used by Russian cybercriminals not only for personal phishing, spamming and malware spreading purposes, but also, to resell the bogus accounts and earn a premium in the process :

"No CAPTCHA can survive a human that’s receiving financial incentives for solving it, and with an army of low-wagedIndia CAPTCHA breakers human CAPTCHA solvers officially in the business of “data processing” while earning a mere $2 for solving a thousand CAPTCHA’s, I’m already starting to see evidence of consolidation between India’s major CAPTCHA solving companies. The consolidation logically leading to increased bargaining power, is resulting in an international franchising model recruiting data processing workers empowered with do-it-yourself CAPTCHA syndication web based kits, API keys, and thousands of proxies to make their work easier, and the process more efficient."

Cybercrime is just as outsourceable as CAPTCHA breaking is these days.

UPDATE: Slashdot, BoingBoing, Ars Technica, and The Tech Herald picked up the story.

Related posts:
The Unbreakable CAPTCHA
Spam coming from free email providers increasing
Gmail, Yahoo and Hotmail’s CAPTCHA broken by spammers
Microsoft’s CAPTCHA successfully broken
Vladuz's Ebay CAPTCHA Populator
Spammers and Phishers Breaking CAPTCHAs
DIY CAPTCHA Breaking Service
Which CAPTCHA Do You Want to Decode Today? Continue reading →

Fake Security Software Domains Serving Exploits

0
August 28, 2008
Psychological imagination, "think cybercriminals" mentality or scenario building intelligence, seem to always produce the results they are supposed to. On Monday, I pointed out that :

"Ironically, the participant in the affiliate program whose original objective was to drive traffic to the fake security software's site, may in fact start receiving so much traffic due to the combination of traffic acquisition tactics, that introducing client-side exploits courtesy of a third-party affiliate network, may in fact prove more profitable then the revenue sharing partnership with the rogue security software's vendor at the first place."

The next day, client-side exploits start getting introduced "in between" the fake security software sites :

"I've blogged before about the problem of Google Adwords pushing Antivirus XP Antivirus 2008. The situation is still ongoing.  However, it's taken a turn for the worse, as these XP Antivirus pages are pushing exploits to install malware on the users system. This will also affect the many syndicators of Google Adwords."

The domain in question bestantivirus2009.com - (68.180.151.21) is hosting the binary at bestantivirus2009 .com/setup_1096_MTYwM3wzNXww_.exe and has an IFRAME pointing to huytegygle .com/index.php (200.46.83.246).

Here's another example antivirus0003.net with an IFRAME pointing to a different location - 124.217.250.85 /~ave/etc/count.php?o=16.

Despite that these domains are part of the "International Virus Research Lab" fake domains portfolio, it remains to be seen whether others will start multitasking as well. Continue reading →

Facebook Malware Campaigns Rotating Tactics

0
August 27, 2008
Trust is vital, and coming up with ways to multiply the trust factor is crucial for a successful malware campaign spreading across social networks. Excluding the publicly available malware modules for spreading across popular social networking sites, using the presumably, already phished accounts for the foundation of the trust factor, the recent malware campaigns spreading across Facebook and Myspace are all about plain simple social engineering and a combination of tactics.

However, in between combining typosquatting and on purposely introducing longer subdomains impersonating a web application's directory structure, there are certain exceptions. Like this flash file hosted at ImageShack and spammed across Facebook profiles, which at a particular moment in the past few days used to redirect to client-side exploits served on behalf of a shady affiliate network that's apparently geolocating the campaigns based on where the visitors are coming from.

img228.imageshack .us/img228/3238/gameonit4.swf redirects to ermacysoffer .info - (216.52.184.243) and to tracking.profitsource .net (67.208.131.124) that's also responding to p223in.linktrust .com (67.208.131.124). Just for the record, we also have halifax-cnline.co.uk parked at 216.52.184.243, 69.64.145.229 and 69.64.145.229, known badware IPs related to previous fraudulent activity.

Moreover, cross-checking this campaign with another Facebook malware campaign enticing users to visit whitneyganykus.blogspot .com where a javascript obfuscation redirects to absvdfd87 .com and from there to the already known tracking.profitsource .net/redir.aspx?CID=9725&AFID=28836&DID=44292, and given that absvdfd87.com is parked at the now known 69.64.145.229, we have a decent smoking gun connecting the two campaigns.

