The Unbreakable CAPTCHA

0
July 17, 2008
In response to the continuing evidence of how spammers are efficiently breaking the CAPTCHAs of popular free email service providers in order to abuse their clean IP reputation, and already validated authenticity through the use of DomainKeys and SenderID frameworks, someone has finally came up with an unbreakable CAPTCHA.



If it only weren't a hoax, it would have even solved the human CAPTCHA solvers problem, whose sessions would have probably expired due to their inability to solve it.



Related posts:

Vladuz's Ebay CAPTCHA Populator

Spammers and Phishers Breaking CAPTCHAs

DIY CAPTCHA Breaking Service

Which CAPTCHA Do You Want to Decode Today?

Continue reading →

Obfuscating Fast-fluxed SQL Injected Domains

0
July 17, 2008
It's all a matter of how you put it, and putting it like represents a good example of tactical warfare, namely, combining different tactics for the sake of making it harder to keep track of the impact of a particular SQL injection campaign. Consider the following examples of obfuscated domains, naturally being in a fast-flux in the time of the SQL injection that several Chinese script kiddies were taking advantage of :



%6b%6b%36%2e%75%73 - kk6.us

%73%61%79%38%2E%75%73 - s.see9.us

%66%75%63%6B%75%75%2E%75%73 - fuckuu.us

%61%2E%6B%61%34%37%2E%75%73 - a.ka47.us

%61%31%38%38%2E%77%73 - a188.ws

%33%2E%74%72%6F%6A%61%6E%38%2E%63%6F%6D - 3.trojan8.com

%6D%31%31%2E%33%33%32%32%2E%6F%72%67 - m11.3322.org



As always, these obfuscations are just the tip of the iceberg considering the countless number of other URL obfuscations techniques that spammers and phishers used to take advantage of on a large scale. For the time being, one of the main reasons we're not seeing massive SQL injections using such obfuscations is mostly because the feature hasn't been implemented in popular SQL injectors for copycat script kiddies to take advantage of. However, with the potential for evasion of common detection approaches, it's only a matter of personal will for someone to add this extra layer to ensure the survivability of the campaign.



The folks behind these obfuscations are naturally multitasking on several different underground fronts. Take for instance 3.trojan8.com (58.18.33.248) also responding to w2.xnibi.com which is also injected at several domains, w2.xnibi.com/index.gif to be precise. The fake .gif file in the spirit of fake directory listings for acquiring traffic in order to serve malware, is actually attempting to exploit a RealPlayer vulnerability - JS/RealPlr.LB!exploit. The deeper you go, the uglier it gets.



Related posts:

Yet Another Massive SQL Injection Spotted in the Wild

Malware Domains Used in the SQL Injection Attacks

SQL Injection Through Search Engines Reconnaissance

Google Hacking for Vulnerabilities

Fast-Fluxing SQL injection attacks executed from the Asprox botnet

Sony PlayStation's site SQL injected, redirecting to rogue security software

Redmond Magazine Successfully SQL Injected by Chinese Hacktivists Continue reading →

The Neosploit Malware Kit Updated with Snapshot ActiveX Exploit

0
July 15, 2008




Raising Symantec's ThreatCon based on a newly introduced exploit within a (random) copy of a popular web malware exploitation kit? Now that's interesting given that there are other modified versions of the publicly available malware kit empowered with exploits as they get released, the single most logical move a administrator of such kit would do is diversity the exploits set as often as possible, keeping it up to date - like they do. ThreatCon is raised already :



"Symantec honeypots have captured further exploitation of the Snapshot Viewer for Microsoft Access ActiveX Control Arbitrary File Download Vulnerability (BID 30114). Before this event, this exploit was known to be used only in isolated attacks. Further analysis of these honeypot compromises has revealed that the exploit has been added to a variant of the neosploit exploit kit, it will very likely reach a larger number of victims. This version will compromise vulnerable English versions of Microsoft Windows by downloading a malicious application into the Windows Startup folder. Computers that have Microsoft Access installed are potentially affected by this vulnerability. Customers are advised to manually set the kill bit on the following CLSIDs until a vendor update is available: F0E42D50-368C-11D0-AD81-00A0C90DC8D9 F0E42D60-368C-11D0-AD81-00A0C90DC8D9 F2175210-368C-11D0-AD81-00A0C90DC8D9"



Why based on a random copy of the kit? Well, the Neosploit malware kit itself is a commodity despite it's publicly announced varying price in the thousands, it leaked for public use just like MPack and Icepack did originally, making statements on the exact type of the vulnerabilities included within a bit pointless, since it will only cover the the exploits included in a particular version only. Web malware exploitation kits are very modular, namely, anyone can introduce new exploits, and tweak them, which is what they've been doing for a while, mostly converging third party traffic management systems with the malware kits in order to improve both, the metrics, and the evasive practices used for making a particular campaign a bit more time consuming to analyze.



Just like the innovations introduced within open source malware, and their localizations to native languages, the open source nature of web malware exploitation kit can result in countless number of variants whose new features make it sometimes difficult to assess whether or not it's a modified kit or an entirely new one - depending on the sophistication of the features of course. The introduction of new exploits within a copy of a particular malware kit should be considered as something logical, and if it's that big a deal, there are many other web malware exploitation kits whose features turn Neosploit into the "outdated choice" for malicious attackers.



Related posts:

The Zeus Crimeware Kit Vulnerable to Remotely Exploitable Flaw

The Small Pack Web Malware Exploitation Kit

Crimeware in the Middle - Zeus

The Nuclear Grabber Kit

The Apophis Kit

The FirePack Exploitation Kit Localized to Chinese

MPack and IcePack Localized to Chinese

The FirePack Exploitation Kit - Part Two

The FirePack Web Malware Exploitation Kit

The WebAttacker in Action

Nuclear Malware Kit

The Random JS Malware Exploitation Kit

Metaphisher Malware Kit Spotted in the Wild

The Black Sun Bot

The Cyber Bot

Google Hacking for MPacks, Zunkers and WebAttackers

The IcePack Malware Kit in Action Continue reading →

Are Stolen Credit Card Details Getting Cheaper?

