Blackhat SEO Campaign Hijacks U.S Federal Form Keywords, Serves Scareware

During the past 24 hours, a blackhat SEO campaign has been hijacking U.S Federal Forms related keywords in an attempt to serve scareware.

What's particularly interesting about the campaign is that the Ukrainian fan club behind it -- you didn't even think for a second that there's no connection with their previous campaigns, did you? -- are using basic segmentation principles since the tax form keywords poisoning is attempting to hijack U.S traffic. Evasive practices are also in place through the usual http referrer check, which would only serve the scareware if the visitor is coming from Google.com, if not a 404 error message will appear.

Upon clicking on the link, the user is redirected through a centralized location responsible for managing the traffic from the thousands of subdomains/keywords used - honda-recycle .cn/go.php?id=2017&key=cbafb5cb2&p=1 - 83.133.123.113 Email: accabj@cn.accaglobal.com. Parked on the same IP are also related malware/scareware domains:

winsoftwareupdatev2 .com - Email: webmaster@kaity.or.kr
much-in-love .com - Email: krebikim@kanmail.net
i-dont-care-much .com - Email: krebikim@kanmail.net
malwareurlblock .com - Email: Qinrui971@hotmail.com
bennysaintscathedral .com - Email: gayaomila@yahoo.com
browsersecurityinfo .com - Email: visor@elcomtech.com
windowssecurityinfo .com - Email: arziw12@freebbmail.com
ringtone-radio .com - Email: bobbyer@iofc.org
events-team-manager .com - Email: krebikim@kanmail.net
1worldupdatesserver .com - Email: tapias.andres@hdtvspain.org
discovernewchina .cn - Email: leijun.ma@unifem.org
rollerskatesadvise .cn - Email: info@chinaeuropaforum.net
allfootballmanager .cn - Email: info@chinaeuropaforum.net
hardwarefactories .cn - Email: leijun.ma@unifem.org
besthockeyteams .cn - Email: info@chinaeuropaforum.net
gowildtours .cn - Email: leijun.ma@unifem.org

The malicious domains used -- with two exceptions -- are all parked at AltusHost Inc./ALTUSHOST-NET. Here's the complete list:
tebdigasbi .com - 91.214.44.205 - Email: martin94304@yahoo.com
kraijfaw .com - 91.214.44.240 - Email: argantael31869@msn.com
reychohica .com - 91.214.44.209 - Email: martin94304@yahoo.com
fequervo .com - 91.214.44.239 - Email: orla53111@hotmail.com
ukaszohat .com - 91.214.44.205 - Email: argantael31869@msn.com
buwrynko .com -  91.214.44.204 - Email: keallach84256@yahoo.com
fetholye .com - 91.214.44.208 - Email: martin94304@yahoo.com
pasbirrada .com - 91.214.44.204 - Email: martin94304@yahoo.com
dynodns.net - legitimate
thebbs.org - legitimate

The people behind the campaign have also taken contingency planning in mind since the scareware domain portfolio is parked on five different IPs - no-spyware-thanks .com - 94.102.48.29; 94.102.51.26; 188.40.61.236; 83.133.126.155; 91.212.107.5 Email: Paul.Saydak@lovellis.com. The complete list:

fast-scan-your-pcv3 .com - Email: info@valeros.com
basicsystemscannerv3 .com - Email: changhong@corpdefence.cn
antivirus-quickscanv5 .com - Email: diana1982@yahoo.com
basicsystemscannerv6 .com - Email: changhong@corpdefence.cn
basicsystemscannerv8 .com - Email: changhong@corpdefence.cn
privatevirusscannerv8 .com - Email: info@rasystems.com
spywarefastscannerv9 .com - Email: info@rasystems.com
online-pro-antivirus-scan .com - Email: findz@freebbmail.com
onlineproscan .com - Email: addworld@freebbmail.com
onlineproantivirusscan .com - Email: addworld@freebbmail.com
online-pro-scanner .com - Email: addworld@freebbmail.com
basicsystemscanner .com - Email: changhong@corpdefence.cn
onlineproantivirusscanner .com - Email: findz@freebbmail.com
iwantsweepviruses .com - Email: leesten@fedexnow.com

Two sampled scareware samples during the past 24 hours phone back to goldmine-sachs .com (Goldman Sachs typosquatting) - 83.133.122.211; 89.47.237.52 - Email: rodriguez.dallas@romehotels.com and to june-crossover .com - 83.133.123.109 - Email: doru@sattenis.com. In regard to 89.47.237.52, the "fan club" used it to host scareware in their June's campaigns.

AltusHost Inc./ALTUSHOST-NET is expected to take action shortly.

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog.
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Scareware Template Localized to Arabic

A "new tactic" is supposedly being used as a Blue Screen of Death scareware template with a single missing fact "for the record" - the template is old, I came across it on June 17th, with Marshal8e6 featuring it even earlier on the 12th of June.

What's new on the template front in respect to scareware is what will inevitably start taking place across all the market segments within the underground economy in the long term - market segmentation and localization, namely, translating the malware/spam/phishing templates to the native language of the prospective victims.
 

A decent example is the first ever template of the popular "My Computer Online Scan" fake scanning screen localized to Arabic - scan-online .co.cc/arabic.php (67.222.148.26).

The last time localization of fake security software was actively taking place was in April, 2008, and the campaigners back then also localized the domain names next to the actual content.

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Continue reading →

Movement on the Koobface Front

Now that the Koobface gang is no longer expressing its gratitude for the takedown of its command and control servers, the group has put its contingency planning in action thanks to the on purposely slow reaction of UKSERVERS-MNT's (78.110.175.15) abuse department.

Next to the regular updates (web.reg .md/1/websrvx2.exe; web.reg.md/1/ prx.exe), the group introduced two new domains and started taking advantage of two more IPs for its main command and control server. upr0306 .com now responds to:

67.215.238.178 - AS22298 - Netherlands Distinctio Ltd
78.110.175.15 - AS42831 UKSERVERS-AS UK Dedicated Servers Limited UK Dedicated Servers
221.5.74.46 - AS17816 - CHINA169-GZ CNCGROUP IP network China169 Guangzhou MAN

and that includes the two new domains introduced - pam-220709 .com; ram-220709 .com, with ram-220709 .com/go/?pid=30909&type=videxpgo.php?sid=4&sref= redirecting to the Koobface botnet.

