Exposing the Market for Stolen Credit Cards Data

0
October 31, 2011

What's the average price for a stolen credit card? How are prices shaped within the cybercrime ecosystem? Can we talk about price discrimination within the underground marketplace? Just how easy is to purchase stolen credit cards known as dumps or full dumps, nowadays?

In this intelligence brief, I will expose the market for stolen credit cards data, by profiling 20 currently active and responding gateways for processing of fraudulently obtained financial data.

Key summary points:
  • Tens of thousands of stolen credit cards a.k.a. dumps and full dumps offered for sale in a DIY market fashion
  • The majority of the carding sites are hosted in the Ukraine and the Netherlands
  • Liberty Reserve is the payment option of choice for the majority of the portals
  • Four domains are using Yahoo accounts and one using Live.com account for domain registration
  • Four of the domains are using identical name servers
  • Each DIY gateway for processing of fraudulently obtained financial data has a built-in credit cards checker or offers links to external sites performing the service
  • Several of the fraudulent gateways offered proxies-as-a-service, allowing cybercriminals to hide their real IPs by using the malware infected hosts as stepping stones
The dynamics of the cybercrime ecosystem share the same similarities with that of a legitimate marketplace. From seller and buyers, to bargain hunters, escrow agents, resellers and vendors specializing in a specific market segment, all the market participants remains active throughout the entire purchasing process. With ZeuS and SpyEye crimeware infections proliferating, it's shouldn'd be surprising that the average price for a stolen credit card is decreasing. With massive dumps of credit card details in the hands of cybercriminals, obtained through ATM skimming and crimeware botnets, the marketplace is getting over-crowded with trusted propositions for stolen credit card details.


What used to be a market where over-the-counter trade was the primary growth factor, is today's highly standardized marketplace with DIY online interfaces, allowing anyone to join and purchase stolen credit card details. Naturally, the vendors of dumps and full dumps are vertically integrating within the marketplace, and are offering additional services such as checkers for credit cards validity, and proxies-as-a-service -- compromised malware infected hosts -- allowing a potential cybercriminal to opportunity to hide their IP while using the recently purchased credit cards data.

How are prices shaped within this new and standardized market model offered commodity goods such as stolen credit cards, and is price discrimination for the stolen credit cards even feasible? The vendors are currently offered fixed prices for the majority of credit cards, with slight increases in the price of a stolen credit card, if the card is Premium. Bulk orders are naturally also considered as a growth factor the DIY interfaces, with slight discounts being offered for bulk orders.

As far as price discrimination is concerned, the concept is long gone, and has become the victim of this ongoing standardization of the market. The same goes for penetration pricing, as the vendors of stolen credit cards details are now enjoying a better underground market transparency into the fraudulent propositions of competing portals, helping them to set the prices more easily, without the need to lower the price in order to enter the market segment.

Let's profile the 20 gateways for processing of fraudulently obtained financial data. 

Responding IPs, registered emails, name servers, ASs, associated ICQ numbers, geolocation of the hosting IP is as follows:
ccmall.cc - 213.5.70.34 - Name server: TR1.ONLINESHOP.SU - Email: gwylhcfktm@whoisservices.cn - AS49544, INTERACTIVE3D-AS - HOSTED IN THE NETHERLANDS
track2.name - 91.213.175.121 - AS6849, UKRTELNET JSC UKRTELECOM - HOSTED IN UKRAINE
trackstore.su - 46.21.148.26 - Email: roger.sroy@yahoo.com - AS35017, SWIFTWAY-AS - HOSTED IN THE NETHERLANDS
magic-numbers.cc - 91.213.175.89; 91.223.77.35 Name server: NS1.1000DNS.NET - Email: contact@privacyprotect.org - AS6849, UKRTELNET JSC UKRTELECOM - HOSTED IN UKRAINE
allfresh.us - 46.21.144.115 - Name server: YNS1.YAHOO.COM - Email: keikomiyahara@yahoo.com - AS35017, SWIFTWAY-AS - HOSTED IN THE NETHERLANDS
freshstock.biz - 38.97.225.166; 69.175.73.184 - Name server - NS1.PIPEDNS.COM Email: ghmbfvntxs@whoisprivacyprotect.com - AS32475, SINGLEHOP , Inc. - HOSTED IN THE UNITED STATES
bulba.cc - 91.223.77.254 - Name server: NS1.NAMESELF.COM - Email: bulbacc@yahoo.com - AS6849, UKRTELNET JSC UKRTELECOM - HOSTED IN UKRAINE
approven.su - 91.229.248.20 - Name server: dns1.naunet.ru - Email: yurtan20@e1.ru - HOSTED IN UKRAINE
cv2shop.com - 72.20.12.205 - Name server: DNS1.NAME-SERVICES.COM - Email: wnfxgjdg@whoisprivacyprotect.com - AS25761, STAMINUS-COMM - HOSTED IN THE UNITED STATES
vzone.tc - 49.212.25.242 - Name server: dns1.yandex.ru - Email: adamsnames@rrpproxy.net - AS9371, SAKURA-C SAKURA Internet - HOSTED IN JAPAN
ccStore.ru - 91.220.101.200 - Name server:  ns1.1000dns.net - Email: ccstoreru@yahoo.com - AS49704 - HOSTED IN THE NETHERLANDS
dumps.cc redirects to privateservices.ws and trackservices.ws - 124.217.247.59 - Name server: NS1.IPSTATES.NET - Email: dumps.cc@domainsproxy.net - AS45839, PIRADIUS-AS PIRADIUS NET - HOSTED IN MALAYSIA
privateservices.ws - 217.23.9.92 - Name server: ns1.servicedns.nl - AS49981, WorldStream AS Maasdijk - HOSTED IN THE NETHERLANDS
perfect-numbers.cc - 91.220.101.75 - Name server: NS1.1000DNS.NET - AS49704, ADDOS-AS FOP Litvinenko Sergey Nikolaevich; icq: 605099359 - HOSTED IN THE NETHERLANDS
mega4u.biz - 178.162.174.71 - Name server: NS1.FREEDNS.WS - Email: persiks@online.ua - AS28753, LEASEWEB-DE - HOSTED IN GERMANY
accessltd.ru - 91.213.175.167 - Name server: ns14.zoneedit.com - Email - admin@accessltd.ru - AS6849, UKRTELNET JSC UKRTELECOM, 18, Shevchenko blvd. Kiev, Ukraine - HOSTED IN UKRAINE
pwnshop.cc - 77.79.13.209 - Name server: NS1.AFRAID.ORG - AS16125, DC-AS UAB - HOSTED IN LITHUANIA
bestdumps.su - 91.213.175.57 - Name server: ns1.1000dns.net - Email: bestdumpssu@live.com ICQ : 619429330 - AS6849, UKRTELNET JSC UKRTELECOM - HOSTED IN UKRAINE
mycc.su - 188.93.17.180 - Name server: ns1.deltahost.com.ua - Email: admin@mycc.su - AS49505, SELECTEL Ltd. - HOSTED IN RUSSIA
bestdumps.biz - 195.3.145.87 - Name server: NS1.BESTDUMPS.BIZ - Email: admin@bestdumps.biz - AS50244 - HOSTED IN LATVIA, Associated email: bdsupport@jabber.org, Associated ICQ: 655584
dumpshop.bz - 217.23.9.93 - Name server: ns1.servicedns.nl - Email: contact@privacyprotect.org; AS49981, WorldStream; HOSTED IN THE NETHERLANDS
cardshop.bz - 217.23.9.67 - Name server: ns1.servicedns.nl - Email: contact@privacyprotect.org; AS49981, WorldStream; HOSTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