0
July 15, 2008


What is shaping the prices of stolen credit card details? The investments the cybercriminals or real life scammers ( through credit card cloning or ATM skimming) put into the process of obtaining the details, or can we even talk about investments being made where an experienced scammer has just purchased 1GB of raw credit cards data from a novice botnet master who isn't really aware of the actual value of his "botnet output"?



Depends on which economic theory you believe in, or whether or not you'll take the "bottom-up approach" or the "top-down" one. And since I'm not aware of the existence of "the invisible hand of the underground market" and centralized power to increase the supply or decrease it to boost prices for the stolen credit card details, also indicating the existence of underground cartels putting everyone in a "price taker" position.



The basics of demand and supply for anything underground will always apply unless of course, The more they want, the cheaper it gets, the less they want, the higher the price on per credit card basis gets, since the investment on behalf of the malicious party that originally stolen them is virtually the same, and he can theoretically break-even in every single case since the credit card details were obtained efficiently. It's up to the seller to follow or entirely ignore economic behavior, and do what they feel like doing with this good which must on the other hand reach its market liquidity as soon as possible, else it becomes obsolete. The current market model can be further explained as a good example of competitive equilibrium :



"Competitive market equilibrium is the traditional concept of economic equilibrium, appropriate for the analysis of commodity markets with flexible prices and many traders, and serving as the benchmark of efficiency in economic analysis. It relies crucially on the assumption of a competitive environment where each trader decides upon a quantity that is so small compared to the total quantity traded in the market that their individual transactions have no influence on the prices."



This can be easily explained in a single sentence - it's a mess and every participant is doing whatever they want to, so generalizing on the prices charged for stolen credit card numbers would be unrealistic, since it's the price a single seller with no real impact on the "average" market price for the same good. As for the average market price itself, it would be hard to measure it depending on the quality of the sample you want to rely on, since this is a type of market where sellers don't have to report price changes in their goods for the purpose of statistical research.



A recently released report by Finjan, with whom I've been on the same page of several high profile incidents so far, touches this very same topic :



"Prices charged by cybercriminals selling hacked bank and credit card details have fallen sharply as the volume of data on offer has soared, forcing them to look elsewhere to boost profit margins, a new report says. Researchers for Finjan, a Web security firm, said the high volumes traded had led to bank and credit card information becoming "commoditized" - account details with PIN codes that once fetched $100 or more each might now go for $10 or $20. In its latest quarterly survey of Web trends, the California-based company said cybercrime had evolved into "a major shadow economy ruled by business rules and logic that closely mimics the legitimate business world."



Excluding the presence of price discrimination for a while, as well as open topic offers in the lines of "how much for X amount of Y?" answered as "how much are you willing to pay?", it's all a matter of the seller in a particular situation.



Furthermore, in real-life market there's always the scarcity problem, however, in the underground market there's no shortage of resources despite the ever growing wants of the buyers. Generalizing even more, take for instance the butterfly effect of a price change in petrol, and result of which is inevitable increase of prices in every single aspect of your life, but in the underground market mostly due to the malicious economies of scale achieved, a price increase in renting a botnet would have no effect in the prices charged for the stolen credit card details obtained through the infected hosts. How come? Basically, the price and resources for malware infection are prone to decrease, if we take a malware infected host as a static foundation for the basis of any upcoming cybercrime activities using it.



Perhaps the most disturbing part is that the market for stolen credit card details is so mature, and its entry barriers so low these days, that the confidential data that cannot be efficiently obtained through real-life means like credit card cloning or ATM skimming on a large scale, is now purchased online for the purpose of abusing it in real-life by embedding the valid information into plastic cards. Continue reading →

Malware and Office Documents Joining Forces

0
July 14, 2008
Common office files as documents, presentations, spreadsheets and PDF files, are the most widely abused ones in targeted attacks, which when backed up with enough personal information and take into consideration the time of their attack if the social engineering campaign is either going to be based on a current/upcoming event, or on an event anticipated due to information gathered through open source intelligence, often make it through common signature based scanning solutions.



Despite the relatively easy to obtain, point'n'click DIY tools for backdooring common office files are available for the script kiddies to take advantage of, some are naturally remaining proprietary tools, making them harder to analyze unless a copy is obtained. Like this one, generating "undetected" by signatures based scanning, office documents and spreadsheets that would drop the actual malware on the PC.



Automatic translation of its description and core features :



"The program represents a generator macros in the language Visual Basic for Application (VBA), for introduction in the document Microsoft Office Word / Microsoft Office Excel executable file (win32 exe), followed by fully automatic recovery and launch, without any  additional action by the user. The only requirement that formed in such a way xls / doc files is to support  VBA macros on the computer end-user formed file and permission to launch macros.



The program uses NOT a vulnerability (exploit) or macro-virus tools for the introduction, extraction or running embedded files. This means that it has generated macros compatible with ALL versions of Microsoft Office products starting with Microsoft Office 97 package, with any established "patches" and the service pack. Macros generated by this program not detected antivirus, for the simple reason that they are not viruses or macro viruses. The program uses only "established" means products built into Microsoft Excel VBA language to achieve their goals.



- Fully automatic generation of macro for the introduction of documents word / excel any given exe-file with his persistence in the body and subsequent documents automatic recovery and launch, when opening a document word / excel. 



- Generated macros are compatible with all versions of ms word / excel since version 97,  employments and regardless of the presence / absence of any patches / servicepacs. 