Facebook is often advising that users stay away from weird URLs, does this mean ignoring ImageShack and Blogspot altogether? The next malware campaign could be taking advantage of DoubleClick and AdSense redirectors - for starters. Continue reading →

Automatic Email Harvesting 2.0

0
August 26, 2008
Just when you think that email harvesting matured into user names harvesting in a true Web 2.0 style with the recently uncovered harvested IM screen names, and Youtube user lists for spammers, phishers and malware authors to take advantage of, someone has filled in the gap that's been around as long as email harvesting has been a daily routine for spammers - dealing with text obfuscations which still remain highly popular online, once it became evident that spammers are in fact crawling for default mailto lines. This email harvesting module can be run a separate script, or get integrated as a module within any botnet, is capable of harvesting the following text obfuscations often used in order to prevent spamming crawlers :

mail@mail.com
mail[at]mail.com
mail[at]mail[dot]com
mail [space]mail [space]com
mail(@)mail.com
mail(a)mail.com
mail AT mail DOT com


The overall availability and easy of obtaining a huge percentage of valid email addresses within an organizaton, is not just resulting in the increasing segmentation and localization of spam, phishing and malware campaigns, it's increasing the profit margins for the spamming providers which is now not just offering verified to be 100% valid email addresses, but also, can providing the foundations for spear phishing and targeted attacks.

Quality assurance in spamming is still in its introduction phrase, with customers starting to put the emphasis on the number of emails that actually made it through the spam filters, than the number of emails sent as a benchmark for increasing the probability of bypassing anti spam filters. Taking into consideration the big picture, sniffing for email addresses streaming out of malware infected hosts, and stealing huge email databases by exploiting vulnerable online communities, seems to be the tactics of choice for the majority of individuals whose responsibility is to continuously provide fresh and valid email addresses. Continue reading →

A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Four

0
August 25, 2008
Thanks to the affiliate based business model that's driving the increase of fake security software and rogue codecs serving domains, the very same templates, but with different domain names, continue appearing in blackhat SEO, spam, and malicious doorways redirection campaigns.

Moreover, with the "time-to-market" of a fake security software decreasing due to the efficiency approach introduced in the form of tips for abuse-free hosting services provided by the "known suspects", and the freely available templates, we're slowly starting to see the upcoming peak of this approach.

In a true proactive spirit, the domains parked at 216.195.56.88 are all upcoming fake security software, to be introduced anytime soon.

fast-pc-scanner-online .com - (92.62.101.41; 91.203.92.48; 91.203.92.106; 58.65.238.171)
top-pc-scanner .com
buy-secure-protection .com
security-scan-pc .com
pc-scanner-online .com
viruses-scanonline .com
virus-scanonline .com
antivirus-scanonline .com
topvirusscan .com
virusbestscan .com
best-security-protection .com
infectionscanner .com
virusbestscanner .com
full-protection-now .com


Pwrantivirus .com - 91.208.0.246
vav-x-scanner .com
vav-scanner .com
scanner.vavscan .com
malware-scan .com
Scanner-Pwrantivirus .com
Xpertantivirus .com
Scanner-xpertantivirus .com


spyware-quickscan-2008 .com - (216.195.56.88)
virus-quickscan-2008 .com
spyware-quickscan-2009 .com
virus-quickscan-2009 .com
winmalwarecontrol .com
antispyware-quick-scan .com
virus-quick-scan .com
antivirus-quick-scan .com
winprivacytool .com


topantispyware2008 .com - (216.195.56.86)
cleanermaster .com - (216.195.56.85)
antivirus777 .com - (67.228.120.3)
pcsecuritynotice .com - (67.228.120.3)

Whereas the average Internet users are falling victims into this type of fraud, what I'm more concerned about is the large traffic the malicious domains receive in general due to all the different traffic acquisition tactics the people behind them apply. This anticipated traffic can then be greatly used as valuable metrics for the many other malicious ways in which it can be monetized.

Ironically, the participant in the affiliate program whose original objective was to drive traffic to the fake security software's site, may in fact start receiving so much traffic due to the combination of traffic acquisition tactics, that introducing client-side exploits courtesy of a third-party affiliate network, may in fact prove more profitable then the revenue sharing partnership with the rogue security software's vendor at the first place.

Related posts:
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Three
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Two
Localized Fake Security Software
Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software
Got Your XPShield Up and Running?
Fake PestPatrol Security Software
RBN's Fake Security Software
Lazy Summer Days at UkrTeleGroup Ltd
Geolocating Malicious ISPs
The Malicious ISPs You Rarely See in Any Report Continue reading →

Web Based Botnet Command and Control Kit 2.0

0
August 22, 2008
The average web based command and control kit for a botnet consisting of single user, single campaign functions only, has just lost its charm, with a recent discovery of a proprietary botnet kit whose features clearly indicate that the kit's coder know exactly which niches to fill - presumably based on his personal experience or market research into competing products.