Let's now take an inside view into each and every of the above-profiled gateways.

_accessltd.ru
Accessltd.ru is currently offering an inventory of 39328 U.S based stolen credit card details for just $2.10 each, followed by another inventory of 342 U.K based credit cards for $9 each, and 108 Japanese based credit cards for $8 each, with another dump of 293 Canadian credit cards for $7 each, and 198 Australian based credit cards for $8 each.

According to the service - "We accept Liberty Reserve only.Refund on your wallets is not possible."

Moreover, here's how the service operates based on the Service Rules:
"To check the card is integrated into the platform checker CCChecker, currently the best checker, not only in our opinion. Replacement cards are only based on the result of this checker. Check Card is available immediately after order payment, in the section My Orders. To check, click "Check". Cards checking in for a few seconds. Button "Check" - available within 20 minutes after purchase. Check Card - a paid service, which costs $ 0.3, if the card is not valid - the cost of cards back to your
account automatically.


Replacement card can only be made in the automatic mode. If checker dont working, for replace need screens your checker in the Support section with a description of the problem. These tickets will only be considered if they contain the results of your test, not a "paid for Skype, did not work, replace". We do not care where and how you use the material, loading support extra information is needed.We will check the card manually, and if any parameter is not correct to make you refund. Sorting:
 

Our shop is available sorted by the following parameters:
1. BIN ( Multiple)
2. State (Multiple)
3. City (Multiple)
4. Zip (Multiple)"

_Domain reconnaissance

accessltd.ru - 91.213.175.167 - Name server: ns14.zoneedit.com - Email - admin@accessltd.ru - AS6849, UKRTELNET JSC UKRTELECOM, 18, Shevchenko blvd. Kiev, Ukraine - HOSTED IN UKRAINE

_AllFresh.us
AllFresh.us is yet another DIY shop for purchasing stolen credit card details, all fresh as the name says.
On 2011/08/04 the service issued updates for "updated US Amex, Discover fresh and good", followed by another update on the next day, this time advertising "updated more cvv Franche new and good today."

The price for a stole card number is static and is $6 per credit card.



_Domain reconnaissance

allfresh.us - 46.21.144.115 - Name server: YNS1.YAHOO.COM - Email: keikomiyahara@yahoo.com - AS35017, SWIFTWAY-AS - HOSTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

_Approven.su
Approven.su is a relatively more advanced DIY shop for purchasing of stolen credit card details, due to to its advanced search options, allowing cybercriminals an easier way for searching into the the dumps/full dumps of stolen credit card details.

The most recent annoucement at Approven.su says "Sumer Jam: 8 new bases - Georgia2, California3, Pennsylvania3, Puerto Rico, California4, Texas4, Virginia, California5".

The price for a stolen credit card is $10, with Platinum cards going for $15.


_Domain reconnaissance

approven.su - 91.229.248.20 - Name server: dns1.naunet.ru - Email: yurtan20@e1.ru - HOSTED IN UKRAINE

_BestDumps.biz
BestDumps.biz  doesn't allow newly registered visitors the opportunity to search across its database of stolen credit card details, unless they pay $50 using Liberty Reserve.

_Domain reconnaissance

bestdumps.biz - 195.3.145.87 - Name server: NS1.BESTDUMPS.BIZ - Email: admin@bestdumps.biz - AS50244 - HOSTED IN LATVIA, Associated email: bdsupport@jabber.org, Associated ICQ: 655584

_Bulba.cc

Bulba.cc offers a Checker for stolen credit cards. The most recent announcement is "UPDATE ADDED 1000 MEXICO RARE! FRESH! 95% VALID!!! Hurry up to load the account".