- Generated macros are not macro-viruses, exploits do not use and do not contain any malicious code, so do not be detected by any antivirus tools as viruses. 



- Conversion body ex-file macro happening in such a way that while in doc / xls file it not detected any antivirus, and can be freely sent by mail safely passed all checks, even if in itself contains viral code defined antivirus.

 


- Sgenerirovanny and attached to the body of the document macro can be protected with a password or signed certificate, using funds established Microsoft Office, which does not affect him productivity or efficiency (macro, in any case remain fully workable). 



- Box macro can be made both in the new document, and in any document containing data and-or other macros. Generated program code is fully compatible with any other embedded in the document macros or entering data, and will not interfere with their work, as well as maintain its efficiency.



- Added auto-finding ways to extract exe-file;

 
- Added possibility of a macro arbitrary text in the body of the instrument;

 
- Optimized algorithm macro-generation code;

 
Enabling this option will lead to the creation macro code, who himself will find a way to unpack and run embedded exe-file. Auto-search finds the current user folder and produces there extraction and launch embedded file. The peculiarity of this method is that this method will work on the computers of users with a limited account, because in its user folder in any case has the right to record / performance. Using this option is justified to improve the "punching" macro on computers with limited account or unknown file structure (let Windows installed on the disk is different from C).



You can specify a name for final file independently, or leave blank, then the name will be generated automatically.


On this possibility has asked for a user program, its essence is that after running a macro, retrieval and downloading exe-file the document with the introduction of exe-file will be withdrawn posed text. Perhaps in this way can improve the application of social engineering, designed to force the user to allow support for macros. For example, in the text of the document indicate:



"This document contains hidden text (password, a system of calculation formulas, interactive components, etc.), Which can be viewed only after the inclusion of support macros. Please enable support for macros and re-opening this document ".



After resolving support macros, and the implementation of embedded exe-file, the document will be withdrawn given a string containing probable "password" or any other textual information.
"


Despite that the tool is proprietary, the underground economy's leaks are largely driven by bargain hunters who would exchange proprietary tool, whose often biased exclusiveness may increase the profit margins, for a service or a good that may be worthless for them in general, but impossible to obtain and take advantage of in the present. It will not just leak in one way or another, someone will inevitably backdoor the backdooring tool and trick the novice bargain hunters into running it, by having both their host infected and money taken.



Related posts:

The Underground Economy's Supply of Goods and Services

Yet Another DIY Proprietary Malware Builder

The Small Pack Web Malware Exploitation Kit - Proprietary

DIY Exploit Embedding Tool - A Proprietary Release

Skype Spamming Tool in the Wild - Proprietary Release Continue reading →

Monetizing Compromised Web Sites

0
July 14, 2008


Despite that pure patriotic hacktivism is still alive and kicking, compromised sites are largely getting monetized these days, starting from hosting blackhat SEO junk pages, to redirecting to live exploit URLs and fake codecs where revenue is earned through their participation in an affiliate business model.



With The Africa Middle Market Fund's site monetized by web site defacers who defaced it "in between" the blackhat SEO infrastructure they were hosting internally, in this I'll comment on the currently compromised and redirection to a fake porn sites, Camara Municipal de Amparo (camaraamparo.sp.gov.br/r.html). Basically, it's homepage is heavily linking to the Zlob variant (camaraamparo.sp.gov.br/ video.exe) in between loading an IFRAME to 61.162.230.12/ index.php. As always, upon uploading their redirector, they've build enough confidence into their new hosting provider that the link to the redirector was instantly spammed across the web. The site is so heavily linking to the internal redirector itself, that upon clicking on the majority of links the user will inevitably come across it.



Speaking of fake porn sites redirecting to Zlob variants, here are the very latest additions spammed across the web through blackhat SEO practices :





just-tube .com

mypornmovies .net

moms-galls .net

porntubefilms .com

porntubedot .com

hot-porntube .com

landmovieblog .com

sexvidtube .com

freelifevideo .com

getyourfreemovie .com

iubat .com

sweetyjoly .com

hardbizarre .com

freeworldvideo .net

hot-porntube .net

qualitymovies .net

porntube1con .net

video-info .net

videocityblog .com

fuckedolder  .com

highpro1 .com

max-graf.com .pl

grandsupertds .info

hot-porn-tube .net

hot-porntube .com

terryschulz .com

show-sextube .com

qualitymovies .net

clubvideos .net




No matter the high profile site that's been exploited in order to participate in such malicious operations, for the time being, crunching out new domain names and using the hosting services of the well known ISPs neglecting their removal, seems to be the tactic of choice. The long tail of SQL injected sites is however, clearly replacing the plain simple blackhat SEO web spamming, so that traffic to these rogue sites is driven through redirection of the the traffic from legitimate sites.

Continue reading →

Violating OPSEC for Increasing the Probability of Malware Infection

0
July 11, 2008


Are malware authors and the rest of the participants in fact willing to violate their OPSEC (operational security) for the sake of increasing the probability of successful malware infection by on purposely lowering down the security settings of Internet Explorer, by adding their malicious netblocks and domains into "Trusted Sites"? You bet.



The infamous Smitfraud or PSGuard Desktop Hijacker, has been cooperating with known malicious parties for over an year now, a cooperation which exposes interesting relatinships between the usual suspects. Starting from the basic fact that a malware infected host is infected with many other totally unrelated to one another pieces of malware, Smitfraud's "pre-infection foreplay" demonstrates that they are willing to sacrifice operational security in order to increaes the probabilty of future infections on the same host.




