What type of antivirus evasion do you want today? For the past several years, we have been witnessing the emerging customerization applied in malware and spyware for hire services. What used to be a situation where the malware authors would code and then start promoting a piece of malware including features that he thinks his potential customers would want by generalizing a cybercriminal's needs, is today's "listening to the customer" win-win situation that they've reached already.
The whole maturity from a product concept to customerization is in fact so prevalent these days, that malware authors wanting to preserve their intellectual property are forbidding their customers from reverse engineering their malware modules, presumably fearing that remotely exploitable flaws like this one in one of the most popular Ebanker malwares for the last two yers Zeus, could be discovered due to the malware author's insecure coding practices. Moreover, limiting the distribution of a single license they are given to more than three people will result in the malware author ignoring any future business relationships with the party that ruined the exclusiveness of the malware, thereby leaking it to the public, something that's been happening and will continue happening with web malware exploitation kits.
What would be the price of a custom malware module coded on demand? How much does it cost to have a built in email harvester that would sniff all the incoming and outgoing email addresses from the infected host to later on include them in upcoming spam and malware campaigns? Would the malware author also provide a managed hosting service for the command and control and the actual binaries on a revenue sharing
Here's an automatically translated, and fairly easy to understand random proposition for coding spyware and malware for hire, aiming to answer many of these questions, clearly demonstrating that today's malware is coded in exactly the same way the customer wants it to :
"As you can see in the history of its development turned directly into the combine, while almost no raspuh in weight, full-size pack аж 18 kb and minialno 5 kb, for all nampomnyu again, all descriptions below can be done as otdelnym bot, and any combination of cross except for a few restrictions. This product is targeted at mass-user and will not be all prodavatsya row. So, you can choose from:
Actually loader - is able to load a file from adminki, by country and other characteristics, such as the number of animals on board with a specific bot, a country group of countries, the availability of certain authors or Fire, sredenemu time online, etc. etc.. You can adjust the speed of shipping limits for each file, can load 1 as well as how files simultaneously
300 €
FTP and not only Graber
Analyzes user traffic and collects from the ftp acclamation, that is ftp acclamation would you regardless of how the customer uses ftp user, thus can be obtained most valuable ftp aka (even those to which the password is not saved), you can also grab other in a way not only acclamation acclamation and other tasty things more)
150 €
Assembler spam bases
Analyzes user traffic and collects from all email, snifit http pop3 smtp protocols, keeps records unikallnosti locally on each boat to reduce the burden on the server as well as globally on a server has 2 mode of operation - ie passive with only collects user to please and active - the very beginning to download the entire inet) in search of soap
220 €
Socks 4 / 5
Normal soks with competently implemented multithreading, is activated only if the user real Ip, otherwise not. And also optional, depending on the connection type and speed ineta.
70 €
Indicates
The primitive method, contamination fleshek avtoranom gives 2-3% increase in the first week and up to 7% in the next, a pleasant trifle)
35 €
Scripts
Loader supports internal scripting language - jscript, to carry out arbitrary actions on the victim machine, whether recording data in the register, setting authentic hon-Pago, opening URL in your browser (it was done so to please with 90% punching)), apload arbitrary files on a server, even theoretically possible to form and grabing inzhekty in IE) has only to write the script zaebetes, vobschem lyuboye actions soul who wish)
70 € basic functionality
Assembler passwords
Collects data such as passwords pstorage IE, MSN, etc., will be added at the request of other sources of passwords
70 €
Mini-AV
When installing loadera wheelbarrows to remove BHO shaped three, zevso-shaped, the majority of shit from all avtoranov, render most keylogerov until all) forward proposals to improve
70 €
File-default
In exe loadera program URL (in adminke) to the file which once progruzit 1 and run at first start loadera on wheelbarrows, while simultaneously helping progruzke Trojan for example, in its entire botnet that does not paired with challenges in adminke, the module operates in 20 seconds after the mini - av which excludes the removal of your Trojan bot, after progruza this exe bot continues to normal activities.
35 €
Form Graber
While in beta version, robbed IE. Sends logs in adminku, folding country. Logs are like logs agent. It consists of:
Graber certificats
On the idea is part formgrabera but could work and of itself, actually there is nothing to describe)
Injections
Literacy sold inzhekty, did not begin work after full progruza pages (as in bolshistve three) and immediately supported injection yavaskript code, which allows avtozalivy and DC inzhekty for data collection. For example not to yuzat acclamation at all is not yet introduce the necessary number of Britain, after which inzhekt ceases to operate. Вобщем mdelat can be anything and in any form) rather than the meager request field pin) And also inzhektov subspecies - a substitute for the issuance of search enginee.
Graber balances
Makes loot aka balances at the entrance to the user acclamation, detail added to the logs.
Screen
Universal method to grab information from absolutely any species and varieties klaiviatur screens, in particular html, flash, in one picture, with a drop-down fields after choosing your encrypted, as well as information such as "enter 3 yu secret letter word" etc. as well as any information which is visible a user but not seen in the logs. Screen settings of adminki, set URL where do screen as well as the type of screen: for virtual keyboard (done several small images of areas around the clique) or to "enter 3 yu secret letter words" (makes 1 full shot). With the withdrawal screen recorded in the log entry with the name of the file to the screen this position.
Antiabuznost for botneta
Feachem adminki, keep botnet enables fast, normal, bezglyuchnyh NEabuzoustoychivyh hosting, with features that you forget what abuzy, nohistory week saporta "abuzoustoychivogo" hosting inaccessibility host to half ineta etc., etc., also with the help of the supplement will be able to keep huge botnety (over SL) at 1 dedike with 512 Lake) and well on the price of hosting a savings, not $ 500 a month and 150. It may use this feature to stroronnim development, Trojans, bots, etc., actually is a separate product. And incidentally, if you do not understand the theory that nenado ask "and how does it work?" imagine that it works and point and neubivaemo in pritsnipe.
600 € +
All prices are in euros, the calculation is made at the rate of CB on the day of purchase. ps I will not disappear as most authors after months of sales, I DONT how to please you get to the assembly ftp, I DONT how many soap collects soap-graber, I DONT what otstuk from loadera, I DONT soksov how many will be from 1 to downloads, and how best To work load a file is not dead quickly, if you are confused my ignorance - that my loader so you do not need more tries)
Rules / Licence
-- Customer has no right to transfer any of his three 3 persons except options for harmonizing with me
-- Customer does not have the right to make any decompile, research, malicious modification of any three parts
-- Customer has no right where either rasprostanyat information about three and a public discussion with the exception of three entries.
-- For violating the rules - without any license denial manibekov and further conversations"
This malware coder seems to be participating in an affiliate program with a malicious ISP that is offering hosting services for the entire campaign, not just the malware binaries, so you have a rather good example that incentives and revenue-sharing models result in value-added services, a all-in-one shop for a customer to take advantage of without bothering to approach a third-party.
