In the particular attack, the injected domain chliyi.com /reg.js loads an iFrame to chliyi.com /img/info.htm where a VBS script attempts to execute by exploiting MDAC ActiveX code execution (CVE-2006-0003), whose detection rate is 1/32 (3.13%) and is detected as Mal/Psyme-A. Approximately, 8,900 sites have been affected. Continue reading →
In the particular attack, the injected domain chliyi.com /reg.js loads an iFrame to chliyi.com /img/info.htm where a VBS script attempts to execute by exploiting MDAC ActiveX code execution (CVE-2006-0003), whose detection rate is 1/32 (3.13%) and is detected as Mal/Psyme-A. Approximately, 8,900 sites have been affected. Continue reading →
Last week, the 2008's W2Sp workshop held in Oakland, California and sponsored by the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, made available all the papers from the workshop, including catchy titles such as :- input type="password" must die!
- Web Authentication by Email Address
- Beware of Finer-Grained Origins
- On the Design of a Web Browser: Lessons learned from Operating Systems
- Analysis of Hypertext Markup Isolation Techniques for XSS Prevention
- Privacy Protection for Social Networking Platforms
- (Under) mining Privacy in Social Networks
- Building Secure Mashups
- Web-key: Mashing with Permission
- Private Use of Untrusted Web Servers via Opportunistic Encryption
- Evidence-Based Access Control for Ubiquitous Web Services
- Privacy Preserving History Mining for Web Browsers
- Towards Privacy Propagation in the Social Web
Information is not free, it just wants to be free. Continue reading →
There are many different ways to review a magazine, however, I'm always sticking to the following critical success factors for a quality magazine :
- The presence of a vision
While a vision is often taken for granted, or even worse, a mission gets misunderstood for a vision, in Hakin9's case the vision could be perhaps best rephrased as "Spoiling the geeks who beg for a nerdy talk to them".
- Relevance of information
The information provided in the articles is highly relevant, and timely, lacking any retrospective approaches and focusing on current and emerging threats only. The same goes for the extensive external resources provided, emphasizing on the importance of self-education.
- Visual materials
The surplus of visual materials is perhaps what won me as a reader from the first moment. In fact, the issues are so rich on visual material illustrating the topic covered in such details, that you can actually take entire sniffing, and javascript obfuscation sessions offline with you, and never ever have to picture the output of a certain process in your mind again.
Digitally ugly for sure, the point is that this malware campaign has been spreading pretty rapidly over MSN and AIM as of recently, and with its success rate so efficiently infecting new hosts, that going through chat logs indicates the botnet master's will to stop spreading it as there are simply too many hosts getting infected faster than he had anticipated at the first place. Ironic, but a perfect example of what happens once the entry barriers into a certain market segment of the IT underground have been lowered to the stage where, it's not about having the capabilities, but the motive to embrace the success rate, like this case.Botnet masters are also masters in social engineering. Apparently, the success rate for this campaign is so high due to its social engineering tactic, which in this case is to establish as many touch points with the potential victim as possible, and also, entice clicking on a commonly accepted as harmless .php file followed by the victim's username in a username@hotmail.com fashion.
What you see is not always what you get, especially with more and more droppers requesting other malware with image file extensions, which gets locally saved in its real nature - %Windir%\Media\System.exe for instance. Continue reading →
Bonjour! In a surprising move by the French blackhats, the Icepack web malware exploitation kit has been localized to French, further expanding the list of malware kits localized to foreign languages, and confirming the localization trend (page 18). Localization has been silently taking plance in the IT underground for the last couple of years, and as of recently going mainstream, followed by the localization of such popular web malware exploitation kits such as MPack, Icepack and Firepack, all to Chinese.The long term impact of localization will improve the communication between those offering malicious services, and those looking for them in their native language. For instance, the sites of certain malicious services are already available in several different languages, and the quality of the translation is courtesy of available translation services provided by native speakers.
Moreover, breaking the language barrier doesn't just expand the market, but also, improves targeting for malware, spam, and phishing campaigns, where a truly professional campaign would speak the native language so naturally, it would leave the receipt with the feeling that it's originating from somewhere within their homeland. In reality though, the malicious parties behind it, or the managed spam providers vertically integrating to offer translations services, would be on the other side of the planet.