Rogue software added as trusted sites upon Smitfraud infection :

about-adult .net

antivirus-scanner .com

best-porncollection .com

getadultaccess .com

getavideonow .com

ieantivirus .com

malwarebell .com

mega-soft-2008 .com

mooncodec .com

movsonline .com

ruler-cash .com

s-freeware .com

sexysoftwaredom .com

supersoft21freeware .com

the-programsportal .com

vwwredtube .com

wetsoftwares .com

youpornztube .com

securewebinfo .com

safetyincludes .com

securemanaging .com

myflydirect .com

onlinevideosoftex .com

scanner.malwscan .com

scanner.shredderscan .com

sex18tube2008 .com

spywareisolator .com

virus-scanner-online .com

security-scanner-online .com

virus-scanonline .com

antivirus-scanonline .com

topantivirus-scan .com

topvirusscan .com

virus-detection-scanner .com

antivirus-scanner .com

infectionscanner .com

internet-security-antivirus .com   

hotvid44 .com

opaadownload .com

somenudefuck .com




Rogue netblocks and IPs added as trusted IP ranges upon Smitfraud infection :

"69.50.*.*"

"69.31.*.*"

"66.235.*.*"

"66.230.*.*"

"216.239.*.*"

"205.188.*.*"

"205.177.*.*"

"195.225.*.*"

"216.195.*.*"

"82.179.*.*"

"81.95.*.*"

"70.84.*.*"

"195.95.*.*"

"194.187.*.*"

"78.129.158.*"

"78.129.166.*"

"89.149.226.*"

"195.93.218.*"

"72.21.53.*

"81.9.3.*"

"213.189.27.*"

"88.255.74.*"

"79.143.178.*"

"202.71.102.*"

"64.202.189.170"

"217.170.77.150"






The second hardcoded trusted IP is also responding to :

virusisolator .com

virus-isolator .org

virus-isolator .net

soft-collections .com

viruswebprotect .com

virus-isolator .us

codecvideo2008-18 .com

sextubecodec55 .com

sextubecodec67 .com

soft-archives .com

soft-collections .com

codecreviews .com

codecvideo2008-18 .com




Such practices leave a great deal of malicious creativity, for instance, once rented a botnet's already infected malware PCs could start trusting the majority of sites in their scammy ecosystem. What's great is that by doing this they expose their affiliations with these affiliate based rogue security software programs, next to their infrastructure on which they may be that easily claiming ownership. Continue reading →

The Template-ization of Malware Serving Sites

0
July 10, 2008
Just like web malware exploitation kits and phishing pages turned into a commodity underground good, allowing easy localization to different languages, and of course, the natural lowering of entry barriers into web malware and phishing in general, the very same thing is happening with fake ActiveX templates like the ones used on the majority of fake porn and celebrity sites I've been assessing recently.



The increase of these bogus ActiveX templates is due to the fact that despite they are currently available for sale, buyers appear to be leaking them for everyone to use so that they can continue maintaining their current business models, namely, the services they offer with the ActiveX templates. Unethical competitive practices among cybercriminals and scammers are only to starting to take place with one another trying to ruin or extend the lifecycle of their services.



Talking about prevalence, the TonsOfPorn ActiveX remains the most widely used rogue ActiveX in the majority of fake codec campaigns for the last couple of months. The ActiveX is largely abused by using another fake porn site template for PornTube, which in combination result in nothing more than huge domain portfolios with no content at all if we exclude the Zlob variants.



And while template-tization means more efficient malware campaigns, it also results in a common pattern for generic detection of such sites. For instance, the folks at Finjan did an experiment by verifying the signature based detection of the common javascript file that was used in the ongoing waves of SQL injection attacks. Their conclusion :



"Can it be that Anti-virus products are now holding more signatures for domains and URLs rather than trying to identify a malicious code they never inspected before? As my research found, just by changing the domain names, some AVs did not find this code as malicious...... surprisingly enough."





When assessing malware campaigns in general, I usually do the same for the record. Storm Worm's use of ind.php for executing its set of exploits has the same detection rate - scanners result: 10/33 (30.30%) and is detected as JS.Zhelatin.zb.



Getting back to the TonsOfPorn ActiveX, it's structure is more static than a Red Army statue in Estonia, making it easy to proactively protect against, no matter the domain, no matter the exploits served. It's detection rate is close to the javascript from the SQL injection attacks - Scanners Result: 9/33 (27.28%) and is detected as Trojan.HTML.Zlob.L.



From my personal experience, blocking an IP address where a couple of hundred malicious domains remain parked, is just as useful as blocking a single domain acting as the main redirector behind a huge domains portfolio of malicious domains. However, the most beneficial approach on a large scale remains the practice of taking care of the most obvious patterns that still remain faily easy to detect, at least for the time being, due to the efficiency the people behind them aim to achieve, making them easily susceptible to generic detection approaches. Continue reading →

Mobile Malware Scam iSexPlayer Wants Your Money

0
July 09, 2008
A bogus media player (iSexPlayer.jar) targeting Symbian S60 3rd edition devices according to several affected parties, is currently being spammed through blackhat search engine optimization. Once infected upon confirming its execution since it's doesn't seem to be exploiting a specific vulnerability besides "bargain hunters" desire for free adult material, the malware attempts to trick the user into participating by becoming a member, however, a quick peek the source code reveals interesting facts about the scam.

For instance, once providing them with your credit card details and basically wanting to try out the service, it appears that there's no way out of it which is a problem since "Trial membership recur at $US 29.95 unless cancelled, Monthly membership recur unless cancelled" and also, "Do you want full access to all pictures and videos? Cost is 2 Euros, charged 100% descreet on your phone bill over SMS. Please allow iSexPlayer to send SMS".

The spammed through blackhat SEO sites are currently active, and perhaps a bit ironic, once you make any transaction with these people, anything that goes on at a later stage such as automatic calling or sms-sing to squeeze your bill, may be in fact legal since you authorized it.