The service advertised itself as follows:
"Hello my name is Bulba. I am official reseller of TRACK2.NAME service. Bulba.cc opened because track2.name closed registration and don't accept new customers. We don't have any specific rules. Our only rule is "we don't replace bad dumps". That means we don't replace them at all and we don't have replacement policy. Don't ask about it in any case!

We accept Libery Reserve, WU, MG, Bank Transfer (NEW) without any fees. Minimum for payment by LR - 10$, WU, MG - 500$, Bank Transfer - 500$. Also we give 10% bonus of money to all purchases.

Our bases: SALES - track2, 50% valid, alot dumps! Very cheap $7 per one! DATABASE9 - TRACK1+TRACK2(90%) + TRACK2(10%) only! 80% valid, FRESH. NEW DATABASE, TRACK 2 only, 95% valid, FRESH! NEW!
"

_Domain reconnaissance

bulba.cc - 91.223.77.254 - Name server: NS1.NAMESELF.COM - Email: bulbacc@yahoo.com - AS6849, UKRTELNET JSC UKRTELECOM - HOSTED IN UKRAINE


_CardShop.bz
CardShop.bz is yet another DIY interface for purchasing stolen credit cards data (dumps/full dumps). The general rules of the site are as follows:


2.1.1) All calculations on a site and its services - automatic
2.1.2) Minimum funding amount on a site 10$ that equals to 50 credits
2.1.3) Period of validity of credits is 1 month (under the additional oral agreement term can be increased). In a case if you had not time to spend all credits, it is possible to make fund of your account and credits will automatically be restored
2.1.4) Refund for not used credits - IS NOT POSSIBLE
In order to avoid conflict situations, please check information that you need before funding account


The Rules of service ONLINE sale CC/DUMPS reads:

"2.2) Rules of service ONLINE sale CC/DUMPS
2.2.1) Return of credits for purchased CC/Dumps which have been checked before purchase and have status VALID - IS NOT POSSIBLE
2.2.1) Return of credits for purchased CC/Dumps which have been checked in 1 hour after purchase through the link 'Check' and having status VALID - IS NOT POSSIBLE
2.2.2) Return of credits for purchased invalid CC/Dumps (DECLINE/HOLD CALL/PICKUP) which are not checked before purchase, is possible only within 24 hours after the order. After 24 hours any claims on return of credits are not accepted
2.2.3) You will not be charged for invalid CC/Dumps if you checked it instant or in 1 hour and credits will be refunded automatically. You will be charged only for CC/Dumps checking even if CC/Dumps is invalid
2.2.4) We do not guarantee limits and amounts on CC/Dumps

2.3) Rules of service ONLINE Check CC/Dumps
2.3.1) Status Valid, means that at the moment of check CC/Dump was Approved
2.3.2) Status Declined, means that at the moment of check CC/Dump was Decline/Pickup/Hold Call
2.3.3) Claims on checked DUMP/CC are not accepted.

2.7) Rules of other services on site CardShop will be added in this agreement later
3) Prices and Tariffs
3.1.1) 1 credit is accepted to a unit of account on site CardShop. Initially 1 credit = 1$. The price for 1 credit can change according to tariffs for funding. Tariffs could be found in Tariff section at site
3.1.2) Administration CardShop reserves the right to itself at any moment to change tariffs. You agree periodically check tariffs on site CardShop to learn about possible changes in them
"

The is currently offering 33903 U.S based stolen credit cards for sale. The web site is also offering Proxies for sale -- compromised malware infected hosts- where the price is 0.3$ per proxy. Next to the inventory of stolen credit cards and the proxy service, the web site is also offering batch checking for the validity of the stolen credit cards, and is also performing Lookups SSN|MMN services, with the ability to Lookup MMN in California state.



_Domain reconnaissance

cardshop.bz - 217.23.9.67 - Name server: ns1.servicedns.nl - Email: contact@privacyprotect.org; AS49981, WorldStream; HOSTED IN THE NETHERLANDS


_CcMall.cc
CcMall.cc is associated with the following ICQ number 777605, where potential buyers would have to connect with the seller in order to be offered the ability to register in the site. "For private limited registration only into the new shop" is currently displayed on CcMall.cc's web site.


_Domain reconnaissance

ccmall.cc - 213.5.70.34 - Name server: TR1.ONLINESHOP.SU - Email: gwylhcfktm@whoisservices.cn - AS49544, INTERACTIVE3D-AS - HOSTED IN THE NETHERLANDS; Name server: tr1.onlineshop.su - Emaill: exchangers@msn.com context.cx is also registered using exchangers@msn.com.

_ccStore.ru
ccStore.ru is associated with the following ICQ - 20606, and requires that a valid email address is supplied in order to activate the access to yet another interface for selling and reselling fraudulently obtained financial data.

_Domain reconnaissance

ccStore.ru - 91.220.101.200 - Name server:  ns1.1000dns.net - Email: ccstoreru@yahoo.com - AS49704 - HOSTED IN THE NETHERLANDS


_Cv2Shop.com
Cv2Shop.com has an inventory of 734 U.S based stolen credit cards for the price of Discovery - $2.2 per piece; Amex for $2; Mastercard for $2; Visa for $1.7 per piece. The fraudulent interface is also offering 80 Canadian stolen credit cards for the price of $7 per piece for Discovery and Amex, and for $6 for Mastercard and $5 for Visa.


