Monday, September 29, 2008

Modified Zeus Crimeware Kit Comes With Built-in MP3 Player

Modified versions of popular open source crimeware kits rarely make the headlines due to the fact that anyone can hijack a crimeware kit's brand, build and innovate using its foundations, and claim it's a new version released by the original authors. That's of course in between the tiny time frame until he's exposed as the fake author of Zeus that may have in fact came up with a unique feature that the original authors didn't include.

This modified version of Zeus is yet another example of how cybercriminals are actively modifying crimeware kits, literally making such practices as keeping version numbers irrelevant. While the administrator is managing his botnet, he can load local, or tunein the built-in online radio stations the author of this modification included, next to changing Zeus entire graphical layout.

Let's take into consideration another example, the infamous Pinch DIY malware builder, that's been around for over 4 years. With the populist arrest of its authors in 2007, cybercriminals are still innovating on the foundations offered by Pinch, and thanks to its publicly obtainable source code. It's also worth pointing out that these two Zeus and Pinch modifications are courtesy of a single individual, that in between modifications of popular crimeware kits, seems to be busy porting different modules on different malware kits and web based malware, knowingly or unknowingly contributing to the convergence of spamming, DDoS, web based malware, and botnet management kits.

From a sarcastic perspective - what's next? Perhaps a built-in slideshow of random screenshots taken from malware infected desktops in the botnet, or even a pink layout modification for female botnet masters. Customerization, and customer tailored services can make anything happen, and naturally enjoy the higher profit margins.

The Commercialization of Anti Debugging Tactics in Malware

Commoditization or commercialization, Themida or Code Virtualizer, individually crypting or outsourcing to an experienced malware crypting service offering discounts on a volume basis next to detection rates of the crypted binary offered by a trusted online scanner that is NOT distributing the samples to the vendors? These are just some of the questions malware authors often ask themselves, while others distribute pirated copies of Code Virtualizer urging everyone to start taking advantage of commercial anti-reverse engineering tools to make their malware harder to analyze. Once again, just like we've seen before, a legitimate commercial application can come handy in the hands of the wrong people :

"Code Virtualizer will convert your original code (Intel x86 instructions) into Virtual Opcodes that will only be understood by an internal Virtual Machine. Those Virtual Opcodes and the Virtual Machine itself are unique for every protected application, avoiding a general attack over Code Virtualizer. Code Virtualizer can protect your sensitive code areas in any x32 and x64 native PE files (like executable files/EXEs, system services, DLLs , OCXs , ActiveX controls, screen savers and device drivers).

Code Virtualizer can generate multiple types of virtual machines with a different instruction set for each one. This means that a specific block of Intel x86 instructions can be converted into different instruction set for each machine, preventing an attacker from recognizing any generated virtual opcode after the transformation from x86 instructions. The following picture represents how a block of Intel x86 instructions is converted into different kinds of virtual opcodes, which could be emulated by different virtual machines.

When an attacker tries to decompile a block of code that was protected by Code Virtualizer, he will not find the original x86 instructions. Instead, he will find a completely new instruction set which is not recognized by him or any other special decompiler. This will force the attacker to go through the extremely hard work of identifying how each opcode is executed and how the specific virtual machine works for each protected application. Code Virtualizer totally obfuscates the execution of the virtual opcodes and the study of each unique virtual machine in order to prevent someone from studying how the virtual opcodes are executed."

With Cyber-as-a-Service business model becoming increasingly common, the entire quality assurance model in respect to malware is slowly maturing from individual malware crypting propositions, where the seller of the service is basically taking advantage of a diverse set of public/private tools, into DIY web services offering crypting discounts on a volume basis, and perhaps most importantly - improving the customer's experience by letting him take advantage of the inventory of crypting tools and bypassing verification services. Within the tool's inventory are naturally lots of (pirated) commercial anti-reverse engineering tools.

As we've seen before, whenever someone starts commercializing what used to be a self-selving process, others will either follow, or disintermediate their services by persistently releasing crypting tools for free in the wild. At the end of the day, it's all a matter of how serious they're about commercializing this market segment, and taking into consideration that a spamming vendor is offering malware crypting services "in between" the rest of the services in their portfolio, this underground cash cow is yet to prove itself in the long term.

Friday, September 26, 2008

Hijacking a Spam Campaign's Click-through Rate

This spammer is DomainKeys verified, a natural observation considering that the spam compaign which I discussed last Wednesday is using bogus Yahoo Mail accounts, and is spamming only Yahoo Mail users through a segmented emails database.

Not necessarily what I wanted to achieve, but once posting the spam campaigns SEO URLs, Yahoo's crawler's picked up the post pretty fast, and have ruined the SEO effect, with everyone clicking on the campaign's links reaching the post. Close to 15,000 unique visitors reached the article during the past 7 days since the now hijacked, spammer's link is no longer achieving the effect it used to.