Symbian Freak has some details, as well as an affected party :

"Last week, I had lend my N73 to one of my friends for use as he had lost his phone. I did not know what he did, but I checked my bills today and see some International calls made that amount to around 20USD. That is around 800 Indian rupees. To check, I called the number and learnt that it was a phone sex line. Now it was time for my friend to answer. The thirteen calls were made during a period spanning two days. On an average there were 7 calls a day. Now, the thing that struck me is, going by the call records, the calls on the second day were made when I had the phone with me. I am pretty sure no one dialled the numbers. I called my buddy and asked him if he had downloaded something. He then spilled the beans informing that he did go to some adult website and installed a software (I do not recall the name)."

The name of the "software" as I've already pointed out is iSexPlayer. Let's dissect the scammers and their sites currently spammed across 100,000 sites using blackhat SEO tactics. Related domains sharing the same IP and internal pages :

3g6.se
3gx.se
conn2.3g6.se
conn2.3g6.se
test.3gx.se


83.241.194.132 (83.241.194.128-83.241.194.191 DGC-DIRECT2-01 Direct2Internet AB - Internet Access Located in Johanneshov, Sweden)

3g6.se/dstream.php
3g6.se/newplayerdl.php
3g6.se/chrono/callback.php
secure.chronopay.com/index.cgi


The scammer's pitch :

"Free access to: - 500 Hardcore scenes - 100 Full lenght movies - Picture galleries Important! To install iSexplayer you must be at least 18 years old. You must install and run iSexplayer™ access module to watch the videos on Nintendo DS, You must install and run iSexplayer™ access module to watch the videos on Apple iPhone, Install iSexplayer"

Upon attempting to download the .jar file from the mobile page, the iSexPlayer.php does the magic like that :

"MIDlet-1: iSexPlayer,/icon.png,Easyloader
MIDlet-Install-Notify: http://3g6.se/install_notify.php?id=1322451
MIDlet-Jar-Size: 101313
MIDlet-Jar-URL: http://3g6.se/iSexPlayer.jar
MIDlet-Name: iSexPlayer
MIDlet-Vendor: Vendor
MIDlet-Version: 1.0
MicroEdition-Configuration: CLDC-1.0
MicroEdition-Profile: MIDP-2.0
did: 1322451
did2: 9416755
"

Who's behind the scam?

"c_javax_microedition_lcdui_Form_fld.append("\niSexPlayer is owned by: ");
c_javax_microedition_lcdui_Form_fld.append("\nEnit Invest S.L. "); 
c_javax_microedition_lcdui_Form_fld.append("\nweb: enitinvest.com ");
c_javax_microedition_lcdui_Form_fld.append("\nemail: support@enitinvest.com ");
c_javax_microedition_lcdui_Form_fld.append("\nTel: 1-800-845-4951 ");"

Enit Invest S.L.
Av. Machupichu 26, S 18
28043 Madrid
email: support@enitinvest.com
Tel: 1-800-845-4951

And since I'm sure that there are more juicy details within the source code further exposing their scammy practices, which you should not authorize in any way, just like you wouldn't really like making a long call on a premium rate number thanks to having a malware infected phone, once more details are gathered, particularly its compatibility with devices, they'll be posted. Continue reading →

Storm Worm's U.S Invasion of Iran Campaign

0
July 09, 2008
The Storm Worm-ers are keeping themselves busy, with two campaigns in less than a week, following the latest on the 4th of July. Now, they are spreading rumors of a U.S invasion in Iran :



"Just now US Army's Delta Force and U.S. Air Force have invaded Iran. Approximately 20000 soldiers crossed the border into Iran and broke down the Iran's Army resistance. The video made by US soldier was received today morning. Click on the video to see first minutes of the beginning of the World War III. God save us."



The campaign is using the following domains :

statenewsworld .com

morenewsonline .com

dailydotnews .com

dotdailynews .com

newsworldnow .com





All registered by the same individual :

ONLINE  CO REANIMATOR (dfgdgf@gmail.com)

REVA 13-27 Deribaska 3565,198346 DZ Tel. +321.3568872



Sample detection rate :

iran_occupation.exe

Scanners Result: 4/33 (12.13%)

File size: 118273 bytes

MD5...: 19ab8f1dddb743c1dc2924cb61d3f877

SHA1..: e0915f377020479ba95ffed0fcb07a2b2aec72f4



Storm Worm domains used in recent campaigns, still parked on infected hosts :



superlovelyric .com

bestlovelyric .com

makingloveworld .com

statenewsworld .com

wholoveguide .com

gonelovelife .com

loveisknowlege .com

lovekingonline .com

lovemarkonline .com

wholefireworksonline .com

morenewsonline .com

makingadore .com

greatadore .com

yourfireworksstore .com

loveoursite .com

dayfireworkssite .com

musiconelove .com

knowholove .com

whoisknowlove .com

theplaylove .com

lovelifecash .com

wantcherish .com

shelovehimtoo .com

makeloveforever .com

bellestarfireworks .com

yourfireworks .com

worldbestfireworks .com

greatfireworkslaws .com

dailydotnews .com

dotdailynews .com

wholovedirect .com

newsworldnow .com

thefireworksjuly .com

grupogaleria .cn

polkerdesign .cn   

nationwide2u .cn

activeware .cn

grupogaleria .cn

likethisone1 .com

lollypopycandy .com

nationwide2u .cn

polkerdesign .cn

verynicebank .com

thefireworksjuly .com

wholefireworksonline .com

worldbestfireworks .com

yourfireworks .com

bellestarfireworks .com

dayfireworkssite .com

greatfireworkslaws .com

yourfireworksstore .com



The "best" is yet to come.



