The "Russia Small Group" - A Step in the Right Direction or a Dangerous Game to Play With?
0The currently ongoing misunderstanding that Russia is actively utilizing active measures in cyberspace and the fact that information warfare operations are clearly making its way into the White House Cyberspace strategy should be considered a precedent which despite the fact that will clearly boost the funding and investment in the industrial military complex in particular cyber threat intelligence and foreign influence detection campaigns to actually boost the U.S Cyber Command and NSA's budget in an attempt to respond to the threat posed by Russia in cyberspace the use of information warfare and information operations in cyberspace that also includes foreign influence operations in the form of active measures should be considered and properly analyzed with caution as it blurs the lines between cyber warfare information warfare information operations and the newly emerged term called foreign influence operations which from the perspective of cybercrime research should be considered a basic rogue and bogus content farm which is capable of acquiring traffic and hijacking traffic using basic blackhat SEO (search engine optimization) techniques.
It used to be a moment in time when Russia and China were actively busy playing copycats from publicly obtainable and accessible U.S DoD and U.S Intelligence Community online documentation and material which basically helped them shape their modern information warfare and cyber warfare doctrines if any. The rest remains cybercrime as usual.
Stay tuned!
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Pillars of Russia’s Disinformation and Propaganda Ecosystem
Continue reading →In this post I'll discuss a newly emerged trend which is called "forward defense" where U.S based cyber warriors will actually bother to proactively respond to and prevent current and emerging cyber attacks by scouting foreign networks including foreign influence and information operation campaigns that also includes the use of botnets and cyber espionage type of campaigns to further protect U.S critical infrastructure from current and emerging cyber threats.
While the majority of the cyber threat intelligence work in the U.S is done by the commercial sector the U.S Cyber Command continues to actively apply basic U.S DoD military methodology including near real-time information sharing initiatives for the purpose of demonstrating the key operational capability in the context of targeting the online infrastructure that also includes to actively respond to information warfare including foreign influence operations.
Key summary points to consider:
- Information Warfare is making its way into the White House official Cyberspace strategy document - I've already discussed this unique trend in a related article which you can check out here - which undoubtedly sets a unique precedent where we have the White House directly interfering with basic military concepts such as for instance information warfare and information operations that also includes the use of foreign influence operations which further empowers the U.S DoD and the NSA with unique capabilities to respond to these type of campaigns possibly directly interfering with Russia's information warfare concepts which believe it or not in another world are directly copied from publicly accessible U.S DoD and NSA publicly accessible papers throughout the years. In terms of information warfare operations that also includes foreign influence operations this is a dangerous game to play which may inevitably lead to actually catching some high-profile information warfare operations or eventually KGB or Russia's FSB operators which goes far beyond the usual duties of the U.S Cyber Command the U.S DoD and the NSA in general which has to do with far more high-profile cyber threats that also includes cyber warfare campaigns and possible direct threats against U.S critical infrastructure
- Foreign influence operations - it still remains unclear as to the extend of this basic misconception which basically relies on the use of social media or the so called rogue and bogus content farms which are pretty similar to high-profile and relevant cybercrime-friendly blackhat SEO (search engine optimization) campaigns in the context of traffic acquisition and traffic hijacking which basically has nothing to do with Russia's active measures in Cyberspace which is a dangerous word to play with in particular in the context of having the U.S Cyber Command the U.S DoD and the NSA hunt down and track down foreign influence operations. It should be also clearly noted that a direct response should be issues on a systematic and persistent basis which basically represents the U.S Cyber Command and the U.S DoD including the NSA's basic principles and mode of operation where the virtual assets of a specific foreign influence operator can either can directly exposed or shut down or actually a direct DoS (Denial of Service) launched against them which shouldn't be surprising in the broader context of fighting cybercrime and responding to cyber warfare incidents and campaigns online
- Sock puppetry and foreign influence operations - yet another dangerous word which should be used with caution remains the use of "sock puppets" which are basically foreign influence operators positioned by the U.S Cyber Command the U.S DoD and the NSA as a possible National Security risk which should be properly monitored and actions taken against it in one form or another in particular a direct attempt to expose the operator behind the rogue and bogus content farm including to actually attempt to launch a DoS (Denial of Service) attacks against their infrastructure
Current and Future Assessment of U.S U.K and German Cyber Intelligence and Cyber Surveillance Programs and Tradecraft - An Analysis
In this rather long analysis I'll walk you though all the currently relevant U.S Intelligence Community Cyber Intelligence and Cyber Surveillance programs in non-alphabetical order with the idea to provoke a meaningful discussion on current tactics techniques and procedures courtesy of the U.S Intelligence community how you can protect yourself and most importantly how the U.S Intelligence community can "perform better" including practical software applications and services solution based recommendations for general users and organizations.
The data in this research has been obtained from Cryptome.org the Snowden archive and the Electrospaces.net research blog including the following archive.
