More cyber leads from the previous analysis of Mpack embedded dekalab.info with a particular malicious domains farm emphasis as follows. Multiple redirectors, blackhat SEO, XOR-ifying javascript obfuscation and a piece of rootkit installed, pretty much everything's in place as usual. The majority of redirectors are part of an exploit serving domains farm. The whole process starts from trancer.biz :
trancer.biz/sys/index.php
81.95.149.176
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Server: nginx/0.5.17
Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2007 11:51:30 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Connection: keep-alive
Location: cawajanga.biz/ts/in.cgi?oscorp
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Server: nginx/0.5.17
Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2007 11:51:31 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Connection: keep-alive
Location: blooded.biz/2103/index.php
Then we get redirected to blooded.biz's obfuscated payload
81.95.149.176 in between loading cawajanga.biz/ts/in.cgi?oscorp and mobi-info.ru where the deobfuscated XOR-ifying javascript leads us to the exact payload location the output of which is in the form of Rootkit.Win32.Agent.fb
File size: 7503 bytes
MD5: 09994afd14b189697a039937f05f440f
SHA1: b9832689aa1272f39959087df41cea13fc283910
Independent Contractor. Bitcoin: 15Zvie1j8CjSR52doVSZSjctCDSx3pDjKZ Email: dancho.danchev@hush.com OMEMO: ddanchev@conversations.im | OTR: danchodanchev@xmpp.jp | TOX ID: 2E6FCA35A18AA76B2CCE33B55404A796F077CADA56F38922A1988AA381AE617A15D3D3E3E6F1
Wednesday, June 27, 2007
Exploits Serving Domains
Independent Security Consultancy, Threat Intelligence Analysis (OSINT/Cyber Counter Intelligence) and Competitive Intelligence research on demand. Insightful, unbiased, and client-tailored assessments, neatly communicated in the form of interactive reports - because anticipating the emerging threatscape is what shapes the big picture at the end of the day. Approach me at dancho.danchev@hush.com
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