_Domain reconnaissance

cv2shop.com - 72.20.12.205 - Name server: DNS1.NAME-SERVICES.COM - Email: wnfxgjdg@whoisprivacyprotect.com - AS25761, STAMINUS-COMM - HOSTED IN THE UNITED STATES


_FreshStock.biz
FreshStock.biz is associated with the following ICQ - 607373112 where users have to initiate the contact in order to obtain access to the DIY shop for stolen credit cards..

_Domain reconnaissance
freshstock.biz - 38.97.225.166; 69.175.73.184 - Name server - NS1.PIPEDNS.COM Email: ghmbfvntxs@whoisprivacyprotect.com - AS32475, SINGLEHOP , Inc. - HOSTED IN THE UNITED STATES

_Magic-Numbers.cc
Magic-Numbers.cc is associated with the following ICQ - 333277 and Jabber: elche@jabber.org where users wanting bulk orders have to contact the cybercriminals offering the DIY interface for stolen credit card numbers.

The web site is currently offering 24642 U.S based stolen credit cards, followed by another 1545 Israeli based credit cards, with a total dumps currently being offered at 43,507. The most recent advertisements read: "Australia base, ultra virgin fresh base - track2 available. Approval rate 85%"

_Domain reconnaissance
 
magic-numbers.cc - 91.213.175.89; 91.223.77.35 Name server: NS1.1000DNS.NET - Email: contact@privacyprotect.org - AS6849, UKRTELNET JSC UKRTELECOM - HOSTED IN UKRAINE

_Mega4u.biz
mega4u.biz is currently closed for free registration.

_Domain reconnaissance

mega4u.biz - 178.162.174.71 - Name server: NS1.FREEDNS.WS - Email: persiks@online.ua - AS28753, LEASEWEB-DE - HOSTED IN GERMANY

_MyCc.su
MyCc.su is associated with the following ICQ - 40040000 and next to offering stolen credit cards for sale, is also soliciting for security vulnerabilities -  "Found a bug? We will pay!". The latest update from September 29 says that 1500 EU based stolen credit cards have been added, followed by another update from the same date, this time with 300 French based stolen credit cards added.

The price of the stolen credit cards varies between $2 and $5

_Domain reconnaissance

mycc.su - 188.93.17.180 - Name server: ns1.deltahost.com.ua - Email: admin@mycc.su - AS49505, SELECTEL Ltd. - HOSTED IN RUSSIA

_Perfect-Numbers.cc
Perfect-Numbers.cc is yet another DIY interface for purchasing stolen credit cards. It's associated with teh following ICQ - 605099359. Users are able to search within the interface only after they have refilled their balance using Liberty Reserve as a means for payment.

_Domain reconnaissance

perfect-numbers.cc - 91.220.101.75 - Name server: NS1.1000DNS.NET - AS49704, ADDOS-AS FOP Litvinenko Sergey Nikolaevich; icq: 605099359 - HOSTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

_PrivateServices.ws
privateservices.ws currently has a database of 634 U.K based stolen credit cards, and another 293 French based stolen credit cards.

_Domain reconnaissance

privateservices.ws - 217.23.9.92 - Name server: ns1.servicedns.nl - AS49981, WorldStream AS Maasdijk - HOSTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

_pwnshop.cc
pwnshop.cc is yet another DIY interface for selling stolen credit card numbers. The web site is currently returning the following message: "You can obtain registration code only from exist clients.Please be aware of scam - registration code is free for exist clients, so if you pay for it - as for refund."

_Domain reconnaissance

pwnshop.cc - 77.79.13.209 - Name server: NS1.AFRAID.ORG - AS16125, DC-AS UAB - HOSTED IN LITHUANIA

_TrackStore.su
trackstore.su is offering existing clients to option to refer additional customers for the price of $20 each. The web site is currently offering 1648 U.S based stolen credit cards, exclusively from the Suntrust Bank for the price of $10 for each stolen credit card.

_Domain reconnaissance

trackstore.su - 46.21.148.26 - Email: roger.sroy@yahoo.com - AS35017, SWIFTWAY-AS - HOSTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

_Track2.name
track2.name is offering stolen credit card numbers for the price of $20 for each stolen credit card.

_Domain reconnaissance

track2.name - 91.213.175.121 - AS6849, UKRTELNET JSC UKRTELECOM - HOSTED IN UKRAINE

_vzone.tc
vzone.tc is yet another DIY shop  for stolen credid card numbers. The current announcement reads : "Dear users, after you buy cards, to view proper information, please click download all cards or download selected card from My Cards page. It will show you all information like Last Name and all the additional info like phone, email. 

P.S If you dislike new shop V.2 of our shop, then please use support link and send us your feedback to admin, if you want to back old shop V.1 then send feedback with proper reasons why u again want to see old shop V.1"

The current price for a stolen credit card is $1.80 for every card. Next to offering stolen credit cards as a service, the shop is also offering SSN and DOB Searcher, next to the opportunity for customers of the shop to also purchase proxies -- compromised malware infected hosts.