Cybercrime is getting even more easier to outsource these days, and with the malicious parties improving their communication and incentives model, the resulting transparency in the underground market
Related posts:
The Underground Economy's Supply of Goods and Services
The Dynamics of the Malware Industry - Proprietary Malware Tools
Using Market Forces to Disrupt Botnets
Multiple Firewalls Bypassing Verification on Demand
Managed Spamming Appliances - The Future of Spam
Localizing Cybercrime - Cultural Diversity on Demand
E-crime and Socioeconomic Factors
Russia's FSB vs Cybercrime
Malware as a Web Service
Localizing Open Source Malware
Quality and Assurance in Malware Attacks
Benchmarking and Optimising Malware
In the overwhelming sea of information, access to timely, insightful and independent open-source intelligence (OSINT) analyses is crucial for maintaining the necessary situational awareness to stay on the top of emerging security threats. This blog covers trends and fads, tactics and strategies, intersecting with third-party research, speculations and real-time CYBERINT assessments, all packed with sarcastic attitude
Tuesday, July 22, 2008
Coding Spyware and Malware for Hire
Independent Security Consultancy, Threat Intelligence Analysis (OSINT/Cyber Counter Intelligence) and Competitive Intelligence research on demand. Insightful, unbiased, and client-tailored assessments, neatly communicated in the form of interactive reports - because anticipating the emerging threatscape is what shapes the big picture at the end of the day. Approach me at dancho.danchev@hush.com
Monday, July 21, 2008
Impersonating StopBadware.org to Serve Fake Security Warnings
Malware is known to have been hijacking search results, take for instance the rogue Antivirus XP 2008 as a recent example, but it's even more interesting to see other rogue security software impersonating Stopbadware.org in order to server fake security warnings that ultimately lead to fake security software.stopbadware2008 .com (58.65.238.171) is one of these examples, where stopbadware2008 .com/antivirus.php redirects to infectionscanner .com and attempts to trick the user into installing download.infectionscanner.com /AntvrsInstall.exe. The message used :
"Reported Insecure Browsing: Navigation blocked. Due to insecure Internet browsing your PC can easily get infected with viruses, worms and trojans without your knowledge, and that can lead to system slowdown, freezes and crashes. Also insecure Internet activity can result in revealing your personal information. To get full advanced real-time protection for PC and Internet activity, register Antivirus 2008. We recommend you to protect your PC now and continue safe Internet browsing."
There's in fact even more rogue software using the same IP (58.65.238.171), courtesy of HostFresh :
virus-scanner-online .com
security-scanner-online .com
viruses-scanonline .com
virus-scanonline .com
antivirus-scanonline .com
download.antivirus-scanonline .com
topantivirus-scan .com
topvirusscan .com
virusbestscan .com
virus-detection-scanner .com
antivirus-scanner .com
infectionscanner .com
virusbestscanner .com
internet-security-antivirus .com
It would be interested to monitor whether or not the template for the fake security warning would start getting used on a large scale.Related posts:
A Portfolio of Fake Video Codecs
Fake PestPatrol Security Software
Got Your XPShield up and Running?
Localized Fake Security Software
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software
RBN's Fake Security Software
Independent Security Consultancy, Threat Intelligence Analysis (OSINT/Cyber Counter Intelligence) and Competitive Intelligence research on demand. Insightful, unbiased, and client-tailored assessments, neatly communicated in the form of interactive reports - because anticipating the emerging threatscape is what shapes the big picture at the end of the day. Approach me at dancho.danchev@hush.com
SQL Injecting Malicious Doorways to Serve Malware
Let's expose yet another such campaign, that has been SQL injected and spammed across a couple of hundred web forums. gpamelaaandersona .info (82.103.129.98) is the typical comprehensive malicious doorway, whose galleries redirect to tds.zbestservice .info/tds/in.cgi?11 (85.255.120.45), and from there the following campaigns load on-the-fly :
porntubev20 .com/viewmovie.php?id=86 (74.50.117.84)
getmyvideonow .com/exclusive2/id/3912999/2/black/white/ - (89.149.194.188)
immenseclips .com/m6/movie1.php?id=1552&n=celebs (85.255.118.156)
movieexternal .com/download.php?id=1552 (77.91.231.201)
2008adults2008a .com/freemovie/144/0/
avwav .com/1931.htm
codecupgrade .com (74.50.117.84)
iwillseethatvideo .com (91.203.92.53)
dciman32 .com (85.255.120.45)
winantivirus2008 .org
porntubev20 .com
crack-land .com
just-tube .com
codecupgrade .com
codecupgrade .com
scanner-tool .com
surf-scanner .com
best-cracks .com
updatehost .com
updatehost .com
freemoviesdb .net
megasoftportal .net
And even more malicious doorways, and rogue software at 89.149.227.195 :
musicportalfree .com
softportalfree .com
verifiedpaymentsolutionsonline .com
my-adult-catalog .com
indafuckfuck .com
best-porncollection .com
funfuckporn .com
sanxporn .com
dolcevido .com
xiedefender .com
online-malwarescanner .com
easyvideoaccess .com
my-searchresults .com
creatonsoft .com
ihavewetfuckpussy .com
How come none of these are in a fast-flux? Pretty simple. Keeping in mind that they continue using the services of the ISPs that you rarely see in any report, survivability through fast-flux is irrelevant when emails sent to abuse@cybercrime.tolerating.isp receive a standard response two weeks later, and when your abuse emails become more persistent, a fake account suspended notice makes it to the front page, whereas the campaigns get automatically updated to redirect to an internal page, again serving the malware and the redirectors.
Related posts:
Fake Porn Sites Serving Malware - Part Two
Fake Porn Sites Serving Malware
Underground Multitasking in Action
Fake Celebrity Video Sites Serving Malware
Blackhat SEO Redirects to Malware and Rogue Software
Malicious Doorways Redirecting to Malware
A Portfolio of Fake Video Codecs
Independent Security Consultancy, Threat Intelligence Analysis (OSINT/Cyber Counter Intelligence) and Competitive Intelligence research on demand. Insightful, unbiased, and client-tailored assessments, neatly communicated in the form of interactive reports - because anticipating the emerging threatscape is what shapes the big picture at the end of the day. Approach me at dancho.danchev@hush.com
Friday, July 18, 2008
Money Mule Recruiters use ASProx's Fast Fluxing Services
Just consider this scheme for a second. A well known money mule recruitment site Cash Transfers is maintaining a fast-flux infrastructure on behalf of the Asprox botnet, that is also providing hosting services for several hundred domains used on the last wave of SQL injection attacks. Ironically, the money mule recruitment site is sharing IPs with many of them. Who are these money launderers (cashtransfers.tk; cashtransfers.eu; type53.eu; sid57.tk; catdbw.mobi; cdrpoex.com etc. ) anyway?"Cash-Transfers Inc. is an online-to-offline international money transfer service. We offer a secure, fast, and inexpensive means of sending money from the UK to offline recipients worldwide. Recipients do not require a bank account or Internet connection to receive funds. We have teamed with select local disbursement partners to provide a convenient, secure, and cost-effective means of sending money to family, friends and business partners abroad. The basic requirements to send money/transfer money are:
1) Senders must have Internet access and a bank account or credit/debit card to transfer money. However, recipients do not require either a bank account or Internet connection.