Related posts :

Storm Worm Hosting Pharmaceutical Scams

All You Need is Storm Worm's Love

Social Engineering and Malware

Storm Worm Switching Propagation Vectors

Storm Worm's use of Dropped Domains

Offensive Storm Worm Obfuscation

Storm Worm's Fast Flux Networks

Storm Worm's St. Valentine Campaign

Storm Worm's DDoS Attitude

Riders on the Storm Worm

The Storm Worm Malware Back in the Game Continue reading →

The Risks of Outdated Situational Awareness

0
July 07, 2008


It's been two months since I analyzed the proprietary email and personal information harvesting tool targeting major career web sites - "Major career web sites hit by spammers attack", received comments from Seek.com.au and Careerbuilder.com, communicated all the actionable intelligence in terms of the bogus accounts used and the related IPs to the career web sites that bothered to show interest in the attack, to come across a ghost story today - Jobsite hack used to market identity harvesting services :



"A Russian gang called Phreak has created an online tool that extracts personal details from CVs posted onto sites including Monster.com, AOL Jobs, Ajcjobs.com, Careerbuilder.com, Careermag.com, Computerjobs.com, Hotjobs.com, Jobcontrolcenter.com, Jobvertise.com and Militaryhire.com. As a result the personal information (names, email addresses, home addresses and current employers) on hundreds of thousands of jobseakers has been placed at risk, according to net security firm PrevX."



All your CV are NOT belong to us, All your CV are ALREADY belong to us. Continue reading →

The ICANN Responds to the DNS Hijacking, Its Blog Under Attack

0
July 07, 2008


Last week, the ICANN has issued an official statement regarding last month's DNS hijackings of some of their domains :



"The DNS redirect was a result of an attack on ICANN's registrar's systems. A full, confidential, security report from that registrar has since been provided to ICANN with respect to this attack.



It would appear the attack was sophisticated, combining both social and technological techniques, but was also limited and focused. The redirect was noticed and corrected within 20 minutes; however it may have taken anywhere up to 48 hours for the redirect to be entirely removed from the Internet. ICANN is confident that the lessons learned and new security measures since introduced will ensure there is not a repeat of this situation in future.
"



They also mentioned that their Wordpress blog has also been a target of a recent attack automatically exploiting vulnerable Wordpres blogs :



"In a separate and unrelated incident a few days later, attackers used a very recent exploit in popular blogging software Wordpress to target the ICANN blog. The attack was noticed immediately and the blog taken offline while an analysis was run. That analysis pointed to an automated attack. The blogging software has since been patched and no wider impact (except the disappearance of the blog while the analysis was carried out) was noted."



Go through the complete coverage of the incident, the technical details regarding it, and the actionable intelligence obtained for the NetDevilz hacking group, in case you haven't done so already. Continue reading →

Lithuania Attacked by Russian Hacktivists, 300 Sites Defaced

0
July 07, 2008


Last week's mass defacement of over 300 Lithuanian sites hosted on the same ISP, an upcoming attack that was largely anticipated due to the on purposely escalated online tensions out of Lithuan's accepted legislation banning communist symbols across the counry, once again demonstrates information warfare building capabilities in action.



Moreover, the attack is again relying on common prerequisites for a successful information warfare campaign, used in the Russia vs Estonia cyberattack last year. These very same Internet PSYOPS tactics ensure the success of the information warfare as a whole :



- start publicly justifying upcoming attacks based on nationalism sentiments, which in a bandwidth empowered (botnets) collectivist society ensures a decent degree of cyber mobilization. In Lithuania's case, the discussions across web forums were on purposely escalated to the point where "if you don't take action, you're not loyal to your country"



-  the media as the battleground for winning the hearts and minds of the bandwidth empowered botnet masters, and position the insult against loyal nationalists next to the daily basis, thereby putting the nationalists in a "stand by" mode prompting them to take actions and to break even. In Estonia's case for instance, news broadcasts of the riots on the streets were on purposely broadcast as often as possible, mostly emphasizing on the nationalist sentiments within the crowds



- prioritizing the attack targets, distributing the targets list and ensuring the coordination in terms of the exact time and data for the attacks to take place is something that didn't happen in the public domain for the mass defacement of Lithuanian sites, the way it happened in the Estonia attack



- utilizing a people's information warfare tactic known as the malicious culture of participation, when everyone's consciously contributing bandwidth to be used/abused by those coordinating the attacks



Also, it's important to point out that by the time they announced their ambitions to attack Lithuania and other countries such as Latvia, Ukraine, and again Estonian sites, they literally put these countries in a "stay tune" mode. Here's a translated statement :



"All the hackers of the country have decided to unite, to counter the impudent actions of Western superpowers. We are fed up with NATO's encroachment on our motherland, we have had enough of Ukrainian politicians who have forgotten their nation and only think about their own interests. And we are fed up with Estonian government institutions that blatantly re-write history and support fascism," says the appeal that is being circulated on Russian Internet forums."



But why would they signal their intentions, compared to keeping them quiet and attack Lithuania surprisingly? Another relevant use of PSYOPS, namely the biased exclusiveness and keeping a non-existent status bar for the upcoming attacks. And since they can launch a coordinated attack at the country at any time without warning about it, this warning was aiming to cause confusion prompting country officials to make public statements that could later on be analyzed and a better attack strategy formed on the basis of what they said they've done to ensure the attacks don't succeed.



If they did launch DDoS attacks compared to defacing over 300 sites hosted on a single ISP, and had warned about the upcoming attacks about a week earlier, successfully shutting down the country's Internet infrastructure would have achieved a double effect, since they did warn them about the attacks, and despite that  they countries couldn't prepate to fight back even though fighting back was futile right from the very beginning.



At least, that's the level of confidence they've build into capabilities.