Program name: ABSOLINE EPILSON - PDF - "This paper describes standard analysis techniques that have been used to both discover iPhone target end point machines and implant target iPhones directly using the QUANTUM system. It shows that the iPhone Unique Device Identifier (UDID) can be used for target tracking and can be used to correlate with end point machines and target phone. It highlights the exploits currently available and the CNE process to enable further targeting."
Current status: The current status of the program is active in terms of possible collerations between iPhone user ID's including an end user's end point Internet user activities in terms of traffic and Web site cookie acquisition for the purpose of interception profiling and active monitoring.
How it works: Every mobile has a unique ID? The problem? It tends to "phone back" to a manufacturers infrastructure and can be uniquely attributed to an end user including -- possibly -- to their end point potentially acting as the "weakest link" potentially exposing and end user's end point Internet activities to the U.S Intelligence community.
The digitally naughty part: Data colleration on a third-party device for the purpose of exposing the actual infrastructure behind the device including related end-points and related devices associated with the user in question - is nothing new. The digitally naughty part? It can be done - and the mobile device in question -- an iPhone -- in this particular case can be easily labeled as the "weakest link" in a possible corporate and end user private environment.
How you can make it work better: Shipping and delivery including supply chain infiltration tactics for the purpose of collerating unique mobile device IDs to a specific isn't new including possible "purchase-order-to-user-ID" colleration and data infiltration through basic social engineering and offensive CNO-based tactics. Potentially launching a targeted and geo-located phishing campaign on a per country city-basis could definitely lead to a positive results in terms of good old fashioned social engineering campaigns in terms of exfiltrating the necessary data including mobile device IDs including possible browser-based Web-based decoys for the purpose of further exposing an end user or an organization's private network and the necessary collerated end point devices.
- Target application-isolation software and service solution providers and owners - launching a variety of malicious and fraudulent potentially disruptive type of attack campaigns should be considered as as option for the purpose of ensuring that the project owner's time remains spend on fighting the malicious attacks including the eventual slowing down of the project development including the project's eventual shutdown. Possible portfolio of attacks might include online identity discrimination including spear phishing campaigns DDoS attack campaigns including possibly mail-flood attacks including possibly TDoS (Telephony Denial of Service attacks) against a variety of tailored and predefined project owner's contact points.
- Develop an internal bug-bounty program for sand-boxing and application isolation software and service providers - crowd-sourcing the bug bounty through public and official channels including the possible outsourcing of the bug hunting process through third-parties while offering the necessary financial incentives might be the best approach to undermine the credibility of the project including the actual owner's credibility and reputation to maintain and operate the project.
- Aim to wage disruptive warfare against private project owners - it should be clearly noted that modern Intelligence Agencies have the capacity to wage disruptive warfare against private project and software owners using a variety of means which include a variety of technical and human-oriented online disruption tactics which should be easily considered as a threat to the project and software owner's existence where the appropriate measures to protect their online assets should be taken into consideration
- Passively measuring and estimating product market-share for Targets of Opportunity - modern Intelligence Agencies have the potential to easily measure the product or project that also includes the software's market share in an attempt to better position a disruptive campaign targeting the project owner including the software owner in a variety of ways and positioning the project owner including the actual software owner as a Target of Opportunity to participate in related mass surveillance and eavesdropping campaigns
On the majority of occasions modern cyber surveillance and eavesdropping campaigns on passive or active SIGINT which has to do with legal and passive lawful surveillance techniques which also includes offensive techniques such as for instance direct attempts to interact with someone's online infrastructure in place for the purpose of compromising and obtaining direct access to their digital assets including personal information.
- "Stripped" mobile device with hardened security and privacy-aware mobile OS
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- WebCRT - Among the most common privacy-exposing scenarios in terms of "ABSOLINE EPILSON" remains the active utilization of unsecure browsing habits namely a misconfigured browser in terms or browser extension including the newly introduced "local IP exposing" WebCRT feature found in a variety of browsers. What should end users better do to protect their local IP including adding additional privacy and security features to their browser? Keep reading. The first thing a user should ensure from a network-based perspective is that their browser fingerprint remains as private as possible including the inability of the U.S Intelligence Community.
- Personal Host Based Firewall - the first thing to look for in a personal firewall is a bi-directional firewall functionality allowing you to block all incoming traffic and successfully allowing you to allow all ongoing traffic based on a variety of rules including possible white-listing. The next logical step would be to implement basic ARP-spoofing prevention solution for the purpose of ensuring that your ISP including VPN provider cannot perform basic ARP-spoofing attack campaigns which could compromise the confidentiality of the targeted host and expose to it a multitude of network-based attack deception attack campaigns.
- HIPS-based firewall - a decent and highly recommended solution to protect end points from malicious software including web-based client-side exploits who might attempt to drop malicious software on the affected hosts include the use of host-based intrusion prevention system which has the potential to stop a wide variety of threats that have the potential to expose an end point to a multi-tude of malicious software such as for instance the use of Comodo Firewall which is a highly relevant and recommended solution for a huge number of end points in terms of offering advanced and sophisticated malware protection mechanisms.