2) Money sent through Cash-Transfers Inc. is available for pick up at the distribution partner instantly, or, in most countries, money can be delivered to the recipient in a matter of hours.
3) Our local agents will call your recipient (during local business hours) to provide additional details, including: forms of identification required, hours of operation, and other locations. The sender will also receive an email confirmation with transaction details and tracking information."
The fast-flux infrastructure they're currently using is also providing services to domains that are currently used, or have been used in previous SQL injection attacks. Some info on the current DNS servers used in the fast-flux :
ns10.cashtransfers.tk
ns11.cashtransfers.tk
ns1.cashtransfers.tk
ns12.cashtransfers.tk
ns2.cashtransfers.tk
ns13.cashtransfers.tk
ns3.cashtransfers.tk
ns14.cashtransfers.tk
ns4.cashtransfers.tk
ns15.cashtransfers.tk
ns5.cashtransfers.tk
ns16.cashtransfers.tk
ns6.cashtransfers.tk
ns17.cashtransfers.tk
ns7.cashtransfers.tk
ns8.cashtransfers.tk
With the distributed and dynamic hosting infrastructure courtesy of the malware infected user, scammers, spammers, phishers and malware authors are only starting to experiment with the potential abuses of such an underground ecosystem build on the foundations of compromises hosts.
Related posts:
Storm Worm's Fast Flux Networks
Managed Fast Flux Provider
Fast Flux Spam and Scams Increasing
Fast Fluxing Yet Another Pharmacy Spam
Obfuscating Fast Fluxed SQL Injected Domains
Storm Worm Hosting Pharmaceutical Scams
Fast-Fluxing SQL injection attacks executed from the Asprox botnet
Independent Security Consultancy, Threat Intelligence Analysis (OSINT/Cyber Counter Intelligence) and Competitive Intelligence research on demand. Insightful, unbiased, and client-tailored assessments, neatly communicated in the form of interactive reports - because anticipating the emerging threatscape is what shapes the big picture at the end of the day. Approach me at dancho.danchev@hush.com
Money Mule Recruiters use ASProx's Fast Fluxing Services
Just consider this scheme for a second. A well known money mule recruitment site Cash Transfers is maintaining a fast-flux infrastructure on behalf of the Asprox botnet, that is also providing hosting services for several hundred domains used on the last wave of SQL injection attacks. Ironically, the money mule recruitment site is sharing IPs with many of them. Who are these money launderers (cashtransfers.tk; cashtransfers.eu; type53.eu; sid57.tk; catdbw.mobi; cdrpoex.com etc. ) anyway?"Cash-Transfers Inc. is an online-to-offline international money transfer service. We offer a secure, fast, and inexpensive means of sending money from the UK to offline recipients worldwide. Recipients do not require a bank account or Internet connection to receive funds. We have teamed with select local disbursement partners to provide a convenient, secure, and cost-effective means of sending money to family, friends and business partners abroad. The basic requirements to send money/transfer money are:
1) Senders must have Internet access and a bank account or credit/debit card to transfer money. However, recipients do not require either a bank account or Internet connection.
2) Money sent through Cash-Transfers Inc. is available for pick up at the distribution partner instantly, or, in most countries, money can be delivered to the recipient in a matter of hours.
3) Our local agents will call your recipient (during local business hours) to provide additional details, including: forms of identification required, hours of operation, and other locations. The sender will also receive an email confirmation with transaction details and tracking information."
The fast-flux infrastructure they're currently using is also providing services to domains that are currently used, or have been used in previous SQL injection attacks. Some info on the current DNS servers used in the fast-flux :
ns10.cashtransfers.tk
ns11.cashtransfers.tk
ns1.cashtransfers.tk
ns12.cashtransfers.tk
ns2.cashtransfers.tk
ns13.cashtransfers.tk
ns3.cashtransfers.tk
ns14.cashtransfers.tk
ns4.cashtransfers.tk
ns15.cashtransfers.tk
ns5.cashtransfers.tk
ns16.cashtransfers.tk
ns6.cashtransfers.tk
ns17.cashtransfers.tk
ns7.cashtransfers.tk
ns8.cashtransfers.tk
With the distributed and dynamic hosting infrastructure courtesy of the malware infected user, scammers, spammers, phishers and malware authors are only starting to experiment with the potential abuses of such an underground ecosystem build on the foundations of compromises hosts.
Related posts:
Storm Worm's Fast Flux Networks
Managed Fast Flux Provider
Fast Flux Spam and Scams Increasing
Fast Fluxing Yet Another Pharmacy Spam
Obfuscating Fast Fluxed SQL Injected Domains
Storm Worm Hosting Pharmaceutical Scams
Fast-Fluxing SQL injection attacks executed from the Asprox botnet
Independent Security Consultancy, Threat Intelligence Analysis (OSINT/Cyber Counter Intelligence) and Competitive Intelligence research on demand. Insightful, unbiased, and client-tailored assessments, neatly communicated in the form of interactive reports - because anticipating the emerging threatscape is what shapes the big picture at the end of the day. Approach me at dancho.danchev@hush.com
Money Mule Recruiters use ASProx's Fast Fluxing Services
Just consider this scheme for a second. A well known money mule recruitment site Cash Transfers is maintaining a fast-flux infrastructure on behalf of the Asprox botnet, that is also providing hosting services for several hundred domains used on the last wave of SQL injection attacks. Ironically, the money mule recruitment site is sharing IPs with many of them. Who are these money launderers (cashtransfers.tk; cashtransfers.eu; type53.eu; sid57.tk; catdbw.mobi; cdrpoex.com etc. ) anyway?"Cash-Transfers Inc. is an online-to-offline international money transfer service. We offer a secure, fast, and inexpensive means of sending money from the UK to offline recipients worldwide. Recipients do not require a bank account or Internet connection to receive funds. We have teamed with select local disbursement partners to provide a convenient, secure, and cost-effective means of sending money to family, friends and business partners abroad. The basic requirements to send money/transfer money are:
1) Senders must have Internet access and a bank account or credit/debit card to transfer money. However, recipients do not require either a bank account or Internet connection.
2) Money sent through Cash-Transfers Inc. is available for pick up at the distribution partner instantly, or, in most countries, money can be delivered to the recipient in a matter of hours.
3) Our local agents will call your recipient (during local business hours) to provide additional details, including: forms of identification required, hours of operation, and other locations. The sender will also receive an email confirmation with transaction details and tracking information."
The fast-flux infrastructure they're currently using is also providing services to domains that are currently used, or have been used in previous SQL injection attacks. Some info on the current DNS servers used in the fast-flux :
ns10.cashtransfers.tk
ns11.cashtransfers.tk
ns1.cashtransfers.tk
ns12.cashtransfers.tk
ns2.cashtransfers.tk
ns13.cashtransfers.tk
ns3.cashtransfers.tk
ns14.cashtransfers.tk
ns4.cashtransfers.tk
ns15.cashtransfers.tk
ns5.cashtransfers.tk
ns16.cashtransfers.tk
ns6.cashtransfers.tk
ns17.cashtransfers.tk
ns7.cashtransfers.tk
ns8.cashtransfers.tk
With the distributed and dynamic hosting infrastructure courtesy of the malware infected user, scammers, spammers, phishers and malware authors are only starting to experiment with the potential abuses of such an underground ecosystem build on the foundations of compromises hosts.