Interestingly, 67.215.238.178 (hosted.by.pacificrack.com) was also used in the blackhat SEO campaigns from June/July, with warwork .info and tangoing .info parked there.

Related posts:
Koobface - Come Out, Come Out, Wherever You Are
Dissecting Koobface Worm's Twitter Campaign
Dissecting the Koobface Worm's December Campaign
Dissecting the Latest Koobface Facebook Campaign 
The Koobface Gang Mixing Social Engineering Vectors

Ukrainian "fan club" and the Koobface connection:
Dissecting a Swine Flu Black SEO Campaign
Massive Blackhat SEO Campaign Serving Scareware
From Ukrainian Blackhat SEO Gang With Love
From Ukrainian Blackhat SEO Gang With Love - Part Two
From Ukraine with Scareware Serving Tweets, Bogus LinkedIn/Scribd Accounts, and Blackhat SEO Farms
From Ukraine with Bogus Twitter, LinkedIn and Scribd Accounts
Fake Web Hosting Provider - Front-end to Scareware Blackhat SEO Campaign at Blogspot  

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Continue reading →

Movement on the Koobface Front

Now that the Koobface gang is no longer expressing its gratitude for the takedown of its command and control servers, the group has put its contingency planning in action thanks to the on purposely slow reaction of UKSERVERS-MNT's (78.110.175.15) abuse department.

Next to the regular updates (web.reg .md/1/websrvx2.exe; web.reg.md/1/ prx.exe), the group introduced two new domains and started taking advantage of two more IPs for its main command and control server. upr0306 .com now responds to:

67.215.238.178 - AS22298 - Netherlands Distinctio Ltd
78.110.175.15 - AS42831 UKSERVERS-AS UK Dedicated Servers Limited UK Dedicated Servers
221.5.74.46 - AS17816 - CHINA169-GZ CNCGROUP IP network China169 Guangzhou MAN

and that includes the two new domains introduced - pam-220709 .com; ram-220709 .com, with ram-220709 .com/go/?pid=30909&type=videxpgo.php?sid=4&sref= redirecting to the Koobface botnet.

Interestingly, 67.215.238.178 (hosted.by.pacificrack.com) was also used in the blackhat SEO campaigns from June/July, with warwork .info and tangoing .info parked there.

Related posts:
Koobface - Come Out, Come Out, Wherever You Are
Dissecting Koobface Worm's Twitter Campaign
Dissecting the Koobface Worm's December Campaign
Dissecting the Latest Koobface Facebook Campaign 
The Koobface Gang Mixing Social Engineering Vectors

Ukrainian "fan club" and the Koobface connection:
Dissecting a Swine Flu Black SEO Campaign
Massive Blackhat SEO Campaign Serving Scareware
From Ukrainian Blackhat SEO Gang With Love
From Ukrainian Blackhat SEO Gang With Love - Part Two
From Ukraine with Scareware Serving Tweets, Bogus LinkedIn/Scribd Accounts, and Blackhat SEO Farms
From Ukraine with Bogus Twitter, LinkedIn and Scribd Accounts
Fake Web Hosting Provider - Front-end to Scareware Blackhat SEO Campaign at Blogspot  

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Continue reading →

Managed Polymorphic Script Obfuscation Services

Cybecriminals understand the value of quality assurance, and have been actively running business models on the top of it for the past two years.

From the multiple offline antivirus scanners using pirated software, the online detection rate checking services allowing scheduled URL scan and notification upon detection by antivirus vendors, to the underground alternatives of VirusTotal in the form of multiple firewalls bypass verification checks - cybercriminals are actively benchmarking and optimizing their releases before launching yet another campaign.

A newly launched service aims to port a universal managed malware feature on the web - the polymorphic obfuscation of malicious scripts in an attempt to increase the lifecycle of a particular campaign.

Interestingly, due to the obvious software piracy within the cybercrime ecosystem which allowed proprietary malware tools to leak in the wild, the service is using a particular malware kit's javascript obfuscation routines and is running a business model on it.

For the time being, it relies on three obfuscation algorithms, HTMLCryptor olnly - used 56 times, TextUnescape - used 109 times, and PolyLite - already used 177 times. The DIY obfuscation service, also checks and notifies the cybercriminal over ICQ in cases when his IPs and domain names have been blacklisted by Google's Safebrowsing, as well as Spamhaus, and more checks against public malware domain/IP databases are on the developer's to-do list.

The price? $20 for monthly access and $5 for weekly. Despite the fact that the service is attempting to monetize a commodity feature available to cybecriminals through the managed updates that come with the purchase of a proprietary web malware exploitation kit, it's not a fad since it fills in the DIY niche where the variety of the algorithms offered and their actual quality will either spell the doom or the rise of the service.

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Continue reading →

Summarizing Zero Day's Posts for July

The following is a brief summary of all of my posts at ZDNet's Zero Day for July.

You can also go through previous summaries for June, May, April, March, February, January, December, November, October, September, August and July, as well as subscribe to my personal RSS feed or Zero Day's main feed.

Notable articles include - Manchester City Council pays $2.4m in Conficker clean up costs; Transmitter.C mobile malware spreading in the wild and Does free antivirus offer a false feeling of security?

01. Manchester City Council pays $2.4m in Conficker clean up costs
02. EyeWonder malware incident affects popular web sites
03. Koobface worm joins the Twittersphere
04. Transmitter.C mobile malware spreading in the wild
05. ImageShack hacked by anti-full disclosure movement
06. Does free antivirus offer a false feeling of security?
07. Remote code execution exploit for Firefox 3.5 in the wild
08. Adobe ships insecure version of Reader from official site
09. The future of mobile malware - digitally signed by Symbian?
10. 419 scammers using Dilbert.com
11. Spammers go multilingual, use automatic translation services

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Continue reading →

Social Engineering Driven Web Malware Exploitation Kit

The standardization through template-ization of bogus codec/flash player/video pages, taking place during the past two years, has exponentially increased the efficiency levels of malware campaigns relying exclusively on social engineering.

Just like phishing pages being commodity, these commodity spoofs of legitimate software/plugins relying on "visual social engineering" represent a market segment by themselves, one that some cybercriminals have been attempting to monetize for a while.