Related posts:

Right Wing Israeli Hackers Deface Hamas's Site

Monetizing Web Site Defacements

Pro-Serbian Hacktivists Attacking Albanian Web Sites

The Rise of Kosovo Defacement Groups

A Commercial Web Site Defacement Tool

Phishing Tactics Evolving

Web Site Defacement Groups Going Phishing

Hacktivism Tensions

Hacktivism Tensions - Israel vs Palestine Cyberwars

Mass Defacement by Turkish Hacktivists

Overperforming Turkish Hacktivists Continue reading →

The Antivirus Industry in 2008

0
July 04, 2008


The folks at Ikarus Security Software seem to have enjoyed drinking of the truth serum, to come up with such a realistic retrospective of  the antivirus industry for the past 10 years, summarized in a single cartoon. Congrats, keeping it realistic means taking the issues seriously, compared to living in a self-serving twisted reality on their own. There's no such thing as cat and mouse game anymore, since the mouse has gotten bigger than the cat. Continue reading →

Gmail, Yahoo and Hotmail’s CAPTCHA Broken

0
July 03, 2008

It's one thing to start efficiently registering thousands of email accounts at reputable email providers by automatically breaking their CAPTCHA authentication, and entirely another to build a business model on the top of it next to the opportunity to abuse if for your own malicious purposes. Which is exactly what we have here, an underground service that's selling registered accounts at Gmail, Yahoo, Hotmail and the most popular Russian email providers in the thousands. Once the inventory of registered accounts drops due to someone's purchase, it continues registering one to two email accounts per second.



Gmail, Yahoo and Hotmail’s CAPTCHA broken by spammers :



"Breaking Gmail, Yahoo and Hotmail’s CAPTCHAs, has been an urban legend for over two years now, with do-it-yourself CAPTCHA breaking services, and proprietary underground tools assisting spammers, phishers and malware authors into registering hundreds of thousands of bogus accounts for spamming and fraudulent purposes. This post intends to make this official, by covering an underground service offering thousands of already registered Gmail, Yahoo and Hotmail accounts for sale, with new ones registered every second clearly indicating the success rate of their CAPTCHA breaking capabilities at these services."



Text based CAPTCHA is so broken, that if major web sites whose services are getting abused don't at least try to slow down the efficient approach of breaking it, we are going to see an entire spamming infrastructure build on the foundation of legitimate email service providers.



Related posts:

Vladuz's Ebay CAPTCHA Populator

Spammers and Phishers Breaking CAPTCHAs

DIY CAPTCHA Breaking Service

Which CAPTCHA Do You Want to Decode Today? Continue reading →

Chinese Bloggers Bypassing Censorship by Blogging Backward

0
July 02, 2008


With China trying to silence over 30,000 rioters during the weekend, by deleting forum postings and deactivating accounts mentioning the riot, Chinese bloggers have started using a widget they originally came up in order to bypass the "Great Firewall of China" by blogging backward, vertically and horizontally :



"So bloggers on forums such as Tianya.cn have taken to posting in formats that China's Internet censors, often employees of commercial Internet service providers, have a hard time automatically detecting. One recent strategy involves online software that flips sentences to read right to left instead of left to right, and vertically instead of horizontally. China's sophisticated censorship regime -- known as the Great Firewall -- can automatically track objectionable phrases. But "the country also has the most experienced and talented group of netizens who always know ways around it," said an editor at Tianya, owned by Hainan Tianya Online Networking Technology Co., who has been responsible for deleting posts about the riot"



An old-school content obfuscation service that they could take advantage of, offers the opportunity to turn a short message into spam or a fake PGP encrypted file, where both parties can easily decode them to the original.



Spammmic is what I have in mind. Continue reading →

Decrypting and Restoring GPcode Encrypted Files

0
July 01, 2008


The futile attempt to directly attack the encryption algorithm used by the GPcode ransomware, is prompting Kaspersky Labs to invest in a more pragmatic solutions to the problem, with a new version of the StopGpcode tool released last week. More info :



"It turns out that if a user has files that are encrypted by Gpcode and versions of those same files that are unencrypted, then the pairs of files (the encrypted and corresponding unencrypted file) can be used to restore other files on the victim machine. This is the method that the StopGpcode2 tool uses.



Where can these unencrypted files be found? They may be the result of using PhotoRec. Moreover, these files may be found in a backup storage or on removable media (e.g., the original files of photographs copied to the hard disk of a computer that has been attacked by Gpcode may still be on a camera’s memory card). Unencrypted files may also have been saved somewhere on a network resource (e.g., films or video clips on a public server) that the Gpcode virus has not reached."



As the customer support desk behind GPcode pointed out in an interview, the malware is prone to evolve, and the simplistic file deletion process will be replaced by secure file deletion in order to render all data recovery tols useless, unless of course backups of the affected data are available. They often aren't, and depending on the importance of the files encrypted, the successful ransom is all a matter of the momentum.



"A person, presumably the author of Gpcode, contacted at one of the e-mail addresses left behind by the program stated that future development efforts will likely increase the key size to 4,096 bits, "if AV companies or other (people) crack the current key, but (that's) impossible. The self-proclaimed author, who used the name "Daniel Robertson," also said that other standard techniques to defeat antivirus will be added, including polymorphic encryption, anti-heuristic features and the ability to self propagate, turning the program into a computer virus. It well pays back itself," he said"



There are even more pragmatic approaches to dealing with this problem, next to backups undermining their business model. Try following the virtual money for instance.

Continue reading →

Summarizing June's Threatscape

0
July 01, 2008
June's threatscape that I'll summarize in this post based on all the research conducted during the month, was a very vibrant one. With the return of GPcode, a remotely exploitable flaw in the Zeus crimeware kit allowing both, researchers and malicious parties to assess the severity of a particular banker malware campaign, the increasing use of malicious doorways next to ICANN and IANA's DNS hijacking, all speak for themselves and how diverse the threats and, of course, the abilities to maintain a decent situatiational awareness about what's going on have become.