Related posts:
Storm Worm's Fast Flux Networks
Managed Fast Flux Provider
Fast Flux Spam and Scams Increasing
Fast Fluxing Yet Another Pharmacy Spam
Obfuscating Fast Fluxed SQL Injected Domains
Storm Worm Hosting Pharmaceutical Scams
Fast-Fluxing SQL injection attacks executed from the Asprox botnet
Tags:
ASProx,
Botnet,
Cash Transfers,
Fast-Flux,
Hacking,
Information Security,
Money Mule,
Money Mule Recruitment,
Security
Independent Security Consultancy, Threat Intelligence Analysis (OSINT/Cyber Counter Intelligence) and Competitive Intelligence research on demand. Insightful, unbiased, and client-tailored assessments, neatly communicated in the form of interactive reports - because anticipating the emerging threatscape is what shapes the big picture at the end of the day. Approach me at dancho.danchev@hush.com
The Ayyildiz Turkish Hacking Group VS Everyone
Certain hacktivist groups often come and go by the time the momentum of their particular cause is long gone. Excluding the hardcore hacktivists who are obliged to defend their country's infrastructure and reputation on the international scene, smart enough to do on one front, there are certain hacktivist groups who ensure their future existence by declaring war and every single country that has ever made statements in contradiction with their vision. Quite a stimulating factor for ensuring the future of your script kiddies group, isn't it?One of these groups is the AYYILDIZ TEAM, a group of Turkish script kiddies who've been pretty active as of recently, targeting everyone, everywhere, leaving statements like the following :
"Me, as AYT-Admin Barbaros, swear to everything which is lovely and holy to me, that you will pay for your actions. We, AYT, as a Cyber Attacking Army will make it sure. Read right, what will we do:
* The government websites will be inaccessible an all lawsuits will be manipulated
* We will infiltrate the server of inland revenues for the manipulation of the data which are there.
* At the same time we will insist into the server of banks and will care for chaos
* Websites of the press will be extinguished.
* If the offence of our prophet (s.a.v.) called your press freedom, we will show you this press freedom
* Websites of divers shops will be hacked. Databank information's and the dates which are there, for example credit card dates, will be policed in this page. (Don't worry, we wouldn't taste one cent of your moneys, we aren't thieves like you. However we don't take care of what happens, if other hackers see this dates and empty your account)"
bkpadd.mobi /ngg.js
usaadw.com /ngg.js
cliprts.com /ngg.js
They are monetizing their defacements by either compiling lists of sites known to be SQL injectable since they've managed to defaced them, then reselling these to the SQL injectors, or are in fact part of the whole process in this scammy ecosystem. Speaking of SQL injections, here's the most recent list of fast-fluxed SQL injected domains participating in the last wave that I've been keeping track of for a while :
pyttco .com/ngg.js
butdrv .com/ngg.js
gitporg .com/ngg.js
brcporb .ru/ngg.js
korfd .ru/ngg.js
adwnetw .com/ngg.js
wowofmusiopl .com.cn/456.js
adwbn .ru/ngg.js
btoperc .ru/ngg.js
nudk .ru/ngg.js
bkpadd .mobi/ngg.js
cliprts .com/ngg.js
adwr .ru/ngg.js
bnrc .ru/ngg.js
adpzo .com/ngg.js
iogp .ru/ngg.js
lodse .ru/ngg.js
usabnr .com/ngg.js
vcre .ru/ngg.js
sdkj .ru/ngg.js
rcdplc .ru/ngg.js
7maigol .cn/ri.js
j8heisi .cn/ri.js
usaadp .com/ngg.js
gbradp .com/ngg.js
cdrpoex .com/ngg.js
rrcs .ru/ngg.js
gbradw .com/ngg.js
hiwowpp .cn/ri.js
cdport .eu/ngg.js
nopcls .com/ngg.js
loopadd .com/ngg.js
tertad .mobi/ngg.js
gbradde .tk/ngg.js
tctcow .com/ngg.js
ausbnr .com/ngg.js
movaddw .com/ngg.js
grtsel .ru/ngg.js
sslwer .ru/ngg.js
destad .mobi/ngg.js
hdrcom .com/ngg.js
addrl .com/ngg.js
porttw .mobi/ngg.js
bnsdrv .com/ngg.js
drvadw .com/ngg.js
crtbond .com/ngg.js
usaadw .com/ngg.js
What used to be plain simple cooperating among every single participant in the underground marketplace, seems to be evolving into long-term business relationships.
Related posts:
Monetizing Compromised Web Sites
Monetizing Web Site Defacements
Underground Multitasking in Action
Right Wing Israeli Hackers Deface Hamas's Site
Pro-Serbian Hacktivists Attacking Albanian Web Sites
The Rise of Kosovo Defacement Groups
A Commercial Web Site Defacement Tool
Phishing Tactics Evolving
Web Site Defacement Groups Going Phishing
Hacktivism Tensions
Hacktivism Tensions - Israel vs Palestine Cyberwars
Mass Defacement by Turkish Hacktivists
Overperforming Turkish Hacktivists
Independent Security Consultancy, Threat Intelligence Analysis (OSINT/Cyber Counter Intelligence) and Competitive Intelligence research on demand. Insightful, unbiased, and client-tailored assessments, neatly communicated in the form of interactive reports - because anticipating the emerging threatscape is what shapes the big picture at the end of the day. Approach me at dancho.danchev@hush.com
Thursday, July 17, 2008
The Unbreakable CAPTCHA
In response to the continuing evidence of how spammers are efficiently breaking the CAPTCHAs of popular free email service providers in order to abuse their clean IP reputation, and already validated authenticity through the use of DomainKeys and SenderID frameworks, someone has finally came up with an unbreakable CAPTCHA.If it only weren't a hoax, it would have even solved the human CAPTCHA solvers problem, whose sessions would have probably expired due to their inability to solve it.
Related posts:
Vladuz's Ebay CAPTCHA Populator
Spammers and Phishers Breaking CAPTCHAs
DIY CAPTCHA Breaking Service
Which CAPTCHA Do You Want to Decode Today?
Independent Security Consultancy, Threat Intelligence Analysis (OSINT/Cyber Counter Intelligence) and Competitive Intelligence research on demand. Insightful, unbiased, and client-tailored assessments, neatly communicated in the form of interactive reports - because anticipating the emerging threatscape is what shapes the big picture at the end of the day. Approach me at dancho.danchev@hush.com
Obfuscating Fast-fluxed SQL Injected Domains
%6b%6b%36%2e%75%73 - kk6.us
%73%61%79%38%2E%75%73 - s.see9.us
%66%75%63%6B%75%75%2E%75%73 - fuckuu.us
%61%2E%6B%61%34%37%2E%75%73 - a.ka47.us
%61%31%38%38%2E%77%73 - a188.ws
%33%2E%74%72%6F%6A%61%6E%38%2E%63%6F%6D - 3.trojan8.com
%6D%31%31%2E%33%33%32%32%2E%6F%72%67 - m11.3322.org
As always, these obfuscations are just the tip of the iceberg considering the countless number of other URL obfuscations techniques that spammers and phishers used to take advantage of on a large scale. For the time being, one of the main reasons we're not seeing massive SQL injections using such obfuscations is mostly because the feature hasn't been implemented in popular SQL injectors for copycat script kiddies to take advantage of. However, with the potential for evasion of common detection approaches, it's only a matter of personal will for someone to add this extra layer to ensure the survivability of the campaign.