Case in point - their latest attempt to do so comes in the form of the first social engineering driven web malware exploitation kit.
 

Despite that the kit's author has ripped off a well known exploits-serving malware kit's statistics interface, what's unique about this release is the fact that the exploit modules come in the form of "Missing Flash Player", "Outdated Flash Player", "Missing Video Codec", "Outdated Video Codec", "Codec Required" modules.

These very same modules represent the dominant social engineering attack vector on the Internet due to the quality of the spoofs and the end users' gullibility while self-infecting themselves. For the time being, the author appears to be an opportunist rather than someone interested in setting new benchmarks for standardization social engineering by using the efficiency and delivery methods offered by a web malware exploitation kit.

Interestingly, a huge number of fake codec serving web sites are already detecting the OS/Browser of the visitor, and serving Mac OS X based malware or Windows based malware based on the detection. This fact, as well as the fact that visual spoofs of OS X like dialogs are also getting template-ized are not a coincidence - it's a signal for an efficient and social engineering driven malware delivery mechanism in the works. The development of the kit will be monitored and updates posted - if any.

Meanwhile, the recent blackhat SEO campaign which attempted to hijack 'Harry Potter and the Half-Blood Prince' related traffic is a good example on how despite the magnitude of the campaign -- hundreds of thousands of indexed and malware serving pages -- due to the manual campaign management, its centralized nature makes it easier to shut down.

Upon clicking on a link, the end user was redirected to usa-top-news .info - 67.228.147.71 - Email: fullhdvid@gmail.com, then to world-news-scandals .com Email: wnscandals@gmail.com, and finally to tubesbargain .com/xplay.php?id=40018 - 216.240.143.7 - j0cqware@gmail.com where the codec was served from exefreefiles .com - 95.211.8.20 - Email: case0ns@gmail.com.  More coded serving domains are parked on the same IPs:

216.240.143.7

sunny-tube-world .com - Email: briashou@gmail.com
the-blue-tube  .com - Email: malccrome@gmail.com
onlysteeltube.com - Email: briashou@gmail.com
thecooltube .com - Email: malccrome@gmail.com
etesttube .com - Email: katschezz@gmail.com
thegrouttube .com - Email: katschezz@gmail.com
fllcorp .com

95.211.8.20

exe-load-2009 .com - Email: robeshur@gmail.com
exefiledata .com - Email: robeshur@gmail.com
exereload .com - Email: robeshur@gmail.com
load-exe-world .com - Email: robeshur@gmail.com
cool-exe-file .com - Email: robeshur@gmail.com
last-home-exe .com - Email: robeshur@gmail.com
exefreefiles .com - Email: case0ns@gmail.com
boardexefiles .com - Email: case0ns@gmail.com
exeloadsite .com - Email: j0cqware@gmail.com

The gang maintains another domain portfolio with pretty descriptive nature for phone back, direct fake codec serving purposes:

agro-files-archive .com
alkbbs-files .com
all-tube-world .com
best-light-search .com
besttubetech .com
chamitron .com
cheappharmaad .com
dipexe .com
downloadnativeexe .com
ebooks-archive .org
etesttube .com
exedownloadfull .com
exefiledata .com
exe-paste .com
exe-soft-development .com
exe-xxx-file .com
eyeexe .com
go-exe-go .com
greattubeamp .com
green-tube-site .com
hotexedownload .com
hot-exe-load .com
imagescopybetween .com
isyouimageshere .com
labsmedcom .com
last-exe-portal .com
lost-exe-site .com
lyy-exe .com
main-exe-home .com
mchedlishvili .name
metro-tube .net
my-exe-load .com
newfileexe .com
protectionimage .com
robo-exe .com
rube-exe .com
securetaxexe .com
softportal-extrafiles .com
softportal-files .com
storeyourimagehere .com
super0tube .com
super-exe-home .com
supertubetop .com
sysreport1 .com
sysreport2 .com
testtubefilms .com
texasimages2009 .com
the-blue-tube.com
thecooltube .com
thegrouttube .com
thetubeamps .com
thetubesmovie .com
tiaexe .com
tube-best-4free .com
tube-collection .com
tvtesttube .com
yourtubetop .com

Who's behind these domains and the Harry Potter blackhat SEO campaign? But, "of course", it's the "fan club" with the Koobface connection, continuing to use the same phone back locations that they've been using during the past couple of months - myart-gallery .com/senm.php - 64.27.5.202 - Email: jnthndnl@gmail.com; robert-art .com/senm.php - 66.199.229.229 - Email: robesha@gmail.com; superarthome .com/senm.php - 216.240.146.119 - Email: chucjack@gmail.com.

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog.

Continue reading →

Social Engineering Driven Web Malware Exploitation Kit

The standardization through template-ization of bogus codec/flash player/video pages, taking place during the past two years, has exponentially increased the efficiency levels of malware campaigns relying exclusively on social engineering.

Just like phishing pages being commodity, these commodity spoofs of legitimate software/plugins relying on "visual social engineering" represent a market segment by themselves, one that some cybercriminals have been attempting to monetize for a while.

Case in point - their latest attempt to do so comes in the form of the first social engineering driven web malware exploitation kit.
 

Despite that the kit's author has ripped off a well known exploits-serving malware kit's statistics interface, what's unique about this release is the fact that the exploit modules come in the form of "Missing Flash Player", "Outdated Flash Player", "Missing Video Codec", "Outdated Video Codec", "Codec Required" modules.

These very same modules represent the dominant social engineering attack vector on the Internet due to the quality of the spoofs and the end users' gullibility while self-infecting themselves. For the time being, the author appears to be an opportunist rather than someone interested in setting new benchmarks for standardization social engineering by using the efficiency and delivery methods offered by a web malware exploitation kit.

Interestingly, a huge number of fake codec serving web sites are already detecting the OS/Browser of the visitor, and serving Mac OS X based malware or Windows based malware based on the detection. This fact, as well as the fact that visual spoofs of OS X like dialogs are also getting template-ized are not a coincidence - it's a signal for an efficient and social engineering driven malware delivery mechanism in the works. The development of the kit will be monitored and updates posted - if any.

Meanwhile, the recent blackhat SEO campaign which attempted to hijack 'Harry Potter and the Half-Blood Prince' related traffic is a good example on how despite the magnitude of the campaign -- hundreds of thousands of indexed and malware serving pages -- due to the manual campaign management, its centralized nature makes it easier to shut down.