01.  U.K's Crime Reduction Portal Hosting Phishing Pages - nothing new here since vulnerable sites are to be "remotely file included" and SQL injected to locally host anything on behalf of a malicious party. Risk and responsibility forwarding is one thing, but having a crime reduction portal hosting phishing pages is entirely another. The phishing pages was shut down in less than 12 hours upon notification








02. Price Discrimination in the Market for Stolen Credit Cards - Tracking down "yet another stolen credit cards for sale" service in the wild, the price discremination that they applied greatly reflects the current lack of transpararency for a potential buyer of stolen credit cards, and how higher profit margins are driving the entire business model. With script kiddies running their own botnets and undermining the sophisticated botnet master's high profit margin business model by undercutting their prices, stolen credit cards are not what they used to be - an exclussive good. Nowadays, they are a commodity good and often a bargain










03. Blackhat SEO Redirects to Malware and Rogue Software - Sampling an active blackhat SEO campaign out of the hundreds of thousands currently active online, releaved a large portfolio of domains serving Zlob variants by pitching them as fake codecs that the end user should download if they are to view the non existent adult content at the sites. Where's the OSINT mean? It's in the fact that the codecs and the fake security software phone back to UkrTeleGroup Ltd's network










04. Using Market Forces to Disrupt Botnets - With the current oversupply of malware infected hosts, and botnet masters embracing the services model for anything malicious, in this post I discussed the radical security approach of puchasing already infected malware hosts on a per country basis, disinfecting them and forcing them to update all the software on the infected PCs. Of course, on an opt-in basis. The possibility to directly provide incentives for botnet hunters to shut down whatever they come across to on a daily basis, and that's a lot of botnets, is also there










05. Who's Behind the GPcode Ransomware? - The title speaks for itself, the research with enough actionable intelligence gathered in the shortest timeframe possible is already proving accurate and highly valuable. How come? Stay tuned for more developments










06. ImageShack Typosquatted to Serve Malware - In a rare instance of a creative attack combining typosquatting in order to impersonate ImageShack and serve malware by redirecting users to an image file that is actually forwarding to the binary, I was recently tipped by the folks at TrendMicro who are also following this that the site is up and running again. Not for long










07. Fake YouTube Site Serving Flash Exploits - Next to using the usual set of exploits courtesy of a commodity web malware exploitation kit, this campaign was also using flash exploits. Even more interesting is the fact that the password stealer obtained was attempting to phone back to a misconfigured malware command and control interface, basically allowing you to assess the campaign from the eyes of the "campaigner"










08. Monetizing Web Site Defacements - Web site defacements are getting monetized just like SQL injections are in order to locally host a blackhat search engine optimization campaign on a vulnerable site with a high page rank. In this post I've assessed such monetization courtesy of a web site defacer at The Africa Middle Market Fund










09. Malicious Doorways Redirecting to Malware - Yet another large domains portfolio exposed though a malicious doorway redirecting to fake porn and video sites serving Zlob variants, tracking down the initial spamming of the malicious doorways across multiple vulnerable forums and guestbooks










10. The Zeus Crimeware Kit Vulnerable to Remotely Exploitable Flaw - When cyber criminals get advised to patch their vulnerable versons of the Zeus Crimeware Kit, you know there's a monoculture in the crimeware market. This flaw released publicly in May, 2008, not just allows others to hijack someone's ebanking botnet, but also, vendors and researchers to better assess a vulnerable Zeus command and control location










11. Fake Celebrity Video Sites Serving Malware - When templates for fake video and adult sites are just as available as they are now, anyone can take advantage of this cheap social engineering track that seems to work just fine. Compared to relying on blackhat search optimization to acquire traffic, some of the campaigns were SQL injected at vulnerable sites in order to drive traffic to them, next to several other tactics which when combined can result in a lot of people unknowingly visiting the sites










12. Phishing Campaign Spreading Across Facebook - An internal phishing campaign was circulating across Facebook, which got taken care of thanks to coordinated efforts with Facebook's security folks. There's also an indicating tha they are currently typosquatting other social networking sites like Hi5 for instance










13. Underground Multitasking in Action - As a firm believed in taking a random sample for a particular threat segment, this was once of these cases confirming the confidence I've built into anticipating upcoming tactics and strategies to be used










14. An Update to Photobucket's DNS Hijacking - Despite that Photobucket didn't oficially acknowledge the DNS hijacking, the hosting provider the NetDevilz hacking team used issued a statement. Ironically, the Turkish hacking group used the same provider weeks later to redirect ICANN and IANA's domains to Atspace.com



15. Fake Porn Sites Serving Malware - Among the largest domains portfolio of malware serving porn sites I've exposed in a while, all of them naturally remain active since they are hosted on a partition of RBN's diverse network. Visualizing a malicious doorway or the entire ecosystem provides a better understanding at how structured the ecosystems are





16. Backdoording Cyber Jihadist Ebooks for Surveillance Purposes - Despite that in this case we have a cyber jihadist backdoording his own released books, the international intelligence community next to law enforcement are known to have expressed interest in backdooring suspect's PCs, so why not SQL inject the cyber jihadist forums themselves?



17. Right Wing Israeli Hackers Deface Hamas's Site - When you read that Hamas's site is hacked, you ask yourself the following, do they even have a web site that's up the running? The answer to which would be the fact that even Hezbollah has been maintaining an Internet infrastructure since 1998



18. ICANN and IANA's Domain Names Hijacked by the NetDevilz Hacking Group - A fact is a fact, no comment here, go through all the technical details of the hijacking, including some actionable intelligence on who's behind the hijacking



19. The Malicious ISPs You Rarely See in Any Report - Who's tolerating malicious activities on their network, and how is the RBN related to all this? Well, when combined, the tiny parts of these ISPs represent a tiny part of the Russian Business Network itself Continue reading →