Related posts:
Yet Another Massive SQL Injection Spotted in the Wild
Malware Domains Used in the SQL Injection Attacks
SQL Injection Through Search Engines Reconnaissance
Google Hacking for Vulnerabilities
Fast-Fluxing SQL injection attacks executed from the Asprox botnet
Sony PlayStation's site SQL injected, redirecting to rogue security software
Redmond Magazine Successfully SQL Injected by Chinese Hacktivists
Independent Security Consultancy, Threat Intelligence Analysis (OSINT/Cyber Counter Intelligence) and Competitive Intelligence research on demand. Insightful, unbiased, and client-tailored assessments, neatly communicated in the form of interactive reports - because anticipating the emerging threatscape is what shapes the big picture at the end of the day. Approach me at dancho.danchev@hush.com
Tuesday, July 15, 2008
The Neosploit Malware Kit Updated with Snapshot ActiveX Exploit
Raising Symantec's ThreatCon based on a newly introduced exploit within a (random) copy of a popular web malware exploitation kit? Now that's interesting given that there are other modified versions of the publicly available malware kit empowered with exploits as they get released, the single most logical move a administrator of such kit would do is diversity the exploits set as often as possible, keeping it up to date - like they do. ThreatCon is raised already : "Symantec honeypots have captured further exploitation of the Snapshot Viewer for Microsoft Access ActiveX Control Arbitrary File Download Vulnerability (BID 30114). Before this event, this exploit was known to be used only in isolated attacks. Further analysis of these honeypot compromises has revealed that the exploit has been added to a variant of the neosploit exploit kit, it will very likely reach a larger number of victims. This version will compromise vulnerable English versions of Microsoft Windows by downloading a malicious application into the Windows Startup folder. Computers that have Microsoft Access installed are potentially affected by this vulnerability. Customers are advised to manually set the kill bit on the following CLSIDs until a vendor update is available: F0E42D50-368C-11D0-AD81-00A0C90DC8D9 F0E42D60-368C-11D0-AD81-00A0C90DC8D9 F2175210-368C-11D0-AD81-00A0C90DC8D9"
Why based on a random copy of the kit? Well, the Neosploit malware kit itself is a commodity despite it's publicly announced varying price in the thousands, it leaked for public use just like MPack and Icepack did originally, making statements on the exact type of the vulnerabilities included within a bit pointless, since it will only cover the the exploits included in a particular version only. Web malware exploitation kits are very modular, namely, anyone can introduce new exploits, and tweak them, which is what they've been doing for a while, mostly converging third party traffic management systems with the malware kits in order to improve both, the metrics, and the evasive practices used for making a particular campaign a bit more time consuming to analyze.
Just like the innovations introduced within open source malware, and their localizations to native languages, the open source nature of web malware exploitation kit can result in countless number of variants whose new features make it sometimes difficult to assess whether or not it's a modified kit or an entirely new one - depending on the sophistication of the features of course. The introduction of new exploits within a copy of a particular malware kit should be considered as something logical, and if it's that big a deal, there are many other web malware exploitation kits whose features turn Neosploit into the "outdated choice" for malicious attackers.
Related posts:
The Zeus Crimeware Kit Vulnerable to Remotely Exploitable Flaw
The Small Pack Web Malware Exploitation Kit
Crimeware in the Middle - Zeus
The Nuclear Grabber Kit
The Apophis Kit
The FirePack Exploitation Kit Localized to Chinese
MPack and IcePack Localized to Chinese
The FirePack Exploitation Kit - Part Two
The FirePack Web Malware Exploitation Kit
The WebAttacker in Action
Nuclear Malware Kit
The Random JS Malware Exploitation Kit
Metaphisher Malware Kit Spotted in the Wild
The Black Sun Bot
The Cyber Bot
Google Hacking for MPacks, Zunkers and WebAttackers
The IcePack Malware Kit in Action
Independent Security Consultancy, Threat Intelligence Analysis (OSINT/Cyber Counter Intelligence) and Competitive Intelligence research on demand. Insightful, unbiased, and client-tailored assessments, neatly communicated in the form of interactive reports - because anticipating the emerging threatscape is what shapes the big picture at the end of the day. Approach me at dancho.danchev@hush.com
Are Stolen Credit Card Details Getting Cheaper?
Depends on which economic theory you believe in, or whether or not you'll take the "bottom-up approach" or the "top-down" one. And since I'm not aware of the existence of "the invisible hand of the underground market" and centralized power to increase the supply or decrease it to boost prices for the stolen credit card details, also indicating the existence of underground cartels putting everyone in a "price taker" position.
The basics of demand and supply for anything underground will always apply unless of course, The more they want, the cheaper it gets, the less they want, the higher the price on per credit card basis gets, since the investment on behalf of the malicious party that originally stolen them is virtually the same, and he can theoretically break-even in every single case since the credit card details were obtained efficiently. It's up to the seller to follow or entirely ignore economic behavior, and do what they feel like doing with this good which must on the other hand reach its market liquidity as soon as possible, else it becomes obsolete. The current market model can be further explained as a good example of competitive equilibrium :
"Competitive market equilibrium is the traditional concept of economic equilibrium, appropriate for the analysis of commodity markets with flexible prices and many traders, and serving as the benchmark of efficiency in economic analysis. It relies crucially on the assumption of a competitive environment where each trader decides upon a quantity that is so small compared to the total quantity traded in the market that their individual transactions have no influence on the prices."
This can be easily explained in a single sentence - it's a mess and every participant is doing whatever they want to, so generalizing on the prices charged for stolen credit card numbers would be unrealistic, since it's the price a single seller with no real impact on the "average" market price for the same good. As for the average market price itself, it would be hard to measure it depending on the quality of the sample you want to rely on, since this is a type of market where sellers don't have to report price changes in their goods for the purpose of statistical research.
A recently released report by Finjan, with whom I've been on the same page of several high profile incidents so far, touches this very same topic :
"Prices charged by cybercriminals selling hacked bank and credit card details have fallen sharply as the volume of data on offer has soared, forcing them to look elsewhere to boost profit margins, a new report says. Researchers for Finjan, a Web security firm, said the high volumes traded had led to bank and credit card information becoming "commoditized" - account details with PIN codes that once fetched $100 or more each might now go for $10 or $20. In its latest quarterly survey of Web trends, the California-based company said cybercrime had evolved into "a major shadow economy ruled by business rules and logic that closely mimics the legitimate business world."
Excluding the presence of price discrimination for a while, as well as open topic offers in the lines of "how much for X amount of Y?" answered as "how much are you willing to pay?", it's all a matter of the seller in a particular situation.