What are some its key differentiation factors? Multitasking at its best, for instance, the kits provides the botnet master with the opportunity to manage numerous different task such as several malware campaigns and DDoS attacks simultaneously, where each of these gets a separate metrics page.  

Automation of malicious tasks, by setting up tasks, and issuing notices on the status of the task, when it was run and when it was ended. Just consider the possibilities for a scheduling malware and DDoS attacks for different quarters.  

Segmentation in every aspect of the tasks, for instance, a DDoS attacks against a particular site can be scheduled to launched on a specific date from infected hosts based in chosen countries only.  

Customized DDoS in the sense of empowering the botnet master with point'n'click ability to dedicate a precise number of the bots to participate, which countries they should be based in, and for how long the attack should remain active. Quality and assurance in DDoS attacks based on the measurement of the bot's bandwidth against a particular country, in this case the object of the attack, so theoretically bots from neighboring countries would DDoS the country in question far more efficiently.  

Historical malware campaign performance, is perhaps the most quality assurance feature in the entire kit, presumably created in order to allow the person behind it to measure which were the most effective malware and DDoS campaigns that he executed in the past. From an OSINT perspective, sacrificing his operational security by maintaing detailed logs from previous attacks is a gold mine directly establishing his relationships with previous malware campaigns.

Bot Description:  
1. Completely invisible Bot work in the system.
2. Not loads system.
3. Invisible in the process.
4. Workaround all firewall.
5. Bot implemented as a driver.
Functions Bot (constantly updated): 
1. Downloading a file (many options).
2. HTTP DDoS (many options, including http authentication).
The web interface 
-- Convenient manager tasks.
-- Every task can be stopped, put on pause, etc. ...
-- Interest and visual scale of the task.  
-- A task manager for DDoS and Loader
    
-- For DDoS tasks
Bots involved in DDoS 'f.
Condition of the victim (works, fell).
2. Bots manager
-- Displays a list of bots (postranichno).
-- Obratseniya date of the first and last.
-- ID Bot.
-- Country Bot.
-- Type Bot.
-- The status Bot (online / offline).
-- Bot bandwidth to different parts of the world (europe, asia).
-- The possibility of removing bots
-- When you click on ID Bot loadable still a wealth of information about it
3. Statistics botneta
-- Statistics both common and build Bot.
-- Information on the growth and decline botneta dates (and build).
-- Bots online
-- All bots
-- Dead bots.

4. Statistics botneta country
-- All countries to work on 
-- New work by country 
-- Online work from country to country
-- Dead bots by country

5. Detailed history botneta 

6. Convenient user-friendly interface adding teams

7. Admin minimal server loads
-- Use php5/mysql

Upcoming features :
1. Form grabber (price increase substantially), for old customers will be charged as an upgrade
2. Public key cryptography
3. Clustering campaigns and DDoS attacks

Despite it's proprietary nature, it's quality and innovative features will sooner or later leak out for everyone to take advantage of, a rather common lifecycle for the majority of proprietary malware kits in general.

Related posts:
Continue reading →

Fake Celebrity Video Sites Serving Malware - Part Two

0
August 21, 2008
Malicious parties remain busy crunching out domain portfolios of legitimately looking celebrity video sites. The very same templates used on the majority of fake celebrity video sites which I exposed in a previous post, remain in circulation with anecdotal situations where they aren't even bothering to match the site's logo with the domain name -- it would ruin the malicious economies of scale approach. And since centralization to some, an laziness to others, remains in tact, the fake security software and fake codecs served remain once parked at the same IP as the fake celebrity sites which I'll expose in this post.

starfeed1 .com - (85.255.117.218)
codecservice1 .com
siteresults1 .com
codecservice6 .com
celebs69 .com
topdirectdownload .com
sexlookupworld .com
favoredtube .com
yourfavoritetube .com
wwvyoutube .com
celebsnofake .com
celebsvidsonline .com
celebstape .com
freevidshardcore .com
topsoftupdate .com
porndebug .com
newfunnyvideo .com
bestfunnyvids .com
pornmoviestube .net


worldstars2008 .com - (79.135.167.54)
antivirus2008-pro .name
antivirus-2008pro .name
antivirus2008pro .name
antivirus2008pro-download .org
antivirus-2008-pro .org
antivirus2008-pro .org
antivirus-2008pro .org
antivirus2008pro .org
thesoft-portal-08 .com
stars-08 .com
thestars-08 .com
thebigstars-08 .com
funny-08 .com
realonlinevideo-2008 .com
2008-adult-2008 .com
adult18tube2008 .com
adultstreamportal2008 .com
2008-adult-s2008 .com 