Continue reading →
nihaorr1.com
free.hostpinoy.info
xprmn4u.info
nmidahena.com
winzipices.cn
sb.5252.ws
aspder.com
11910.net
bbs.jueduizuan.com
bluell.cn
2117966.net
s.see9.us
xvgaoke.cn
1.hao929.cn
414151.com
cc.18dd.net
kisswow.com.cn
urkb.net
c.uc8010.com
rnmb.net
ririwow.cn
killwow1.cn
qiqigm.com
wowgm1.cn
wowyeye.cn
9i5t.cn
computershello.cn
z008.net
b15.3322.org
direct84.com
caocaowow.cn
qiuxuegm.com
firestnamestea.cn
qiqi111.cn
banner82.com s
meisp.cn
okey123.cn
b.kaobt.cn
nihao112.com
al.99.vc
aidushu.net
chliyi.com
free.edivid.info
52-o.cn
actualization.cn
d39.6600.org
h28.8800.org
ucmal.com
t.uc8010.com
dota11.cn
bc0.cn
adword71.com
killpp.cn
w11.6600.org
usuc.us
msshamof.com
newasp.com.cn
wowgm2.cn
mm.jsjwh.com.cn
17ge.cn
adword72.com
117275.cn
vb008.cn
wow112.cn
nihaoel3.com
Some new additions that I'm tracking :
a.13175.com
r.you30.cn
d39.6600.org
001yl.com
free.edivid.info
aaa.1l1l1l.Com/error/404.html
cc.buhaoyishi.com/one/hao5.htm?015
aaa.77xxmm.cn/new858.htm?075
llSging.com/ww/new05.htm?075
shIjIedIyI.net/one/hao8.htm?005
congtouzaIlaI.net/one/hao8.htm?005
aa.llsging.com/ww/new05.hTm?075
The rough number of SQL injected sites is around 1.5 million pages, in reality the number is much bigger, and there are several ongoing campaigns injecting obfuscated characters making it a bit more time consuming to track down. Who's behind these attacks? Besides the automation courtesy of botnets, the short answer is everyone with a decent SQL injector, and today's SQL injectors have a built-in reconnaissance capabilities, like this one which I assessed in a previous post. Continue reading →
For the time being, malware authors continue emphasizing on the product concept, namely they build a malware based on their perception of what a malware should constitute of, then start offering it for sale as well as it's source code. In the long-term however, based on the increasing number of malware and spyware coding on demand, malware authors would undoubtedly embrace the customerization concept and start putting more efforts into figuring out what the customer really want compared to their current "built it, price, advertise it" and they'll come mentality.
Moreover, despite the generated buzz over the Zeus banker malware and its copyright notice, Zeus remains publicly available, and so is its source code, placing it under the open-source malware segment. So emphasizing on how malware authors are trying to protect their work is exactly what's not happening right now. Releasing it in open-source form increases its life cycle, and both, the original authors, and the community build around the malware benefit from the new features introduced within.
And now that the most popular web malware exploitation kits are already localized to Chinese due to their open-source nature, making it harder to maintain a decent situational awareness on the new features introduced courtesy of third-party coders, we may that easily see Zeus localized to Chinese as well. It's a trend, not a fad. Continue reading →
"According to Trend Micro Advanced Threats Researcher David Sancho, whitehouse.org has been compromised to harbor some malicious, obfuscated JavaScript code which “background downloads” code to unsuspecting visitors of the site, where a malicious file is downloaded (which is detected by Trend Micro as TROJ_DELF.GKP ). Of course, the official White House Web site is whitehouse.gov, and although it has been reported that some people believe whitehouse.org is the real deal, even those looking for this site specifically should be forewarned."
Go through the complete post - Pro-Serbian hacktivists attacking albanian web sites.