Upon clicking on a link, the end user was redirected to usa-top-news .info - 67.228.147.71 - Email: fullhdvid@gmail.com, then to world-news-scandals .com Email: wnscandals@gmail.com, and finally to tubesbargain .com/xplay.php?id=40018 - 216.240.143.7 - j0cqware@gmail.com where the codec was served from exefreefiles .com - 95.211.8.20 - Email: case0ns@gmail.com.  More coded serving domains are parked on the same IPs:

216.240.143.7

sunny-tube-world .com - Email: briashou@gmail.com
the-blue-tube  .com - Email: malccrome@gmail.com
onlysteeltube.com - Email: briashou@gmail.com
thecooltube .com - Email: malccrome@gmail.com
etesttube .com - Email: katschezz@gmail.com
thegrouttube .com - Email: katschezz@gmail.com
fllcorp .com

95.211.8.20

exe-load-2009 .com - Email: robeshur@gmail.com
exefiledata .com - Email: robeshur@gmail.com
exereload .com - Email: robeshur@gmail.com
load-exe-world .com - Email: robeshur@gmail.com
cool-exe-file .com - Email: robeshur@gmail.com
last-home-exe .com - Email: robeshur@gmail.com
exefreefiles .com - Email: case0ns@gmail.com
boardexefiles .com - Email: case0ns@gmail.com
exeloadsite .com - Email: j0cqware@gmail.com

The gang maintains another domain portfolio with pretty descriptive nature for phone back, direct fake codec serving purposes:

agro-files-archive .com
alkbbs-files .com
all-tube-world .com
best-light-search .com
besttubetech .com
chamitron .com
cheappharmaad .com
dipexe .com
downloadnativeexe .com
ebooks-archive .org
etesttube .com
exedownloadfull .com
exefiledata .com
exe-paste .com
exe-soft-development .com
exe-xxx-file .com
eyeexe .com
go-exe-go .com
greattubeamp .com
green-tube-site .com
hotexedownload .com
hot-exe-load .com
imagescopybetween .com
isyouimageshere .com
labsmedcom .com
last-exe-portal .com
lost-exe-site .com
lyy-exe .com
main-exe-home .com
mchedlishvili .name
metro-tube .net
my-exe-load .com
newfileexe .com
protectionimage .com
robo-exe .com
rube-exe .com
securetaxexe .com
sk1project .org
softportal-extrafiles .com
softportal-files .com
storeyourimagehere .com
super0tube .com
super-exe-home .com
supertubetop .com
sysreport1 .com
sysreport2 .com
testtubefilms .com
texasimages2009 .com
the-blue-tube.com
thecooltube .com
thegrouttube .com
thetubeamps .com
thetubesmovie .com
tiaexe .com
tube-best-4free .com
tube-collection .com
tvtesttube .com
yourtubetop .com

Who's behind these domains and the Harry Potter blackhat SEO campaign? But, "of course", it's the "fan club" with the Koobface connection, continuing to use the same phone back locations that they've been using during the past couple of months - myart-gallery .com/senm.php - 64.27.5.202 - Email: jnthndnl@gmail.com; robert-art .com/senm.php - 66.199.229.229 - Email: robesha@gmail.com; superarthome .com/senm.php - 216.240.146.119 - Email: chucjack@gmail.com.

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog.

Continue reading →

5th SMS Ransomware Variant Offered for Sale

"Your system has been blocked because it is running a pirated copy of Windows. In order to unblock it, enter the activation code sent to you by SMS-ing the following number."

Demand and emerging business models based on micro-payment ransom meet supply, with yet another SMS-based ransomware variant offered for sale ($25). Just like in previous underground market propositions, this one comes with a value-added service in the form of managed undetected binaries on a daily basis for an extra $5 for an undetected copy. It's worth pointing out that due to the customization offered, their original layouts and the error messages will look a lot different once their customers get hold of the ransomware.

Key features include:
- protecting against repeated infection through Mutex
- pops-up on the top of all windows
- disables safe mode, as well as possible key combinations attempting to bypass the window
- adds itself as a trusted executable/excluded one in Windows Firewall
- variety of non-intrusive auto-starting/executable injecting capabilities
- Rotx encryption for the activation codes
- ability to embedd more than one activation code
- monitors and automatically blocks process names of tools that could allow removal
- complete removal of the code from the system once the correct activation code is entered
- zero detection rate of a sampled binary -- of course the advertiser is biased and he didn't bother including reference to the service he used (Virustotal, NoVirusThanks.org etc.)

Despite several isolated cases where the originally Russian-based ransomware is affecting international English-speaking users, the campaigns are primarily targeting Russian speaking users -- at least for the time being until the malware authors or their customers start localizing it. This emerging micro-payment ransomware business model is the direct result of largely unregulated market segments allowing literally anyone to get hold of a premium and automatically managed number in order to facilitate it.

Related posts:
4th SMS Ransomware Variant Offered for Sale
3rd SMS Ransomware Variant Offered for Sale
SMS Ransomware Source Code Now Offered for Sale
New ransomware locks PCs, demands premium SMS for removal

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Continue reading →

A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Twenty Three

Part twenty three of the diverse portfolio of fake security software series, will once again summarize the scareware domains currently in circulation, delivered through the usual channels - blackhat SEO, compromises of legitimate web sites, comment spam and bogus adult web sites, with an emphasis on a yet another bogus company acting as a front-end to an affiliate network - AK Network Commerce Ltd.

Scareware remains the dominant monetization tactic applied by cybercriminals automatically abusing Web 2.0 properties.

