A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Eight

In the spirit of "taking a bite out of cybercrime", here are the latest fake security software domains, typosquatted and already acquiring traffic through a dozen of malware campaigns redirecting to most of them :



antivirus-scanner-online.com (67.205.75.14)



archivepacker.com (78.157.142.111)

winpacker.com

xh-codec.net



securedownloadcenter.com (89.18.189.44)

winupdates-server.com

browserssecuritypage.com

megatradetds0.com

quickscanpc.com (78.159.118.144)

clickchecker6.com



gensoftdownload.com (91.203.93.25)



online-av-scan2008.com (66.232.105.232)

anothersoftportal09.com

bigfreesoftarchive.com

celebs-on-video-08.com

celebs-on-video-2008.com

cleansoftportal2009.com

hot-p0rntube.com

hot-porn-tube-2008.com

hot-porn-tube2008.com

hot-porn-tube2009.com

justdomain08.com

new-porntube-2008.com

online-av-scan2008.com

s0ftvvarep0rtal.com

s0ftvvareportal.com

s0ftvvareportal08.com

s0ftwarep0rtal08.com

softportalforfun.com

softportalforfun08.com

softportalforfun2008.com

softvvareportal.com

softvvareportal08.com

softvvareportal2008.com

trustedsoftportal06.com

trustedsoftportal2008.com

antivirus-online-08.com (89.187.48.155; 218.106.90.227)

anti-virus-xp.com

anti-virus-xp.net

anti-virusxp2008.net

antimalware09.com

antivirxp.net

av-xp08.net

av-xp2008.com

av-xp2008.net

avx08.net

axp2008.com

e-antiviruspro.com

eantivirus-payment.com

ekerberos.com

online-security-systems.com

xpprotector.com

youpornzztube.com

sp-preventer.com (92.241.163.32)

spypreventers.com



u-a-v-2008.com (92.241.163.31)

uav2008.com



power-avcc.com (92.62.101.57)

power-avc.com

pvrantivirus.com



m-s-a-v-c.com (92.62.101.55)

ms-avcc.com

ms-avc.com



wav2008.com (92.241.163.30)

wiav2009.com

win-av.com

windows-av.com

windowsav.com 



You know the drill. 



Related posts:

A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Seven

A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Six

A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Five

A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Four

A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Three

A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Two

Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software

Web Based Malware Emphasizes on Anti-Debugging Features

Following the ongoing development of a particular web based malware, always comes handy in terms of assessing the commoditization of anti-debugging features within modern malware. With plain simple, "managed binary crypting and firewall bypassing verification" on demand in February, to August's overall anti antivirus software mentality as a key differentiation factor of the malware.

So what are they working on? Anti tracing and emulation protection, PeiD and PESniffer protection, as well as anti heuristic scanning with a simple junk data adding feature in order to maintain a smaller binary size.

Here's a translated description :

"- The binary works under admin and under normal user
- The binary is always run as the "current user"
- An unlimited number of bots can be loaded and integrated within the command and control, and with the geolocation feature, filters can be applied for a particular country
-After successful infection, the binary which is tested against popular firewall and proactive protection security ensures that the actions it takes and their order do not trigger protactive protection mechanisms in place
- binary file size is 25k, the size can be reduced once it's crypted

- Doesn't take advantage of BITS protocol
- Doesn't allow an infected host to be infected twice
- Bypassing NAT and supporting "always-on" connections
- A simple, easy to configure web based admin panel"

What if the buyer doesn't care about the quality assurance practices applied? Managed lower AV detection and firewall bypassing service comes into play.

Fake Windows XP Activation Trojan Wants Your CVV2 Code

In a self-contradicting social engineering attempt, a malware author is offering to sale a (updated version of Kardphisher) DIY fake Windows XP activation builder, which despite the fact that it claims "We will ask for your billing details, but your credit card will NOT be charged", is requesting and remotely uploading all the credit card details required for a successfully credit card theft.

Perhaps among the main reasons why such simplistic social engineering attempts never scaled in a "malicious economies of scale" approach, is because sophisticated crimeware kits capable of obtaining the very same data automatically, started leaking for everyone to start taking advantage of - including yesterday's cybercriminals using such DIY fake message builders.