Related posts:
Continue reading →
Continuing the rogue security software series I've just stumbled upon a fake PestPatrol site - pest-patrol.com (85.255.121.181) hosted at the the RBN connected Ukrtelegroup Ltd (85.255.112.0-85.255.127.255 UkrTeleGroup UkrTeleGroup Ltd. 27595 ASN ATRIVO), just like the majority of sites assessed in previous posts.Where's the malware at pest-patrol.com? In one of these anecdotal cases, the way the people behind these rogue sites use the same template over and over again, and consequently forget to change the rogue software's name, in this case, not only is pest-patrol.com's mail server responding to antispycheck.com, but they've also uploaded a broken template. Continue reading →
These are Storm Worm's latest domains where the infected hosts try to phone back :
cadeaux-avenue.cn (active)
polkerdesign.cn (active)
tellicolakerealty.cn (active and SQL injected at vulnerable sites)
Administrative Email for the three emails : glinson156 @ yahoo.com
Related DNS servers for the latest campaign :
ns.orthelike.com
ns2.orthelike.com
ns3.orthelike.com
ns4.orthelike.com
ns.likenewvideos.com
ns2.likenewvideos.com
ns3.likenewvideos.com
ns4.likenewvideos.com
Storm Worm related domains which are now down :
centerprop.cn
apartment-mall.cn
stateandfed.cn
phillipsdminc.cn
apartment-mall.cn
biggetonething.cn
gasperoblue.cn
giftapplys.cn
gribontruck.cn
ibank-halifax.com
limpodrift.cn
loveinlive.cn
newoneforyou.cn
normocock.cn
orthelike.com
supersameas.com
thingforyoutoo.cn
One of the domains that is injected as an iFrame is using ns.likenewvideos.com as DNS server, whereas likenewvideos.com is currently suspended due to "violating Spam Policy". Precisely.
Related posts:
Social Engineering and Malware
Storm Worm Switching Propagation Vectors
Storm Worm's use of Dropped Domains
Offensive Storm Worm Obfuscation
Storm Worm's Fast Flux Networks
Storm Worm's St. Valentine Campaign
Storm Worm's DDoS Attitude
Riders on the Storm Worm
The Storm Worm Malware Back in the Game Continue reading →
The botnet masters behind Asprox are converging tactics already, by fast-fluxing the SQL injected domains. Related URLs for this campaign :banner82.com
dll64.com
aspx88.com
bank11.net
cookie68.com
exportpe.net
Read the complete assessment - Fast-Fluxing SQL Injection Attacks Executed from the Asprox Botnet, and go through previous posts related to the botnet as well - Phishing Emails Generating Botnet Scaling; Inside a Botnet's Phishing Activities; Fake Yahoo Greetings Malware Campaign Circulating. Continue reading →
Yet another proprietary web malware exploitation kit has been released at the beginning of this month, further indicating that the efficient supply of such kits is proportional to their simplistic nature. The only differentiation factor in the Small Pack is perhaps the inclusion of all known Opera exploits up to version 9.20, however, the rest of the features are the natural ones included in the majority of already known exploitation kits :- IE exploits included - Quick TIme Modified, PNG, MDAC, DX Media
- Firefox exploits included - Quick Time, PNG, EMBED
- Opera - all exploits up to version 9.20
- RC4 encryption
- lifetime updates
- Geolocation
- opportunity to request additional functions
Converging infection and distribution vectors, evasion and survivability, metrics and command and control in a single all-in-one web malware exploitation kits is, however, is definitely in the works considering the developments introduced in the rest of the kits currently available. For instance, despite that the ongoing waves of SQL injection attacks with multiple campaigns are injecting the malicious domains in its original form, certain attacks are starting to inject obfuscated URLs making it harder to assess the impact of the campaign using open source intelligence techniques.
The bottom line, as long as webmasters continue participating in the so called "traffic exchange" revenue models, knowingly or unknowingly embedding links that would later on ultimately redirect to a malicious site, "traffic exchange" is receiving the most attention at the strategic level, next to "traffic acquisition" at the tactical level. Basically, the traffic inventory that could be supplied is the direct result of an ongoing SQL injection attack, or malware embedded through other means, with the traffic brokers directly undermining webmaster's unethical inclusion of exploits within their domains portfolio.
One thing's for sure - web malware exploitation kits are not just getting localized, they're also being cloned.
Related posts:
The FirePack Exploitation Kit Localized to Chinese
MPack and IcePack Localized to Chinese
The FirePack Exploitation Kit - Part Two
The FirePack Web Malware Exploitation Kit
The WebAttacker in Action
Nuclear Malware Kit
The Random JS Malware Exploitation Kit
Metaphisher Malware Kit Spotted in the Wild
The Black Sun Bot
The Cyber Bot
Google Hacking for MPacks, Zunkers and WebAttackers
The IcePack Malware Kit in Action Continue reading →
The lone hacktivist also left a message at the malicious domain (wowyeye.cn), which reads :
“The invasion can not control bulk!!!!If the wrong target. Please forgive! Sorry if you are a hacker. send email to kiss117276@163.com my name is lonely-shadow TALK WITH ME! china is great! f**k france! f**k CNN! f**k ! HACKER have matherland!”