The latest scareware domains are as follows:
scanyourcomputeronlinev1 .com - 78.46.251.41; 83.133.126.155; 91.212.107.5; 94.102.48.29; 78.46.251.41 - Email: info@chinainindia.org.in
promalwarescannerv2 .com - Email: info@researchcmr.com
spywarefolderscannerv2 .com Email: willpan@glamoxcon.com
antivirusscannerv10 .com - Email: mohammed32@yahoo.com
scanyourcomputeronlinev1 .com - Email: info@chinainindia.org.in
folder-antivirus-scanv1 .com - Email: info@duebamet.com
personalfolderscanv2 .com - Email: hfbeauty@yahoo.com
spywarefolderscannerv2 .com - Email: willpan@glamoxcon.com
privatevirusscannerv2 .com - Email: hfbeauty@yahoo.com
secure-antivirus-scanv3 .com - Email: info@duebamet.com
bestfoldervirusscanv3 .com - Email: alfonso-li@sohun.com
antispyware-scannerv3 .com - Email: willpan@glamoxcon.com
liveantimalwarescannerv3 .com - Email: hongkong@campusparis.org
onlinespywarescannerv3 .com - Email: Peng@pradac.cn
onlineantivirusscanv4 .com - Email: Peng@pradac.cn
onlineantispywarescanv6 .com - Email: czoao@hotmail.com
antivirus-scannerv6 .com - Email: paul.smith@acdc.cn
antivirusonlinescanv9 .com - Email: info@chinainindia.org.in
antimalwarescannerv9 .com - Email: mohammed32@yahoo.com
antispywarescannerv9 .com - Email: mohammed32@yahoo.com
bestcomputerscanv7 .com - Email: cgrenier@reclamation.com

in5id .com - 67.212.71.196 - Email: getoony@gmail.com
goscantune .com - Email: canrcnad@gmail.com
in5ch .com - Email: getoony@gmail.com
goscanback .com - Email: alcnafuch@gmail.com
goscanlook .com - Email: chinrfi@gmail.com
gotunescan .com - Email: canrcnad@gmail.com
gofatescan .com - Email: alcnafuch@gmail.com
gobackscan .com - Email: alcnafuch@gmail.com
goparkscan .com - Email: canrcnad@gmail.com
in5st .com - Email: getoony@gmail.com
gagtemple .info - Email: tiermity@gmail.com
strelyk .info - Email: tiermity@gmail.com
mixsoul .info - Email: tiermity@gmail.com
loacher .info - Email: tiermity@gmail.com
unvelir .info - Email: tiermity@gmail.com
lendshaft .info - Email: tiermity@gmail.com

goironscan .com - 209.44.126.152 - Email: aloxier@gmail.com
metascan4 .com - Email: exmcon@gmail.com
notescan4 .com - Email: exmcon@gmail.com
genscan4 .com - Email: exmcon@gmail.com
scanlist6 .com - Email: exmcon@gmail.com
goscanpark .com - Email: exmcon@gmail.com
gobackscan .com - Email: exmcon@gmail.com
gomapscan .com - Email: exmcon@gmail.com
scan4gen .com - Email: exmcon@gmail.com
namearra .info - Email: stnorvel@gmail.com
xtraroom .info - Email: stnorvel@gmail.com
sundalet .info - Email: stnorvel@gmail.com

privacy-centre .org - 89.208.136.91 - Email: acapz@freebbmail.com
prvacy-centre .org - Email: acapz@freebbmail.com
privacy-centar .org - Email: acapz@freebbmail.com
prvacy-centar .org - Email: acapz@freebbmail.com
privacy-ceter .org - Email: acapz@freebbmail.com
prvacy-ceter .org - Email: acapz@freebbmail.com
privacy-center .org - Email: acapz@freebbmail.com
prvacy-center .org - Email: acapz@freebbmail.com
privacy-centor .org - Email: acapz@freebbmail.com
privacy-centr .org - Email: acapz@freebbmail.com
prvacy-centr .org - Email: acapz@freebbmail.com
pcenter56 .com
privacyupdate447 .com - Email: prv54@lycos.com
pcenter57 .com

personalonlinescanv3 .com - 78.46.251.41 - Email: vms@hellofm.in
antivirusfolderscanv5. com - Email: Bush.Mussar@yahoo.com
antivirusfolderscannerv5 .com - Email: Bush.Mussar@yahoo.com
privatevirusscannerv5 .com - Email: cs@pakoil.com.pk
antivirusforcomputrerv5 .com - Email: Bush.Mussar@yahoo.com
spywarefastscannerv6 .com - Email: cs@pakoil.com.pk
antimalwarescanv7 .com - Email: Bush.Mussar@yahoo.com
antimalwareproscannerv8 .com - Email: Bush.Mussar@yahoo.com
antimalwareproscannerv9 .com - Email: Bush.Mussar@yahoo.com
antivirusscannerv9 .com - Email: Bush.Mussar@yahoo.com
advanedspywarescan .com - Email: xors678@freebbmail.com
securedvirusscan .com - Email: adsff@freebbmail.com
secured-virus-scanner .com - Email: adsff@freebbmail.com

free-spyware-cleaner .com - 212.117.160.18 - Email: robertsimonkroon@gmail.com
free-spyware-checker .org - Email: robertsimonkroon@gmail.com
fast-spyware-cleaner .org - Email: robertsimonkroon@gmail.com
clean-pc-now .org - Email: robertsimonkroon@gmail.com
spyware-scaner .com - Email: robertsimonkroon@gmail.com
free-spyware-cleaner .com - Email: robertsimonkroon@gmail.com
free-tube-orgasm .net - Email: robertsimonkroon@gmail.com
free-spyware-cleaner .net - Email: robertsimonkroon@gmail.com
clean-pc-now .net - Email: robertsimonkroon@gmail.com
spyware-killer .biz - Email: robertsimonkroon@gmail.com

protectionsystemlab .com - 89.149.254.174; 91.212.198.36
ez-scanner-online .com
smart-antivirus-online .com
uptodatesystem .com
checks-files-now .com
download-filez-now .us
files-download-now .net
check-files-now .net

antispyware2009 .com - 75.125.241.58
remover .org
antispyware  .com
regsweep .com
registryclear .com
adwarebot .com

cleanmalwarefree .com - 218.93.205.244 - Email: IvanMaltzev@gmail.com
killlabs .com - Email: ad6@safe-mail.net
cleanmalwarefast .com - Email: ad6@safe-mail.net
cleanmalwareeasy .com - Email: ad6@safe-mail.net