Moreover, according to recently reseased survey results, end users cannot distinguish between fake popups and real ones, and on their way to continue doing what they were doing, click OK on that pesky warning message telling them that they're about to get infected with malware. Taking into consideration the fact that the popup windows the researchers used look like cheap creative compared to the average fake security software's layout high quality GUIs, it is perhaps worth restating your research questions with something in the lines of - What motivates end users to install an antivirus application going under the name of Super Antivirus 2009 or Mega Virus Cleaner 2008? The fact that the fake status bar is telling them that they're infected with 47 spyware cookies, or the fact that they ended up at the fake site while browsing their trusted web services?

The increase of rogue security software domains is happening due to the high payout affiliation based model, the standardized creative allowing the participants to come up with their own fake names if they want to, and due to the fact that the fake security threats scareware approach seems to be perfectly taking advantage of the overall suspicion on the effectiveness of their legitimate security software.

Inside a Managed Spam Service

A managed spam vendor always has to raise the stakes during its introduction period on the market. But what happens when a market follower starts using the market leader's proprietary managed spamming system, and is able to provide better spamming rates at a cheaper prices?  Market forces and unethical competition at its best.

So, what is this market challenger using the monopolist's -- in respect to managed spamming services not spam in general -- proprietary system (Spamming vendor launches managed spamming service) up to anyway? Promising and delivering, 1, 400,000 emails daily, 60,000 mails per hour, and 100 emails per minute. What we've got here are the spam metrics out of 5 already finished spam campaigns that has managed to sent out a million spam emails using only 2000 malware infected hosts. Also, CC-ing and BCC-ing made it possible to multiple the effect of the campaign and increase the total number of emails spammed. Talking about benchmarks, 789 emails per minute at a rate of 12/13 emails per second is a pretty good one, considering it's only 2k bots that they were using. What they also promise is automatic rotation of IPs upon automatically checking them against public blacklists, and a mix rotation of IPs from their own netblocks located in Russia and Germany with the fresh IPs coming from the newly infected hosts.

Earlier this month, I discussed the market leader's managed spamming system, access to which they also offer for rent :

"An inside look of the system obtained on 2008-08-12 indicates that they are indeed capable of delivering what they promise - speed, simplicity and 5000 malware infected hosts. Moreover, the attached screenshot demonstrates that 20 different email databases can be simultaneously used resulting in 16,523,247 emails about to get spammed using 52 different macroses. Furthermore, what they refer to as a dynamic set of regional servers aiming to ensure that the central server never gets exposed, is in fact fast-flux which depending on how many bots they are willing to put into “rtsegional server mode” shapes the size of the fast-flux network at a later stage."

With cutting edge managed spam services like the ones currently in circulation, it remains to be seen whether or not spammers would migrate to this outsourcing model, or continue coming up with adaptive ways to send out their scams and malware on their own.

Syndicating Google Trends Keywords for Blackhat SEO

Several hundred Windows Live Spaces and AOL Journals, are currently syndicating the most popular keywords provided by Google Trends, and are consequently hijacking the top search queries exposing users to Zlob codecs.

Here are some same bogus blogs used in the campaign, naturally pre-registered long before they executed it :

vinniedigg18 .spaces.live.com
journals.aol .com/iolatour16
fredabreak02 .spaces.live.com
thedaalerts01 .spaces.live.com
allisonpolls08 .spaces.live.com
rheabreak18 .spaces.live.com
racquellog17 .spaces.live.com
monikavideo11 .spaces.live.com
journals.aol .com/shelvakill27
tomekadigg26 .spaces.live.com
ivahnet19 .spaces.live.com
journals.aol .com/louisathere13
allisonpolls08 .spaces.live.com
valericatch03 .spaces.live.com
journals.aol .com/iolatour16
hadleycue01 .spaces.live.com
journals.aol .com/staceyliving01
collettebreak17 .spaces.live.com
journals.aol .com/nataliablog16
natalymore26 .spaces.live.com


A comprehensive listing of the blogs involved can be downloaded here.