Go through related posts on the recent Chinese Anti-CNN campaign. Continue reading →
Don't. Continuing previous posts with three different portfolios of fake security software, and Zlob malware variants posing as video codecs, the rogue security application XP Shield is the latest addition to the never ending list, with the following domains participating in the campaign :xp-shield.com
xpshield.com
xpantiviruspro.com
xpantivirussecurity.com
xponlinescanner.com
xpprotectionsoftware.com
xpantivirussite.com
antivirus2008x.com
securityscannersite.com
antivirus-xp.awardspace.us
xpantivirus.awardspace.co.uk
The detection rates for the time being :
XPShieldSetup.exe
Scanners result : 1/32 (3.13%)
File size: 517632 bytes
MD5...: 99c7271ac88edc56e1d89c9f738f889c
SHA1..: 3347564017d289ffd116f70faa712e05883358f4
XPantivirus2008_v880381.exe
Scanners result : 4/32 (12.5%)
File size: 65024 bytes
MD5...: ef9024963b1d08653dcc8d8b0d992998
SHA1..: 436bf47403e0840d423765cf35cf9dea76d289a5
In the long term, however, features and customizations already adopted by ethical phishing initiatives, would become the default set of features for public, and not the proprietary kits that theoretically should act as the benchmark. As in a previous discussion on the dynamics of the malware industry and the proprietary tools within, lowering the entry barriers into phishing by releasing this applications for free, greatly benefits the more experienced phishers, as the novice market entrants would be the ones making the headlines :
"The DIY phishing kits trend started emerging around August, 2007, with the distribution of a simple kit (screenshots included), whose objective was to make it easy for a phisher already possessing the phishing page, to enter a URL where all the data would be forwarded to. Several months later, the kit went 2.0 (screenshots included) and introduced new preview, and image grabber features in order to make it easier for the phisher to obtain the images to be used in the attack. In early 2008, two more phishing kits made it in the wild, with the first once having direct FTP upload capabilities as well DIY Phishing Kit as automated updating of the latest phishing page, and the second one taking advantage of plugins under a .phish file extension."
Read the entire post - DIY phishing kits introducing new features.
Building DDoS bandwidth capacity for offensive cyber warfare operations may seem rational, but this departamental cyber warfare approach would never manage to match the capabilities of the self-mobilizing hacktivist crowd :"Where’s the enemy, and where’s the enemy’s communications and network infrastructure at the first place? It’s both nowhere, and everywhere, and you cannot DDoS “everywhere”, and even if you waste a decade building up the capability to DDoS everywhere, your adaptive enemy will undermine the resources, time and money you’ve put into the process by avoiding outside-to-inside attacks, and DDoS your infrastructure from inside-to-inside."
Here are related comments on how unnecessary the whole idea is at the first place. Continue reading →
The process of localizing open source malware, as well as publicly obtainable web malware explotation kits is continuing to receive the attention of malicious attackers, the Chinese underground in particular. Starting from MPack and IcePack's original localizations to Chinese, the FirePack exploitation kit is the latest one to have been recently localized to Chinese, and the trend is only starting to emerge.What is prompting Chinese users to translate these kits to their native language anyway? Is it the kit's popularity, success rates, lack of alternatives, or capability matching with the rest of the internaltional underground community? I'd go for the last point. Continue reading →
Go through the complete assessment of the tool used for extracting personal data from major career sites as well. Continue reading →
The ongoing development of the tool showcases several important key points, namely, how a market share leader's products in a certain region, Korea in this case, often receive the attention of malware authors embedding product-specific DoS attacks within, and also, the fact that the average script kiddies are continuing getting empowered with access to DDoS tools going beyond the average HTTP request flooders and ICMP flooding attacks. Furthermore, realizing the PSYOPs effect that could be created out of the popularity of this DIY malware, a specific Anti CNN version was released during the Anti CNN attack campaigns, and as you can also see, ABC.com is hard coded as an example of a site to be attacked.
From an unrestricted warfare perspective, what is the difference between someone who has on purposely infected themselves with malware to appear as an infected hosts in this malware's C&C, and when traced back as a participant in the DDoS attacks simply states she's been infected with malware, next to those infected hosts who were unknowingly participating in the DDoS attacks? There wouldn't be any.
Continue reading →

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