adware-2010 .com - 67.211.161.49
adware-2009.comantispyware2013 .com - 98.124.199.1; 98.124.198.1
antispyware2012 .com
securityscanweb .com - 209.44.126.22 - Email: Gerald.A.Flowers@trashymail.com
securitytestavailable .com - 209.44.126.81 - Email: Roy.M.Tucker@pookmail.com
liveantivirusinfov2 .com - 78.47.132.222; 78.47.172.69 - Email: cgrenier@reclamation.com
antivirus-scannerv9 .com - Email: paul.smith@acdc.cn
purchuaseonlinedefence .com - 78.47.91.154 - Email: jenny@allbestmarine.com.sg
purchuaseliveprotection .com - Email: jenny@allbestmarine.com.sg

windowssecurityinfo .com - 83.133.123.113 - Email: arziw12@freebbmail.com
antimalwarescanner-v2 .com - Email: tareen@yahoo.com
maliciousbaseupdates .com - Email: freight@beds.com
ieprotectionlist .com - Email: vanmullem@yahoo.com

personalcleaner2009 .com - 88.208.19.4 - Email: personalcleaner2009.com@liveinternetmarketingltd.com
ak-networkcommerce .com - Email: ak-networkcommerce.com@liveinternetmarketingltd.com
pc-antimalwaresuite .com - Email: pc-antimalwaresuite.com@liveinternetmarketingltd.com
basepayment .com - Email: basepayment.com@liveinternetmarketingltd.com

Sampled malware phones back to od32qjx6meqos .cn/ua.php, more phone back locations are also parked there:
0ni9o1s3feu60 .cn - 220.196.59.23 - Email: robertsimonkroon@gmail.com
mf6gy4lj79ny5 .cn - Email: robertsimonkroon@gmail.com
84u9wb2hsh4p6 .cn - Email: robertsimonkroon@gmail.com
7bs5nfzfkp8q8 .cn - Email: robertsimonkroon@gmail.com
kt4lwumfhjb7a .cn - Email: robertsimonkroon@gmail.com
q2bf0fzvjb5ca .cn - Email: robertsimonkroon@gmail.com
rncocnspr44va .cn - Email: robertsimonkroon@gmail.com
t1eayoft9226b .cn - Email: robertsimonkroon@gmail.com
4go4i9n76ttwd .cn - Email: robertsimonkroon@gmail.com
kzvi4iiutr11e .cn - Email: robertsimonkroon@gmail.com
hxc7jitg7k57e .cn - Email: robertsimonkroon@gmail.com
mt3pvkfmpi7de .cn - Email: robertsimonkroon@gmail.com
fyivbrl3b0dyf .cn - Email: robertsimonkroon@gmail.com
z6ailnvi94jgg .cn - Email: robertsimonkroon@gmail.com
p7keflvui9fkl .cn - Email: robertsimonkroon@gmail.com
f1uq1dfi3qkcm .cn - Email: robertsimonkroon@gmail.com
p0umob9k2g7mp .cn - Email: robertsimonkroon@gmail.com
7zju2l82i2zhz .cn - Email: robertsimonkroon@gmail.com

One of the latest front-ends to scareware affiliate networks is AK Network Commerce Ltd (ak-networkcommerce .com) :

"Implementing latest anti-hacker technology based on expert and user reviews AK Network Commerce Ltd enables hacker-proof defense, blocks unauthorized access to your private information, and hides your identity. Having combined latest features of cutting-edge privacy protection technologies our knowledgeable team designed products to easily and effectively fight perilous cyber attempts. Thorough selection and step-by-step application of elements and tools required for comprehensive protection of your personal data helped us achieve success and become industry leading representatives. We did our best to prove that the time has come to leave behind worries about private data theft."

The company is the very latest attempt of a bogus company to build legitimacy into their "latest anti-hacker technology". Meanwhile, the blacklisting , sample distribution, and shutting down the scareware domains not only undermines the effectiveness of their largely centralized malware campaigns, costs them missed revenue projections, but also, it increases the opportunity costs for the gang.

Related posts:
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Twenty Two
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Twenty One
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Twenty
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Nineteen
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Eighteen
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Seventeen
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Sixteen
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Fifteen
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Fourteen
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Thirteen
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Twelve
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Eleven
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Ten
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Nine
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Eight
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Seven
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Six
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Five
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Four
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Three
A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Two
Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog.
Continue reading →

Koobface - Come Out, Come Out, Wherever You Are

UPDATE2: New binaries are hosted at web.reg .md/1/pdrv.exe; web.reg .md/1/pp.10.exe and at web.reg .md/1/fb.49.exe.

UPDATE: The Koobface gang is upgrading the command and control infrastructure in response to the positive ROI out of the takedown activities. This of course doesn't mean that enough evidence on "who's who" behind Koobface and a huge percentage of the currently active malware campaigns targeting Web 2.0 properties hasn't been gathered already.

Especially now that it's apparent we know each other's names. A recent Koobface update includes the following message: (thanks to TrendMicro for pinging me) : 

We express our high gratitude to Dancho Danchev (http://ddanchev.blogspot.com) for the help in bug fixing, researches and documentation for our software.

The ROI of several abuse notices during the weekend, quick response from China's CERT which took care of 61.235.117.71 (thanks Patrick!), and Oc3 Networks & Web Solutions Llc abuse team which took care of the Koobface activity at 98.143.159.138 -- cgpay-re-230609 .com still responds to the IP -- looks pretty positive and managed to increase the opportunity cost for the Koobface gang since it caused them some troubles during the weekend.

With Koobface worm's Twitter campaign currently in a stand by mode due to the publicity it attracted, as well as the fact that the central redirection points used in the campaign are down, let's assess the current Koobface hosting infrastructure, with an emphasis on UKSERVERS-MNT (AS42831) which stopped responding to abuse notifications as of Sunday.

How did the Koobface gang/fan club responded to the downtime anyway? By introducing several new domains, and parking them at 78.110.175.15 - UKSERVERS-MNT (AS42831), whose abuse department remains unreachable ever since.

Following the first abuse notice sent to UKSERVERS-MNT the company temporarily closed the account (78.110.175.15) of the "customer", then brought it back online. Asked why, they responded that the "customer" claimed he's been compromised and that he needs to clean up the mess and secure the server.  In reality that means "give us some time to smoothly update DNS records and migrate operations now that all of our command and control locations are offline".

Since they presumed I don't take lying personally, half an hour later I checked again and the Koobface command and control servers were operational again. The company forwarded the responsibility to the customer and said they closed down the account.