Furthermore, in real-life market there's always the scarcity problem, however, in the underground market there's no shortage of resources despite the ever growing wants of the buyers. Generalizing even more, take for instance the butterfly effect of a price change in petrol, and result of which is inevitable increase of prices in every single aspect of your life, but in the underground market mostly due to the malicious economies of scale achieved, a price increase in renting a botnet would have no effect in the prices charged for the stolen credit card details obtained through the infected hosts. How come? Basically, the price and resources for malware infection are prone to decrease, if we take a malware infected host as a static foundation for the basis of any upcoming cybercrime activities using it.
Perhaps the most disturbing part is that the market for stolen credit card details is so mature, and its entry barriers so low these days, that the confidential data that cannot be efficiently obtained through real-life means like credit card cloning or ATM skimming on a large scale, is now purchased online for the purpose of abusing it in real-life by embedding the valid information into plastic cards.
Independent Security Consultancy, Threat Intelligence Analysis (OSINT/Cyber Counter Intelligence) and Competitive Intelligence research on demand. Insightful, unbiased, and client-tailored assessments, neatly communicated in the form of interactive reports - because anticipating the emerging threatscape is what shapes the big picture at the end of the day. Approach me at dancho.danchev@hush.com
Monday, July 14, 2008
Malware and Office Documents Joining Forces
Common office files as documents, presentations, spreadsheets and PDF files, are the most widely abused ones in targeted attacks, which when backed up with enough personal information and take into consideration the time of their attack if the social engineering campaign is either going to be based on a current/upcoming event, or on an event anticipated due to information gathered through open source intelligence, often make it through common signature based scanning solutions.Despite the relatively easy to obtain, point'n'click DIY tools for backdooring common office files are available for the script kiddies to take advantage of, some are naturally remaining proprietary tools, making them harder to analyze unless a copy is obtained. Like this one, generating "undetected" by signatures based scanning, office documents and spreadsheets that would drop the actual malware on the PC.
Automatic translation of its description and core features :
"The program represents a generator macros in the language Visual Basic for Application (VBA), for introduction in the document Microsoft Office Word / Microsoft Office Excel executable file (win32 exe), followed by fully automatic recovery and launch, without any additional action by the user. The only requirement that formed in such a way xls / doc files is to support VBA macros on the computer end-user formed file and permission to launch macros.
The program uses NOT a vulnerability (exploit) or macro-virus tools for the introduction, extraction or running embedded files. This means that it has generated macros compatible with ALL versions of Microsoft Office products starting with Microsoft Office 97 package, with any established "patches" and the service pack. Macros generated by this program not detected antivirus, for the simple reason that they are not viruses or macro viruses. The program uses only "established" means products built into Microsoft Excel VBA language to achieve their goals.
- Fully automatic generation of macro for the introduction of documents word / excel any given exe-file with his persistence in the body and subsequent documents automatic recovery and launch, when opening a document word / excel.
- Generated macros are compatible with all versions of ms word / excel since version 97, employments and regardless of the presence / absence of any patches / servicepacs.
- Generated macros are not macro-viruses, exploits do not use and do not contain any malicious code, so do not be detected by any antivirus tools as viruses.
- Conversion body ex-file macro happening in such a way that while in doc / xls file it not detected any antivirus, and can be freely sent by mail safely passed all checks, even if in itself contains viral code defined antivirus.
- Sgenerirovanny and attached to the body of the document macro can be protected with a password or signed certificate, using funds established Microsoft Office, which does not affect him productivity or efficiency (macro, in any case remain fully workable).
- Box macro can be made both in the new document, and in any document containing data and-or other macros. Generated program code is fully compatible with any other embedded in the document macros or entering data, and will not interfere with their work, as well as maintain its efficiency.
- Added auto-finding ways to extract exe-file;
- Added possibility of a macro arbitrary text in the body of the instrument;
- Optimized algorithm macro-generation code;
You can specify a name for final file independently, or leave blank, then the name will be generated automatically.
On this possibility has asked for a user program, its essence is that after running a macro, retrieval and downloading exe-file the document with the introduction of exe-file will be withdrawn posed text. Perhaps in this way can improve the application of social engineering, designed to force the user to allow support for macros. For example, in the text of the document indicate:
"This document contains hidden text (password, a system of calculation formulas, interactive components, etc.), Which can be viewed only after the inclusion of support macros. Please enable support for macros and re-opening this document ".
After resolving support macros, and the implementation of embedded exe-file, the document will be withdrawn given a string containing probable "password" or any other textual information. "
"This document contains hidden text (password, a system of calculation formulas, interactive components, etc.), Which can be viewed only after the inclusion of support macros. Please enable support for macros and re-opening this document ".
After resolving support macros, and the implementation of embedded exe-file, the document will be withdrawn given a string containing probable "password" or any other textual information. "
Despite that the tool is proprietary, the underground economy's leaks are largely driven by bargain hunters who would exchange proprietary tool, whose often biased exclusiveness may increase the profit margins, for a service or a good that may be worthless for them in general, but impossible to obtain and take advantage of in the present. It will not just leak in one way or another, someone will inevitably backdoor the backdooring tool and trick the novice bargain hunters into running it, by having both their host infected and money taken.
Related posts:
The Underground Economy's Supply of Goods and Services
Yet Another DIY Proprietary Malware Builder
The Small Pack Web Malware Exploitation Kit - Proprietary
DIY Exploit Embedding Tool - A Proprietary Release
Skype Spamming Tool in the Wild - Proprietary Release
Independent Security Consultancy, Threat Intelligence Analysis (OSINT/Cyber Counter Intelligence) and Competitive Intelligence research on demand. Insightful, unbiased, and client-tailored assessments, neatly communicated in the form of interactive reports - because anticipating the emerging threatscape is what shapes the big picture at the end of the day. Approach me at dancho.danchev@hush.com
Monetizing Compromised Web Sites
Despite that pure patriotic hacktivism is still alive and kicking, compromised sites are largely getting monetized these days, starting from hosting blackhat SEO junk pages, to redirecting to live exploit URLs and fake codecs where revenue is earned through their participation in an affiliate business model.With The Africa Middle Market Fund's site monetized by web site defacers who defaced it "in between" the blackhat SEO infrastructure they were hosting internally, in this I'll comment on the currently compromised and redirection to a fake porn sites, Camara Municipal de Amparo (camaraamparo.sp.gov.br/r.html). Basically, it's homepage is heavily linking to the Zlob variant (camaraamparo.sp.gov.br/ video.exe) in between loading an IFRAME to 61.162.230.12/ index.php. As always, upon uploading their redirector, they've build enough confidence into their new hosting provider that the link to the redirector was instantly spammed across the web. The site is so heavily linking to the internal redirector itself, that upon clicking on the majority of links the user will inevitably come across it.