new-content-s2008 .com
newcontent-s2008 .com
worldstars2008 .com
thestars2008 .com
thebigstars2008 .com
newcontents2008 .com
18x-adult2008 .com
2008adult2008 .com
adult-x2008 .com
hotadulttube08 .com
adultxx-18 .com
newcontent-s2008a .com
antivirus2008pro-download .com
onlinestreamvide .com
onlinestreamvide .com
ns2.onlinestreamvide .com
xxxstreamonline .com4
supersoft21freeware .com
kvm-secure .com
kvmsecure .com
themusic-08portal .com
adultstreamportal .com
streamxxxvideo .com
antivirus-2008-pro .com
antivirus2008-pro .com
antivirus-2008pro .com
thefunny-08 .com
thestars-08 .com
thestars08 .com
celebsnofake .com
adult-s-portal .com
adultsoftcodec .com
adultstreamportal .com
adultxx-18 .com


And while none of these seem to be taking advantage of client-side exploits, a Russian celebrity site that seems to by syndicating the malicious redirectors from a legitimate advertising network, is an exception worth point out due to the Adobe Flash player exploit it's attempting to take advantage of.  

Bestcelebs .ru javascript redirectors through several different doorways :

crklab .us/index.php => firstblu .cn/3.php?19383577 => xanjan .cn/in.cgi?mytraf => atomakayan .biz/afterftpcheck/2603/index.php =>
toksikoza .net/fi/index.php?mytraf => toksikoza .net/fi/1.swf

What you see is so not what you get. Continue reading →

A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Three

0
August 20, 2008
One would assume that once you've managed to trick leading advertising providers into accepting your malicious flash ads inside their networks, you would do anything but hijack the end user's clipboard and rely on their curiosity in order to direct them to your fake security software site. Is the curiosity approach working anyway? Naturally, thanks to the effect of "regressive Darwinism".

Compared to February, 2008's malicious advertising (Malvertising) attack, the current one is less comprehensive and not so well thought of -- thankfully.

What these campaigns have in common is the fake security software served at the bottom line, next to the malware campaigners persistence in introducing new domains, like the very latest ones :

adware-download .com
windows-scanner2009 .com
antivirus2008free .com    
antivirusfree2008 .net
antispyware2008scanner .com
softwareantivirus2008 .com
free-2008-antivirus .com
free-2008-antivirus .net
free-antivirus-2008 .com
free-antivirus-2008 .net
free2008antivirus .com
free2008antivirus .net
getas2008xp .com
software-2008-antivirus .com
software-2008-antivirus .net
software-antivirus-2008 .com
software2008antivirus .com
software2008antivirus .net
softwareantivirus .net
2008-software-antivirus .net
2008-xp-antivirus .com
2008antivirusfree .com
2008antivirusfree .net
2008antivirussoftware .com
2008antivirussoftware .net
2008antivirusxp .net
2008freeantivirus .com
2008freeantivirus .net
2008softwareantivirus .com
2008softwareantivirus .net
2008xpantivirus .net
2008-antivirus-free .com
2008antivirusxp .com
2008-free-antivirus .com
2008-free-antivirus .com
2008-free-antivirus .net
2008-antivirus-free .net
2008-antivirus-software .net
2008-antivirus .net
antivirus-2008-free .com
antivirus-2008-free .net
antivirus-2008-software .com
antivirus-2008-software .net
antivirus-free-2008 .com
antivirus-software-2008 .com


No matter how fancy malvertising is in respect to demonstrating the creativity of malicious parties wanting to appear at legitimate sites by abusing their advertising providers, there are far more efficient tactics to do so. Continue reading →

DIY Botnet Kit Promising Eternal Updates

0
August 20, 2008
Among the main differences between a professional botnet command and control kit, and one that's been originally released for free, is the quality and the clearly visible experience of the kit's programmer in the professional one.

A Chinese hacking group is offering the moon, and asking for nothing. And in times when a cybercriminal can even monetize his conversation with a potential customer by telling him he's actually consulting them and barely talking, is this for real and how come? This "Robin Hood approach" on behalf of the group could have worked an year ago, when greedy cybercriminals were still charging hundreds of thousands of dollars for their sophisticated banker malwares. Today, most of them leaked in such a surprising, and definitely not anticipated on behalf of the malware coders way, that not only they stopped offering support and abandoned their releases, but what used to be available only to those willing to open their virtual pocket and transfer some virtual currency, is available to everyone making such free botnet kits irrelevant - mostly due to their simplicity speaking for zero quality assurance we can see in professional kits.

Once the dust settles on this populist underground release, its potential users would once again return to their localized copies of web based botnet command and control kits. Continue reading →