However, what the Koobface gang did was to register a new domain and use it as Koobface C&C again parked at the same IP, which remains active - zaebalinax .com Email: krotreal@gmail.com - 78.110.175.15 - in particular zaebalinax .com/the/?pid=14010 which is redirecting to the Koobface botnet. Two more domains were also registered and parked there, u15jul .com and umidsummer .com - Email: 2009polevandrey@mail.ru which remain in stand by mode at least for the time being.

Upon execution the Koobface binary phones back to upr0306 .com/achcheck.php; upr0306 .com/ld/gen.php (78.110.175.15) and attempts to download upload.octopus-multimedia .be/1/pdrv.exe; upload.octopus-multimedia .be/1/pp.10.exe.

UKSERVERS-MNT (AS42831) is also known with its connections to gumblar.cn malware campaigns, as well as having hosted a domain (supernerd.org) part of a Photobucket malvertising campaign.

Related posts:
Dissecting Koobface Worm's Twitter Campaign
Dissecting the Koobface Worm's December Campaign
Dissecting the Latest Koobface Facebook Campaign 
The Koobface Gang Mixing Social Engineering Vectors

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog.
Continue reading →

Koobface - Come Out, Come Out, Wherever You Are

UPDATE2: New binaries are hosted at web.reg .md/1/pdrv.exe; web.reg .md/1/pp.10.exe and at web.reg .md/1/fb.49.exe.

UPDATE: The Koobface gang is upgrading the command and control infrastructure in response to the positive ROI out of the takedown activities. This of course doesn't mean that enough evidence on "who's who" behind Koobface and a huge percentage of the currently active malware campaigns targeting Web 2.0 properties hasn't been gathered already.

Especially now that it's apparent we know each other's names. A recent Koobface update includes the following message: (thanks to TrendMicro for pinging me) : 

We express our high gratitude to Dancho Danchev (http://ddanchev.blogspot.com) for the help in bug fixing, researches and documentation for our software.

The ROI of several abuse notices during the weekend, quick response from China's CERT which took care of 61.235.117.71 (thanks Patrick!), and Oc3 Networks & Web Solutions Llc abuse team which took care of the Koobface activity at 98.143.159.138 -- cgpay-re-230609 .com still responds to the IP -- looks pretty positive and managed to increase the opportunity cost for the Koobface gang since it caused them some troubles during the weekend.

With Koobface worm's Twitter campaign currently in a stand by mode due to the publicity it attracted, as well as the fact that the central redirection points used in the campaign are down, let's assess the current Koobface hosting infrastructure, with an emphasis on UKSERVERS-MNT (AS42831) which stopped responding to abuse notifications as of Sunday.

How did the Koobface gang/fan club responded to the downtime anyway? By introducing several new domains, and parking them at 78.110.175.15 - UKSERVERS-MNT (AS42831), whose abuse department remains unreachable ever since.

Following the first abuse notice sent to UKSERVERS-MNT the company temporarily closed the account (78.110.175.15) of the "customer", then brought it back online. Asked why, they responded that the "customer" claimed he's been compromised and that he needs to clean up the mess and secure the server.  In reality that means "give us some time to smoothly update DNS records and migrate operations now that all of our command and control locations are offline".

Since they presumed I don't take lying personally, half an hour later I checked again and the Koobface command and control servers were operational again. The company forwarded the responsibility to the customer and said they closed down the account.

However, what the Koobface gang did was to register a new domain and use it as Koobface C&C again parked at the same IP, which remains active - zaebalinax .com Email: krotreal@gmail.com - 78.110.175.15 - in particular zaebalinax .com/the/?pid=14010 which is redirecting to the Koobface botnet. Two more domains were also registered and parked there, u15jul .com and umidsummer .com - Email: 2009polevandrey@mail.ru which remain in stand by mode at least for the time being.

Upon execution the Koobface binary phones back to upr0306 .com/achcheck.php; upr0306 .com/ld/gen.php (78.110.175.15) and attempts to download upload.octopus-multimedia .be/1/pdrv.exe; upload.octopus-multimedia .be/1/pp.10.exe.

UKSERVERS-MNT (AS42831) is also known with its connections to gumblar.cn malware campaigns, as well as having hosted a domain (supernerd.org) part of a Photobucket malvertising campaign.

Related posts:
Dissecting Koobface Worm's Twitter Campaign
Dissecting the Koobface Worm's December Campaign
Dissecting the Latest Koobface Facebook Campaign 
The Koobface Gang Mixing Social Engineering Vectors

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog.
Continue reading →

From Ukraine with Bogus Twitter, LinkedIn and Scribd Accounts

Could a dysfunctional abuse department facilitate cybercrime? Appreciate my rhetoric with an emphasis on Layered Technologies, Inc.

Exactly one month ago, the Ukrainian gang that I've been extensively monitoring due to their apparent involvement in literally each and every malware campaign targeting Web 2.0 properties -- that's of course next to the Koobface connection in general -- intensified their automatic abuse of Twitter, Scribd and LinkedIn using plain simple social engineering tactics.

Since the campaign seems to be ongoing, it's time to spill some coffee on their latest scareware domains, see how the campaign's quality degraded upon notifying the affected parties, and emphasize on the fact that since Layered Technologies, Inc. abuse department wasn't available for comment prior to this post, the Ukrainian "fan club" continues using their services.

Bogus Twitter accounts serving scareware part of their campaign:
twitter .com/carmenelectrapn
twitter .com/LilKimUncensord
twitter .com/KimKardashian11
twitter .com/KateWinsletNude
twitter .com/DeniseRichardsK
twitter .com/KendraWilkinso1
twitter .com/CHristinaRicciN
twitter .com/Shakira_nude

twitter .com/BritneySpears11
twitter .com/PamelaAnderson0
twitter .com/kimkardashian3
twitter .com/BritneySpearse
twitter .com/LindsayLohannn
twitter .com/KatieHolmesNud
twitter .com/LilKimUncensord
twitter .com/britneyspearst
twitter .com/LindsayLohanee
twitter .com/JenniferLovew
twitter .com/AnnaFarisNnude
twitter .com/MileyCyrusnud
twitter .com/carmenelectrasx
twitter .com/adulttrishstrat

As in previous campaign, their redirectors continue working -- excluding oymomahon .com which is down -- and serving newly typosquatted scareware domains. For instance showmealltube .com/fathulla/13.html (64.92.170.135; 216.32.83.110) which is exclusively used on all the bogus accounts redirects to myhealtharea .cn/in.cgi?14 (64.92.170.135; 216.32.83.110), again Layered Technologies, Inc.