What does this prove? It proves that users tend to trust emails that pass through spam filters so much that they actually click on the links. And whereas it's a spam campaign, and not a malware campaign, the next time they over trust such a email, they'll expose themselves to client-side vulnerabilities courtesy of a copycat web malware exploitation kit.

The latest search query the campaign is using :
- yahoo.com/search/search;_ylt=?p=...........................................stossregularnew............$0.00.........

leads to stossregularnew.com (61.255.135.185).

- yahoo.com/search/search;_ylt=?p=||||||||||||||||clapmoon||||||||||||$229|||||||||||||||| leads to clapmoon.com (122.198.62.4).

Thursday, September 25, 2008

250k of Harvested Hotmail Emails Go For?

$50 in this particular case, however, keeping in mind that the email harvester is anything but ethical, this very same database will be sold and re-sold more times than the original buyer would like to know about. Moreover, what someone is offering for sale, may in fact be already available as a value-added addition to a managed spamming service.

With metrics and quality assurance applied in a growing number of spam and phishing campaigns, filling in the niche of email harvesting by distinguishing between different types of obfuscated emails by releasing an easily embeddable module, was an anticipated move. What's to come? Spam and malware campaigns across social networks "as usual" will propagate faster thanks to the ongoing harvesting of usernames within social networks, that would later on get imported in Web 2.0 "marketing" tools targeting the high-trafficked sites and automatically spamming them.

From a spammer's perspective, geolocating these 250k emails could increase their selling prices since the buyers would be able to launch localized attacks with messages in the native languages of the receipts. Is the demand for quality email databases fueling the developments of this market segment, or are the spammers self-serving themselves and cashing-in by reselling what they've already abused a log time ago? That seems to be the case, since there's no way a buyer could verify the freshness of the harvested emails database and whether or not it has already been abused.

For the time being, we've got several developed and many other developing market segments within spamming and phishing as different markets with different players. On one hand are the legitimately looking spamming providers offering "direct marketing services" working with lone spammers who find a reliable business partner in the face of the spamming vendor whose customers drive both side's business models. On the other hand, you've got the spammers excelling in outsourcing the automatic account registration process, coming up with ways to build a spamming infrastructure -- already available as a module to integrate in managed spamming services -- using legitimate services as a provider of the infrastructure.

Despite that the arms race seems to be going on at several different fronts, spammers VS the industry and spammers VS spammers fighting for market share, the entire underground ecosystem is clearly allocating a lot of resources for research and development in order to ensure that they are always a step ahead of the industry.

Related posts:
Harvesting Youtube Usernames for Spamming 
Thousands of IM Screen Names in the Wild
Automatic Email Harvesting 2.0
Dissecting a Managed Spamming Service
Managed Spamming Appliances - the Future of Spam
Inside an Email Harvester's Configuration File
Segmenting and Localizing Spam Campaigns
Shots from the Malicious Wild West - Sample Four

Wednesday, September 24, 2008

A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Six

Thanks to misconfigured traffic management kits, not taking advantage of all the built-in features that could have made a research a little bit more time consuming, here are the latest fake security software domains popping up at the end of fake adult content sites :

anti-spyware8 .com
anti-spyware4 .com
anti-spyware11 .com
anti-spyware10 .com

antivirus-cs1 .com
antivirus-cs14 .com
antivirus-cs4 .com
antivirus-cs15 .com
antivirus-cs5 .com
antivirus-cs7 .com
antivirus-cs8 .com
antivirus-cs9 .com
trustedpaymenssite .com
altawebgl-500 .com
masterspitetds09 .com
protectionaudit .com
prt3ctionactiv3scan .com
prtectionactivescan .com
smartantivirusv2 .com
smartantivirus2009v2 .com
smartantivirus2009v2-buy .com
smartantivirus-2009v2buy .com
smart-antivirus2009v2buy .com
anti-virus-xp .com
anti-virus-xp .net
e-antiviruspro .com
ultimate-anti-virus .com
antimalwarewarrior2009 .com

spyware-buy .com
superantivirus2009 .com
total-secure2009 .com
pcprivacycleanerpro .com
bestguardownload .com
trustedantivirus .com
antivirus-buy1 .com
spyware-quickscan-2008 .com
securealertbar .com
secureclick1 .com
megantivirus2009 .com
micro-antivirus2008 .com
superantivirus2009 .com
advanced-anti-virus .com 
antivirusmaster2009 .com 
scanner-online1 .com
internet-scanner2009 .com
filescheck-list303 .com
virus-webscanner .com
virus9-webscanner .com
spamnuker .com
detect-file101 .com
googlescanners-360 .com
onlinescannersite9 .com
bestantivirusscan .com
hottystars .com
internet-defenses .com
globals-advers .com
quickupdates29 .com
myscanners101 .com
myfreescan500 .com
scanthnet .com
scanners-pro .com
megatradetds0 .com
xp-licensingpages .com
bestantivirusscan .com