_Domain reconnaissance

vzone.tc - 49.212.25.242 - Name server: dns1.yandex.ru - Email: adamsnames@rrpproxy.net - AS9371, SAKURA-C SAKURA Internet - HOSTED IN JAPAN

_DumpsSheck.com
dumpscheck.com is associated wit the following ICQ - 612303315 is an advanced checker for the validity of stolen credit card details. The web site says "Current merchant accepts VISA, MASTERCARD, AMEX, DISCOVER, DINERS, JCB."
_Domain reconnaissance

dumpscheck.com - 206.217.196.47 - Name server: NS1.DUMPSCHECK.COM - Icq 612303315; AS4436, NLAYER Communications, Inc. - HOSTED IN THE UNITED STATES

Related posts on the economics of cybercrime:
New report details the prices within the cybercrime market
CardCops: Stolen credit card details getting cheaper
Microsoft study debunks profitability of the underground economy
Are Stolen Credit Card Details Getting Cheaper?
Squeezing the Cybercrime Ecosystem in 2009
Price Discrimination in the Market for Stolen Credit Cards
The Underground Economy's Supply of Goods
Microsoft study debunks phishing profitability

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter. Continue reading →

Exposing the Market for Stolen Credit Cards Data

October 31, 2011
In this post, I will perform an OSINT analysis, exposing one of the key botnet masters behind the infamous Koobface botnet, that I have been extensively profiling and infiltrating since day one. I will include photos of the botnet master, his telephone numbers, multiple email addresses, license plate for a BMW, and directly connect him with the infrastructure -- now offline or migrated to a different place -- of Koobface 1.0.

The analysis is based on a single mistake that the botnet master made - namely using his personal email for registering a domain parked within Koobface's command and control infrastructure, that at a particular moment in time was directly redirecting to the ubiquitous fake Youtube page pushed by the Koobface botnet.

Let's start from the basics. Here's an excerpt from a previous research conducted on the Koobface botnet:

However, what the Koobface gang did was to register a new domain and use it as Koobface C&C again parked at the same IP, which remains active - zaebalinax.com Email: krotreal@gmail.com - 78.110.175.15 - in particular zaebalinax.com/the/?pid=14010 which is redirecting to the Koobface botnet. Two more domains were also registered and parked there, u15jul .com and umidsummer .com - Email: 2009polevandrey@mail.ru which remain in stand by mode at least for the time being.

The Koobface botnet master's biggest mistake is using the Koobface infrastructure for hosting a domain that was registered with the botnet master's personal email address. In this case that zaebalinax.com and krotreal@gmail.com. zaebalinax.com is literally translated to "Gave up on Linux". UPDATED: Multiple readers have to contacted me to point out that zaebalinax is actually translated to "f*ck you all" or "you all are p*ssing me off".

The same email krotreal@gmail.com was used to advertise the sale of Egyptian Sphynx kittens on 05.09.2007:

The following telephone belonging to Anton was provided - +79219910190. The interesting part is that the same telephone was also used in another advertisement, this time for the sale of a BMW:


Photos of the BMW, offered for sale, by the same Anton that was using the Koobface infrastructure to host zaebalinax.com Email: krotreal@gmail.com:



Upon further analysis, it becomes evident that his real name is Anton Nikolaevich Korotchenko (Антон Николаевич Коротченко). Here are more details of this online activities:

Real name: Anton Nikolaevich Korotchenko (Антон Николаевич Коротченко)
City of origin: St. Petersburg
Primary address: Omskaya st. 26-61; St. Petersburg; Leningradskaya oblast,197343
Associated phone numbers obtained through OSINT analysis, not whois records:
+79219910190
+380505450601
050-545-06-01
ICQ - 444374
Emails: krotreal@yahoo.com
krotreal@gmail.com
krotreal@mail.ru
krotreal@livejournal.com
newfider@rambler.ru
WM identification (WEB MONEY) : 425099205053
Twitter account: @KrotReal; @Real_Koobface
Flickr account: KrotReal
Vkontakte.ru Account: KrotReal; tonystarx 
Foursquare Account: KrotReal

Also, a chat log from 2003, identifies KrotReal while he's using the following IP -  krotreal@ip-534.dialup.cl.spb.ru

How do you trigger a change that would ultimately affect the entire cybercrime ecosystem? By personalizing cybercrime.

Go through previous research conducted on the Koobface botnet:
Koobface Redirectors and Scareware Campaigns Now Hosted in Moldova
The Koobface Gang Wishes the Industry "Happy Holidays"
Koobface Gang Responds to the "10 Things You Didn't Know About the Koobface Gang Post"
10 things you didn't know about the Koobface gang
How the Koobface Gang Monetizes Mac OS X Traffic
Koobface Botnet's Scareware Business Model - Part Two
Koobface Botnet's Scareware Business Model
From the Koobface Gang with Scareware Serving Compromised Site
Koobface Botnet Starts Serving Client-Side Exploits
Koobface-Friendly Riccom LTD - AS29550 - (Finally) Taken Offline
Dissecting Koobface Gang's Latest Facebook Spreading Campaign
Koobface - Come Out, Come Out, Wherever You Are
Dissecting Koobface Worm's Twitter Campaign
Koobface Botnet Redirects Facebook's IP Space to my Blog
Koobface Botnet Dissected in a TrendMicro Report
Massive Scareware Serving Blackhat SEO, the Koobface Gang Style
Movement on the Koobface Front - Part Two
Movement on the Koobface Front
Dissecting the Koobface Worm's December Campaign
The Koobface Gang Mixing Social Engineering Vectors
Dissecting the Latest Koobface Facebook Campaign Continue reading →

Dissecting the Ongoing Mass SQL Injection Attack

0
October 20, 2011

The ongoing mass SQL injection attack, has already affected over a million web sites. Cybercriminals performing active search engines reconnaissance have managed to inject a malicious script into ASP ASP.NET websites.

From client-side exploits to bogus Adobe Flash players, the campaign is active and ongoing. In this intelligence brief, we'll dissect the campaign and establish a direct connection between the campaign and last March's Lizamoon mass SQL injection attack.