Speaking of fake porn sites redirecting to Zlob variants, here are the very latest additions spammed across the web through blackhat SEO practices :
mypornmovies .net
moms-galls .net
porntubefilms .com
porntubedot .com
hot-porntube .com
landmovieblog .com
sexvidtube .com
freelifevideo .com
getyourfreemovie .com
iubat .com
sweetyjoly .com
hardbizarre .com
freeworldvideo .net
hot-porntube .net
qualitymovies .net
porntube1con .net
video-info .net
videocityblog .com
fuckedolder .com
highpro1 .com
max-graf.com .pl
grandsupertds .info
hot-porn-tube .net
hot-porntube .com
terryschulz .com
show-sextube .com
qualitymovies .net
clubvideos .net
No matter the high profile site that's been exploited in order to participate in such malicious operations, for the time being, crunching out new domain names and using the hosting services of the well known ISPs neglecting their removal, seems to be the tactic of choice. The long tail of SQL injected sites is however, clearly replacing the plain simple blackhat SEO web spamming, so that traffic to these rogue sites is driven through redirection of the the traffic from legitimate sites.
Independent Security Consultancy, Threat Intelligence Analysis (OSINT/Cyber Counter Intelligence) and Competitive Intelligence research on demand. Insightful, unbiased, and client-tailored assessments, neatly communicated in the form of interactive reports - because anticipating the emerging threatscape is what shapes the big picture at the end of the day. Approach me at dancho.danchev@hush.com
Friday, July 11, 2008
Violating OPSEC for Increasing the Probability of Malware Infection
Are malware authors and the rest of the participants in fact willing to violate their OPSEC (operational security) for the sake of increasing the probability of successful malware infection by on purposely lowering down the security settings of Internet Explorer, by adding their malicious netblocks and domains into "Trusted Sites"? You bet.The infamous Smitfraud or PSGuard Desktop Hijacker, has been cooperating with known malicious parties for over an year now, a cooperation which exposes interesting relatinships between the usual suspects. Starting from the basic fact that a malware infected host is infected with many other totally unrelated to one another pieces of malware, Smitfraud's "pre-infection foreplay" demonstrates that they are willing to sacrifice operational security in order to increaes the probabilty of future infections on the same host.
Rogue software added as trusted sites upon Smitfraud infection :
about-adult .net
antivirus-scanner .com
best-porncollection .com
getadultaccess .com
getavideonow .com
ieantivirus .com
malwarebell .com
mega-soft-2008 .com
mooncodec .com
movsonline .com
ruler-cash .com
s-freeware .com
sexysoftwaredom .com
supersoft21freeware .com
the-programsportal .com
vwwredtube .com
wetsoftwares .com
youpornztube .com
securewebinfo .com
safetyincludes .com
securemanaging .com
myflydirect .com
onlinevideosoftex .com
scanner.malwscan .com
scanner.shredderscan .com
sex18tube2008 .com
spywareisolator .com
virus-scanner-online .com
security-scanner-online .com
virus-scanonline .com
antivirus-scanonline .com
topantivirus-scan .com
topvirusscan .com
virus-detection-scanner .com
antivirus-scanner .com
infectionscanner .com
internet-security-antivirus .com
hotvid44 .com
opaadownload .com
somenudefuck .com
Rogue netblocks and IPs added as trusted IP ranges upon Smitfraud infection :
"69.50.*.*"
"69.31.*.*"
"66.235.*.*"
"66.230.*.*"
"216.239.*.*"
"205.188.*.*"
"205.177.*.*"
"195.225.*.*"
"216.195.*.*"
"82.179.*.*"
"81.95.*.*"
"70.84.*.*"
"195.95.*.*"
"194.187.*.*"
"78.129.158.*"
"78.129.166.*"
"89.149.226.*"
"195.93.218.*"
"72.21.53.*
"81.9.3.*"
"213.189.27.*"
"88.255.74.*"
"79.143.178.*"
"202.71.102.*"
"64.202.189.170"
"217.170.77.150"
The second hardcoded trusted IP is also responding to :
virusisolator .comvirus-isolator .org
virus-isolator .net
soft-collections .com
viruswebprotect .com
virus-isolator .us
codecvideo2008-18 .com
sextubecodec55 .com
sextubecodec67 .com
soft-archives .com
soft-collections .com
codecreviews .com
codecvideo2008-18 .com
Such practices leave a great deal of malicious creativity, for instance, once rented a botnet's already infected malware PCs could start trusting the majority of sites in their scammy ecosystem. What's great is that by doing this they expose their affiliations with these affiliate based rogue security software programs, next to their infrastructure on which they may be that easily claiming ownership.
Independent Security Consultancy, Threat Intelligence Analysis (OSINT/Cyber Counter Intelligence) and Competitive Intelligence research on demand. Insightful, unbiased, and client-tailored assessments, neatly communicated in the form of interactive reports - because anticipating the emerging threatscape is what shapes the big picture at the end of the day. Approach me at dancho.danchev@hush.com
Thursday, July 10, 2008
The Template-ization of Malware Serving Sites
The increase of these bogus ActiveX templates is due to the fact that despite they are currently available for sale, buyers appear to be leaking them for everyone to use so that they can continue maintaining their current business models, namely, the services they offer with the ActiveX templates. Unethical competitive practices among cybercriminals and scammers are only to starting to take place with one another trying to ruin or extend the lifecycle of their services.
Talking about prevalence, the TonsOfPorn ActiveX remains the most widely used rogue ActiveX in the majority of fake codec campaigns for the last couple of months. The ActiveX is largely abused by using another fake porn site template for PornTube, which in combination result in nothing more than huge domain portfolios with no content at all if we exclude the Zlob variants.
And while template-tization means more efficient malware campaigns, it also results in a common pattern for generic detection of such sites. For instance, the folks at Finjan did an experiment by verifying the signature based detection of the common javascript file that was used in the ongoing waves of SQL injection attacks. Their conclusion :
"Can it be that Anti-virus products are now holding more signatures for domains and URLs rather than trying to identify a malicious code they never inspected before? As my research found, just by changing the domain names, some AVs did not find this code as malicious...... surprisingly enough."
When assessing malware campaigns in general, I usually do the same for the record. Storm Worm's use of ind.php for executing its set of exploits has the same detection rate - scanners result: 10/33 (30.30%) and is detected as JS.Zhelatin.zb.Getting back to the TonsOfPorn ActiveX, it's structure is more static than a Red Army statue in Estonia, making it easy to proactively protect against, no matter the domain, no matter the exploits served. It's detection rate is close to the javascript from the SQL injection attacks - Scanners Result: 9/33 (27.28%) and is detected as Trojan.HTML.Zlob.L.
From my personal experience, blocking an IP address where a couple of hundred malicious domains remain parked, is just as useful as blocking a single domain acting as the main redirector behind a huge domains portfolio of malicious domains. However, the most beneficial approach on a large scale remains the practice of taking care of the most obvious patterns that still remain faily easy to detect, at least for the time being, due to the efficiency the people behind them aim to achieve, making them easily susceptible to generic detection approaches.