- Basic Network Deception - it should be clearly noted that every network is a subject to possibly compromise including automated and targeted attacks which could be easily prevented and actually allow a network operator or a network user to gather the necessary cyber attack information which could easily offer an in-depth peek inside the activities of the cyber attacker in particular the type of information that they're interested in obtaining. Case in point would be the use of a proprietary network-based deception appliance such as for instance Thinkst Canary including the use of the Nova Network Deception Appliance which empowers a network operator with a sophisticated network deception techniques which allows them to trick a cyber attacker into falling victim into a rogue network-based assets with the actual network operator in a perfect position to gather intelligence on the real intentions of the cyber attacker while properly protecting their infrastructure from malicious attackers
- Custom-Based DNS-based DNSSEC-based servers with no logs policy - worry about the U.S Intelligence Community and your ISP eavesdropping on your traffic and Web browsing history potentially launching man-in-the-middle attacks? Consider utilizing basic free privacy-conscious DNS service provider with DNSSEC-enabled no-logs policy such as for instance - DNS Watch - which you can freely use without worry that your Web browsing history and DNS request history will be logged and potentially abused. A possible logical recommendation in the context of improving an end-point's in-depth security strategy might be the utilization of the so called protective DNS which offers an in-depth protection techniques and is often available online for free. Case in point is the use of Cisco's Umbrella solution which offers an in-depth protection mechanism and is available to end users and organizations online for free.
Sample Screenshot of the Privacy-Preserving Browser-Based Advanced Tor Router features:
- Anti-forensics - it used to be a moment in time when users were primarily concerned with their browsing habits and use of online resources which is where specific browsers that don't log anything on the hard drive come into play. A possible solution and recommendation here include the use of the Sphere anti-forensics browser which doesn't log anything on the hard drive and should be considered as a decent anti-forensics solution for anyone who's interested.
- VeraCrypt containers - a proper full-disk encryption solution should be taken into consideration in case the user wants to protect their information and intellectual property from physical type of attacks that also includes the use of Virtual Desktops with built-in security and privacy mechanisms in place such as for instance the use of Comodo Secure Desktop
- Application isolation - it should be clearly noted that a modern and in-depth defense strategy should include the use of application sandboxing solutions which has the potential to prevent a huge number of client-side based exploitation attempts including to actually protect an end user from a variety of Web based client-side exploits serving threats such as for instance the use of Sandboxie which is a free solution that actually works and has the potential to prevent a huge number of Web based threats that expose users to a variety of threats
- Hardware-Based Isolation - a proper network based strategy should consist of a basic hardware-isolation methodology where for instance malicious attackers would have hard time trying to penetrate and compromise due an additional level of hardware-isolation applied methodologies and techniques
- Whitelisting - although this approach has been widely discussed throughout the years it should be clearly noted that modern anti-malware solutions should be also providing a possible application whitelisting feature where users should only whitelist a basic application which would allow them to still perform their activities and basically block and prevent and execution of related applications
- always password-protect your end-point software including possibly ensuring that the end-point security software can self-protect from having it shut down
- always ensure that a manual update is properly taking place compared to automatic updates which leaves a window of opportunity for a possible network traffic colleration including possibly rogue and bogus update entering your network
- ensure that you're not utilizing the cloud-database feature for the purpose of looking up your Web browsing history including possible host-based application execution which could lead to a possible data and end-point inventory colleration which basically leaves you with a properly secured "stripped" security solution that you can use to properly secure your end-point without the risk of having your Web browsing history exposes including your end-point application inventory which could lead to possible fingerprinting and inventory-mapping which could lead to possible targeted attacks
Mainstream VPN provider as an entry point to a proprietary hardened and privacy-features tailored network - such as for instance the Tor network - NordVPN is a highly recommended solution against "ABSOLINE EPILSON" type of end-point colleration-based targeting type of attacks. What do I have in mind? Basically the off-the-shelf commercial vendor is also currently capable of offering VPN2Tor type of access which basically offers a variety of privacy-enhancing features which basically can offer stealth and commercially-relevant solution which basically combines VPN functionality with access to the Tor Network which basically offers a high-degree of security and anonymity which can be used to protect against "ABSOLINE EPILSON" type of attacks in terms of traffic and geographical location deniability including possibly offering limited data-colleration capabilities on behalf of U.S Intelligence Agencies.
A proprietary off-the-shelf VPN service provider basically taking you a step higher in preserving your online privacy by introducing and actually providing a unique set of no-logs jurisdiction-aware type of encryption-protocols and basic traffic-mixing tactics and strategies - Cryptohippie.
Want to find out more? Are you interested in a possible evaluation of your organization's Security Project or Security Product in terms of a Security Assessment or a possible OPSEC (Operational Security) based Privacy Features Evaluation? Interested in inviting me to speak at your event including possible sensitive and classified project involvement?
Feel free to reach me at dancho.danchev@hush.com
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