What do all of these bogus blogs have in common? The fact that they are all being abused by a single malware campaign, and the Keep it Simple Stupid mentality only a lazy malware campaigner can take advantage of. All of the blogs as using a central redirection domain, shutting it down or blocking it renders the number of bogus blogs is circulation irrelevant. In this case, the domain in question is video.xmancer.org (216.195.59.75).

Here are the the rest of the domains participating in the campaign, as well as the parked ones at the corresponding IPs :

video.xmancer .org (216.195.59.75)
buynowbe .com
loveniche .com
antivirus-freecheck .com
jetelephone .cn
reducki .cn
woteenhas .cn
lilaloft .cn

clipztimes .com (78.157.143.235)
imagelized .com
vidzdaily .com

gotmovz .com (78.108.177.91)
dwnld-clips .com

movwmstream .com (77.91.231.183)
newwmpupdate .com
zaeplugin .com
movaccelerator .com
optimwares .com
piterserv .com

moviesportal2008p .com (72.232.183.154)
movieportal2008a .com
funnyportal2008l .com
starsportal2008p .com
softportal2008p .com
movieportal2008q .com

In short, despite that the campaign is poised to attract generic search traffic, it's a self-exposing blackhat SEO campaign since each and every blog participating is also linking to the rest of the ones within the ecosystem.

Related posts:
Blackhat SEO Redirects to Malware and Rogue Software
Blackhat SEO Campaign at The Millennium Challenge Corporation
Massive IFRAME SEO Poisoning Attack Continuing
Massive Blackhat SEO Targeting Blogspot
The Invisible Blackhat SEO Campaign
Attack of the SEO Bots on the .EDU Domain
p0rn.gov - The Ongoing Blackhat SEO Operation
The Continuing .Gov Blackat SEO Campaign
The Continuing .Gov Blackhat SEO Campaign - Part Two
Compromised Sites Serving Malware and Spam

Managed Fast Flux Provider - Part Two

We're slowly entering into a stage where RBN bullet proof hosting franchises are vertically integrating, and due to the requests from their customers are starting to offer that they refer to as "mirrored hosting" which in practice is plain simple fast flux network consisting of RBN-alike purchased netblocks, and naturally, botnet infected hosts.

Managed fast-fluxing is only starting to go mainstream, for instance, in July I found evidence that money mule recruiters were using ASProx's infected hosts as hosting infrastructure, and in November, 2007, an infamous spamming software vendor was also found to have been offering fast-flux services in the past.

In this most recent fast-flux service, we have a known spammer and botnet master that in between self-serving himself on is way to ensure his portfolio of scammy domains remains online for a "little longer", is commercializing fast-fluxing and is offered a DIY service :

"Finally after hardwork and great appreciation from our normal bullet proof hosting/server clients we are able to launch Mirrored hosting. What is Mirrored hosting ?

================
Mirrored hosting is a powerful mirrored web hosting management, uses multiple Virtual servers to host website with 100% uptime. Mirrored hosting is a combination of two things, which are:

1. Specially Designed Virtual Servers
2. Powerful Automated Control Panel

How does it work ?
=============== 

Mirrored hosting uses specially configured Virtual Servers making them link with the Mirrored hosting Control Panel which is then controlled by our own control panel allowing us to provide smooth streamline hosting with no downtime. No one is able to trace original IP of the server or the place where the files are hosted so the websites/domains hosted have a 100% Uptime. This is achieved by unique customisation of our Virtual Servers.

Actually, it takes ips around the world and our powerful control panel just rotates the ips every 15 minutes. though all these ips you will see will be fake no one can trace the orignal ip where files are hosted. Sometimes the ip is from China, Korea, USA, UK, Japan, Lithuania etc."

The concept has always been there for cybercriminals to take advantage of, but once it matures into a managed service it would undoubtedly lower down the entry barriers allowing yesterday's average phishers to take advantage of what only the "pros" were used to.

Related posts:
Storm Worm's Fast Flux Networks
Managed Fast Flux Provider
Fast Flux Spam and Scams Increasing
Fast Fluxing Yet Another Pharmacy Spam
Obfuscating Fast Fluxed SQL Injected Domains
Storm Worm Hosting Pharmaceutical Scams
Fast-Fluxing SQL injection attacks executed from the Asprox botnet