The same goes for the second domain, delshikandco .com/paqi-video/30.html (216.32.83.104) Email: alexeyvas@safe-mail.net (multiple scareware domains registered under the same email) as well as another redirector maintained by them used in previous campaign, ntlligent .info/tds/in.cgi (72.232.163.171) also both hosted at Layered Technologies, Inc..

The new scareware domains used in the first redirection:
nusecurityshields .com - 91.213.29.252 - FakeAlert-WinwebSecurity.gen
besecurepctrue .com
wesecurepcs .com
securityverpcs .com
allsecuredpcshields .com
myrealsecuritys .com
realsecurityspot .com
allentruesecurity .com

The second redirection leads to thetubesmovie .com/xplaymovie.php?id=40012 - 216.240.143.7 - Email: queeziegl@gmail.com where onlinemovies.40012.exe (Trojan.Crypt.ZPACK.Gen) is served, which upon execution phones back to myart-gallery .com/senm.php?data= (64.27.5.202) Email: jnthndnl@gmail.com; robert-art .com/senm.php?data= (66.199.229.229) Email: robesha@gmail.com; and superarthome .com/senm.php?data= (216.240.146.119) Email: chucjack@gmail.com. Yet another redirector at showmeall-tube-xx .com/xtube.htm - 78.159.98.70 - Email: crashtestdanger@mail.ru attempts to download more scareware from showmeall-tube-xx .com/setup.exe - Trojan:Win32/Winwebsec.

Parked on 216.240.143.7 are also:
go-go-tube.com - Email: consanch@gmail.com
thetubesmovie.com - Email: queeziegl@gmail.com
tubessite.com - Email: roberkimb@gmail.com
besttubetech.com - Email: tashcham@gmail.com
supertubetop.com - Email: queeziegl@gmail.com
yourtubetop.com - Email: tashcham@gmail.com
greattubetop.com - Email: roberkimb@gmail.com
fllcorp.com
my-tube-dot.com - Email: consanch@gmail.com

The newly registered Scribd and LinkedIn accounts also point to these very same domains. Bogus Scribd accounts -- approximately a thousand -- participating in the campaign:
scribd .com/Eva_Mendes%20naked
scribd .com/Kim_Kardashian%20sex%20tape%20free
scribd .com/Nude%20wrestling
scribd .com/KimKardashianSex%20Tape
scribd .com/BritneySpears%20Sex%20Tape
scribd .com/HollyMadison_Naked
scribd .com/Free%20Animal%20Sex%20Videos
scribd.com/BritneySpearsCircus
scribd .com/Emma%20Watson%20kissingsomeone
scribd .com/Paris%20Hilton%20%20sex%20tape
scribd .com/Ellen%20degeneresgay
scribd .com/Gallery%20of%20Lindsay_Lohan
scribd .com/Amy_Smart%20nude
scribd .com/Stacy_Keibler%20in%20a%20bikini
scribd .com/Jennifer%20Aniston%20sexiest1
scribd .com/HelenMirren%20nudity
scribd .com/Vida_Guerra%20butt
scribd .com/Paris%20Hilton%20in%20bed

scribd .com/Paris%20Hilton%20sex%20video
scribd .com/Paris%20Hilton%20%20movie
scribd .com/ParisHiltonnaked1
scribd .com/Jessica%20Rabbitadult
scribd .com/Maria_Kanellis%20playboy
scribd .com/Anna_Nicole_uncensored
scribd .com/Kim+Kardashian%20sex%20video
scribd .com/keeleyhazellsextape
scribd .com/Britney-Spears-womanizer2
scribd .com/BRITNEY%20SPEARS%20DESNUDA%201
scribd.com/Age%20of%20EmmaWatson
scribd .com/JenniferLopez%20desnuda
scribd .com/BritneySpears%20comix
scribd .com/MUJERES%20NEGRAS%20DESNUDAS%201
scribd .com/John%20Cena's%20%20dick
scribd .com/Hilary%20Duff%20naked%201

scribd .com/MaribelGuardia%20desnuda
scribd .com/Jessica%20Simpsonnude
scribd .com/Amanda-Bynes-nip-slip1
scribd .com/Tara-Reid-desnuda1
scribd .com/Jessica%20Albanude
scribd .com/Mujeres%20famosas%20%20desnudas
scribd .com/AngelinaJolie%20Naked
scribd .com/Lindsay_Lohan%20naked
scribd .com/Niurka_Marcos%20desnuda
scribd .com/FOTOS%20DE%20MARIBEL%20GUARDIA%20DESNUDA
scribd .com/INGRID%20CORONADO%20DESNUDA%201
scribd .com/NINEL%20CONDE%20DESNUDA1

scribd .com/Paris%20Hilton%20movie%201
scribd .com/Free%20Kim%20Kardashian%20%20Sex%20%20Tape
scribd .com/Pamela%20anderson%20nude
scribd .com/Vanessa-Williams-Penthouse-pictorial2
scribd .com/Natalie%20Portman%20sunbathing%201
scribd .com/Anne%20Hathaway%20naked%201
scribd .com/Stacy_Keibler%20nude
scribd .com/Scarlett_Johansson%20galleryx

Bogus LinkedIn accounts participating in the campaign:
linkedin .com/pub/anneliese-van-der-pol-nude/14/150/371
linkedin .com/pub/disney-s-raven-symone-nude/14/150/604
linkedin .com/pub/jennifer-love-hewitt/13/ab6/396
linkedin .com/pub/free-nude-celebs/14/6b/65b
linkedin .com/in/nudetubee
linkedin .com/in/nudepics2
linkedin .com/in/freenudecelebrities1
linkedin .com/in/nudecelebrities1
linkedin .com/in/nudephotos1
linkedin .com/pub/nude-art/14/6b/6a

The statistics from two of the bit.ly URLs showcase how the campaign scaled due to the number of bogus accounts, and they virtually disappeared upon notifying the affected parties which removed the accounts in less than an hour. The gang keeps making a point that I made a while ago - a single group can dominate the entire Web 2.0 threatscape, automatically if they want to.

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog.
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