SQL injected domains -- thanks to Dasient's Tufan Demir for the ping:
nbnjki.com/urchin.js - 146.185.248.3 - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com
jjghui.com/urchin.js - 146.185.248.3 - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com
bookzula.com/ur.php - 146.185.248.3 - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com
bookgusa.com/ur.php - 146.185.248.3 - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com
dfrgcc.com/ur.php - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com
statsl.com/ur.php - 111.22.111.111 - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com
milapop.com/ur.php - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com
jhgukn.com/ur.php - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com
vovmml.com/ur.php - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com
bookvivi.com/ur.php - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com

Responding to 146.185.248.3 is also file-dl.com; bookfula.com and bookvila.com - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com

Detection rate for urchin.js:
urchin.js - Trojan.JS.Redirector - 17/42 (40.5%)
MD5   : 4387f9be5af4087d21c4b44b969a870f
SHA1  : 8a47842ccf6d642043ee8db99d0530336eef6b99
SHA256: 975e62fe1d9415b9fa06e8f826f776ef851bd030c2c897bc3fbee207519f8351

The redirections take place as follows:
  • bookzula.com/ur.php -> www3.topasarmy.in/?w4q593n= - Email: bill.swinson@yahoo.com -> firstrtscaner.rr.nu
  • nbnjkl.com/urchin.js -> power-wfchecker.in/?1dlia916= - Email: bill.swinson@yahoo.com
bill.swinson@yahoo.com has also been used to register the following scareware-serving domains:
uberble-safe.in
uberate-safe.in
best-jsentinel.in
topantivir-foru.in
personalscannerlg.in
rideusfor.in
hardbsy-network.in
enablesecureum.in
hardynauchecker.in
best-jsentinel.in
smartklhdefense.in
smartaasecurity.in
personal-scan-4u.in
unieve-safe.in
safe-solutionsoft.in
hugeble-cure.in
topsecuritykauu.in
personalcleansoft.in
powerscanercis.in
topksfsecurity.in
hard-antivirbjb.in
strong-guardbxz.in
smart-suiteguard.in
thebestkrearmy.in
smart-guardianro.in
freeopenscanerpo.in
best-networkqjo.in
hard-antivirbjb.in
smartantivir-scanner.in
most-popularsoftcontent.in
bester-msecuriity.in
doneahme.in
strong-checkerwrt.in
safepowerforu.in
safe-securityarmy.in
personal-bpsentinel.in
personalcleansoft.in
ostestsystemri.in
saveinternet-guard.in
just-perfectprotection.in
firstholdermvq.in
just-perfectprotection.in
allcle-safe.in
brawaidme.in
uniind-safe.in
moreaz-fine.in
trueeox-safe.in
safexanet.in
personal-internet-foryou.in



For the time being, the campaing is redirecting to a fake YouTube page enticing users into downloading a bogus Adobe Flash player in order to view the video.

Detection rate for the bogus Adobe Flash player:
scandisk.exe - Backdoor:Win32/Simda.A - 8/43 (18.6%)
MD5   : fb4c93935346d2d8605598535528506e
SHA1  : 0ff7ccd785c0582e33c22f9b21156929ba7abaeb
SHA256: b204586cbac1606637361dd788b691f342cb1c582d10690209a989b040dab632

Upon execution the sample phones back to:
209.212.147.141/chrome/report.html
98.142.243.64/chrome/report.html

update.19runs10q3.com - 65.98.83.115

The same phone back locations have been used in a variety of related malware -- thanks to Kaspersky's David Jacoby for the ping. For instance, in this malware sample that's also phoning back to the same URLs, we have active HOSTS file modification as follows:

See related post:  Sampling Malicious Activity Inside Cybercrime-Friendly Search Engines

www.google.com.=87.125.87.99;
google.com.=87.125.87.103;
google.com.au.=87.125.87.104;
www.google.com.au.=87.125.87.147;
google.be.=77.125.87.148;
www.google.be.=77.125.87.149;
google.com.br.=77.125.87.109;
www.google.com.br.=77.125.87.150;
google.ca.=77.125.87.152;
www.google.ca.=77.125.87.153;
google.ch.=77.125.87.155;
www.google.ch.=77.125.87.158;
google.de.=77.125.87.160;
www.google.de.=77.125.87.161;
google.dk.=92.125.87.123;
www.google.dk.=92.125.87.160;
google.fr.=92.125.87.154;
www.google.fr.=92.125.87.134;
google.ie.=92.125.87.170;
www.google.ie.=92.125.87.177;
google.it.=92.125.87.173;
www.google.it.=92.125.87.147;
google.co.jp.=92.125.87.103;
www.google.co.jp.=84.125.87.147;
google.nl.=84.125.87.103;
www.google.nl.=84.125.87.147;
google.no.=84.125.87.103;
www.google.no.=84.125.87.147;
google.co.nz.=84.125.87.103;
www.google.co.nz.=84.125.87.147;
google.pl.=84.125.87.103;
www.google.pl.=64.125.87.147;
google.se.=64.125.87.103;
www.google.se.=64.125.87.147;
google.co.uk.=64.125.87.103;
www.google.co.uk.=64.125.87.147;
google.co.za.=64.125.87.103;
www.google.co.za.=64.125.87.147;
www.google-analytics.com.=64.125.87.101;
www.bing.com.=92.123.68.97;
search.yahoo.com.=72.30.186.249;
www.search.yahoo.com.=72.30.186.249;
uk.search.yahoo.com.=87.248.112.8;
ca.search.yahoo.com.=100.6.239.84;
de.search.yahoo.com.=87.248.112.8;
fr.search.yahoo.com.=87.248.112.8;
au.search.yahoo.com.=87.248.112.8;
ad-emea.doubleclick.net.=64.125.87.101;
www.statcounter.com.=64.125.87.101;

The Lizamoon mass SQL injection connection

The same email used to register the SQL injected domains jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com has been used to register the Lizamoon mass SQL injection attack domains extensively profiled here - "Dissecting the Massive SQL Injection Attack Serving Scareware".