Independent Security Consultancy, Threat Intelligence Analysis (OSINT/Cyber Counter Intelligence) and Competitive Intelligence research on demand. Insightful, unbiased, and client-tailored assessments, neatly communicated in the form of interactive reports - because anticipating the emerging threatscape is what shapes the big picture at the end of the day. Approach me at dancho.danchev@hush.com
Wednesday, July 09, 2008
Mobile Malware Scam iSexPlayer Wants Your Money
A bogus media player (iSexPlayer.jar) targeting Symbian S60 3rd edition devices according to several affected parties, is currently being spammed through blackhat search engine optimization. Once infected upon confirming its execution since it's doesn't seem to be exploiting a specific vulnerability besides "bargain hunters" desire for free adult material, the malware attempts to trick the user into participating by becoming a member, however, a quick peek the source code reveals interesting facts about the scam.For instance, once providing them with your credit card details and basically wanting to try out the service, it appears that there's no way out of it which is a problem since "Trial membership recur at $US 29.95 unless cancelled, Monthly membership recur unless cancelled" and also, "Do you want full access to all pictures and videos? Cost is 2 Euros, charged 100% descreet on your phone bill over SMS. Please allow iSexPlayer to send SMS".
Symbian Freak has some details, as well as an affected party :
"Last week, I had lend my N73 to one of my friends for use as he had lost his phone. I did not know what he did, but I checked my bills today and see some International calls made that amount to around 20USD. That is around 800 Indian rupees. To check, I called the number and learnt that it was a phone sex line. Now it was time for my friend to answer. The thirteen calls were made during a period spanning two days. On an average there were 7 calls a day. Now, the thing that struck me is, going by the call records, the calls on the second day were made when I had the phone with me. I am pretty sure no one dialled the numbers. I called my buddy and asked him if he had downloaded something. He then spilled the beans informing that he did go to some adult website and installed a software (I do not recall the name)."
3g6.se
3gx.se
conn2.3g6.se
conn2.3g6.se
test.3gx.se
83.241.194.132 (83.241.194.128-83.241.194.191 DGC-DIRECT2-01 Direct2Internet AB - Internet Access Located in Johanneshov, Sweden)
3g6.se/dstream.php
3g6.se/newplayerdl.php
3g6.se/chrono/callback.php
secure.chronopay.com/index.cgi
The scammer's pitch :
"Free access to: - 500 Hardcore scenes - 100 Full lenght movies - Picture galleries Important! To install iSexplayer you must be at least 18 years old. You must install and run iSexplayer™ access module to watch the videos on Nintendo DS, You must install and run iSexplayer™ access module to watch the videos on Apple iPhone, Install iSexplayer"
Upon attempting to download the .jar file from the mobile page, the iSexPlayer.php does the magic like that :
"MIDlet-1: iSexPlayer,/icon.png,Easyloader
MIDlet-Install-Notify: http://3g6.se/install_notify.php?id=1322451
MIDlet-Jar-Size: 101313
MIDlet-Jar-URL: http://3g6.se/iSexPlayer.jar
MIDlet-Name: iSexPlayer
MIDlet-Vendor: Vendor
MIDlet-Version: 1.0
MicroEdition-Configuration: CLDC-1.0
MicroEdition-Profile: MIDP-2.0
did: 1322451
did2: 9416755"
Who's behind the scam?
"c_javax_microedition_lcdui_Form_fld.append("\niSexPlayer is owned by: ");
c_javax_microedition_lcdui_Form_fld.append("\nEnit Invest S.L. ");
c_javax_microedition_lcdui_Form_fld.append("\nweb: enitinvest.com ");
c_javax_microedition_lcdui_Form_fld.append("\nemail: support@enitinvest.com ");
c_javax_microedition_lcdui_Form_fld.append("\nTel: 1-800-845-4951 ");"
Enit Invest S.L.
Av. Machupichu 26, S 18
28043 Madrid
email: support@enitinvest.com
Tel: 1-800-845-4951
Independent Security Consultancy, Threat Intelligence Analysis (OSINT/Cyber Counter Intelligence) and Competitive Intelligence research on demand. Insightful, unbiased, and client-tailored assessments, neatly communicated in the form of interactive reports - because anticipating the emerging threatscape is what shapes the big picture at the end of the day. Approach me at dancho.danchev@hush.com
Storm Worm's U.S Invasion of Iran Campaign
The Storm Worm-ers are keeping themselves busy, with two campaigns in less than a week, following the latest on the 4th of July. Now, they are spreading rumors of a U.S invasion in Iran :"Just now US Army's Delta Force and U.S. Air Force have invaded Iran. Approximately 20000 soldiers crossed the border into Iran and broke down the Iran's Army resistance. The video made by US soldier was received today morning. Click on the video to see first minutes of the beginning of the World War III. God save us."
The campaign is using the following domains :
statenewsworld .com
morenewsonline .com
dailydotnews .com
dotdailynews .com
newsworldnow .com
All registered by the same individual :
ONLINE CO REANIMATOR (dfgdgf@gmail.com)
REVA 13-27 Deribaska 3565,198346 DZ Tel. +321.3568872
Sample detection rate :
iran_occupation.exe
Scanners Result: 4/33 (12.13%)
File size: 118273 bytes
MD5...: 19ab8f1dddb743c1dc2924cb61d3f877
SHA1..: e0915f377020479ba95ffed0fcb07a2b2aec72f4
Storm Worm domains used in recent campaigns, still parked on infected hosts :superlovelyric .com
bestlovelyric .com
makingloveworld .com
statenewsworld .com
wholoveguide .com
gonelovelife .com
loveisknowlege .com
lovekingonline .com
lovemarkonline .com
wholefireworksonline .com
morenewsonline .com
makingadore .com
greatadore .com
yourfireworksstore .com
loveoursite .com
dayfireworkssite .com
musiconelove .com
knowholove .com
whoisknowlove .com
theplaylove .com
lovelifecash .com
wantcherish .com
shelovehimtoo .com
makeloveforever .com
bellestarfireworks .com
yourfireworks .com
worldbestfireworks .com
greatfireworkslaws .com
dailydotnews .com
dotdailynews .com
wholovedirect .com
newsworldnow .com
thefireworksjuly .com
grupogaleria .cn
polkerdesign .cn
nationwide2u .cn
activeware .cn
grupogaleria .cn
likethisone1 .com
lollypopycandy .com
nationwide2u .cn
polkerdesign .cn
verynicebank .com
thefireworksjuly .com
wholefireworksonline .com
worldbestfireworks .com
yourfireworks .com
bellestarfireworks .com
dayfireworkssite .com
greatfireworkslaws .com
yourfireworksstore .com
The "best" is yet to come.
Related posts :
Storm Worm Hosting Pharmaceutical Scams
All You Need is Storm Worm's Love
Social Engineering and Malware
Storm Worm Switching Propagation Vectors
Storm Worm's use of Dropped Domains
Offensive Storm Worm Obfuscation
Storm Worm's Fast Flux Networks
Storm Worm's St. Valentine Campaign
Storm Worm's DDoS Attitude
Riders on the Storm Worm
The Storm Worm Malware Back in the Game
Independent Security Consultancy, Threat Intelligence Analysis (OSINT/Cyber Counter Intelligence) and Competitive Intelligence research on demand. Insightful, unbiased, and client-tailored assessments, neatly communicated in the form of interactive reports - because anticipating the emerging threatscape is what shapes the big picture at the end of the day. Approach me at dancho.danchev@hush.com
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