power-avc .com
pvrantivirus .com
online-xp-antivirus-checker .com
antivir-online-scan .com
online-win-xpantivirus .com
tube-911 .com
favoredmovie .com
getqtysoftware .com
softwareportal2008 .com
megazcodec .com
soft-upgrade-network .com
download-base .com
fastsoftdownloads .com
software-downloadz .com
download-soft-basez .com
plupdate .com
0scan .com
virus-online-scan .com
0scanner .com
porno-tds .com
jirolu .com
virus-online-scanz .com
red-tubbe .info
win-xp-antivir-hqscanne .com
xp-protections .com
xp-registration .com
xp2008-protect .com
getdefender2009 .com
gettotalsec2008 .com
msantivirus-xp .com
xp-licensingpages .com
protectionpurchase .com
winxp-antivir-on-line-scan .com
antispychecker .com
errorofbrowser .com
fresh-video-news .com
newschannel2008 .com
internet--daily-news .com
secure.signupsecurity .com
xpacodec .com
xpbcodec .com
gmkvideo .com
hqsextube08 .com
antivirusworld9 .com
viacodecright1 .com
viacodecright2 .com
quickupdates29 .com
antivirusworld9 .com
scanthnet .com
city-codec .com
citycodec .net
codecdownload.anothersoftportal09 .com
viacodecright2 .com
sextubecodec023dfs41 .com
hot-sextubedriver2 .com
viacodecright2 .com


The Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software series are prone to continue taking a bite out of cybercrime, and the people who distribute them on a affiliation based revenue sharing model.

Related posts:
Fake Porn Sites Serving Malware - Part Three
Fake Porn Sites Serving Malware - Part Two
Fake Porn Sites Serving Malware
EstDomains and Intercage VS Cybercrime
Fake Security Software Domains Serving Exploits
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Five
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Four
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Three
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Two
Localized Fake Security Software
Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software
Got Your XPShield Up and Running?
Fake PestPatrol Security Software
RBN's Fake Security Software
Lazy Summer Days at UkrTeleGroup Ltd
Geolocating Malicious ISPs
The Malicious ISPs You Rarely See in Any Report

Two Copycat Web Malware Exploitation Kits in the Wild

We're slowly entering into "can you find the ten similarities" stage in respect to web malware exploitation kits, and their coders continuous supply of copycat malware kits under different names, taking advantage of different exploits combination. Copycat web malware exploitation kits are faddish, however, from a strategic perspective, releasing exploits kits like this one covered by Trustedsource, consisting entirely of PDF exploits, can greatly increase the exploitability level of Adobe vulnerabilities in general.

A similar web malware exploitation kit, once again using only Adobe related exploits is Zopa. Have you seen this layout before? That's the very same layout MPack and IcePack were using, were in the sense of cybercriminals preferring to use much mode modular alternatives these days. Ironically, Zopa is more expensive than MPack and IcePack, with the coder trying to cash-in on its biased exclusiveness and introduction stage buzz generated around it.

The second web malware exploitation kit is relying on a mix of exploits targeting patched vulnerabilities affecting IE, Firefox and Opera, with its authors asking for $50 for monthly updates, updates of what yet remains unknown. Both of these kits once again demonstrate the current  mentality of the kit's coders having to do with -- thankfully -- zero innovation, fast cash and no long-term value.

However, modularity, convergence with traffic management kits, vertical integration with cybercrime services and bullet proof hosting providers, advanced metrics, evasive practices, improved OPSEC (operational security), and dedicated cybercrime campaign optimizing staff, are all in the works.

Related posts:
Web Based Botnet Command and Control Kit 2.0
DIY Botnet Kit Promising Eternal Updates
Pinch Vulnerable to Remotely Exploitable Flaw
The Zeus Crimeware Kit Vulnerable to Remotely Exploitable Flaw
The Small Pack Web Malware Exploitation Kit
Crimeware in the Middle - Zeus
The Nuclear Grabber Kit
The Apophis Kit
The FirePack Exploitation Kit Localized to Chinese
MPack and IcePack Localized to Chinese
The Icepack Exploitation Kit Localized to French
The FirePack Exploitation Kit - Part Two
The FirePack Web Malware Exploitation Kit
The WebAttacker in Action
Nuclear Malware Kit
The Random JS Malware Exploitation Kit
Metaphisher Malware Kit Spotted in the Wild
The Black Sun Bot
The Cyber Bot
Google Hacking for MPacks, Zunkers and WebAttackers
The IcePack Malware Kit in Action