Related posts:
This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter. Continue reading →

Dissecting the Ongoing Mass SQL Injection Attack

October 20, 2011

The ongoing mass SQL injection attack, has already affected over a million web sites. Cybercriminals performing active search engines reconnaissance have managed to inject a malicious script into ASP ASP.NET websites.

From client-side exploits to bogus Adobe Flash players, the campaign is active and ongoing. In this intelligence brief, we'll dissect the campaign and establish a direct connection between the campaign and last March's Lizamoon mass SQL injection attack.

SQL injected domains -- thanks to Dasient's Tufan Demir for the ping:
nbnjki.com/urchin.js - 146.185.248.3 - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com
jjghui.com/urchin.js - 146.185.248.3 - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com
bookzula.com/ur.php - 146.185.248.3 - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com
bookgusa.com/ur.php - 146.185.248.3 - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com
dfrgcc.com/ur.php - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com
statsl.com/ur.php - 111.22.111.111 - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com
milapop.com/ur.php - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com
jhgukn.com/ur.php - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com
vovmml.com/ur.php - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com
bookvivi.com/ur.php - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com

Responding to 146.185.248.3 is also file-dl.com; bookfula.com and bookvila.com - Email: jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com

Detection rate for urchin.js:
urchin.js - Trojan.JS.Redirector - 17/42 (40.5%)
MD5   : 4387f9be5af4087d21c4b44b969a870f
SHA1  : 8a47842ccf6d642043ee8db99d0530336eef6b99
SHA256: 975e62fe1d9415b9fa06e8f826f776ef851bd030c2c897bc3fbee207519f8351

The redirections take place as follows:
  • bookzula.com/ur.php -> www3.topasarmy.in/?w4q593n= - Email: bill.swinson@yahoo.com -> firstrtscaner.rr.nu
  • nbnjkl.com/urchin.js -> power-wfchecker.in/?1dlia916= - Email: bill.swinson@yahoo.com
bill.swinson@yahoo.com has also been used to register the following scareware-serving domains:
uberble-safe.in
uberate-safe.in
best-jsentinel.in
topantivir-foru.in
personalscannerlg.in
rideusfor.in
hardbsy-network.in
enablesecureum.in
hardynauchecker.in
best-jsentinel.in
smartklhdefense.in
smartaasecurity.in
personal-scan-4u.in
unieve-safe.in
safe-solutionsoft.in
hugeble-cure.in
topsecuritykauu.in
personalcleansoft.in
powerscanercis.in
topksfsecurity.in
hard-antivirbjb.in
strong-guardbxz.in
smart-suiteguard.in
thebestkrearmy.in
smart-guardianro.in
freeopenscanerpo.in
best-networkqjo.in
hard-antivirbjb.in
smartantivir-scanner.in
most-popularsoftcontent.in
bester-msecuriity.in
doneahme.in
strong-checkerwrt.in
safepowerforu.in
safe-securityarmy.in
personal-bpsentinel.in
personalcleansoft.in
ostestsystemri.in
saveinternet-guard.in
just-perfectprotection.in
firstholdermvq.in
just-perfectprotection.in
allcle-safe.in
brawaidme.in
uniind-safe.in
moreaz-fine.in
trueeox-safe.in
safexanet.in
personal-internet-foryou.in



For the time being, the campaing is redirecting to a fake YouTube page enticing users into downloading a bogus Adobe Flash player in order to view the video.

Detection rate for the bogus Adobe Flash player:
scandisk.exe - Backdoor:Win32/Simda.A - 8/43 (18.6%)
MD5   : fb4c93935346d2d8605598535528506e
SHA1  : 0ff7ccd785c0582e33c22f9b21156929ba7abaeb
SHA256: b204586cbac1606637361dd788b691f342cb1c582d10690209a989b040dab632

Upon execution the sample phones back to:
209.212.147.141/chrome/report.html
98.142.243.64/chrome/report.html

update.19runs10q3.com - 65.98.83.115

The same phone back locations have been used in a variety of related malware -- thanks to Kaspersky's David Jacoby for the ping. For instance, in this malware sample that's also phoning back to the same URLs, we have active HOSTS file modification as follows:

See related post:  Sampling Malicious Activity Inside Cybercrime-Friendly Search Engines

www.google.com.=87.125.87.99;
google.com.=87.125.87.103;
google.com.au.=87.125.87.104;
www.google.com.au.=87.125.87.147;
google.be.=77.125.87.148;
www.google.be.=77.125.87.149;
google.com.br.=77.125.87.109;
www.google.com.br.=77.125.87.150;
google.ca.=77.125.87.152;
www.google.ca.=77.125.87.153;
google.ch.=77.125.87.155;
www.google.ch.=77.125.87.158;
google.de.=77.125.87.160;
www.google.de.=77.125.87.161;
google.dk.=92.125.87.123;
www.google.dk.=92.125.87.160;
google.fr.=92.125.87.154;
www.google.fr.=92.125.87.134;
google.ie.=92.125.87.170;
www.google.ie.=92.125.87.177;
google.it.=92.125.87.173;
www.google.it.=92.125.87.147;
google.co.jp.=92.125.87.103;
www.google.co.jp.=84.125.87.147;
google.nl.=84.125.87.103;
www.google.nl.=84.125.87.147;
google.no.=84.125.87.103;
www.google.no.=84.125.87.147;
google.co.nz.=84.125.87.103;
www.google.co.nz.=84.125.87.147;
google.pl.=84.125.87.103;
www.google.pl.=64.125.87.147;
google.se.=64.125.87.103;
www.google.se.=64.125.87.147;
google.co.uk.=64.125.87.103;
www.google.co.uk.=64.125.87.147;
google.co.za.=64.125.87.103;
www.google.co.za.=64.125.87.147;
www.google-analytics.com.=64.125.87.101;
www.bing.com.=92.123.68.97;
search.yahoo.com.=72.30.186.249;
www.search.yahoo.com.=72.30.186.249;
uk.search.yahoo.com.=87.248.112.8;
ca.search.yahoo.com.=100.6.239.84;
de.search.yahoo.com.=87.248.112.8;
fr.search.yahoo.com.=87.248.112.8;
au.search.yahoo.com.=87.248.112.8;
ad-emea.doubleclick.net.=64.125.87.101;
www.statcounter.com.=64.125.87.101;

The Lizamoon mass SQL injection connection

The same email used to register the SQL injected domains jamesnorthone@hotmailbox.com has been used to register the Lizamoon mass SQL injection attack domains extensively profiled here - "Dissecting the Massive SQL Injection Attack Serving Scareware".

Related posts:
This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter. Continue reading →

Spamvertised IRS-themed "Last Notice" Emails Serving Malware

0
October 18, 2011

Cybercriminals are once again impersonating the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for malware-serving purposes. In this intelligence brief, we'll dissect the malware campaign.

Spamvertised attachment: IRS_Calculations_#ID6749.zip
Spamvertised message: Notice, There are arrears reckoned on your account over a period of 2010-2011 year. You will find all calculations according to your financial debt, enclosed. You have to pay out the debt by the 17 December 2011. Yours sincerely, IRS.

- Detection rate:
IRS_Calculations.exe - W32/Yakes.B!tr - 34/40 (85.0%)
MD5   : e44eb03582f030d30251e6be384f6b32
SHA1  : eaa3d76534d247d04987b8950965d0142d770b29
SHA256: 18386f49580298eee73688ce5e626a9e332886c25403a991495e0a3250c53e32

Upon execution phones back to:
bitgale.com/404.php?type=stats&affid=574&subid=01&iruns - 31.44.184.42; AS15884 - Email: davidsiddins@gxmailbox.com
shbsharri.com/arkivi_files/574-01.exe - returns "Bandwidth Limit Exceeded" - 74.55.50.202; AS21844 - Email: contact@privacyprotect.org
shbsharri.com/arkivi_files/setup.exe - returns "Bandwidth Limit Exceeded"
shbsharri.com/arkivi_files/sl16.exe - returns "Bandwidth Limit Exceeded"
shbsharri.com/arkivi_files/sssss.exe - returns "Bandwidth Limit Exceeded"
gansgansgroup.ru/true/index.php?cmd=getgrab - Connect to 91.229.90.139 on port 80 ... failed
gansgansgroup.ru/true/index.php?cmd=getproxy - Connect to 91.229.90.139 on port 80 ... failed
gansgansgroup.ru/true/index.php?cmd=getload&login=4117AF14E694E469C&sel=donat&ver=5.1&bits=0&file=1&run=ok
gansgansgroup.ru/true/index.php?cmd=getsocks&login=4117AF14E694E469C&port=11925

gansgansgroup.ru - 91.229.90.139; AS6753 (responding to 91.229.90.139 is also falcononfly2006.ru - Email: makrogerhouse@yandex.ru) - Email: gansgansgroup.ru@allperson.ru

The same email makrogerhouse@yandex.ru, has been linked to a previously spamvertised IRS-themed malware campaign.

Clearly, both campaigns have been launched by the same cybercriminal.

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter. Continue reading →

Spamvertised "IRS notice" Serving Malware

0
October 09, 2011

Cybercriminals are spamvertising yet another malware-serving campaign. Impersonating the IRS, malicious attackers are attempting to entice end users into downloading and executing a malicious file attachment. 

Spamvertised message: Tax notice, There are arrears reckoned on your account over a period of 2010-2011 year. You will find all calculations according to your financial debt, enclosed. Sincerely, Internal Revenue Service


Detection rate:
Calculations.exe - TrojanDownloader:Win32/Dofoil.D - 33/43 (76.7%)
MD5   : 178bb562d9c0ef2b0a87467dcbd945ee
SHA1  : 9ef75146aeb27102a1e5662284f369a43144225c
SHA256: d1551934d60033c871b377015c8be65d608b33543f149369d1e70361e06dc05e

Upon execution, it phones back to falcononfly2006.ru/blog/task.php?bid=2bfc680038ba2be7&os=5-1-2600&uptime=0&rnd=150156

falcononfly2006.ru - 91.229.90.139, AS6753 - Email: makrogerhouse@yandex.ru

makrogerhouse@yandex.ru is also associated with the following domains:
diamondexchange2011.ru
philippinemoney2011.ru
Bedownloader2011.ru
dolcekomarenoro2011.ru
forsalga102.ru
runescapegpge2011.ru
yomwarayom2001.ru
philippinemoney2011.ru
moneymgmt2011.ru
moneykeep2011.ru
firewallmakeover.ru
czechmoney2011.ru
communityspace2911.ru
brazilianmoney2011.r
u

Monitoring of the campaign is ongoing.

This post has been reproduced from Dancho Danchev's blog. Follow him on Twitter. Continue reading →